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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Everyone needs adequate access to essential goods and services, including food, water, housing, 
health care and education, in order to lead a dignified life. To satisfy their basic needs, individuals 
depend on their own means: property and labour. The deprived, namely individuals lacking the 
means, rely on the help of others. Depending on the ability to help, the responsibility of supporting 
the deprived shifted over time from one group to another, particularly from religious institutions to 
the state.1 The responsibility to support the deprived is now recognised as state obligation and 
enshrined in international human rights law, particularly in human rights treaties guaranteeing 
economic, social and cultural rights.      
The recognition of economic, social and cultural rights has not eliminated deprivation in the world. 
Large numbers of individuals and groups experience deprivation, particularly due to the problem of 
poverty in the world. In 2019, the total population in the world reached 7.7 billion people.2  Around 
17% of the total population (1.3 billion people) were poor, according to the 2019 Multidimensional 
Poverty Index.3 They were unable to exercise their economic, social and cultural rights, because 
poverty indicates lack of access to essential goods and services. The remaining 83% of the total 
population do not experience multidimensional povery, implying that states do discharge their 
international human rights obligations, but they have not achieved full realisation of the rights.   
The problems of poverty and non-performance of international obligation are more serious in Africa, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, than in other parts of the world. The majority of the population in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (around 58%) experience multidimensional poverty.4 According to the World 
Bank data, of the 28 poorest countries in the world, 27 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, indicating 
that extreme poverty is an African problem.5 The data also implies that the performance of African 
States in discharging their obligations contained in economic, social and cultural rights treaties is very 
low. States are accountable for failing to carry out their international legal obligations. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to identify the content and scope of the obligations.   
In this research, I examine state obligations under economic, social and cultural rights treaties. I 
focus on African States because of the African problem of poverty and the resulting low enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights in Africa. African States are party to several economic, social and 
cultural rights treaties. The development of these treaties took place within the framework of 
international organisations, mainly the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), which is now the African Union (AU). Of these treaties, I investigate state obligations under 
                                                          
1 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press) 102-103. 
2 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights (United Nations 2019) 5. 
3 United Nations Development Programme and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Global 
Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019: Illuminating Inequalities (2019) 1.  
4 Ibid. 
5 World Bank Group, Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle (World Bank 2018) 2. 
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the main human rights treaty of the AU, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter).6   
In the next section of this chapter, I sketch models of human rights treaty-making in international law 
and their implications for economic, social and cultural rights to provide a background for the model 
adopted by the African Charter. This in turn sheds light on the nature of state obligations entrenched 
in the African Charter. In the third section, I briefly discuss the development of the African Charter as 
the first treaty of the OAU/AU, explain how the text of the Charter treats economic, social and 
cultural rights, identify judicial and quasi-judicial organs monitoring the implementation of the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter, and discuss how these organs developed economic, social and cultural 
rights in practice. In the fourth section, I introduce general state obligations in international human 
rights law as the main subject of this study and explain the reasons for selecting some general 
obligations, which are discussed in the remaining chapters. In the fifth section, I clarify the research 
questions that I seek to answer. In the sixth section, I describe the methodological approaches I 
employed to answer the research questions. Finally, I outline the structure of the study.   
1.2 Economic, social and cultural rights in international human rights law 
Economic, social and cultural rights are a category of human rights. In international human rights law, 
rights such as the rights to education, food, health, housing, social security, water and sanitation, 
work (including trade union rights) and cultural rights fall under this category. The right to property 
also falls under this category, although this right is guaranteed in predominantly civil and political 
rights treaties.7 Economic, social and cultural rights are guaranteed in several international treaties. 
Chief among them are the European Social Charter (European Charter),8 the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),9 and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention)10 along with the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador).11  
Economic, social and cultural rights treaties have common features. Each treaty has its own 
distinctive features as well. Still, by assuming international human rights as a single project, it is 
possible to paint with a broad brush the treaty-making developments relating to economic, social 
and cultural rights since 1948, the year when the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (American Declaration)12 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration)13 were adopted. Both declarations recognise economic, social and cultural rights. The 
declarations do not distinguish these rights from other categories of rights, for example, from civil 
and political rights. However, distinctions between these categories of rights began to emerge at the 
stage of developing treaties. 
                                                          
6 Adopted 27 June 1981 & came into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 
(1982). 
7 See Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ In Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas 
(eds), Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 18. 
8 Adopted 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965, European Treaty Series No 35; European Social Charter 
(Revised), adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999, European Treaty Series No 163. 
9 Adopted 16 December 1966 entered into force 3 January 1976; 993 UNTS 3. 
10 Adopted 21 November 1969, entry into force 18 July 1978, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123; 9 ILM 99 (1969). 
11 Adopted 17 November 1988, entry into force 16 November 1999, OAS Treaty Series No. 69; 28 ILM 156 (1989). 
12 Adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, 2 May 1948. 
13 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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In 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).14 The Convention was ‘the first 
comprehensive treaty for the protection of human rights to emerge’.15 The Universal Declaration 
significantly influenced its drafting.16 However, unlike the Universal Declaration, the European 
Convention on Human Rights did not recognise economic, social and cultural rights—at least when it 
was adopted.17 It originally established a commission and a court to supervise the civil and political 
rights that it guarantees.18 Later, the Commission was phased out and was replaced by a permanent 
court that functions on a full-time basis.19 It took the Council of Europe around a decade to adopt the 
European Social Charter in 1961, which was revised in 1996. The European Committee of Social 
Rights (European Committee) monitors the implementation of the European Social Charter.20 The 
European Committee does not have the power to receive and determine individual complaints. It 
examines state reports and collective complaints.21    
From the European model, as I prefer to call it, two features are notable. First, this model of treaty-
making distinguishes civil and political rights from economic, social and cultural rights. The model 
provides a separate treaty for each category of rights. One may argue that this distinction is based on 
an unstated assumption that the nature of state obligations relating to each category of rights is 
different. Second, the model establishes different monitoring mechanisms for each category of 
rights. The supervision mechanism for civil and political rights is strong because it comprises a full-
time court with the power to receive individual complaints and render binding judgments in cases of 
violations. On the other hand, the supervision mechanism for social rights is weak because it is a 
part-time quasi-judicial organ, which lacks the power to receive individual complaints and make 
binding decisions. Judged by the strength of supervision mechanisms, the European model places 
social rights in a lower class. The European model influenced later developments. Apart from some 
minor changes, other human rights systems replicated the European model except the African 
human rights system.  
In 1966, the Universal Declaration bifurcated into the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR following the European model. The Human Rights Committee monitors 
the implementation of the ICCPR.22 It has the power to receive and determine individual complaints 
alleging violations of the ICCPR.23 However, the ICCPR does not establish a court. In contrast, the 
ICESCR does not establish a treaty body, although its supervision mechanism evolved over time. In 
1985, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) was established.24  The CESCR 
                                                          
14 Adopted 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
15 William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2016) 1. 
16 Schabas (n 15) 1.  
17 Protocol No 1 adds the right to property and the right to education to the Convention. 
18 Schabas (n 15) 7. 
19 Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the 
control machinery established thereby, European Treaty Series No 155, adopted 11 May 1994, entered into force 1 
November 1998. 
20 European Social Charter, Arts 24 & 25; European Social Charter (Revised), Art C.  
21 European Social Charter, Art 24; European Social Charter (Revised), Art C; Additional Protocol to the European Social 
Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, adopted 9 November 1995 and entered into force 1 July 1998, 
European Treaty Series - No. 158 
22 ICCPR, Art 28;  
23 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 
adopted 16 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976, Art 1. 
24 Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17. 
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gradually acquired the power to receive and determine individual complaints.25 In a legal sense, the 
ICESCR’s supervision mechanism had fully evolved to match that of the ICCPR by 2013, when the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR entered into force. Of course, the bifurcation of the Universal 
Declaration did not occur in a vacuum. The two Covenants were developed during the Cold War. 
During that period, the western capitalist states emphasised civil and political rights while socialist 
states prioritised economic, social and cultural rights.26  
In 1969, the American Convention was adopted based on the European model. Like the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it mainly guarantees civil and political rights apart from few 
exceptions.27 It establishes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American 
Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).28 In 1988, 
around two decades later, a protocol to the American Convention (the Protocol of San Salvador) was 
adopted to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights. Even then, these rights were excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court apart from few exceptions.29 
In 1981, the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter. By then, there 
were enough economic, social and cultural rights treaties at the global and regional levels to draw 
on. The European Social Charter, the ICESCR, the American Convention were already in force. Unlike 
these treaties, however, the African Charter does not replicate the European model. The African 
Charter adopts a different model of human rights treaty-making—an African model, as I prefer to call 
it. The Charter recognises all categories of rights: civil, political economic, social, cultural and 
collective rights. It does not make any distinction between these categories of rights in terms of the 
corresponding state obligations. It establishes the same mechanism for monitoring the 
implementation of all categories of rights. In this regard, the African Charter is the first international 
treaty to recognise supranational quasi-judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. 
In short, the Charter achieved conventional unity of rights that had never been achieved in treaties 
adopted hitherto.  
The African model is replicated in other treaties adopted within the framework of the OAU/AU. An 
example includes the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s 
Charter).30  Three protocols to the African Charter are another set of examples.31 The League of Arab 
States also adopted the African model as the Arab Charter on Human Rights indicates.32 Since the 
adoption of the African Charter, the United Nations inclined towards the African model. This is 
                                                          
25 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/63/117, adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013. 
26 Kitty Arambulo Strengthening the supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Theoretical and procedural aspects (1999) 17. 
27 American Convention, Arts 17, 19 & 21. One may consider the right to property, protection of children and family among 
social rights. cf ICESCR, Art 10.  
28 American Convention, Art 33. 
29 Protocol of San Salvador, Art 19(6). 
30 Adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
31 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa, adopted 
29 January 2018 by the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Addis Ababa; Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Older Persons in Africa, adopted 31 January 2016 by the 26th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly held in Addis Ababa; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa, adopted 11 July 2003 by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Maputo, entered into 
force 25 November 2005. 
32 Adopted by League of Arab States, 22 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008. 
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evident from the hybrid model adopted by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).33 
1.3 Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter 
The African Charter is the main subject of this study. I briefly introduce the Charter below by 
sketching the context in which it emerged, the organs monitoring the implementation of the rights it 
recognises, and the development of economic, social and cultural rights. I begin with the discussion 
of the Charter’s development in the next subsection. The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Court) monitor the implementation of the rights recognised in the Charter. I briefly introduce these 
organs in the second and third subsections. In the last subsection, I introduce the development of 
economic, social and cultural rights as developed in the practice of the African Commission.  
1.3.1 Development of the African Charter 
The African Charter developed as the main African human rights treaty under the aegis of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). When the OAU (now African Union) was established in May 
1963, its Constitution (OAU Charter) mentioned human rights.34 The OAU Charter states that the 
organisation observes the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in promoting international cooperation.35 The OAU Charter did not express the human rights 
commitment of the OAU until it was replaced by the Constitutive Act of the African Union.36 The OAU 
was preoccupied with the protection of the state rather than the rights of the individuals within 
states.37 Yet the OAU contributed to the achievement of peoples’ self-determination and the 
prohibition of apartheid or racial discrimination in its early years.38 
The African Charter was conceived in the 1970s. This period brought changes to the OAU as it did 
elsewhere. According to Moyn, the 1970s marks the rebirth of human rights.39 Moyn emphasises that 
human rights obtained renewed attention and force during the 1970s due to the failure of other 
political models for achieving the cause of justice.40 Several human rights events occurred during this 
period. Global and regional human rights treaties came into force. These include the ICESCR, the 
ICCPR, along with its first optional protocol, and the American Convention. During this period, 
‘human rights also became of more prominent concern in international politics, especially as an 
ideological tool in the West's Cold War armoury.’41 Politicians, particularly the Carter administration 
in the United States, ‘started to invoke human rights as the guiding rationale of the foreign policy of 
                                                          
33 CRPD, adopted UN Doc.A/61/611, adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008, 2515 UNTS 3; CRC, adopted 
20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, GA res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, UN Doc 
A/44/49 (1989); 1577 UNTS 3; 28 ILM 1456 (1989). Like the African Charter, these treaties guarantee economic, social 
and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights; they establish the same mechanism for monitoring the 
implementation of both categories of rights. Like the ICESCR, these treaties require progressive realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Like the ICCPR, they do not require progressive realisation of civil and political rights. 
34 Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 UNTS 39, adopted 25 May 1963, entered into force 13 September 1963 
35 OAU Charter, Art II(1)(e). 
36 Adopted in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000 and entered into force on 26 May 2001, Art 2(h). It provides that the objective of 
the African Union is to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.’ 
37 Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (CUP 2004) 7.  
38 Murray, From the OAU to the African Union, (n 37) 7-8. 
39 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press 2010). 
40 Moyn (n 39) 5. 
41 Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (OUP 2012) 159. 
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states.’42 For Africa, this means that aid from the United States was linked to human rights.43 Some 
events had also occurred on the African continent: in the 1970s, Africa witnessed the ‘rise and fall of 
the three most brutal dictators (Amin of Uganda, 1971-79; Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, 1968-79 
and Bokassa of the Central African Empire, 1966-1979).’44 The violations of human rights in these 
countries indicate that the protection of post-colonial African States, which had been the main 
concern of the OAU, did not guarantee individual rights within each state. For these reasons, the 
OAU decided to establish an African Human Rights System in 1979.45 
The decision was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU during its 
sixteenth ordinary session held from July 17 to 20 1979 in Monrovia, Liberia. The Assembly instructed 
the Secretary-General of the OAU to organise a meeting of highly qualified experts ‘to prepare a 
preliminary draft of an “African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights” providing inter alia for the 
establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples' rights.’46 In its decision, the 
Assembly appears to emphasise economic, social and cultural rights. The Assembly underlined that it 
is ‘essential to give special attention to economic, social and cultural rights in future.’47  The emphasis 
on economic, social and cultural rights at the time was not peculiar to Africa. It reflected an 
international context in which the Third World countries asserted the priority of economic, social and 
cultural rights since the first international human rights conference of 1968.48 As Burke 
demonstrates, the Third World countries (including African States) focused on economic, social and 
cultural rights partly because they were unable to uphold civil and political rights as they collapsed 
into authoritarianism.49  
The OAU Assembly adopted the African Charter in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1981. Like the Monrovia 
decision, the text of the African Charter emphasises economic, social and cultural rights. In its 
preamble, the Charter proclaims that ‘the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.’ According to some authors, this clause 
indicates that the African Charter attaches more importance to economic, social and cultural rights 
                                                          
42 Moyn (n 39) 4. 
43 Issa G Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (CODESRIA 1989) 94.  
44 Shivji (n 43) 94. 
45 Decision on Human and People’s Rights in Africa, AHG/Dec.115 (XVI) Rev. 1, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the OAU held from 17 to 20 July 1979 in Monrovia, Liberia [hereafter ‘Monrovia Decision’], at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/5165/files/A_34_552-EN.pdf (accessed 16 January 2019). 
46 Monrovia Decision, para 2(b). 
47 Monrovia Decision, preamble. 
48 Roland Burke, ‘From Individual Rights to National Development: The First UN International Conference on Human Rights, 
Tehran, 1968’ (2008) 19/3 Journal of World History 275-296, 288. The conference declared that ‘the full realization of 
civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.’ Proclamation of 
Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, UN Doc. A/CONF. 
32/41 at 3 (1968), para 13. 
49 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 
109.  
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than to civil and political rights.50 Others read this clause as an expression of the indivisibility, 
interdependence, and interrelatedness of human rights.51  
The African Charter guarantees all categories of rights. The most peculiar normative invention of the 
Charter is in the area of peoples’ rights. The Charter recognises peoples’ rights that are not 
guaranteed in any other human rights treaty. The right to freely dispose of wealth and natural 
resources (Article 21), the right to economic, social and cultural development (Article 22), and the 
right to peace (Article 23) are unique to the African Charter. The Charter also recognises peoples’ 
rights guaranteed in other human rights treaties, for example, the right to self-determination (Article 
20), which is also guaranteed in the ICCPR and ICESCR.52 It also guarantees a collective right to a 
general satisfactory environment (Article 24).53  
The Charter also guarantees individual rights. Civil and political rights guaranteed in the Charter 
include the right to life (Article 4), the prohibition of slavery and torture (Article 5), the right to liberty 
(Article 6), the right to a fair trial (Article 7), the right to freedom of religion (Article 8), the right to 
freedom of expression and information (Article 9), the right to freedom of association (Article 10), 
the right to freedom of assembly (Article 11), the right to freedom of movement (Article 12), and the 
right to participate in government (Article 13). The African Charter does not expressly guarantee 
some civil rights including the right to privacy, the right to be recognised as a person and the 
prohibition of imprisonment for inability to discharge contractual obligations.54  The African Charter 
guarantees fewer economic, social and cultural rights compared to other treaties. The Charter 
guarantees the right to property (Article 14), the right to work (Article 15), the right to health (Article 
16), the right to education (Article 17(1)), the right to participate in cultural life (Article 17(2)), and 
the right to protection of family (Article 18(1)). 
The substantive rights under the African Charter have been expanded by states through additional 
protocols to the Charter, which guarantee the rights of specific groups, namely, women, older 
persons, and persons with disabilities. The substantive rights in the Charter have also been expanded 
in the practice of the African Commission and the African Court. I briefly discuss the Commission and 
the Court below and then turn to the development of economic, social and cultural rights, 
particularly in the practice of the Commission.    
1.3.2 African Commission 
The African Commission was established in 1987 and held its first session in Addis Ababa on 2 
November 1987.55 The Commission consists of eleven members appointed for a renewable term of 
                                                          
50 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, 'Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis? Implementing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327, 337; EI-Obaid Ahmed 
EI-Obaid & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua ‘Human Rights in Africa: A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present’ 
(1996) 41 McGill Law Journal 819, 846. 
51 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The Development of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2015) 4 International Human Rights Law 
Review 147-193, 149. 
52 cf ICCPR, Art 1; ICESCR, Art 1. 
53 Cf Protocol of San Salvador, Art 11.  
54 cf ICCPR, Arts 11, 16 & 17. 
55 First Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Covering the period from November 1987 
through April 1988, adopted on 28 April 1988, reproduced in Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans (eds) Documents of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (Hart Publishing 2001) 129; Rachel Murray, The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Hart Publishing 2000)11. 
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six years.56 Members of the Commission elect a chairperson and a vice-chairperson from among 
themselves for a term of two years, renewable only once.57 The Commission is not a permanent 
body—members of the Commission discharge their responsibilities on a part-time basis. The African 
Charter requires that the commissioners meet at least once a year.58 The Commission’s Rules of 
Procedure increase the number of meetings per year.  The Rules require a minimum of two meetings 
in ordinary sessions, which last for about two weeks.59 The Commission also meets in extraordinary 
sessions. Since 2008, the Commission usually holds two ordinary sessions and two extraordinary 
sessions; in total, four sessions in a year.60  
The seat of the Commission is separate from the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
Secretariat of the Commission is based in Banjul, The Gambia, where the Commission holds most of 
its sessions. The Commission also holds its sessions in other member states of the AU. The Secretary 
of the Commission is appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission without consulting the 
African Commission.61 
The African Commission establishes subsidiary mechanisms such as special rapporteurs, committees, 
and working groups.62 The Commission has established five special rapporteurs, four committees and 
seven working groups, in total 16 subsidiary mechanisms (also called special mechanisms).63 The 
composition of special mechanisms is different from the special procedure of the UN Human Rights 
Council where mandate holders are different from members of treaty bodies. In the African Union 
system, all special rapporteurs are members of the African Commission. The chairpersons of all 
committees and working groups are also members of the Commission. Some subsidiary mechanisms 
(committees and working groups) exclusively comprise of members of the Commission, particularly 
when they relate to matters such as resolutions, communications, budget and staff.  Other subsidiary 
mechanisms involve external experts.  
In the area of economic, social and cultural rights, the African Commission established a subsidiary 
mechanism called the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by a resolution 
adopted in 2004.64 The Resolution mandates the Working Group to prepare two draft documents: 
Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and revised reporting guidelines 
pertaining to economic, social and cultural rights. The Working Group completed these tasks in 2011. 
In 2015, the Commission tasked the Working Group ‘to prepare principles and guidelines on the right 
to water to assist states in the implementation of their obligations.’65 In February 2016, the 
Commission assigned the task of drafting a protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Citizens to 
Social Protection and Social Security jointly to the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural 
                                                          
56 African Charter, Arts 30, 31 & 36.  
57 African Charter, Art 42(1); Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in May 
2010 in Banjul, rule 12. 
58 African Charter, Art 64(2). 
59 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 26(1). 
60 African Commission, Sessions at <http://www.achpr.org/sessions/> (accessed 10 May 2019). 
61 Viljoen (n 41) 293. 
62 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 23(1). 
63 African Commission, Special Mechanisms, at <http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/> (accessed 10 May 2019). 
64 African Commission, Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR/Res.73(XXXVI)04, adopted 
during 36th Ordinary Session held from 23 November to 7 December 2004 in Dakar, Senegal.  
65 African Commission, Resolution on the Right to Water Obligations, ACHPR/Res.300 (EXT.OS/XVII)2015, adopted during 
17th Extraordinary Session held from 19 to 28 February 2015 in Banjul, The Gambia. 
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Rights and the Working Group on the Rights of Older Persons and People with Disabilities in Africa.66 
As reconstituted in 2017, the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights consists of four 
commissioners and ten external experts.67  
Article 45 of the African Charter empowers the African Commission to promote, protect, and 
interpret the African Charter. Article 45(1) of the Charter lists the promotional mandate of the 
Commission. Article 45(1)(a) of the Charter empowers the Commission to collect documents, 
undertake research, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, and disseminate information. In 
the area of economic, social and cultural rights, the Commission exercised this mandate and 
conducted a seminar in 2004 in Pretoria, South Africa.68 The Seminar led to the adoption of the 
Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (Pretoria Declaration).69 
The promotional mandate of the African Commission includes its power to ‘formulate and lay down 
principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights’ according 
to Article 45(1)(b) of the Charter. Under this mandate, the Commission has adopted several 
documents. Of these documents, some are directly related to economic, social and cultural rights. As 
already noted, the Commission adopted the Pretoria Declaration in 2004. In 2011, it adopted the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (usually referred to as ‘Nairobi Principles and 
Guidelines’ or simply ‘Nairobi Principles’ in the Commission’s documents).70 In the same year, the 
Commission adopted the State Party Reporting Guidelines for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (usually referred to as ‘Tunis Reporting Guidelines’ 
or simply ‘Tunis Guidelines’ in the Commission’s documents).71 In 2012 and 2014, the Commission 
adopted two general comments on the right to (reproductive) health of women under the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo 
Protocol).72 
The African Commission cooperates with African and international institutions to discharge its 
promotional mandate according to Article 45(1)(c) of the African Charter. The institutions include 
                                                          
66 African Commission, Resolution on the Reconstitution and Renewal of the Mandate of the Working Group on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa and Renewal of the Appointment of its Chairperson and Members - ACHPR/Res. 
391(LXI) 2017, adopted during 61st Ordinary Session held from 1 to 15 November 2017 in Banjul, The Gambia. 
67 African Commission, Resolution on the Reconstitution and Renewal of the Mandate of the Working Group on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa and Renewal of the Appointment of its Chairperson and Members - ACHPR/Res. 
391(LXI) 2017, adopted during 61st Ordinary Session held from 1 to 15 November 2017 in Banjul, The Gambia. 
68 Sibonile Khoza ‘Promoting economic, social and cultural rights in Africa: The African Commission holds a seminar in 
Pretoria’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 334. 
69 African Commission, Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR/Res.73(XXXVI)04, adopted 
during 36th Ordinary Session held from 24 November to 7 December 2004 in Dakar, Senegal. 
70 31st Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, EX.CL/717(XX), para xi. The Nairobi 
Principles are available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-
cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf (accessed 28 January 2019). See Resolutions of the African 
Commission ACHPR/Res. 391(LXI) 2017, ACHPR/Res. 316 (LVII) 15; ACHPR/Res.296 (EXT.OS/XVI) 14; ACHPR/Res.252 (LIV) 
13; ACHPR/Res.193 (L) 11.    
71 African Commission, 31st Activity Report, EX.CL/717(XX), para xi. See Activity reports of the African Commission, eg, 40th 
Activity Report (para xxi) & 39th Activity Report (para xviii); Resolutions of the African Commission, eg, ACHPR/Res. 346 
(LVIII) 2016, ACHPR/Res.193 (L) 11. 
72 African Commission, General Comments on Article 14 (1) (d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted at 52nd Ordinary Session held from 9 to 22 October 2012 in 
Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire; General Comment No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted at its 55th 
Ordinary Session held from 28 April to 12 May 2014 in Luanda, Angola. 
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National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
Commission grants affiliate status to NHRIs.73 By 2018, it had given affiliate status to 29 NHRIs.74 The 
Commission grants observer status to NGOs.75 By 2018, the Commission had granted observer status 
to 518 NGOs.76 In its resolutions, the Commission expressly states that it suspends or withdraws an 
NGO that fails to fulfil the criteria stipulated by the Commission. The Commission hardly ever 
suspends or withdraws the observer status of NGOs. In 2018, however, the Executive Council of the 
AU forced the Commission to withdraw observer status of one NGO called Coalition of African 
Lesbians (CAL).77 NGOs with observer status play important roles in the work of the African 
Commission. They provide administrative, financial and technical support to the Commission and its 
subsidiary mechanisms.78 They participate in developing principles and rules. They submit 
communications to the Commission on behalf of victims. They influence the work and priorities of 
the Commission.79 
State reporting is the core of the Commission’s promotional mandate.80 Yet the African Charter does 
not expressly mandate the Commission to examine state reports. Article 62 of the African Charter 
requires states to submit a report every two years. The report is about the legislative and other 
measures taken to give effect to the rights guaranteed in the African Charter. Upon the Commission’s 
recommendation, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU authorised the 
Commission to examine state reports in 1988.81 Now protocols to the African Charter expressly 
require states to submit periodic reports to the African Commission.82 Apart from few exceptions, 
states submit their reports to the African Commission.83 In terms of regularity of submission, states 
differ. Some are up-to-date with their reporting obligations while others are late.84 After the 
submission, state representatives present the report during public session of the Commission. 
Members of the Commission ask questions—usually relating to their mandate. For example, the 
Chairperson of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights asks questions relating to 
economic, social and cultural rights.85 The outcome of the consideration of state reports is called 
                                                          
73 African Commission, Resolution on the granting of Observer Status to National Human Rights Institutions in Africa, 
ACHPR/Res.31 (XXIV)98, adopted in Banjul on 31 October 1998; Resolution on the Granting of Affiliate Status to National 
Human Rights Institutions and specialized human rights institutions in Africa, ACHPR/Res. 370 (LX) 2017, adopted on 22 
May 2017 in Niamey, Niger.  
74 African Commission, 45th Activity Report, para 34. 
75 African Commission, Resolution on the Criteria for Granting and Maintaining Observer Status to Non-Governmental 
Organizations working on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa, adopted at 59th Ordinary Session held from 21 October 
to 4 November 2016 in Banjul, The Gambia; Resolution on the Criteria for Granting and Enjoying Observer Status to Non-
Governmental Organizations Working in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted at 25th Ordinary Session held 
from 26 April to 5 May 1999 in Bujumbura, Burundi. 
76 African Commission, 45th Activity Reports, para 35. 
77 African Commission, 45th Activity Report, para 60. 
78 Nobuntu Mbelle, ‘The Role of Non-governmental Organisations and National Human Rights Institutions at the African 
Commission’ in Rachel Murray & Malcolm D Evans (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: the system 
in practice 1986-2008 (CUP 2008). 
79 Mbelle (n 78) 306. 
80 Viljoen (n 41) 349. 
81 Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AHG/Res. 176 (XXIV), 24th Ordinary Session held 
from 25 to 28 May 1988. Second Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, para 31, 
reproduced in Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans (eds) Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (Hart Publishing 2001) 172. 
82 Protocol on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art 34(1); Protocol on the Rights of Older Persons, Art 22(1). 
83 Five states, namely, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia have never 
submitted their report by 2018. See African Commission, 45th Activity Report, para 27. 
84 See African Commission, 45th Activity Report, para 27. 
85 My personal observation at the 61st session of the Commission held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 1 to 15 November 2017. 
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‘concluding observations’, a document that highlights positive developments as well as areas of 
concern and makes recommendations. The concerns raised and the recommendations made usually 
relate to mandates of the members of the Commission. 
The Commission examines and determines allegations of human rights violations pursuant to its 
protection mandate stipulated under Article 45(2) of the African Charter. The Charter provides for 
both individual and inter-state complaints. The Commission received only one case from states.86 All 
other cases were submitted to the Commission by individuals and NGOs. The Commission has a very 
liberal view on standing and receives communications from any person or organisation. By the end of 
2018, the Commission had received 460 cases. Of the total number of cases received, 231 cases 
(around 50%) were pending before the Commission by the end of 2018.87 It disposed of 229 
communications over the last three decades.88 It decided 96 cases on merits. Merit decisions 
constitute around 42% of decided cases. The Commission ruled 100 cases inadmissible. The 
remaining cases were stricken out or closed for lack of diligent prosecution or other reasons or 
disposed of on other procedural grounds. Some cases were withdrawn by the parties.  
The African Charter does not expressly empower the Commission to order provisional measures. 
According to its 2010 Rules, the Commission may order provisional measures to prevent irreparable 
harm to victims at any time after the receipt of the communication but before the determination on 
the merits.89 Accordingly, the Commission has issued several provisional measures.90 After examining 
a case on the merits, the Commission usually makes a declaration of violations by identifying specific 
violated provisions of the African Charter. In some cases, it makes reparation orders including the 
payment of compensation.91 It usually requires the determination of the amount of monetary 
compensation according to domestic laws. In some cases, it takes it upon itself to determine the 
exact amount of compensation—or at least part of the amount.92        
The Commission’s protective mandate was expanded by the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights 
(African Court Protocol), which empowered the Commission to submit cases to the African Court.93 
The Commission can make referrals at any stage of its proceeding.94 The Commission does not 
transfer all cases submitted to it, but makes referrals only in cases that fulfil three requirements. 95 
The first requirement relates to cases decided on the merits. The Commission refers such cases to 
the African Court when the respondent state is unwilling or fails to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations.96 Until March 2020, for more than a decade, the Commission did not refer any 
                                                          
86 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African Commission and 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987–2018)’ (2018) 7 International Human Rights Law Review 1-42, 10. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2004) AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2004). 
87 African Commission, 45th Activity Report, para 32. 
88 African Commission, Decision on Communications, at <http://www.achpr.org/communications/decisions/?sort=_date> 
(accessed 12 May 2019).  
89 African Commission’s Rules of Procedure (2010), rule 98(1). 
90 Ssenyonjo, Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa, (n 86) 21. 
91 Ssenyonjo, Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa, (n 86) 21. 
92 See Equality Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) v Federal Republic of Ethiopia Communication 
341/2007, 57th Ordinary Session held from 4 to 18 November 2015 in Banjul; Mbiankeu Geneviève v Cameroon 
Communication No 389/10, adopted 6 May 2015 at 56th Ordinary Session held from 21 April to 7 May 2015 in Banjul. 
93 Adopted by the OAU Assembly on 10 June 1998, entered into force on 25 January 2004, Art 5. 
94 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 118(4). 
95 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 118. 
96 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 118(1). 
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case decided on the merits to the African Court.97 The Commission is trying perhaps to avoid the 
possibility of conflicting findings on the merits.98 The second requirement relates to provisional 
measures: the Commission refers such cases to the African Court when the respondent state fails to 
comply with provisional measures ordered by the Commission.99 The last requirement of referral 
relates to serious or massive violation of human rights. The African Charter requires the Commission 
to draw the attention of the AU Assembly to ‘cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious 
or massive violations of human and peoples' rights.’100 In addition, the Commission refers such cases 
to the African Court.101 By March 2019, the Commission referred only three cases to the African 
Court.102 The Commission made its first referral on 16 March 2011, which involves situations of 
serious and massive violations of human rights in Libya.103 On 12 July 2012, the Commission made its 
second referral against Kenya in a case involving both the failure of the respondent state to comply 
with provisional measures and situations of serious and massive violations of human rights.104 The 
third referral was made on 31 January 2013 against Libya, involving the failure of the respondent 
State to comply with provisional orders of the Commission.105 
Finally, the Commission has the power to interpret the Charter upon request by states, AU 
institutions or organisations recognised by the AU in accordance with Article 45(3) of the African 
Charter. However, the Commission’s documents do not show instances where the Commission has 
interpreted the Charter upon request.  As a result, the Commission usually interprets the Charter 
under its promotional and protective mandates, for example, through its decision on individual 
communications (protective mandate) and principles and rules (promotional mandate).  
1.3.3 African Court  
The movement for establishing an African Court of Human Rights precedes even the establishment of 
the OAU.106 Nevertheless, the establishment of the OAU in 1963 did not give the movement a new 
impetus, as the OAU was preoccupied with other priorities during its early years. Even by 1981 when 
the African Charter was adopted, it was still premature in the drafters’ view to establish a court.107 
The idea matured in 1994 when the OAU assembly mandated the drafting process of a protocol 
establishing the Court.108 The OAU Assembly adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Court Protocol) on 10 June 1998 at its Summit held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.109 The Protocol 
                                                          
97 See African Court, Contentious Matter, at <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21> 
(accessed 14 May 2019). 
98 Ssenyonjo, Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa, (n 86) 38. 
99 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 118(2). 
100 African Charter, Art 58(1). 
101 African Commission’s Rules (2010), rule 118(3). 
102 See African Court, Contentious Matter, at <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21> 
(accessed 14 May 2019). 
103 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Application No 
004/2011 (African Court, Order of Provisional Measures of 25 March 2011). 
104 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of Kenya Application No 006/2012 (African Court, 
Judgment of 27 May 2017) para 5 (Ogiek case).  
105 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya Application No 002/2013 (African Court, Order of Provisional 
Measures of 15 March 2013) para 3. 
106 Viljoen (n 41) 413. 
107 Viljoen (n 41) 412. 
108 Max du Plessis & Lee Stone, ‘A court not found?’ (2007) 7/2 African Human Rights Law Journal 522 – 544, 536. 
109 Solomon T Ebobrah, ‘Towards a Positive Application of Complementarity in the African Human Rights System: Issues of 
Functions and Relations’ (2011) 22/3 European Journal of International Law 663-688, 664. 
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came into force on 25 January 2004 but the judges’ election took place two years later in January 
2006.110 The first judges were sworn in before the AU Assembly on 2 July 2006, and the Court began 
operating in Addis Ababa in November 2006, moving to its seat in Arusha, Tanzania, in August 
2007.111 The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission.112  
The African Court consists of eleven judges elected for a term of six years, renewable only once.113 
The Court elects its President and Vice-President for a term of two years, renewable only once.114 The 
President performs judicial functions on a full-time basis and resides at the seat of the Court in 
Arusha,115 whereas all the other judges carry out their functions on a part-time basis.116 The judges 
meet during ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Court.117 The Court holds four ordinary 
sessions in a year, each lasting around 15 days.118  
The African Court receives cases from the African Commission, states and African inter-governmental 
organisations.119 States may accept the competence of the Court to receive cases from individuals 
and NGOs by making a declaration at the time of ratification of the African Court Protocol or any 
later time.120 Of the 30 states that ratified the African Court Protocol by March 2019, nine made the 
declaration permitting individuals and NGOs access to the Court.121  Of the total 202 cases submitted 
to the Court until March 2019, almost all were submitted by individuals (187 cases, around 93%) and 
NGOs (12 cases, around 6%).122 The majority of the cases (around 63%) were against the host State, 
Tanzania. Of the total cases received, the Court finalised 52 (around 26%) and transferred 4 cases to 
the African Commission. The remaining 146 cases (around 72%) were pending, which shows that the 
case backlog is mounting.123 
The African Court exercises the most extensive jurisdiction over human rights matters among 
regional human rights courts. The jurisdiction of the Court goes beyond its foundational treaty, the 
African Charter and its protocol. In relation to contentious matters, the Court’s jurisdiction extends 
to any ‘relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.’124 The Court applies ‘the 
provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States 
concerned.’125 The Court has ‘a unique mandate that is not directly matched by either of the Court’s 
regional counterparts,’ the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the European Court of Human 
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Rights.126 The African Court’s advisory jurisdiction is even wider than its jurisdiction in contentious 
matters. The Court’s advisory jurisdiction extends beyond ratified treaties. The Court provides ‘an 
opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights 
instruments.’127  
The African Court’s jurisdiction is also extensive in terms of categories of rights. In other regional 
human rights systems, human rights courts are primarily civil and political rights courts save for a few 
exceptions and indirect application of economic, social and cultural rights. The African Court is the 
only human rights court that has a complete mandate over the adjudication of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Surprisingly, the Court acquired jurisdiction over economic, social and cultural rights 
guaranteed in the ICESCR a decade earlier than the CESCR itself obtained the power to examine 
individual complaints.128 However, the Court’s extensive jurisdiction has not yet attracted many cases 
in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. 
In the future, if the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) enters into force, the African Court will be transformed 
into the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.129 The Malabo Protocol adds a 
criminal section to a merged court, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.130 The merger has 
not taken place yet.131 The future African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights will have 
three sections: a general affairs section, a human and peoples’ rights section, and an international 
criminal law section.132  
1.3.4 Development of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter 
The African Charter adopts a minimalist approach to economic, social and cultural rights as it omits 
some of the rights recognised in other treaties, particularly in the ICESCR.133 Among the omitted 
rights are the right to an adequate standard of living for oneself and one’s family, including adequate 
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions—the right to be 
free from hunger, the right to social security, including social insurance.134 Other rights such as the 
right to work and the right to education are missing some elements.135 The Charter has been 
compared with the ICESCR and criticised as defective for these omissions.136 Yeshanew suggests 
amending the Charter and adopting an additional protocol among possible solutions, but considers 
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interpretation a preferred way of fixing the defects.137 Interestingly, all of the rights that are now 
missing from the text of the Charter were included in the early draft of the Charter with sufficient 
details that rival the provisions of the ICESCR.138 Unfortunately, the final text of the Charter does not 
contain them.  
The African Commission has implied the omitted rights from other rights guaranteed in the Charter. 
In 1989, the Commission adopted the Guidelines for National Periodic Reports that heavily relied on 
international human rights law, including the ICESCR.139 These guidelines require states to report on 
the right to an adequate standard of living, such as the right to food and the right to adequate 
housing under the right to health (Article 16) and the rights related to the family (Article 18).140 The 
right to social security is also included under the right to health.141 The Commission also requires 
reports on elements of rights missing from the Charter.  For example, states should report on trade 
union rights under the right to work although the Charter does not guarantee that aspect of the 
right.142   
In the 2004 Pretoria Declaration, the Commission adopted the view that access to the minimum 
essential food and ‘to basic shelter, housing and sanitation and adequate supply of safe and potable 
water’ are part of the right to health.143  The Declaration provides that the African Charter implies 
recognition of the right to shelter, the right to basic nutrition and the right to social security when 
the economic, social and cultural rights expressly guaranteed are read together with the right to life 
and respect for human dignity.144 In the Pretoria Declaration, the Commission modified its position in 
the 1989 Guidelines. While it acknowledges that these rights are not expressly guaranteed under the 
Charter, it goes beyond the right to health and refers to the right to life and the right to inherent 
human dignity as the sources of other economic, social and cultural rights.  
The Commission identified a combination of expressly guaranteed rights, from which it derived each 
right omitted from the Charter in the Nairobi Principles. For example, it derived the right to housing 
from a combination of the right to property, the right to health and the protection of the family.145 
Similarly, the Commission implied other rights omitted from the Charter, including the right to food, 
the right to water, and the right to social security, from a range of expressly recognised rights.146 The 
content of the rights read into the Charter mirrors the content of the rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR as developed by the CESCR.  
The Commission’s decisions in individual complaints show a similar trend despite some 
inconsistencies. The Commission recognises economic, social and cultural rights that are not 
expressly guaranteed in the African Charter. In Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Another v Nigeria (Ogoniland case) decided in 2001, the Commission held that the Charter  
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recognises the right to housing and the right to food.147 It held that ‘the combined effect of articles 
14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter or housing.’148 The destruction of Ogoni 
houses and villages and the obstruction, harassment, beating, and killing of citizens trying to rebuild 
their ruined homes ‘constitute massive violations of the right to shelter.’149 In the same case, the 
Commission accepted the complainants’ argument that ‘the right to food is implicit in the African 
Charter, in such provisions as the right to life (Article 4), the right to health (Article 16) and the right 
to economic, social and cultural development (Article 22).’150 The Commission found Nigeria in 
violation of the right to food.151 
In Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan (Darfur case) decided in 2009, the 
Commission examined an alleged violation of several Charter rights due to the conflict in Darfur.152  
The Complainants relied on the Commission’s decision in the Ogoniland case and submitted that 
there was a violation of the right to housing. Instead, the Commission found that the eviction or 
demolition of victims’ houses violates the right to property; that the destruction of homes is a 
violation of the right to health; and that evicting the victims violates the right to family life.153 
However, it did not find a violation of a separate right to housing. Similarly, it did not find a violation 
of a separate right to food, but it did find violations of the right to life, the right to health and the 
right to development from which it derived the right to food in the Ogoniland case.  
In two cases decided in 2015, the Commission adopted different views on the right to housing, 
although the decisions were adopted in the same year.154 In Nubian Community v Kenya, the 
Commission examined discrimination against members of the Nubian Community in obtaining 
nationality and the consequence of such discrimination on the enjoyment of other rights including 
the right to work, the right to health, the right to education and protection of the family.155 It found a 
violation of the right to property due to an eviction without provision of alternative housing.156 In 
addition, it found a violation of the right to health and the right to protection of the family.157 
However, it did not find a violation of a separate right to housing. On the other hand, the 
Commission found a violation of the right to housing in Mbiankeu Geneviève v Cameroon.158 The 
complainant, a French national of Cameroonian origin living and working in France, and her husband 
acquired a plot of land for building a residential house. As the development of the land began with 
the construction of a hut on it, another person who claimed the land destroyed the hut and assaulted 
and chased away the complainant’s husband. As the complainant’s husband had obtained the land 
from a fraudulent seller, he could not obtain another plot of land as a replacement nor be 
reimbursed for the monies invested in it. Although the family was not living in Cameroon, the 
Commission found a violation of the right to adequate housing.159 
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The African Commission has also contributed to the preparation of treaties that expanded economic, 
social and cultural rights under the African Charter. The Commission drafted three protocols to the 
Charter. The protocols relate to the rights of women, older persons and persons with disabilities. 
These protocols expressly recognise economic, social and cultural rights omitted from the Charter. 
The Maputo Protocol recognises the rights of women to food, water and housing.160 The Protocol on 
the rights of older persons guarantees the right to social security.161 The Protocol on the rights of 
persons with disabilities guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes 
‘adequate food, access to safe drinking water, housing, sanitation and clothing.’162  
In sum, economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter have been expanded. The 
expansion has occurred in the practice of the African Commission. Human rights treaties developed 
after the African Charter have also added rights omitted from the African Charter. As a result, the 
rights recognised under the African Charter and its protocols evolved to match the list of rights 
recognised under the ICESCR.  
1.4 General obligations: Meaning and selection 
Economic, social and cultural rights have evolved under the African Charter, as discussed above. The 
African Commission has played the major role in developing the rights. The rights in the African 
Charter have evolved to match the list of rights guaranteed in the ICESCR, indicating that the African 
Commission has used the ICESCR and its interpretation by the CESCR as a frame of reference to 
develop the rights in the African Charter. I will examine whether the same frame of reference works 
for general obligations under the African Charter. This is particularly interesting because the African 
Charter and the ICESCR adopt different models of treaty-making when it comes to economic, social 
and cultural rights and their corresponding state obligations. I first explain what I call general 
obligations.  
The recognition of human rights in international treaties entails specific and general state 
obligations. Specific obligations correspond to one right or specific rights in a treaty, while general 
obligations are applicable to all rights in a treaty. In the formulation of treaty provisions, general and 
specific obligations may appear in diffident parts of a treaty. The ICESCR is an example, containing 
provisions relating to general obligations (ie, progressive realisation, non-discrimination/equality and 
limitation) in a separate part, preceding the provisions that guarantee specific rights.   
State obligations cutting across specific rights are many, but the principal one is the ‘progressive 
realisation’ obligation.163 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR contains this obligation:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. 
The progressive realisation provision is not unique to the ICESCR. The provision is common in 
economic, social and cultural rights treaties adopting the European model of treaty-making including 
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the American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador.164 These treaties require states to 
gradually achieve full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.  
Defined as the principal obligation in the practice of the CESCR as well as in the literature,165 
progressive realisation is an interesting subject of study.  It is necessary to identify the scope and 
nature of this obligation to praise states for their achievements or to condemn them and hold them 
internationally accountable for their failures. This is particularly important in Africa where the level of 
discharging obligations corresponding to economic, social and cultural rights is relatively low. 
Moreover, it is useful to examine the legal nature of the concept of progressive realisation under the 
African Charter, which does not contain the concept. The omission of the concept from the Charter 
does not mean the same thing for everyone. For some authors, it means that economic, social and 
cultural rights entail immediate obligations;166 others consider immediate realisation impractical or 
unrealistic due to the underdevelopment of African States.167  
Because of the status of being the principal obligation, progressive realisation has become a 
reference point for describing other general obligations as obligations related to, as being an 
exception to or as important for progressive realisation. The limitation clauses of economic, social 
and cultural rights treaties contain obligations related to progressive realisation. Immediate 
obligations are exceptions to progressive realisation and the obligation to ensure participation in the 
implementation of the rights is important in discharging the progressive realisation obligation. Thus, 
the study of exceptions to and relatives of the progressive realisation clarifies the scope and content 
of the progressive realisation obligation itself. I briefly discuss below these exceptions to and 
relatives of the progressive realisation obligation. 
One of the concepts related to the progressive realisation obligation is limitation. Treaty texts 
contain the concept of progressive realisation and limitation in separate clauses. In the ICESCR, the 
progressive realisation provision (Article 2(1)) and the limitation clause (Article 4) are limitations of 
different kind;168 but both are limitations, anyway. In the practice of the CESCR, the use of the 
progressive realisation is ubiquitous, while the use of the limitation clause is scanty. Like the ICESCR, 
the Protocol of San Salvador provide for progressive realisation and limitation in separate 
provisions.169 The European Social Charter provides for a general limitation clause only.170 In national 
constitutions, which provide for a general limitation clause along with progressive realisation clauses 
embedded in provisions guaranteeing each economic, social and cultural right, progressive 
realisation is considered an internal limitation, while a general limitation clause is an external 
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limitation.171 Limitation clauses and the principle of proportionality have received wide scholarly 
attention in relation to civil and political rights guaranteed in international human rights treaties as 
well as in national constitutions.172 The application of limitation clauses to economic, social and 
cultural rights and the relationship with the progressive realisation clause is as scarce as the practice 
of the CESCR. Among scholars that tackle the issue, the applicability of the principle of 
proportionality (as a component of the limitation analysis) to economic, social and cultural rights 
(particularly in relation to positive obligation) is a point of disagreement.173  
In the African Charter, the relationship between progressive realisation and limitation is not 
straightforward. The text of the Charter is silent on both issues, omitting the general limitation clause 
as well as the progressive realisation clause. Scholars are limited to critiquing the African Charter for 
omitting a general limitation clause.174 Thus, the existing literature does not address the relationship 
between limitation and progressive realisation clauses. Also missing from the literature is the 
discussion of the practice of the African Commission and the African Court on the application of 
limitation and proportionality to Charter rights in general and to economic, social and cultural rights 
in particular.  
The exceptions to progressive realisation are immediate obligations.175 These include the obligations 
to respect, protect, take steps, monitor the realisation of rights, adopt legislation and a plan of 
action, avoid retrogressive measures, ensure minimum essential levels of each right and ensure the 
realisation of the rights without discrimination on prohibited grounds.176 The items in this list are not 
mutually exclusive. Protecting, monitoring or legislating does not happen without taking steps. 
Monitoring, remedying, planning can be subsumed under core obligations, as the practice of the 
CESCR shows. I investigate minimum core obligations and non-discrimination and equality as 
immediate obligations in line with the emphasis placed on them in practice by CESCR and the African 
Commission. 
When states discharge minimum core obligations, individuals will be able to enjoy a minimum 
essential level of each right. Thus, minimum core obligations are a category of state obligations to 
ensure that individuals can obtain goods and services such as food, water, shelter and health care 
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that are necessary for their survival. No treaty text identifies or requires states to discharge minimum 
core obligations, yet the concept of minimum core in theory and its application by the CESCR has 
attracted wide scholarly publications.177 Some authors argue that the African Commission has 
adopted the minimum core approach as a model for reviewing measures taken by states to 
implement economic, social and cultural rights.178 That is, the African Commission has adopted the 
position of the CESCR.179 However, whether there are points of divergence between the practice of 
the African Commission and that of the CESCR, and the normative implications of such divergence 
have not been investigated.  
Non-discrimination is another immediate obligation of general application. Non-discrimination is 
applicable to all human rights—unlike progressive realisation and minimum core obligations, whose 
application is usually limited to economic, social and cultural rights. Human rights treaties usually 
contain provisions on non-discrimination. The European Social Charter, the ICESCR, the American 
Convention, and the Protocol of San Salvador prohibit discrimination.180 Moreover, the American 
Convention provides for a self-standing right to equality.181 States should ensure the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights without any discrimination on prohibited grounds. States can 
immediately eliminate de jure discrimination.182 States may be unable to eliminate de facto 
discrimination immediately and achieve substantive equality.183 Some authors link a substantive 
conception of equality to economic, social and cultural rights.184 Some authors link non-
discrimination and equality under the African Charter to the indirect enforcement of economic, social 
and cultural rights.185 I will provide a comprehensive analysis of the practice of the African 
Commission and the African Court in relation to non-discrimination and equality, which is missing 
from the existing literature. Moreover, I will address a substantive conception of equality in relation 
to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter.  
Finally, the obligation to ensure the participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of 
their economic, social and cultural rights is an important obligation.186 Participation, particularly the 
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right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, is a political right usually guaranteed in civil and 
political rights treaties. The American Convention and the African Charter guarantee this right, as 
they are civil and political rights treaties. Nevertheless, the European Social Charter, the ICESCR and 
the Protocol of San Salvador do not provide for the political right to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs since these treaties purely deal with economic, social and cultural rights. 
The participation of individuals and groups in the conduct of public affairs, particularly in elections, 
has attracted a number of scholarly publications.187 In relation to economic, social and cultural rights, 
several such studies find gaps in the participation of the deprived individuals and groups in the 
process of adjudication.188 The existing literature does not address a general state obligation to 
ensure participation. This obligation has been established in the practice of the CESCR and other 
treaty bodies. In this research, I examine the legal basis and content of the obligation to ensure 
participation under the African Charter.  
1.5 Research questions 
In this study, I seek to answer five research questions. The first one relates to the concept of 
progressive realisation. What is the concept of progressive realisation under the African Charter? 
Progressive realisation is a relatively old human rights concept, but it is new to the African Charter. I 
will seek to answer this question by investigating the history, justification, meaning and implication 
of progressive realisation. That is, I will search for answers to a range of sub-questions. First, I will 
examine the reason for omitting the concept of progressive realisation from the Charter in the first 
place. This question is particularly intriguing in light of the fact that economic, social and cultural 
rights treaties adopted before the African Charter expressly incorporate progressive realisation. 
Second, I will examine why the African Commission has introduced the concept into the African 
Charter. In fact, the context in which the African Charter was adopted has not remained the same. 
Changes are inevitable. Are there new developments that justify the introduction of progressive 
realisation? Third, I will examine the meaning and content of this concept. Does the African 
Commission give the concept a new meaning? Does it transplant the meaning and content developed 
by the CESCR? Finally, I will examine whether the introduction of progressive realisation has any 
consequence for other rights guaranteed in the African Charter.  
                                                          
187 See Fabienne Peter, ‘The Human Right to Political Participation’ (2013) 7/1 Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 1-16; 
Abdulqawi A Yusuf, ‘The Role That Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples can Play in the Current World 
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Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative Lessons from South African Evictions Law’ (2014) 32/4 
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The second research question relates to limitations. The question is this: What are limitations on 
economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter? Are limitations different from 
progressive realisation? This question is relevant in light of the introduction of progressive realisation 
into the African Charter. The lack of available resources may justify a failure to achieve progressive 
realisation as well as retrogression (reduction in the level of enjoyment) in exceptional 
circumstances. In particular, the European Committee regards retrogressive measures as limitations. 
Thus, the relationship between progressive realisation and limitations is worth investigating. In this 
regard, I seek to answer this sub-question: What is the relationship between progressive realisation, 
retrogression and limitations? Moreover, it is useful to address how the African Commission and the 
African Court analyse limitations under the Charter in general and their application to economic, 
social and cultural rights.  In this regard, I will answer the following sub-questions: what is the 
practice of the African Commission and the African Court on the development and application of a 
general limitation clause under the African Charter? Do the Commission and the Court evaluate the 
proportionality of limitations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights? 
The third and fourth research questions relate to exceptions of progressive realisation. The 
exceptions are immediate obligations, the investigation of which is relevant in view of the dichotomy 
of obligations employed by the African Commission, despite the text of the African Charter not 
including such a classification. The Commission provides examples of immediate obligations, which 
include ‘the obligation to take steps, the prohibition of retrogressive steps, minimum core obligations 
and the obligation to prevent discrimination.’189 As already noted, I will deal with the obligation to 
take steps and the prohibition of retrogressive measures in addressing the first and second research 
questions. The third and fourth research questions relate to minimum core obligations and non-
discrimination.  
The third research question relates to the concept of minimum core. What are minimum core 
obligations under the African Charter? The text of the African Charter does not refer to the phrase 
‘minimum core obligation’ or its equivalent, yet the African Commission has declared that economic, 
social and cultural rights require the implementation of minimum core obligations.190 The African 
Court has yet to address this concept. To answer the third research question, I will respond to the 
following sub-questions: What does the African Commission mean by ‘minimum core obligation’? 
What are the content and characteristics of these obligations?  
The fourth research question relates to non-discrimination and equality. The African Charter 
stipulates a number of provisions on equality and non-discrimination;191 however, it is not clear how 
these obligations apply to economic, social and cultural rights. Hence, the fourth research question: 
What does the obligation to ensure non-discrimination and equality entail for the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights? This research question has the following sub-questions. How 
does the African Commission and the African Court interpret equality and non-discrimination under 
the African Charter? Can substantive equality help the implementation of economic, social and 
cultural rights? What are the circumstances that require temporary special measures to advance 
these rights? What improvements should be made to the principle of equality/non-discrimination in 
order to make it more relevant to economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter? 
                                                          
189 Nairobi Principles, para 16. 
190 Nairobi Principles, para 17. 
191 African Charter, Arts 2, 3, 18(3), 19 & 28 
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The last research question relates to the obligation to ensure participation as an important element 
in the assessment of progressive realisation. Like other treaty bodies, the African Commission and 
the African Court explain that states have an obligation to ensure the participation of individuals in 
the implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, individuals have 
the political right to participate in government while peoples have the right to self-determination. 
That is, the relationship between the obligation to ensure participation and the individual right to 
participate in government or the collective right to self-determination is not clear. This yields the fifth 
research question: What is the obligation to ensure participation of individuals or groups in the 
implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights? This research question has the 
following sub-questions: What is participation under the African Charter? What is the practice of the 
African Commission/Court in interpreting participation under the Charter? How does the 
requirement of participation enhance the protection of economic, social and cultural rights?  
1.6 Methodological approach  
In this research, I investigate general state obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights guaranteed in the African Charter. To answer the research questions described above, I 
analyse the text of the African Charter in light of the drafting history and the findings of the African 
Commission and the African Court. I examine the drafting history of the Charter to answer part of the 
first research question (why did the drafters omit the concept of progressive realisation from the 
African Charter?). Apart from this exception, I answer all research questions based on the analysis of 
the Charter text along with the findings of the African Commission and the African Court. I use field 
observations and interviews as additional sources of information where necessary.  
For the purpose of this research, I use the term ‘findings’ broadly to include the official documents of 
any treaty body, whether such body is a judicial or a quasi-judicial organ. Findings of judicial organs 
include judgments, orders and advisory opinions. Findings of quasi-judicial bodies take different 
forms and names including comments, conclusions, decisions, declarations, guidelines, observations, 
opinions, principles, reports, resolutions, rules, and statements. The findings indicate practical 
application of human rights standards and show the practice of treaty bodies. I do not arrange these 
findings in any hierarchical order. I look for what the treaty bodies say about the meanings of a 
certain concept or about a content of a particular right or its corresponding obligation.  
1.6.1 Findings of the African Commission and the African Court 
The African Commission and the African Court publish their findings. The Court’s findings include 
advisory opinions, judgments and orders. The Commission’s findings include decisions on individual 
communications, concluding observations, advisory opinions,192 and soft law instruments. The 
Commission’s soft law instruments include general comments, declarations, guidelines, model law, 
principles and resolutions.193 Conventionally, the term ‘soft law’ includes non-treaty agreements 
among states.194 Such instruments can also be adopted by states through their participation in 
international organisations. The Commission’s soft law instruments do not fall under non-treaty 
agreements among states, nor were they adopted by an international organisation, by the AU 
                                                          
192 African Commission adopted only one advisory of opinion, Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted at the 41st Ordinary 
Session held in Accra, Ghana in May 2007. 
193 African Commission, at <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/> (accessed 26 May 2019).  
194 Hartmut Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’ (1999) 10/3 European Journal of International Law 499-515, 500. 
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Assembly, to be specific. Still, the Commission’s documents may fall under the non-conventional 
meaning of soft law employed by some authors.  Guzman and Meyer classify decisions of 
international tribunals among soft law.195 They define soft law as ‘nonbinding rules or instruments 
that interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises that in turn 
create expectations about future conduct.’196             
The African Charter does not describe the status of the Commission’s findings. The Charter does not 
indicate whether the Commission’s findings are binding or not. The African Court Protocol does not 
specify the status of the African Court’s findings either. It is perhaps unnecessary to attach such 
status to the findings. In any event, the findings do not establish new obligations other than those 
established by the Charter. The Commission and the Court explain the obligations under the Charter 
(and other treaties) or determine whether there is a breach of those obligations or not. There is no 
point in establishing the Commission and the Court or accepting their jurisdiction unless states 
comply with their findings. In cases of a breach of the African Charter, it should not matter whether 
the breach is established by the Commission or the Court, because both have the power to do so. 
Whichever institution establishes the breach, it boils down to the willingness of the respondent state 
to comply with the decision or remedy the violation. 
Despite the textual silence of the two treaties (the African Charter and the African Court Protocol), 
scholars distinguish the status of the findings of the two institutions. The findings of the Court are 
considered binding, while the findings of the Commission are not.197 Writing in 2000, before the 
establishment of the African Court, Udombana labelled the Commission as a toothless bulldog for its 
normative and structural deficiencies that centred on ‘the non-binding nature of the Commission's 
decisions.’198 If this criticism was made with the hope that states would fully comply with the findings 
of the African Court, the hope has yet to materialise. Full or partial compliance with the Court’s 
findings is an exception rather than the rule. In 2018, the Court reported that only one State (Burkina 
Faso) fully complied with its judgment.199 The Court stressed that non-compliance with its findings is 
one of the major challenges it faced.200 There is no guarantee that states fully comply with findings 
considered to be binding. As Murray and Long rightly observe, the debate on the binding/non-
binding nature of findings is an unhelpful distraction.201  
While analysing the findings, therefore, I do not find it necessary to distinguish the normative value 
of the Commission’s findings from that of the Court. Nor do I distinguish the value of different types 
of findings. I do not attach a different value to the Commission’s findings whether such findings were 
made in relation to individual communications, state reports, or in soft law instruments. I analyse the 
findings to discover how the African Commission and the African Court explain general state 
obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter.  
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The findings of the Commission and the Court relate to various issues. Thus, rather than analysing all 
findings, I have selected those relevant to the research questions described above. From the 
Commission’s soft law documents, I have selected those dealing with economic, social and cultural 
rights. In fact, the Commission has adopted its major interpretation of these rights in the Nairobi 
Principles. From the Commission’s decisions in individual communications, I have selected cases 
relevant to general state obligations corresponding to economic, social and cultural rights. The 
Commission’s cases had been reported in the African Human Rights Law Report (AHRLR) until 2011. 
The cases are also available on the Commission’s website although they are not provided in a 
searchable database. The cases can be filtered by the outcome (eg, whether decided on merits or 
admissibility) or by respondent states. I have selected cases on economic, social and cultural rights 
from cases decided on the merits because the research questions do not relate to procedural issues. 
To filter these cases, I have used economic, social and cultural rights provisions of the African Charter 
(ie, Articles 14 (right to property), 15 (right to work), 16 (right to health), 17(right to education and 
culture), and 18(1) (right to protection of family)). Of the 99 cases decided on the merits by March 
2020, violations of economic, social and cultural rights had been alleged in 39 cases, which were the 
subject of my analysis. The Commission found violations in 30 cases. Most of the findings of 
violations relate to the right to property (Article 14) and the right to protection of the family (Article 
18(1)). I also analysed 38 concluding observations available on the Commission’s website.      
The African Court publishes its findings on its web page. It publishes orders and judgments in 
contentious cases as well as advisory opinions, but does not organise its judgments and opinions in a 
searchable database. I excluded cases that did not pass the admissibility or jurisdiction stage of the 
proceedings. I analysed judgments on the merits. By March 2020, the Court rendered 37 judgments 
on the merits. Of these, the Court found a violation of economic, social and cultural rights provisions 
of the African Charter in only two cases.202 While the Court finalised 12 advisory opinions, none of 
them relate to substantive rights under the Charter. Thus, my analysis does not include advisory 
opinions. 
1.6.2 Interviews and observations  
In addition to desk research, I conducted interviews and observations. The purpose of the interviews 
and observations was to collect data that can be useful to answer the research questions.  I 
conducted two field trips: from 31 October to 14 November 2017, I conducted the first field trip to 
the seat of the African Commission in Banjul, The Gambia.  From 5 to 9 March 2018, I conducted the 
other field trip to the seat of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights in Arusha, the United 
Republic of Tanzania. The main purpose of these field trips was to conduct interviews with 
commissioners, judges and legal officers of the African Commission and the African Court as well as 
with experts involved in the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, the 
aim of my trip to Banjul was to observe public sessions of the African Commission. I planned the trips 
to coincide with the sessions of the African Commission and the African Court. The commissioners 
and judges carry out their function on a part-time basis, as noted above. They are available only 
during the sessions. 
With regard to the selection of interviewees, I used the expertise of the respondents as a criterion. I 
considered familiarity of the respondents with the work of the African Commission on economic, 
                                                          
202 Ogiek case; Sébastien Germain Ajavon v Republic of Benin App No 013/2017 (Judgment of 29 March 2019).  
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social and cultural rights. Before requesting an interview with a particular person, I conducted a 
background study to find out who would be able to give me relevant answers to my interview 
questions. I found out that the Commission’s work on economic, social and cultural rights is mostly 
carried out through its Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which prepared the 
Nairobi Principles mentioned above. The members of the working group are 14 as already 
mentioned.203 In addition, the Secretariat of the Commission assigns one legal officer to assist the 
working group. My objective was to select as many respondents as possible from the members; 
however, this was challenging. Based on their availability, I interviewed two commissioners, the 
acting deputy secretary, two legal officers, and two expert members. In total, I conducted eight 
interviews in Banjul. The interviews helped me understand how the Commission conducts its 
business, including who prepares soft law instruments such as the Nairobi Principles, and who drafts 
the decisions on individual complaints. I also obtained views of the Chairperson of the working group 
on issues related to my research questions.   
Another objective of the field trip to Banjul was to participate in the Commission’s 61st Session held 
from 1 to 15 November 2017. During this session, the Commission celebrated its 30th Anniversary 
reflecting on its challenges and prospects. My participation in the 30th Anniversary celebration 
helped me understand how the practice of the Commission has emerged and developed. I attended 
the public sessions of the Commission and observed the presentation of reports by state 
representatives and the examination of the same by members of the Commission. The 
commissioners ask state delegates questions relating to their mandate in special procedures of the 
Commission. For example, the Chairperson of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights requests state delegates to clarify questions related to the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the concerned state party. I also participated in stakeholder consultation on draft 
guidelines and principles on Articles 21 and 24 of the African Charter. Although Articles 21 and 24 of 
the African Charter are not the subject of this research, the participation in stakeholders’ 
consultation provided me insight into the process of adopting the Nairobi Principles. Thus, I found 
the 61st Session very instructive. From my participation in the Commission’s public session, I learned 
about the actual process of state reporting and NGO participation. 
The field trip to Arusha took place between 4 March and 11 March 2017 during the 48th ordinary 
session of the African Court. Unlike the Commission, the Court does not have special mechanisms 
that work on economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, my plan was to interview at least three 
judges and four legal officers. As is the case with the African Commission, it was challenging to meet 
the target. Based on their availability, I managed to interview two judges (including the president of 
the Court), the registrar and his deputy, the head of the legal division and two other legal officers. In 
total, I conducted seven interviews in Arusha.  I found the interviews helpful in terms of 
understanding how the Court, particularly the registrar and the head of the legal division distribute 
the cases among legal officers. Since the Court has not dealt with general state obligations in 
economic, social and cultural rights cases, I learned how the legal officers and judges will deal with 
such issues in the future.     
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1.6.3 Insights from the UN, European and Inter-American human rights systems  
The African Charter requires the Commission to apply certain principles while monitoring the 
implementation of the Charter. Article 60 of the Charter requires the African Commission to draw 
inspiration from international human rights law. The Commission should take into consideration 
practices, customs, general principles, legal precedents and doctrine according to Article 61 of the 
Charter. These principles may apply to the African Court. While the Commission’s jurisdiction is 
limited to the Charter and its protocols, the Court’s jurisdiction extends to any human rights treaties 
ratified by respondent states.204 The African Commission and the African Court usually refer to other 
human rights treaties and the practice of different treaty bodies. In line with the requirement of the 
African Charter and the practice of the African Commission and the African Court, I draw on the texts 
of selected treaties and the practice of treaty bodies supervising those selected treaties. The purpose 
of drawing on these treaties and the practice relating to them is to provide a background for the 
investigation of general state obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights in the 
African Charter.  
For the purpose of drawing insights, the discussion of all economic, social and cultural rights treaties 
is not feasible. The African Charter is a general human rights treaty, since it is applicable to all groups. 
Since I examine general state obligations under a general human rights treaty, I draw on human 
rights treaties of general application. I excluded treaties dealing with economic, social and cultural 
rights of a particular group (eg, children, women or persons with disabilities) although I will refer to 
them when it is necessary to make a particular point. I selected some treaties from three human 
rights systems. One is global (the United Nation system). The other two are regional (European and 
Inter-American systems).  
From the global human rights system operating under the umbrella of the United Nations, I selected 
the ICESCR for this purpose. I also draw on the practice of the CESCR. Documents of the CESCR, 
including general comments, concluding observations and statements, are available from its web 
page. It is feasible to examine all general comments, decided cases and statements given how few 
they are, however, it is not feasible to read all concluding observations given their very high 
number.205 Instead, I have collected relevant concluding observations from the Universal Human 
Rights Index.206 As a searchable database for use by different stakeholders including academics, the 
Index enables users to perform basic and advanced searches by using filters. I searched the Index for 
relevant terms, filtering the results using the CESCR, since the organ that issues a document can be 
used to filter the search results of the Universal Human Rights Index database.  
From the European human rights system operating under the aegis of the Council of Europe, I 
selected the European Social Charter. I examined the European Social Charter along with the practice 
of the European Committee. Documents of the European Committee are available from the HUDOC 
database,207 which is suitable for narrowing down the search results by using different criteria, such 
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as violated provisions of the European Social Charter and respondent states. I selected cases of the 
European Committee for analysis by searching relevant terms and filtering the results. Moreover, I 
used references to a case in another case or in scholarly writings to locate relevant cases. 
From the Inter-American human rights system of the Organisation of the American States, I selected 
the American Convention on Human Rights along with the Protocol of San Salvador. I examined the 
provisions of these treaties along with the practice of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court. I located merits reports of the Inter-American Commission and advisory opinions 
and judgments of the Inter-American Court through secondary sources (ie, books, journal articles 
etc). I obtained relevant cases and documents cited in secondary sources written in English from the 
web pages of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court. 
1.7 Structure of the research 
This research is organised in seven chapters. In the first chapter (present chapter), I introduce the 
research. I identify the research problem in relation to the existing literature, frame the research 
questions, explain the research methodology, and provide the structure of the study. I will answer 
the research questions in five chapters (from chapter two to chapter six). In these chapters, I will first 
discuss the key concepts (ie, progressive realisation, limitation, minimum core, non-
discrimination/equality and participation) by reviewing the literature and examining the practice of 
the CESCR, the European Committee, the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court. 
Then I will turn to the investigation of the key concepts under the African Charter and in the practice 
of the African Commission and the African Court.   
In the second chapter, I will investigate the concept of progressive realisation. In particular, I will 
challenge the conventional meanings of the concept. I will place the omission of the concept from 
the African Charter in historical context. I will search for the Commission's justification, if any, for 
importing the concept into the African Charter. I will also examine possible consequences of 
introducing the concept into the African Charter. In this chapter, I will answer the first research 
question: What is the concept of progressive realisation under the African Charter?  
In the third chapter, I will examine the concept of limitation of rights in general and its applicability to 
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the relationship between limitation and progressive 
realisation. I will then analyse the practice of the African Commission and the African Court and 
identify requirements to be observed while states impose limitation on rights guaranteed under the 
African Charter. Additionally, I will examine whether the identified requirements apply to economic, 
social and cultural rights, ultimately answering the second research question: What are limitations on 
economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter? 
In the fourth Chapter, I will deal with minimum core obligations, beginning with the definition of the 
concept of minimum core and responding to critics of the concept. I will then examine the content 
and characteristics of minimum core obligations. Since the African Commission transplants the 
concept from the practice of the CESCR, I will identify some modifications the Commission makes to 
the content and meaning of minimum core obligation while introducing the concept into the African 
Charter. In this chapter, I will answer the third research question: What are minimum core 
obligations under the African Charter? 
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In the fifth chapter, I will examine the immediate obligation to prohibit discrimination in the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. I will also identify the relationship between 
the achievement of substantive equality and the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. I 
will argue that substantive equality can be achieved by prioritising vulnerable groups, adopting 
temporary special measures in favour of them, and by modifying social structures impeding the 
enjoyment of their rights. In this chapter, I will answer the fourth research question: What does the 
obligation to ensure non-discrimination and equality entail? 
In the sixth chapter, I will examine the obligation to ensure the participation of individuals and 
groups in the implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights. I will discuss provisions of 
the African Charter related to the participation of individuals and groups, and assess whether these 
provisions provide the legal basis for the obligation of states to ensure participation by analysing the 
practice of the African Commission and the African Court. I will also examine whether the African 
Commission and the African Court have developed criteria for the purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of participation. In this chapter, I will answer the last research question: What is the 
obligation to ensure participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of their economic, 
social and cultural rights? 
Finally, I will summarise findings of the research in the last chapter. In the summary, I will identify 
problems with the African Commission’s interpretation of the African Charter, and make some 
suggestions for consideration by both the African Commission and the African Court. I also identify a 
couple of topics for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PROGRESSIVE REALISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of ‘progressive realisation’ usually describes state obligations corresponding to 
economic, social and cultural rights. Adopted in 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)1 incorporates the concept, implying obligations different from 
those undertaken by states under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),2 
which does not refer to ‘progressive realisation’. Some human rights treaties follow the ICESCR and 
require progressive realisation when they guarantee economic, social and cultural rights.3 These 
treaties, however, do not provide the meaning of the concept.  
The concept of progressive realisation refers to a principle that the enjoyment of human rights 
should advance or improve over time. The pace of advancement depends on the resources available 
to a particular state because resources are not only scarce but also unevenly distributed. As a result, 
the rate of advancement in wealthier states is supposed to be faster, but all states should always be 
advancing whether slowly or rapidly. A slow advancement is unacceptable, however, when a greater 
achievement is possible, since states should make maximum use of their resources.4 An 
advancement or improvement necessarily eliminates the possibility of backsliding or decreasing the 
exercise of the rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
established a presumption against deliberately retrogressive measures,5 indicating that progressive 
realisation includes the corollary principle of non-retrogression.6 The concept of progressive 
realisation also gives states some flexibility or discretion in the implementation of the rights.7 
The principle of progressive realisation arises from the scarcity of resources. The principle would 
have been unnecessary if resources were abundant. The realisation of any right is expensive.8 It does 
not matter whether the right in question is civil, cultural, economic, political or social. The realisation 
of rights depends on available resources. The cost of each right varies; the realisation of some rights 
requires more resources than that of others. The general assumption is that civil and political rights 
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of retrogression in economic and social rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed) Economic and Social Rights After the Global Financial 
Crisis (CUP 2014) 123. 
7 Lillian Chenwi ‘Unpacking “progressive realisation”, its relation to resources, minimum core and reasonableness, and some 
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8 Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (WW Norton & Company 1999). 
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are cheaper than economic, social and cultural rights,9 however, the application of the principle of 
progressive realisation is limited to human rights treaties that guarantee economic, social and 
cultural rights.10 This limited application of the principle raises several questions: How did the 
principle evolve in international human rights treaties? Why is the principle included in these 
treaties? What are the meanings of the principle? Does it have any pitfalls? In the second section, I 
seek to answer these questions with the purpose of setting a comparative background for the 
remaining sections of the chapter. The section mainly analyses the ICESCR and the practices of the 
CESCR. It also draws on the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) and the 
European Social Charter (European Charter) and on the practice of their monitoring bodies.   
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter or Charter) guarantees some 
economic, social and cultural rights.11 The Charter does not contain the principle of progressive 
realisation, unlike other economic, social and cultural rights treaties, and its drafting history shows 
that the omission was not an accident. The drafters drew on the ICESCR and the American 
Convention, which were already in force and contain the principle of progressive realisation.12 A 
provision in one of the early drafts of the Charter expressly required progressive realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights, but the drafters jettisoned the principle in the end.13 The African 
Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or 
Commission) to interpret the Charter and oversee its implementation.14 Early practices of the 
Commission show that it understood the omission of the principle of progressive realisation as 
requiring immediate implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.15 Later, the Commission 
introduced the principle into the interpretation of the Charter. This change of position raises some 
questions. Why did the drafters of the African Charter omit the principle? What are the processes 
used by the African Commission to introduce the concept later? I seek to answer these questions in 
the third section of the chapter. This and the remaining sections of the chapter examine the text of 
the African Charter and the practice of the African Commission. 
The most legally technical argument against economic, social and cultural rights is that they entail 
vague obligations.16 That is, the progressive realisation obligation under the ICESCR is not clear. One 
author described the concept as a ‘monster’ in international human rights law.17 The CESCR issued 
several general comments to provide clarification. However, critics continued asking: ‘what does 
                                                          
9 Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Princeton University Press 2008) 234. 
10 Eva Brems ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights Law Review 349-372, 365. 
11 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981 & came into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
12 Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, prepared for the Meeting of Experts in Dakar, Senegal from 28 
November to 8 December 1979, by Kéba Mbaye, CAB/LEG/67/1 (hereafter Mbaye’s draft), reproduced in C Heyns (ed), 
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13 Mbaye’s draft, art 3. 
14 African Charter, arts 30 & 45. 
15 Presentation of the Third Activity Report, by the Chairman of the Commission, Professor U. O. Umozurike to the 26th 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government of the OAU (9 - 11 July 1990), reproduced in Rachel Murray & 
Malcolm Evans (eds) Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2001) 202 - 203.  
16 Wouter Vandenhole ‘Completing the UN complaint mechanisms for human rights violations step by step: Towards a 
complaints procedure complementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2003) 21/3 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 423-462, 436. 
17 Gauthier de Beco ‘The right to inclusive education according to article 24 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: background, requirements and remaining questions’ (2014) 33/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
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"progressive realization" mean?’18 The concept raises the question as to the meaning of economic, 
social and cultural rights.19 If progressive realisation has been a subject of criticisms for lacking clarity 
under the ICESCR, how does the African Commission define it? How are the Commission’s definitions 
similar to or different from those adopted under the ICESCR? Section four deals with the meanings 
attributed to the concept of progressive realisation under the African Charter. 
The African Charter mandates the African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Court) to draw inspiration from international human rights law.20 While introducing 
the principle of progressive realisation, the African Commission has drawn inspiration from the 
ICESCR.21 From an institutional perspective, the CESCR, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Inter-American Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
Court) do not need to justify the principle because it is enshrined in their respective treaties.22 
However, the African Charter does not provide the African Commission and the Court with the same 
treaty text. Thus, a question to be examined in the fifth section relates to the justifications provided 
for introducing the principle.  
The supporters of progressive realisation during the drafting of the ICESCR viewed the principle ‘as a 
necessary accommodation to the vagaries of economic circumstances’.23 In other words, the 
principle addresses the economic diversity of states.24 The CESCR affirmed that the principle is a 
flexibility device that reflects the realities of the real world.25 On the other hand, the principle also 
had opponents even during the drafting of the ICESCR, who objected that it would make the ICESCR 
provisions a dead letter.26 The objection did not vanish after the adoption and entry into force of the 
ICESCR. Unfortunately, the principle has remained one of the main targets of ICESCR critics, who 
argue that ‘for good reason, economic, social, and cultural rights, unlike civil and political rights, have 
been defined primarily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively’.27 They point to the 
weakness of the progressive obligation ‘as evidence of the secondary, non-legal, or non-binding 
nature of economic, social, and cultural rights’.28 If the ICESCR is suffering from a defect because of 
the principle of progressive realisation, the African Charter is a ‘healthy’ treaty. Then, one wonders, 
what are the implications of the Commission’s interpretation of the African Charter for economic, 
social and cultural rights and the Charter itself? The sixth section will address this issue by identifying 
some of the risks of introducing progressive realisation. Finally, the last section closes the chapter 
with some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                          
18 Michael J Dennis & David P Stewart ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an 
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) American 
journal of International Law 462 – 515, 464. 
19 Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History (Princeton University Press 2012) 107. 
20 African Charter, arts 60 & 61. 
21 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles), adopted 24 October 2011, . 
22 ICESCR, art 2(1); American Convention, art 26. 
23 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of states Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’  (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 156-229, 175. 
24 Brems, ‘maximum and minimum’, (n 10) 365. 
25 CESCR, General Comment No 3, para 9. 
26 Alston & Quinn (n 23), 176. 
27 Dennis & Stewart (n 18) 465. 
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2.2 Progressive realisation: A general view 
This section examines the principle of progressive realisation by comparing the ICESCR, the European 
Charter and the American Convention along with the practice of their monitoring bodies, the CESCR, 
the European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee), the Inter-American Commission, 
and the Inter-American Court. The first subsection locates these treaties on a chronological map 
showing the incorporation of progressive realisation in international human rights treaties. The 
second subsection deals with the meaning of the principle of progressive realisation. This part 
focuses on the practice of the CESCR. It also includes the experience of the Inter-American 
Commission, Inter-American Court, and the European Committee with regard to non-retrogression 
where they have dealt with the issue particularly in the context of economic crisis. The third 
subsection will assess the potential and pitfalls of the principle. The purpose of this section is to 
provide a background for the discussions on the African Charter that will follow in the remaining 
sections.  
2.2.1 A brief history of progressive realisation 
The adoption of the ICESCR in the year 1966 marks an important milestone in the history of 
progressive realisation. Economic, social and cultural rights instruments adopted before the ICESCR 
do not contain the concept. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American 
Declaration), which is geographically limited to the Americas, guarantees economic, social and 
cultural rights.29 It was adopted on 2 May 1948, making it the world’s first general international 
human rights instrument. As its names implies, the declaration is not a treaty, however, it would be 
difficult to classify the declaration under non-binding instruments. The Inter-American Court attaches 
some legal value to it, holding that the declaration is ‘a source of international obligations’.30 
Whatever the legal nature and geographical coverage of the declaration, it is worth noting that it 
recognises economic, social and cultural rights but it does not contain the concept of progressive 
realisation. 
On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).31 Like the American Declaration, the Universal 
Declaration is not a treaty. However, it has wider geographical coverage and lays down standards 
that have global application. The Universal Declaration formulates each right in the same manner as 
entitlement of individuals, without distinguishing civil and political rights from economic, social and 
cultural rights.32 The reference of the General Assembly to ‘the draft covenant on human rights,’ 
when it adopted the Declaration but deferred considering a right of petition, indicates the 
expectation that it was to grow into one binding treaty.33 The position was confirmed in 1950 when it 
decided ‘to include in the Covenant on Human Rights economic, social and cultural rights’, stressing 
that ‘the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are 
                                                          
29 Ninth International Conference of American states, Bogotá, Colombia. Reproduced in Theo van Banning et al, Human 
Rights Instruments (University for Peace 2004) 143 – 144. 
30 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within 
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 14 July 1989, 
para 45. 
31 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
32 Compare, for example, art 3, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life’, and art 22, which guarantees that 
‘[e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social security’. In contrast, compare art 6(1) of the ICCPR, which 
provides that ‘[e]very human being has the inherent right to life’, and art 9 of the ICESCR, which provides that ‘[t]he 
states Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security’. 
33 Right to Petition, General Assembly Resolution 217 B (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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interconnected and interdependent’.34 Unfortunately, the idea of a single treaty did not materialise 
in the end. Still, it is noteworthy that the Universal Declaration guarantees economic, social and 
cultural rights but does not contain the concept of progressive realisation. Therefore, it represents a 
period in history when the guarantee of economic, social and cultural rights was not linked to the 
concept of progressive realisation. 
Adopted on 18 October 1961, the European Social Charter comes next in the chronology of events 
relevant to economic, social and cultural rights.35 While this development covers a smaller 
geographical area, being limited to the region indicated by its name, it represents an important 
milestone in the history of economic, social and cultural rights in terms of its legal nature. It is a 
binding treaty. However, the European Charter guarantees social rights only, unlike the Universal 
Declaration. A separate treaty, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights or European Convention), guarantees civil and 
political rights. The European Charter does not contain an express provision on the concept of 
progressive realisation, and the revision in 199636 did not introduce an express provision either. 
Khaliq and Churchill argue that ‘the rights found in the European Charter are in general not 
progressive in nature, i.e. they are not to be implemented gradually as a state party’s resources and 
level of development permit, but are of immediate effect’.37 Lougarre and Cullen assert an opposite 
view: Lougarre reads the preamble to the European Charter as implicitly recognising ‘the principle of 
progressive realisation’,38 while Cullen argues that the European Committee addresses ‘the issue of 
resources and the progressive realisation of economic and social rights’.39 Cullen bases her argument 
on the decision in Autism Europe v France, in which the European Committee required states ‘to 
achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an 
extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources’.40 She cites Marangopoulos 
Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece, which restates the holding in Autism Europe v 
France.41 In Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, the European Committee held 
that the ‘realisation of the fundamental social rights recognised by the Revised Charter is guided by 
the principle of progressiveness’.42  
Like the European Charter, the ICESCR guarantees only one category of rights. Its adoption in 1966 is 
a crucial turning point in the relationship between the concept of progressive realisation and 
economic, social and cultural rights because of how it made the obligation of progressive realisation 
the defining characteristic of each right. The ICESCR contains the principle of progressive realisation 
                                                          
34 General Assembly Resolution 421 E (VI) of 4 December 1950, Draft International Covenant on Humans Rights and 
Measures of Implementation: Future Work of the Commission on Human Rights. 
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36 European Social Charter (Revised), adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999, European Treaty Series No 163. 
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40 Autism Europe v France, Complaint No. 13/2002, Decision on merits adopted on 4 November 2003, para 53.  
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in Article 2(1), a general provision applicable to every right recognised therein.43 In contrast, a similar 
provision under the ICCPR does not make any connection between progressive realisation and civil 
and political rights.44  
The evolution of the ICESCR since its adoption is also relevant for the history of progressive 
realisation. Two developments in particular are notable. One is the establishment of the CESCR in 
1985,45 which has since then been interpreting the principle of progressive realisation in its general 
comments and other instruments. In 1990, in particular, it explained the principle in its general 
comment on state obligations.46 The other development is the adoption and entry into force of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-
ICESCR).47 The protocol is weak in several ways;48 however, it does decouple the concept of 
progressive realisation from that of justiciability at the global level. The principle of progressive 
realisation ‘goes to the heart of the “justiciability” debate,’49 and some have even understood the 
principle to mean non-justiciability.50 The Optional Protocol disentangles these concepts. It leaves 
intact the content of the progressive realisation obligation under Article 2(1), but empowers the 
CESCR to examine complaints alleging violations of rights under the ICESCR, including a failure to 
ensure their progressive realisation.51 The protocol has changed the nature of ICESCR rights by 
creating international justiciability.  
The next development took place at a regional level in the Americas in 1969 when the Organisation 
of American States (OAS) adopted the American Convention in San José. The Convention does not 
guarantee many economic, social and cultural rights itself, but it requires the progressive realisation 
of the rights implicitly recognised in the Charter of the OAS.52 An additional protocol 1988 (Protocol 
of San Salvador) guarantees economic, social and cultural rights and restates the progressive 
realisation obligation already incorporated in the American Convention.53     
In 1981, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), adopted the African 
Charter, which guarantees economic, social and cultural rights.54 The Charter draws on the ICESCR 
and the American Convention, but departs from these treaties with regard to the principle of 
progressive realisation because it does not contain the concept. Protocols to the African Charter have 
expanded substantive rights relating to specific groups, particularly women, older persons and 
                                                          
43 Art 2(1) provides that: ‘Each state Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’. 
44 ICCPR, art 2. 
45 Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, para b. 
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persons with disabilities.55 Although the protocols contain provisions relating to general state 
obligations, they do not contain the concept of progressive realisation.56  
In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).57 The 
CRC guarantees economic, social and cultural rights. In terms of state obligations, the CRC requires 
states to take measures ‘to the maximum extent of their available resources’ only in relation to 
economic, social and cultural rights, distinguishing these rights from civil and political rights.58 
However, unlike the ICESCR, it does not use the qualification of ‘progressive realisation’. As Eide and 
Rosas argue, under the CRC, ‘the obligations arise immediately’ only qualified by the requirement to 
use maximum resources.59 However, the Committee on the Rights of the Child aligned the CRC with 
the ICESCR in 2003.60 The Committee stated that the requirement of taking measures to the 
maximum of states’ available resources ‘introduces the concept of “progressive realization”’ of 
economic, social and cultural rights into the CRC.61  
In 1990, the OAU adopted the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter), guaranteeing economic, social and cultural rights of the child.62 The African 
Children’s Charter reflects the CRC with a few exceptions and modifications that make it more 
relevant to African realities. Unlike the CRC, the African Children’s Charter does not distinguish state 
obligations that apply to economic, social and cultural rights from those applicable to civil and 
political rights. In a language reminiscent of the African Charter, it requires states to take necessary 
steps to ‘adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect’ to the rights it 
guarantees.63 It does not require their progressive realisation in its general obligation provision.64 
Adopted in 2004,65 the Arab Charter on Human Rights recognises economic, social and cultural rights 
as well as civil and political rights.66 This treaty provides for the same general obligations with regard 
to all the rights it guarantees,67 yet does not incorporate the principle of progressive realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
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Adopted in 2006, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) represents the 
latest development in the area of economic, social and cultural rights.68 The CRPD distinguishes state 
obligations corresponding to economic, social and cultural rights from those corresponding to civil 
and political rights.69 Like the ICESCR, the CRPD requires the progressive realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights.70 This requirement should not affect obligations ‘that are immediately 
applicable according to international law’.71 Thus, unlike the ICESCR, the CRPD makes the exception 
that economic, social and cultural rights are subject to immediate obligations under Article 4(2).  
In sum, a perusal of human rights treaties that guarantee economic, social and cultural rights in 
chronological order reveals that the relationship between the concept of progressive realisation and 
economic, social and cultural rights began in 1966 with the adoption of the ICESCR. This relationship 
was built on top of the existing treaty-making model adopted by the Council of Europe. The 
European treaty-making model separates economic, social and cultural rights from civil and political 
rights. The UN adopted the European model, which evolved in later treaties, particularly in the CRC, 
CRPD, and the OP-ICESCR. The CRC and CRPD guarantee economic, social and cultural rights as well 
as civil and political rights in the same treaty. Moreover, the OP-ICESCR makes economic, social and 
cultural rights under the ICESCR justiciable and thereby clarifies the confusion between progressive 
realisation and justiciability. The CRPD recognises that the obligation of progressive realisation 
should not affect immediate obligations. The AU and its predecessor, the OAU, adopted a different 
model of treaty making. As the African Charter (along with its protocols) and the African Child’s 
Charter show, the African treaty-making model guarantees human rights in the same treaty. The 
Arab Charter indicates that the Arab League also adopted this model. Treaties that adopt the African 
model do not contain the concept of progressive realisation. The human rights treaties that contain 
the concept of progressive realisation do not explain the meaning of the concept, which leads to a 
need for an examination of the concept’s interpretation. The following discussion searches for the 
meaning of the concept in the practice of the treaty bodies.  
2.2.2 Meaning of progressive realisation 
From the outset, one must concede that progressive realisation does not convey a single, universally 
accepted meaning and may therefore have several interpretations. On the one hand, the concept is 
used to strengthen the international accountability of states with regard to the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. In this sense, it is submitted, the meaning of the concept 
includes three dimensions. First, progressive realisation implies advancement in the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Second, the concept implies non-retrogression. Finally, it also 
implies that states have discretion in the implementation of these rights. These meanings are evident 
from the explanations of the CESCR, Inter-American Court, Inter-American Commission, and the 
European Committee as discussed below.72 On the other hand, progressive realisation has been 
invoked to undermine economic, social and cultural rights. This aspect of the meaning of progressive 
realisation will be discussed below among the pitfalls of the principle.  
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2.2.2.1 Progressive realisation as advancement in the enjoyment of rights 
Progressive realisation refers to the achievement of economic, social and cultural rights over time 
because the full realization of these rights ‘will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period 
of time’.73 It refers to the obligation of states to make advancements or improvements in the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights,74 with the goal of attaining full realisation of the 
rights. As the CESCR emphasises, ‘states have an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively 
as possible towards the goal’.75 The goal (i.e. full realisation of the rights) is not something 
determinate, but rather ‘more akin to a horizon line’76 that recedes into the distance as one tries to 
reach it. The drafting history of the ICESCR reflects this view. As Alston and Quinn recount, 
progressive realisation was meant to convey the idea that the ICESCR does not set a final fixed goal 
to be achieved by states.77 Rather, it implies that the implementation of these rights ‘should be 
pursued without respite’.78 To reach the goal, states should advance toward the goal as quickly as 
possible since they are required to make their move expeditiously. Whether a state has made an 
expeditious move depends on the circumstances of each case. In its assessment, the CESCR takes 
into account the period in which states take the measures.79 Nevertheless, it correctly avoids 
dictating states a fixed period. What matters is whether the time taken or to be taken to achieve the 
goal is reasonable because states need to adopt measures that may take a short, medium or even 
long time to achieve.80 In this regard, the European Committee emphasised in Autism-Europe v 
France that states must take measures to achieve the goals of the European Charter ‘within a 
reasonable time’.81 The efforts of states to achieve the full realisation of rights must produce results 
because they are required to make their move as effectively as possible. Measures taken must yield 
fruits. States should achieve ‘measurable progress over time’.82 Without a result, a state cannot claim 
to have carried out its progressive realisation obligation no matter how speedy its move may be.   
The CESCR distinguishes the general principle of progressive realisation from specific immediate 
obligations that coexist with it. The latter includes the obligation to take steps, monitor the 
realisation of rights, ensure a minimum essential level of each right and guarantee non-
discrimination.83 The CESCR compares the two Covenants and characterises the obligations under the 
ICCPR as immediate obligations significantly different from the progressive realisation under the 
ICESCR.84 This characterisation does not mean that one is the diametrical opposite of the other. 
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Rather, as the CESCR itself suggests, progressive realisation is the sum of immediate obligations 
discharged over time with the effect of advancing the enjoyment of the rights. This view arises from 
the fact that the obligation ‘to take steps’ is an immediate obligation and its implementation over 
time constitutes progressive realisation. The CESCR observed that ‘while the full realization of the 
relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a 
reasonably short time’.85  
In defining progressive realisation in the context of housing rights in South Africa, Bilchitz establishes 
a relationship between progressive realisation and minimum core obligations. He does not maintain 
a watertight dichotomy between them, as he considers minimum core obligations a component of 
progressive realisation.86 He defines progressive realisation as a movement from the realisation of 
minimum essential levels of rights to their full realisation. 87 Similarly, Chenwi argues that progressive 
realisation includes ‘some immediate (as well as tangible) obligations’ such as the obligation to take 
steps.88 Bilchitz and Chenwi suggest that some immediate obligations are part of progressive 
realisation. 
The dichotomy between immediate and progressive obligations could be dangerous because the 
classification of something as a progressive obligation ‘might lead a state to believe that it does not 
need to act in any specific way immediately’.89 States are always under an obligation to act, as they 
have an immediate obligation to take steps. Put differently, at a particular point in time, states have 
immediate obligations only. The progressive realisation obligation arises over a certain period. It 
would be difficult for a state to justify inaction on resource grounds if it adopts and implements a 
plan of action that sets goals and provides an estimate of available resources.90 In such case, ‘the 
issue of resource constraints begins to fade’.91 As the CESCR stressed, ‘[t]he “availability of 
resources”, although an important qualifier to the obligation to take steps, does not alter the 
immediacy of the obligation, nor can resource constraints alone justify inaction’.92  
Indeed, lack of resources is not a defence for a state’s inaction; however, the availability of resources 
does determine the degree of advancement in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 
That is, the principle of progressive realisation reflects the view that most of the rights guaranteed in 
the ICESCR ‘depend in varying degrees on the availability of resources’.93 During the drafting of the 
ICESCR, the resource question united supporters of progressive realisation from the developing 
Global South and the developed Global North. As Whelan and Donnelly recount, the US 
representative echoed the argument of the Indian delegate that ‘their resources and state of 
economic development did not permit them to implement the economic and social rights at one 
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stroke of the pen’.94 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, therefore, reflects resource scarcity in the principle of 
progressive realisation.  
Progressive realisation is shorthand for the phrase ‘with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized’ used in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.95 It is the principal obligation of 
result dependent on, but different from, the obligation to take steps.96 The latter is an obligation of 
conduct, which is of an immediate effect.97 The requirement that each state party should take steps 
‘to the maximum of its available resources’ supplements this obligation.98 Alston and Quinn examine 
the drafting history of the ICESCR and explain that the reference to ‘available resources’ in this 
provision is not limited to budgetary appropriations,99 but to the real resources of a country.100 
Without being exhaustive, Robertson identifies that ‘financial, natural, human, technological, and 
informational resources are the most important resources in achieving ICESCR rights’.101 To this list, 
Skogly adds cultural and scientific resources.102 She finds in the literature a tendency to 
overemphasise and equate the term ‘resources’ with ‘economic or financial resources’ although the 
ICESCR does not refer to ‘maximum of available financial or economic resources’.103  
The view that ‘all economic, social and cultural rights must be provided by the state’ is a widespread 
misunderstanding.104 It is the responsibility of the individual to satisfy his or her own needs ‘through 
his or her own efforts and by use of own resources’.105 The resources necessary for the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights do not come entirely from the state.106 Article 
2(1) therefore refers to those resources ‘that are available within the society as a whole, from the 
private sector as well as the public’.107  
Resources under Article 2(1) are also not limited to those existing within national boundaries. The 
CESCR emphasises that available resources include ‘both the resources existing within a state and 
those available from the international community through international cooperation and 
assistance’.108 The CESCR considers that states have the obligation to seek or provide international 
assistance and cooperation. It stressed that ‘states parties facing considerable difficulties in achieving 
progressive realization of [economic, social and cultural rights] due to a lack of national resources 
have an obligation to seek international cooperation and assistance’.109 They should also avail 
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themselves of the technical assistance and cooperation of the United Nations’ specialized agencies 
when formulating and implementing national strategies with regard to these rights.110 
While states that lack national resources have the obligation to seek, developed states have the 
obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation. The CESCR stressed that:  
[I]nternational cooperation for development and thus for the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights […] is an obligation of states parties, especially of those states that are in a position to 
provide assistance. This obligation is in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, as well as articles 2, paragraph 1, and articles 15 and 23 of the [ICESCR].111 
When developing states make a request for an assistance, developed states ‘must respond to such 
requests in good faith and in accordance with the international commitment of contributing at a 
minimum 0.7 per cent of their gross national income for international cooperation and assistance’.112 
The CESCR’s position on the legal nature of this obligation is unequivocal. Its source is international 
law, as its reference to the United Nations Charter indicates. However, it is important to note that 
some states were reluctant to accept international assistance and cooperation as a legal concept 
during the drafting of the OP-ICESCR.113  
The pace of progressive realisation varies from one state to another depending on the quality as well 
as quantity of their available resources.114 In its monitoring process, the CESCR distinguishes the 
inability from the unwillingness of a state party to comply with its obligations.115 Empirical data 
shows that states with a similar level of resources may have different levels of achievement in the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.116 The unwillingness may be indicated by a failure 
to allocate resources or a failure to make proper use of the allocated resources. Article 2(1) requires 
states to allocate the highest possible amount of resources for the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights. In principle, the allocation of maximum available resources does not require states to 
use all resources at their disposal. However, when there is a failure to satisfy minimum core 
obligations corresponding to a right, states should be able to prove that they have made efforts ‘to 
use all resources’ at their disposal as a matter of priority.117      
The unwillingness of a state may also manifest when that state fails to ensure the maximum 
utilisation of allocated resources. A proper utilisation of resources is as important as their allocation 
because factors such as corruption and improper spending undermine the efficiency of human rights 
implementation.118 Putting available resources to full use is necessary. The CESCR does also monitor 
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this aspect, albeit mostly in an indirect way. For example, it requires states to make ‘full use of the 
maximum available resources’ before they take retrogressive measures.119 Here it focuses on 
utilisation rather than allocation. In its statement on available resources, the CESCR has also made a 
similar indication. In examining ‘a communication concerning an alleged failure of a state party to 
take steps to the maximum of available resources,’ it considers ‘whether the state party adopted the 
option that least restricts’ the rights under the ICESCR from a range of several policy options.120 
Indirectly, this means that states should adopt measures that best enhance the enjoyment of rights. 
Its emphasis on low-cost measures can be another indication of its focus on how the allocated 
resources should be used.121  
Unfortunately, in some instances the CESCR appears to shy away from monitoring resource 
allocation and utilisation. With regard to the right to social security, for example, it observed: ‘In 
accordance with article 2(1), states parties to the Covenant must take effective measures, and 
periodically revise them when necessary, within their maximum available resources, to fully realize 
the right’.122 It made a similar observation with regard to some other rights.123 This approach has an 
implication for its supervision. The CESCR departs from the language of the ICESCR, which requires 
each state party to take steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources’.124 In so doing, it 
obliterates one of the requirements under the ICESCR. To illustrate, any use of resources logically 
falls somewhere on a continuum that ranges from the worst use to the best use. Similarly, any 
resource allocation ranges from none to maximum. Any amount of resource allocation or any degree 
of resource utilisation always falls within the maximum of available resources. Unless the CESCR 
requires states to make the best use of their resources or to make the highest possible allocation for 
the realisation of the rights under the ICESCR, it is not necessary to state that measures should be 
taken within available resources. The purpose of the CESCR is not to monitor whether states exceed 
their available resources in the implementation of the rights under the ICESCR. Therefore, the 
requirement of taking steps within the maximum of available resources lowers the standard set in 
the ICESCR.  
2.2.2.2 Progressive realisation as non-retrogression in the enjoyment of rights 
Human rights conditions in a given state may take three directions over time: they may improve, 
remain the same, or even worse, decline. The improvement in the enjoyment of human rights over 
time is progressive realisation. On the other hand, if the enjoyment of the rights remains the same 
over time, there is no progressive realisation. Nor there is a progressive realisation when the 
enjoyment of the rights declines. In this respect, progressive realisation may mean non-
retrogression. This is a necessary implication of the obligation to make improvement or 
advancement. The meaning of non-retrogression and the criteria for evaluating the appropriateness 
of retrogressive measures are discussed below.    
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i) Meaning of non-retrogression 
Retrogression is the decline in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The concept 
‘involves two dimensions: normative and empirical’.125 Empirical retrogression is concerned with de 
facto ‘backsliding in the effective enjoyment of the rights,’126 resulting from natural events or other 
occurrences over which a state has no control. For example, natural calamities such as flood or 
earthquake may destroy several factories. Obviously, the destruction of factories results in loss of 
jobs, leading to reduction in the enjoyment of the right to work. The actions or omissions of a state 
may also cause empirical retrogression. An omission can be a state’s failure to regulate non-state 
actors such as corporations. Such omission may lead to unlawful dismissals of workers, which in turn 
results in a reduced enjoyment of the right to work. The acts of a state such as promulgation of a law 
may reduce the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. That is, an empirical retrogression 
may result from a normative retrogression, which ‘concerns steps backwards in terms of legal, de 
jure guarantees’.127 For instance, a state may repeal an existing law prohibiting forced labour.128 
However, normative retrogression does not always result in empirical retrogression. For example, if 
no employer actually practices forced labour despite the repeal of the law, actual reduction in the 
enjoyment of the right to work would not happen.  
Progressive realisation, therefore, implies non-retrogression in the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights. The principle of non-retrogression is a corollary principle of progressive 
realisation.129 In defining progressive realisation under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the CESCR stressed 
that ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures’ can only be adopted with the most careful 
consideration.130  Such measure can only be justified on two grounds: when it increases the overall 
enjoyment of the rights provided in the ICESCR; and when a state party has no resources after 
making the full use of its maximum available resources.131 The CESCR includes this requirement in 
most of its general comments adopted since 1999.132  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
have adopted the same view while interpreting Article 26 of the American Convention, which is 
similar to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. In National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social 
Security Institute et al v Peru, the Inter-American Commission relied on the practice of the CESCR and 
held that: 
[T]he nature of the obligations derived from article 26 of the American Convention means that total 
effectiveness of such rights must be achieved progressively and in attention to the available resources. 
This means a correlative obligation not to back down in the advances achieved in this matter. That is 
the non regressive obligation developed by other international [treaty bodies].133 
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The Inter-American Commission shows that progressive realisation and non-retrogression are two 
sides of the same coin despite the different terminology.134 If there is retrogression in the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights, a priori, there is no progressive realisation. In Acevedo 
Buendía et al v Peru, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopts the same view based on the 
practice of the CESCR and the Inter-American Commission.135 It held that ‘there is a duty – though 
conditioned – of not adopting retrogressive steps’.136  
The European Committee invoked the principle of non-retrogression with respect to the right to 
social security, which requires states ‘to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social 
security to a higher level’.137 In GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v Greece, the Committee examined, among 
other things, the effects of measures taken in response to an economic crisis.138 The Committee 
recognised that ‘it may be necessary to introduce measures to consolidate public finances in times of 
economic crisis.’ However, the Committee subjected such measures to two limits – sufficiency and 
inclusion – holding that ‘any changes to a social security system must maintain in place a sufficiently 
extensive system of compulsory social security and refrain from excluding entire categories of worker 
from the social protection offered by this system’.139 The Committee concluded that ‘financial 
consolidation measures which fail to respect these limits constitute retrogressive steps which cannot 
be deemed to be in conformity with [the Charter]’.140 
As to what constitutes a retrogressive measure, the practice of human rights treaty bodies do not 
provide a clear direction. The CESCR occasionally mentions that it considers state conduct to be 
retrogressive. In a couple of general comments, the CESCR lists some state conducts as examples of 
retrogressive measures,141 most of which are legislative measures, as they relate to the promulgation 
of new laws or the abrogation of existing ones. For example, enacting laws that permit forced labour 
or repealing laws that provide protection against unlawful dismissal constitutes a retrogressive 
measure with regard to the right to work.142 Also, enacting laws that revoke ‘public health funding for 
sexual and reproductive health services’ or passing laws that criminalise ‘certain sexual and 
reproductive health conduct and decisions’ amounts to taking retrogressive measures.143 The bones 
of contention in the regional systems are also legislative measures decreasing the enjoyment of 
rights, particularly the right to social security. The European Committee found that a Greek law 
constitutes a retrogressive step for reducing the number of individuals who have access to a social 
security system.144  Peruvian laws came under the spotlight before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for decreasing the amount of 
pension payments.145  
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The CESCR also lists retrogressive measures that at first glance do not appear to require the 
enactment or repeal of laws. For example, ‘the removal of sexual and reproductive health 
medications from national drug registries’ and ‘the imposition of barriers to information, goods and 
services relating to sexual and reproductive health’ are considered retrogressive measures.146 A 
reduction or removal of subsidies also constitutes a retrogressive measure. In its concluding 
observations on Egypt, the CESCR was ‘concerned that retrogressive measures, such as the reduction 
or removal of subsidies’ affect the enjoyment of the right to food and called upon the state party to 
‘undertake immediate measures to address the retrogression in the right to adequate food’.147 Even 
these measures cannot be dissociated from the enactment or repeal of laws. For example, laws may 
be enacted to place certain medications on national drug registries while repeal of the same laws 
results in their removal from the registries. For the same reason, subsidies on food supply may have 
been authorised by a legislative enactment.  
The CESCR distinguishes between violations resulting from an omission and those arising from an 
act of commission.148 It usually considers that retrogressive measures are a violation resulting 
from acts of commission.149 The CESCR also distinguishes three levels or types of state 
obligations: duties to respect, to protect and to fulfil. Retrogressive measures can affect these 
levels of obligations. In the general comment on the right to work (Article 6 of the ICESCR), 
retrogressive measures are tantamount to a failure to carry out the duty to respect.150 In the 
general comment on the right to sexual and reproductive health (Article 12 of the ICESCR), 
retrogressive measures are not clearly linked to the duty to respect.151 However, the same 
conducts are regarded as retrogressive measures and as a failure to discharge the duty to 
respect. For example, ‘enacting laws criminalizing certain sexual and reproductive health 
conduct and decisions’ is a retrogressive measure.152 The same legislative measure is considered 
contrary to the duty to respect.153 In some other general comments, the CESCR limits itself to 
stating that retrogressive measures constitute a violation of the rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR.154 
Langford and King indicate that the duty to respect is related to the individual or discriminatory 
aspect of the violation, while ‘non-retrogression refers to collective changes that affect all 
persons’—suggesting a nuanced distinction between them.155 The collective changes caused by a 
retrogressive measure need not affect all persons in a particular state, for they can still be 
collective even if they affect only a certain sector of society. For example, in GENOP-DEI and 
ADEDY v Greece, the impugned measure affected specifically young workers, not even all 
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workers.156 However, the CESCR does not distinguish an individual aspect from a collective 
aspect of a violation when it deals with the duty to respect. For example, it has explained that 
legislative measures can violate the duty to respect,157 and as such, usually have a collective 
application since laws are not made for one individual.  
Retrogressive measures relate to the duty to protect indirectly. A failure to regulate non-state 
actors that interfere with the enjoyment of rights is a violation of the duty to protect, while 
repealing laws that protect individuals against private actors is a retrogressive measure contrary 
to the duty to respect. For example, a failure to promulgate laws that regulate the dismissal of 
workers is a violation of the duty to protect while abrogation of laws that protect individuals 
against unlawful dismissal amounts to a retrogressive measure in violation of the duty to 
respect.158 A similar example can be given with regard to the duty to fulfil. States should provide 
food to individuals who lose their crops due to natural disasters such as an earthquake, drought 
and flood.159 The failure to provide food during such emergencies may amount to a violation of the 
duty to fulfil, but interrupting provision of foodstuff during such period could be retrogressive 
measures violating the duty to respect.  
The obligation of non-retrogression is a conditional obligation, as it suffers from an exception. That 
is, the presumption against retrogressive measures is rebuttable, as there is no absolute prohibition 
of such measures. The CESCR does not completely bar retrogression. It requires justification for only 
‘deliberately’ retrogressive measures.160 Commentators suggest that non-retrogression is not always 
good. Drawing on national experiences, Landau argues that the principle ‘may have dangerous and 
counterproductive effects’ because instead of affecting the poor, it usually affects the middle and 
upper classes in the form of salary or pension cuts.161 The prohibition of retrogressive measures, 
therefore, ‘may prevent or slow necessary structural reforms’.162 In other words, ‘a prohibition 
against retrogressive measures may leave the non-enjoyment of economic and social rights by the 
poor undisturbed’ and retain the status quo.163    
The CESCR permits even ‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ on two conditions.164 First, it is 
permissible when such a measure increases the total enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights.165 The rise in the sum of rights-holders may indicate the total increase in the enjoyment of the 
rights. This understanding dispels the concern that non-retrogression may be dangerous. Thus, a 
retrogressive measure (e.g. decreasing the pension or salary of middle and upper class) is permissible 
if it increases the enjoyment of the rights by the masses. Second, a retrogressive measure is 
permissible when a state party faces resource constraints despite maximum use of its available 
resources.166 To assess compliance with this requirement, the CESCR adopted some criteria.167 
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Therefore, the CESCR does not prohibit retrogressive measures. It rather examines them with 
heightened scrutiny.168 For making such scrutiny, it has developed some criteria discussed below.169  
The Inter-American system also recognises the exceptions to the prohibition of retrogressive 
measures. The Inter-American Commission held that not every retrogressive measure is incompatible 
with Article 26 of the American Convention.170  Strong reasons can justify taking retrogressive 
measures.171 In examining a claim by Peruvian pensioners concerning a reduction of pensions, it 
found that the retrogressive measures were compatible with the American Convention. Its reasons 
are that ‘the reduction affected a reduced number of pensioners with the aim of improving the 
conditions of the exercise of the right by the rest of the beneficiaries’.172 This resonates with the 
CESCR’s view that retrogressive measures are permissible if they increase the totality of the rights 
guaranteed under the ICESCR. 
Similarly, the European Committee recognises conditions under which retrogressive steps are 
permissible with regard to the right to social security, permitting such measures when they ‘maintain 
in place a sufficiently extensive system of compulsory social security and refrain from excluding 
entire categories of worker from the social protection offered by this system’.173  It found that a 
Greek law which has the practical effect of excluding young workers from the social security system 
is incompatible with the state obligation to ‘endeavour to raise progressively the system of social 
security to a higher level’ under Article 12(3) of the European Charter.174  
ii) Criteria for reviewing retrogression 
The CESCR has been developing some criteria for evaluating retrogressive measures. These criteria 
have evolved tremendously over time. In 1990, when the CESCR developed the principle of non-
retrogression as a logical implication of the principle of progressive realisation, it did not lay down 
detailed criteria for reviewing retrogressive measures.175 Resource constraints are one of the 
conditions for which retrogressive measures are permissible, as noted above.176 In 2007, the drafting 
of the OP-ICESCR prompted the CESCR to issue a statement on available resource.177 The Statement 
outlined seven objective criteria for evaluating retrogressive measures taken due to resource 
constraints.178 These criteria include consideration of factors such as economic recession, armed 
                                                          
168 Langford (n 82) 240. 
169 statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Public debt, austerity measures and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2016/1, 22 July 2016, para 4. 
170 National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al v Peru, para 140. 
171 Ibid para 141. 
172 Ibid para 143. 
173 GENOP-DEI & ADEDY v Greece, para 47. 
174 Ibid para 47-49. 
175 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. 
176 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. 
177 CESCR, statement on Available Resources (n 79). 
178 Ibid para 10: ‘Should a state party use “resource constraints” as an explanation for any retrogressive steps taken, the 
Committee would consider such information on a country-by-country basis in the light of objective criteria such as: (a) 
The country’s level of development; (b) The severity of the alleged breach, in particular whether the situation concerned 
the enjoyment of the minimum core content of the Covenant; (c) The country’s current economic situation, in particular 
whether the country was undergoing a period of economic recession; (d) The existence of other serious claims on the 
state party’s limited resources; for example, resulting from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or 
international armed conflict. (e) Whether the state party had sought to identify low-cost options; and (f) Whether the 
state party had sought cooperation and assistance or rejected offers of resources from the international community for 
the purposes of implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reason’. 
 48 
conflicts and natural disasters.179  It is clear from the 2007 statement that these criteria do not apply 
to the other condition (i.e. increasing the total enjoyment of rights).  
In 2008, the CESCR identified criteria for assessing retrogressive measures in the general comment 
on the right to social security.180 No such criteria were included in the general comments adopted 
hitherto. These criteria are significantly different from those adopted a few months earlier in the 
2007 statement apart from the requirement of compliance with the minimum core content.181 The 
CESCR does not limit the 2008 criteria to retrogressive measures adopted due to resource 
constraints. Thus, the criteria apply to all retrogressive measures as far as they affect the right to 
social security. Later, the CESCR reproduced the 2008 criteria in its statement on austerity measures 
adopted in 2016.182 Thus, the 2008 criteria form part of the 2016 criteria as discussed below.  
In 2012, the Chairperson of the CESCR sent an open letter to the state parties.183 The letter called 
upon states to refrain from taking measures that infringe upon economic, social and cultural rights 
during the financial crisis. In this letter, the chairperson emphasised that: ‘Economic and financial 
crises and a lack of growth impede the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights 
and can lead to regression in the enjoyment of those rights’. The letter acknowledges that some 
adjustments are inevitable during an economic and financial crisis. It lays down criteria for evaluating 
the appropriateness of retrogressive measures, adjustment policies, to borrow the terms used in the 
letter.184 
In 2016, the CESCR adopted some instruments relevant to retrogressive measures. Notable among 
them are two general comments (No. 22 and No. 23) and a statement on public debt and austerity 
measures. While all of these instruments deal with criteria used to assess retrogressive measures, 
they do not provide an identical list. Under General Comment 22, states have the burden of proving 
the necessity of retrogressive measures.185 states are required to ensure that retrogressive measures 
‘are only temporary, do not disproportionately affect disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
groups, and are not applied in an otherwise discriminatory manner’.186 General Comment 23 refers 
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to the 2012 Chairperson’s Letter and provides that when a state party introduces retrogressive 
measures, ‘it has to demonstrate that such measures are temporary, necessary and non-
discriminatory, and that they respect at least its core obligations’.187 
With some modifications to the criteria contained in the 2012 Letter, the CESCR reaffirmed these 
criteria in July 2016: 188 
If the adoption of retrogressive measures is unavoidable, such measures should be necessary and 
proportionate [...]. They should remain in place only in so far as they are necessary; they should not 
result in discrimination; they should mitigate inequalities that can grow in times of crisis and ensure 
that the rights of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately 
affected; and they should not affect the minimum core content of the rights protected under the 
Covenant.189 
One of the modifications concerns the duration of retrogressive measures. The 2012 criteria require 
that retrogressive measures should be temporary and that they should be limited to the period of 
the crisis.190 In contrast, the 2016 statement does not limit retrogressive measures to the period of 
crisis. It does not use the word ‘temporary’; it requires that retrogressive measures ‘should remain in 
place only in so far as they are necessary’. Thus, states can extend retrogressive measures beyond 
the period of crisis.191  
The 2016 statement dropped the emphasis on the range of measures to be adopted. The 2012 Letter 
requires that the measures to be adopted ‘must comprise all possible measures’. In other words, the 
measures should be as comprehensive as possible. It also provides tax measures as one of the 
examples of measures to be taken. However, the 2016 statement omits two requirements: a) policies 
adopted during period of economic recession should be comprehensive; and b) states must take tax 
measures. That is, the 2016 Statement gives states more discretion than the 2012 Letter does. 
Finally, the 2016 statement eliminated some requirements with regard to the minimum core content 
of a right. The 2012 Letter requires that retrogressive measures should identify the minimum core 
content of a right or social protection floor, which should be identified by reference to the work of 
the International Labour Organisation. In the 2012 Letter, the CESCR equates the minimum core 
content of a right with a social protection floor, but it changed that view in the 2016 statement. 
According to the 2012 Letter, states have the discretion to determine what constitutes a minimum 
core content of a right, while the 2016 statement is not clear on who determines the core. In 
addition, the 2016 statement avoids reference to social protection floors and to the work of the 
International Labour Organisation.  
Some criteria emerge from the 2016 statement. The first one relates to the necessity and 
proportionality of a retrogressive measure. The CESCR does not distinguish necessity from 
proportionality, instead defining them together. A retrogressive measure is ‘necessary and 
proportionate’ when ‘the adoption of any other policy or failure to act would be more detrimental to 
                                                          
187 CESCR, General Comment 23: para 52. 
188 CESCR, statement on Public Debt (n 169), para 4. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Chairperson’s letter (n 183). 
191 statement on Public Debt (n 169), para 4. It provides that: ‘They should remain in place only insofar as they are 
necessary’. 
 50 
economic, social and cultural rights’.192 This criterion largely corresponds to the test of ‘least 
restrictive means’ employed to determine whether restrictions on rights are appropriate.193 The 
second criterion is used to evaluate the duration or the life span of retrogressive measures. Such 
measures should not be put in place for an indefinite period. The CESCR emphasises that 
retrogressive measures ‘should remain in place only in so far as they are necessary’.194 Thus, it 
evaluates the temporal necessity of the measures. 
The third and fourth criteria, prohibition of discrimination and mitigation of inequality, are closely 
related. Retrogressive measures should not be discriminatory in the first place. The CESCR does not 
require states to achieve equality when retrogressive measures are taken, however, it requires them 
to reduce the level of inequalities which may ensue from any given crisis. Thus, retrogressive 
measures should contain inbuilt mechanisms for lessening inequalities. In particular, states must 
ensure that ‘disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately 
affected’.195 Finally, the requirement of respect for ‘the minimum core content of the rights,’ draws 
the line below which the reduction in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights should 
not fall due to retrogressive measures.196  
These 2016 criteria are applicable to evaluate the appropriateness of all retrogressive measures 
affecting all rights in the ICESCR. A caveat must be added to this conclusion, though: the 2016 
statement takes the right to social security as an example. The statement reads:  
As regards the right to social security for instance, when faced with retrogressive measures adopted 
by states, the Committee examines whether: (a) there was reasonable justification for the action; (b) 
alternatives were comprehensively examined; (c) there was genuine participation of affected groups 
in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (d) the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory; (e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the realization of the right to social 
security, an unreasonable impact on acquired social security rights or whether an individual or group is 
deprived of access to the minimum essential level of social security; and (f) whether there was an 
independent review of the measures at the national level.197 
The statement reproduced verbatim the 2008 criteria as the application of the 2016 criteria to the 
right to social security. The application, however, resulted in the introduction of additional elements. 
First, the requirement that retrogressive measures should be comprehensive (‘b’) was left out from 
the 2016 statement, although a similar idea was included in the 2012 Letter. Second, the 
requirement of genuine participation (‘c’) and independent national review (‘f’) do not seem to fall 
under any of the 2016 general criteria. 
As a result, the 2016 statement may be subject to at least two alternative readings. One view is to 
regard the last two criteria (genuine participation and independent national review) as applicable to 
the right to social security only. This view is supported by the texts of the 2016 statement and the 
general comment on the right to social security. Neither instrument clearly extends the two criteria 
to evaluate retrogressive measures affecting other rights under the ICESCR. An alternative view is to 
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consider these criteria applicable to all retrogressive measures, affecting all rights under the ICESCR 
as suggested by Nolan and others.198 They derive this criterion from the general comment on the 
right to social security.199  However, they do not clarify how a criterion intended to be applicable to 
one right (the right to social security) also extends to all the rights under the ICESCR. 
iii) Application of the criteria for reviewing retrogression 
The criteria laid down to evaluate the appropriateness of retrogressive measures are in their early 
development.200 The CESCR does not evaluate whether a retrogressive measure complies with each 
of these criteria, nonetheless, the following can be inferred from its concluding observations. The 
CESCR usually expresses its concern that austerity measures or retrogressive measures reduce the 
enjoyment of rights; then, it calls the attention of states to the documents containing the criteria (the 
2012 Letter and the 2016 statement), particularly in relation to reports submitted in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing austerity measures.201 Sometimes, it reproduces the criteria in 
its recommendations.202 It then requires states that came out of economic or financial crisis to review 
the austerity or retrogressive measures.203  
Finally, the CESCR seems to have evaluated the appropriateness of retrogressive measures with at 
least some of the criteria, particularly, the mitigation of inequalities and temporariness. It found that 
Portugal’s measures did not comply with the criterion of mitigating inequality, as it held that ‘various 
measures, specifically those that target disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, have 
not been sufficient to adequately protect them against the consequences of the crisis.’204 It 
expressed similar concern with regard to measures taken by the United Kingdom as it ‘is seriously 
concerned about the disproportionate, adverse impact that austerity measures introduced in 2010 
are having on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and groups’.205 In line with its requirement that a retrogressive measure 
should be temporary, the CESCR seems to have suggested that Cyprus unnecessarily extended the 
duration of the measure when it required the state to ‘[e]nsure that austerity measures are gradually 
phased out’.206   
 
 
                                                          
198 Nolan et al (n 6) 140. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Nolan et al (n 6) 132. 
201 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus, E/C.12/CYP/CO/6, 28 October 2016, para 12; Concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report of Ukraine, E/C.12/UKR/CO/6, 13 June 2014, para 5; Concluding observations 
on the combined fourth and fifth reports of Bulgaria, E/C.12/BGR/CO/4-5, 11 December 2012, para 11; Concluding 
observations on the fourth report of Iceland, E/C.12/ISL/CO/4, 11 December 2012, para 6; Concluding observations of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Spain, E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, 6 June 2012, para 8. 
202 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, para 19. 
203 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus, E/C.12/CYP/CO/6, 28 October 2016, para 12; Concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, para 19; Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Portugal, 
E/C.12/PRT/CO/4, 8 December 2014, para 6. 
204 Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Portugal, E/C.12/PRT/CO/4, 8 December 2014, para 6. 
205 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, para 19 
206 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus, E/C.12/CYP/CO/6, 28 October 2016, para 12. 
 52 
2.2.2.3 Progressive realisation as state discretion  
The principle of progressive realisation denotes that states have some discretion in the 
implementation of the rights. It represents ‘a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of 
the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights’.207 The CESCR indicates that the conditions necessary for the 
implementation of rights are not the same in all states. Thus, the concept is ‘a tool developed to 
accommodate economic diversity among states subscribing to the same human rights obligations’.208 
It provides states ‘some leeway in choosing the measures to be adopted according to the context’.209 
That is, progressive realisation implies that states have some discretion in the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
The CESCR recognises that the measures of implementation depend on the contexts in each state. It 
acknowledges that ‘[t]he most appropriate ways and means of implementing [economic, social and 
cultural rights] will inevitably vary significantly from one state party to another’.210 For this reason, 
‘[e]very state has a margin of discretion in assessing which measures are most suitable to meet its 
specific circumstances’.211 The CESCR respects the discretion of states when it evaluates measures 
taken to achieve the progressive realisation of rights: 
At all times the Committee bears in mind its own role as an international treaty body and the 
role of the state in formulating or adopting, funding and implementing laws and policies 
concerning economic, social and cultural rights. To this end, and in accordance with the 
practice of judicial and other quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies, the Committee always 
respects the margin of appreciation of states to take steps and adopt measures most suited 
to their specific circumstances. 212 
However, the CESCR does not establish a clear link between states’ margin of discretion and the 
concept of progressive realisation. It appears that the two concepts have an indirect relationship. As 
a flexibility device, progressive realisation requires recognition of contextual diversity. To recognise 
contextual diversity, the CESCR respects states’ margin of discretion. In other words, states have a 
margin of discretion in taking steps necessary to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights. 
The CESCR has not adopted a clear position on the amount of discretion given to states. It simply 
acknowledges the discretion of states in most of its general comments, although at times it does 
qualify the breadth of this discretion. In its general comment on the right to take part in cultural life, 
it emphasised that ‘states parties have a wide margin of discretion in selecting the steps they 
consider most appropriate for the full realization’ of the rights.213 In a later statement, it seems to 
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suggest that states have narrower discretion: ‘Each state is left a certain margin of appreciation to 
decide which measures it should adopt to progressively realize the rights’ under the ICESCR.214 
Langford and King raise some concerns over the CESCR’s adoption of the margin of appreciation 
reasoning. They argue that leaving states a margin of discretion based on the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights may unnecessarily dilute the provisions of the ICESCR.215 They 
stress that the European Court uses the doctrine ‘to rule out consideration of social policy issues’ 
while the CESCR cannot avoid ruling on such issues, as they lie at the heart of its mandate.216 
The European Committee has also adopted ‘the concept of margin of appreciation and has made 
reference to it frequently’.217 In MFHR v Greece, it took ‘into consideration the margin of discretion 
granted to national authorities’.218 In GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v Greece, it recognised ‘that states 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to the design and implementation of national 
employment policies’.219 However, the European Committee does not connect the doctrine with the 
concept of progressive realisation.  
2.2.3 Potential and Pitfalls of progressive realisation: An assessment 
The requirement of resources and the principle of progressive realisation, as discussed above, have 
the potential for strengthening the international accountability of states. It is needless to state that 
holding states internationally accountable is one of the purposes of international human rights 
treaties such as the ICESCR. States have undertaken the task of taking steps to the maximum of their 
available resources under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. This is an immediate obligation of conduct, 
which is more onerous than the obligation of result.220 Put differently, states are subject to 
international supervision for allocating resources and efficiently using those resources for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. In contrast, the ICCPR does not expressly lay down 
such a requirement. In other words, the ICCPR leaves more space to the states on how to allocate 
and use their resources.  
The immediate obligation to take steps must result in progress because states have a progressive 
realisation obligation, which is an obligation of result.221 States are subject to international scrutiny 
for advancing the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Even if they are successful in 
demonstrating that they have allocated resources and used those resources efficiently, they have to 
explain why they could not make advancement in the realisation of these rights. In contrast, the 
ICCPR does not refer to progressive realisation. This does not mean that the realisation of civil and 
political rights remains static over a particular period. The ICCPR itself requires states to report ‘on 
the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights’.222 In this sense, it would be absurd to limit 
progressive realisation to economic, social and cultural rights only. 
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In fact, the artificial dichotomy between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights resulted in the restriction of progressive realisation only to the latter.223 This does not mean 
that the principle of progressive realisation is not relevant to civil and political rights. Indeed, the 
principle can be a useful tool for taking into accounts not only economic diversity of states but also 
other contextual differences, such as cultural factors.224 The principle has the potential to facilitate 
maximum achievement in the realisation of human rights by allowing ‘the measurement of degrees 
of good as well as bad human rights performance’.225 
However, not all stakeholds employ the principle of progressive realisation to convey the meanings 
explained above; the principle is usually associated with problems of some sorts. Chief among them 
is the understanding of the principle as a defect in the legal nature of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Critics cite the weakness of the principle as ‘evidence of the secondary, non-legal, or non-
binding nature of economic, social, and cultural rights’.226 This characterisation is usually made in 
comparison with civil and political rights. For example, Bossuyt argues that the observance of civil 
and political rights merely requires abstention; and that ‘they must be observed immediately’ while 
the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights requires ‘an active intervention from the 
state;’ and ‘they may be implemented progressively’.227 Along the same lines, Dennis and Stewart 
argue that ‘for good reason, economic, social, and cultural rights, unlike civil and political rights, have 
been defined primarily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively’.228   
The objection to the legal nature of economic, social and cultural rights because of the principle of 
progressive realisation should be placed in context. This claim can be examined in light of the 
political conflict underlying the dichotomy between economic, social and cultural rights on the one 
hand, and civil and political rights on the other. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
bifurcated, limiting the principle of progressive realisation only to the ICESCR, the division was 
blamed on the ideological divisions during the Cold War.229 Similar concerns were raised after the 
Cold War. For example, during the consideration of the OP-ICESCR by the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly, the representative of the United states asserted that civil and political rights, and 
economic, social and cultural rights were ‘fundamentally different in a legal sense’, since the latter 
are subject to progressive realisation and available resources while the former are not.230 In his 
article published in 2006, Aryeh Neier, the founder of Human Rights Watch and a former president of 
the Open Society Foundation, warned that ‘it is dangerous to allow [the] idea of social and economic 
rights to flourish’.231 These are two examples from representatives of states and non-governmental 
organisations indicating that the political conflict over the nature of economic, social and cultural 
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rights is still alive, only now it is between the North and the South.232 The South, a collection of 
developing countries constituting the majority of the General Assembly, has been pushing for global 
economic justice through initiatives such as the New International Economic Order and the 
Declaration on the Right to Development.233 Therefore, it is submitted, the technical legal arguments 
against economic, social and cultural rights based on the principle of progressive realisation are a 
reflection of the underlying disagreements, whether past or present, in relation to economic and 
political issues.  
The principle of progressive realisation does not sit well with the supporters of economic, social and 
cultural rights either. The central concern is that the principle negatively affects the recognition and 
protection of these rights by providing states with a legal defence for their failure. That is, ‘the 
progressive realization clause will be increasingly embraced as an escape hatch by recalcitrant 
states’.234 In other words, states that fail to discharge their obligations under the ICESCR may use the 
notion of progressive realization as a reason for avoiding any compliance at all with their human 
rights obligations.235 Recalcitrant states may claim ‘that the lack of progress is due to insufficient 
resources when, in fact, the problem is often not the availability but rather the distribution of 
resources’.236 Similarly, Young classifies progressive realisation among ways of limiting economic, 
social and cultural rights. She argues that ‘expressly protected economic and social rights are 
commonly limited by the obligation of "progressive realization," which introduces a relative standard 
for the discharging of duties owed by the state’.237 Here, the principle of progressive realisation 
means a legal defence readily available to states when they fail to carry out their obligations. 
Sometimes, progressive realisation is taken to mean that economic, social and cultural rights are 
non-justiciable. The concept is at least a reason for the non-justiciability of these rights. For example, 
during the adoption of the OP-ICESCR, the representatives of the United States and Denmark seem to 
have used the concept to mean non-justiciability when they emphasised the difficulty of adjudicating 
alleged violations of economic, social and cultural rights.238 According to Canada, ‘[p]rogressive 
realization is not a concept which easily lends itself to adjudication’.239 Similarly, some authors 
conflate progressive realisation and non-justiciability.240  
Another concern relates to the means of operationalising the principle: it is not clear how to measure 
resource allocation and utilisation or progress in the enjoyment of rights. This concern does not 
pertain to the principle per se; the concern that the principle of progressive realisation would be 
used as an escape hatch may indicate a lack of tools or mechanisms for ascertaining whether a state 
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has taken steps to the maximum of its available resources. Indeed, no such tools have existed since 
the entry into force of the ICESCR in 1976.  
One can easily dismiss some of these criticisms and concerns. The fact that economic, social and 
cultural rights are enshrined in international treaties dispels their mischaracterisation as non-legal, 
non-binding rights. The argument that economic, social and cultural rights do not impose immediate 
obligations is flawed. The CESCR has identified and confirmed that the ICESCR demands immediate 
obligations, observing that ‘while the Covenant provides for progressive realization and 
acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various 
obligations which are of immediate effect’.241 The Committee also identifies provisions of the ICESCR 
that are capable of immediate application,242 warning against the misinterpretation of the ICESCR 
that deprives progressive realisation of all meaningful content.243 It recommends the construction of 
the ICESCR in accordance with its overall objective ‘which is to establish clear obligations for states 
parties in respect of the full realization of the rights’.244 In terms of approach, the Committee’s 
clarification flows from the context, object and purpose of the ICESCR. This is in line with the general 
rules of treaty interpretation.245 Therefore, the immediate obligations identified by the CESCR 
originate from the text of the ICESCR.  
The problem of operationalising the principle is not as difficult as it appears. Of course, it is 
unreasonable to expect the CESCR or a similar (quasi-) judicial body to have the necessary technical 
expertise to develop monitoring tools. However, efforts to measure the level of realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights have been made by different bodies and disciplines. For example, 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a guide on 
the measurement and implementation of human rights in 2012.246 Monitoring bodies can also use 
tools developed by economists, such as the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index, 
which measures the difference between actual and potential achievements.247 
To conclude, the principle of progressive realisation has the potential to improve the accountability 
of states on their human rights performance when understood in light of the purpose of human 
rights treaties. However, this is just one of the readings. The principle is also invoked as a defect in 
economic, social and cultural rights reflecting the underlying political conflict. Therefore, human 
rights bodies should be careful in applying the principle to treaties that do not incorporate the 
principle. One such treaty is the African Charter. The development of the principle of progressive 
realisation under the African Charter will be discussed shortly.      
2.3 Evolution of progressive realisation under the African Charter 
The concept of progressive realisation has evolved over time in the African Charter. In the beginning, 
the omission of the concept from the text of the African Charter was understood as imposing 
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immediate obligation on states. Later, this view was changed and the concept was imported into the 
Charter.  
2.3.1 Omission from the text of the African Charter 
An enquiry into how the African Charter treats the concept of progressive realisation should 
obviously start with its text according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).248 
Article 1 of the Charter provides that states to the ‘Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and 
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them’. This provision might have been an appropriate place to incorporate the concept 
of progressive realization because most human rights treaties usually contain the concept in clauses 
that provide for general state obligations.249  Article 1 applies to all rights guaranteed in the Charter 
because there are no separate provisions of state obligations relating to different categories of 
Charter rights. This provision, however, does not contain any requirement to the effect that states 
should progressively achieve the full realisation of the recognised rights. Neither does it condition 
the enjoyment of these rights on the availability of resources. The text of the Charter is unequivocally 
clear that the drafters omitted the concept of progressive realisation from the Charter. Thus, the 
enquiry may continue beyond the text. 
Chronologically, the African Charter came late in the development of the human rights project. The 
ICESCR had already been in force when the Charter was adopted in 1981 and 13 African states had 
already ratified it.250 In particular, the two states (Senegal and The Gambia) that played an important 
role in the preparation and adoption of the Charter were already party to the Covenant by 1978.251 
Moreover, the American Convention could have provided a regional benchmark in terms of including 
the principle of progressive realisation in the text of the African Charter. Then, one may wonder why 
the African Charter did not follow the path taken by the ICESCR and the American Convention. In 
searching for an answer, recourse can be made to supplementary means of treaty interpretation in 
order to examine the preparatory work of the Charter and the circumstances of its conclusion.252 
Indeed, the ICESCR and the American Convention were the basis for drafting the African Charter. 
Kéba Mbaye, a Senegalese jurist then Vice-President of the International Court of Justice and 
Chairperson of the legal experts committee drafting the African Charter, submitted to the experts a 
proposed draft, which was ‘largely drawn from the provisions of the [ICESCR] and the American 
Convention on Human Rights’.253 Mbaye’s draft contains an almost verbatim reproduction of Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR (the progressive realization provision) as Article 3 of his draft African Charter. 
In his draft, Mbaye kept the distinction between economic, social and cultural rights and civil and 
political rights by dividing them, addressing them in different chapters.254 He also prescribed 
different monitoring mechanisms. Under Article 14, Mbaye’s draft requires states to report ‘on the 
measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance’ of 
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economic, social and cultural rights while requiring judicial protection of civil and political rights 
under Article 32. 
However, the drafters did not accept Mbaye’s proposal with regard to progressive realisation. As is 
abundantly clear from the experts’ draft of the African Charter produced after their meeting in 
Dakar, the drafters not only excised the requirement of progressive realization but also eliminated 
the distinction between the two categories of rights and their monitoring mechanisms.255 The 
ministerial conferences that considered the draft Charter did not reintroduce progressive realisation 
or adopt different monitoring mechanisms.256 
The indivisibility of rights was a central theme during the drafting process. In his opening speech, 
President Senghor instructed the drafters that: 
We are certainly not drawing lines of demarcation between the different categories of rights. We are not 
grading these either. We wanted to show essentially that beside civil and political rights, economic, social 
and cultural rights should henceforth be given the important place they deserve.257 
In line with Senghor’s instruction, the drafters reported that ‘[e]conomic, social and cultural rights 
were given the place they deserved’ in the Charter.258 That is, they placed economic, social and 
cultural rights on the same footing as civil and political rights, as opposed to other global and 
regional human rights treaties that arguably accorded them less importance. The Charter thereby 
departs from the orthodoxies of the era,259 and some even argue that the Charter attaches more 
importance to economic, social and cultural rights than to civil and political rights.260 
In this respect, the Charter represents an African conception of human rights because it establishes a 
conceptual and conventional unity of all human rights.261 The originality may have resulted from the 
fact that the Charter is a compromise among African states themselves and represents a common 
position towards international law. As the Charter itself declares allegiance to the Movement of Non-
Aligned Countries, Africa did not subscribe to either camp of the Cold War.262 If the western capitalist 
states emphasised civil and political rights as opposed to socialist states that prioritised economic, 
social and cultural rights at the time of drafting the Charter,263 a neutral approach to human rights 
would treat all rights in the same way. However, that does not indicate a uniform economic system 
across the Continent. The unity of all human rights under the Charter can be understood as a 
compromise between the socialist and capitalist African countries that participated in the 
negotiation of its texts.264 Its departure in this regard from global and regional human rights treaties 
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can also be understood as an attempt of newly independent African states ‘questioning mainstream 
international law’.265  
2.3.2 Understanding of the textual omission by the African Commission  
A piece of evidence of how the Commission understands the omission of progressive realisation from 
the Charter can be found in one of its statements. Umozurike, in his capacity as the Chairperson of 
the Commission, emphasised that ‘[the] Charter requires that all [economic, social and cultural] 
rights and more should be implemented now’.266 He underscored that the Charter requires 
immediate implementation. That is, the Charter does not allow states to postpone their obligations—
a view contrary to what the concept of progressive realisation entails. Other members of the 
Commission also echoed this view.267 Based on his interview with some members of the Commission 
in 2009, Yeshanew reports that the Commissioners believe that ‘the obligations of states relating to 
the economic, social and cultural rights in the [African] Charter are immediate’.268  
In its case law, the Commission does not employ ‘immediate obligation’ terminology, but its 
decisions essentially imply that the Charter imposes immediate obligations. In Free Legal Assistance 
Group and Others v Zaire, the Commission held that the government’s failure ‘to provide basic 
services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of medicine’ violates the right to 
health.269 The Commission did not examine whether the respondent state had necessary resources 
or required time to mobilise those resources to provide safe drinking water, electricity and medicine. 
It is difficult to imagine that the Commissioners did not know that generating electricity, building 
water facilities and purchasing medicine not only require huge resources but also time. Rather, the 
above holding shows the Commission’s conviction that the Charter provides for immediate 
obligations. As a result, the mere fact that there was no electricity, safe drinking water, and medicine 
was enough to constitute a violation of the Charter. 
In Purohit and Another v The Gambia, which was decided in 2003, the Commission examined the 
detention of persons with mental disabilities and stated the following:270 
[T]he scheme of the [Lunatics Detention Act] is lacking in terms of therapeutic objectives as well as 
provision of matching resources and programmes of treatment of persons with mental disabilities, a 
situation that the Respondent state does not deny but which nevertheless falls short of satisfying the 
requirements laid down in Articles 16 and 18(4) of the African Charter.  
Because of the respondent state’s failure to provide a mental illness scheme with resources, the 
Commission found violations of the right to health (Article 16) and measures of protection for 
persons with disabilities (Article 18(4)).  
In Gunme and Others v Cameroon (Southern Cameroon case), the Commission examined, among 
other things, an alleged violation of the right to development due to economic marginalisation and 
lack of economic infrastructure in the Southern Cameroon and held that ‘[t]he lack of such resources, 
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if proven would constitute a violation of the right to development’.271 Although the Commission did 
not find a violation, it indicated that a failure to allocate resources might constitute a violation. The 
finding of no violation was based on explanations and statistical data showing ‘allocation of 
development resources in various socio-economic sectors’ contrary to the allegation of the 
complainants.272  
In Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (Ogoniland case), the 
Commission examined an alleged violation of several economic and social rights in Nigeria due to the 
exploitation of oil reserves in Ogoniland without regard to the health and environment of the Ogoni 
people.273 While explaining that all rights generate ‘the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil’, 
the Commission observed that ‘[the ICESCR], for instance, under Article 2(1) stipulates exemplarily 
that states “undertake to take steps…by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.”’274 One expects a reference to Article 2(1) to come with all its baggage, 
particularly the concept of progressive realisation. The Commission, however, excluded the relevant 
phrase of the provision (i.e. ‘to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights’). Nor did it discuss the concept in canvassing state 
obligations concerning the duty to fulfil. Apparently, the Commission used the quotation to 
emphasise that states should take steps and identify means of taking those steps. The undertaking to 
take steps even under the ICESCR is an immediate obligation.275 Therefore, the Commission’s 
reluctance to refer to the concept and its emphasis on taking steps instead can be read as an 
interpretive strategy adopted on purpose in order to eschew the concept of progressive realisation.      
The Commission’s view that the Charter demands immediate obligations has supporters in the 
literature. Odinkalu submits that ‘the obligations that state parties assume with respect to economic, 
social and cultural rights are clearly stated as of immediate application’.276 Ouguergouz, who later 
became a judge and Vice-President of the African Court, argues that ‘states parties are legally bound 
to ensure that the individual immediately enjoys these rights’.277 To Olowu, ‘in the absence of any 
textual inference to the contrary, the spirit and letters of economic, social and cultural rights 
provisions connote immediate implementation under the African Charter’.278 
2.3.3 Introduction of progressive realisation through the interpretation of the African Charter   
The African Commission has avoided using the term ‘progressive realisation’ for a long time even 
with regard to the right to health under Article 16, whose wording is understood in the literature as 
an exception to the Charter’s requirement of immediate obligation.279  Viljoen argues that the 
Commission decided to qualify the right to health with ‘available resources’ in Purohit and Another v 
The Gambia but suggests that the case should not be the basis for applying the qualification of 
                                                          
271 (2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009), para 205.  
272 Southern Cameroon case, para 206. 
273 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). 
274 Ogoniland case, paras 44 & 48. 
275 General Comment 3, para 2. 
276 Odinkalu (n 259) 349. 
277 Fatsah Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human rights and 
sustainable democracy in Africa (2003) 200. 
278 Dejo Olowu, An integrative rights-based approach to human development in Africa (2009) 58. 
279 Viljoen (n 251) 217; Odinkalu (n 259) 349; Ouguergouz (n 277) 200; Yeshanew (n 268) 254. Art 16 (1) of the African 
Charter provides that: ‘Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health. 
 61 
‘available resources’ to the ‘unqualified’ right to education.280 Relying on the same case, Yeshanew 
argues that ‘the African Commission read the “progressive realization” qualification’ into Article 16 of 
the Charter.281 
Indeed, the Commission referred to ‘available resources’ in Purohit and Another v The Gambia, which 
was decided in 2003, when it held that 
[H]aving due regard to this depressing but real state of affairs, the African Commission would like to 
read into Article 16 the obligation on part of states party to the African Charter to take concrete and 
targeted steps, while taking full advantage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health 
is fully realised in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind.282  
However, the case is more of a confirmation of immediate obligations than an introduction of 
progressive realisation for a number of reasons. First, the Commission did not use the ‘best 
attainable’ language of Article 16, which is the basis for commentators to consider the provision an 
exception to the immediate obligation requirement.283 Second, the Commission emphasised 
immediate obligations, as it did in the Ogoniland case. It underscored the obligation to take steps 
and the prohibition of discrimination, which are immediate obligations even under the ICESCR.284 
Third, the Commission found a violation of Article 16 because of the respondent state’s failure to 
provide resources to the mental health scheme. Finally, the respondent state did not argue that its 
failure was due to a lack of resources.  
The Commission used the terms ‘progressive realisation’ in the Southern Cameroon case decided in 
2009. The Commission held that the Republic of Cameroon is ‘under obligation to invest its resources 
in the best way possible to attain the progressive realisation of the right to development, and other 
economic, social and cultural rights.’285 It seems that the Commission introduced the terms 
inadvertently because it was not even dealing with rights usually classified under the economic, 
social and cultural rights category. It used the terms ‘progressive realisation’ in relation to the right to 
development, which is usually considered to be part of peoples’ rights. Even when the complainants 
alleged a violation of the right to education because of the respondent state’s conduct of 
‘underfunding and understaffing primary education’, the Commission’s finding of no violation was 
not based on lack of resources. Nonetheless, the case does evidence the Commission’s use of the 
terms in its case law.   
The wholesale importation of the concept has been made through what the Commission calls soft 
law instruments.286 Even before deciding the Southern Cameroon case, the Commission used the 
term ‘progressive realisation’ in the Pretoria Declaration adopted in 2004.287 The declaration requires 
states to prepare ‘National Action Plans, which set out benchmark indicators for the progressive 
realisation of social, economic and cultural rights’.288 In a language similar to Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR, the declaration calls upon the states to give full effect to economic, social and cultural rights 
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‘by using the maximum of their resources’.289 Similar to the Southern Cameroon case, the 
Commission did not provide any justification for the incorporation.  
An elaborate introduction of the concept occurred in 2011 when the Commission adopted the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (also known 
as Nairobi Principles) which expressly declare that the concept of progressive realisation is applicable 
to economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter.290 In the Preamble of the Nairobi 
Principles, the Commission lists a number of instruments from which it has drawn inspiration, but the 
contents of the Nairobi Principles show that the principles are merely a transplantation of the 
CESCR’s interpretation because they reproduce, with some exceptions, the general comments of the 
CESCR. The Commission followed the approaches already adopted by the CESCR in identifying state 
obligations and explaining the substantive content of the rights. 
In terms of approach, the Commission has travelled in an opposite direction of that of the CESCR, 
which started from the texts and carved immediate obligations out of progressive realisation. The 
CESCR states that ‘the obligation [under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR] differs significantly from that 
contained in Article 2 of the [ICCPR] which embodies an immediate obligation’.291 Still, it identified 
from Article 2 of the ICESCR immediate obligations to take steps and to guarantee rights without 
discrimination.292 From the ICESCR’s overall objective of establishing clear obligations for states, it 
identified state duties largely understood as immediate obligations, namely, the prohibition of 
retrogressive measures and minimum core obligations.293 The CESCR convincingly proceeded towards 
establishing clarity in state obligations without abandoning its textual foundations.  
On the contrary, the African Commission does not have similar texts to work with. Article 1, the 
general obligation provision of the Charter, is similar to Article 2 of the ICCPR, understood both by 
the Human Rights Committee and by the CESCR as enshrining immediate obligations.294 The 
Commission admitted that ‘the African Charter does not expressly refer to the principle of 
progressive realisation’.295 Had the Commission proceeded from the texts, it would have ended up 
declaring that the Charter, like the ICCPR, provides for immediate obligations. As it skips this 
foundational stage, the Commission could not find particular provisions of the Charter from which 
the concept can be derived.  
2.4 Meaning of progressive realisation in the African Charter 
Progressive realisation has different meanings, as discussed above. Like the CESCR, the African 
Commission understands the concept as advancing or improving the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights over time. However, the Commission does not link the prohibition of retrogressive 
measures with progressive realisation. It introduces non-retrogression as an immediate obligation. 
Unlike the CESCR, the Commission does not connect discretion of states with the concept of 
progressive realisation.  
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2.4.1 Progressive realisation as advancement of economic, social and cultural rights 
The Commission’s view largely converges with that of the CESCR with regard to the meaning of 
progressive realisation. The Commission understands the concept as implying advancement in the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. It defines the concept as ‘[t]he obligation to 
progressively and constantly move towards the full realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights’.296 States should advance towards the goal of full realisation. That is, they should continuously 
be improving the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights; a sporadic improvement is not 
sufficient since the Commission requires states to ‘constantly move towards’ the goal.  
Like the CESCR, the Commission emphasises that states should be quick in taking measures. It 
observed that ‘states parties are therefore under a continuing duty to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’.297 States 
complying with this requirement of taking steps expeditiously do not postpone actions necessary for 
the realisation of economic social and cultural rights, but rather take immediate action because the 
Commission emphasises that all ‘states parties have immediate obligations to take steps’.298 Such 
steps should be taken ‘in accordance with a measurable national plan of action’, indicating that such 
a plan should be prepared in the first place.299 The steps taken by states must be effective, producing 
a visible result in the enjoyment of these rights. 
In principle, the pace of advancement in the enjoyment of rights should be reasonable.300 The 
Commission requires states not only to take measures that ‘contain clear goals, indicators and 
benchmarks for measuring progress’ under their obligation to fulfil,301 but also state to set 
timeframes for achieving their goals.302 Like other human rights bodies, the Commission does not 
have its own mechanisms to ascertain whether the states have actually made improvement that 
corresponds to the resources they command.  
The pace of advancement or progress depends on available resources and varies from one state 
party to another. The Commission stresses that ‘states need sufficient resources to progressively 
realise economic, social and cultural rights’.303 The issue of resources forms an integral part of the 
Commission’s definition of progressive realisation. For this reason, the Commission lays down some 
requirements with regard to the generation as well as the allocation of resources. It acknowledges 
that ‘[t]here are a variety of means through which states may raise these resources’.304 It focuses on 
two means: taxation and international aid. The African Charter does not clearly link the payment of 
taxes or their collection to any of the rights it guarantees, however, it states that the individual has 
the duty ‘to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society’ according to Article 29(6) under 
the chapter on duties. The African Commission derived a state obligation from this individual duty. It 
stresses that the ‘duty of the individual to pay taxes imposed by the African Charter implies that 
there is an obligation on the state to institute an effective and fair taxation system’.305  In terms of 
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supervision, it is not clear how the Commission can ascertain whether states have put in place an 
effective and fair taxation system.   
According to the Commission, the resources required to achieve the full realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights include regional and international aid.306 The Commission does not go to the 
details of distinguishing regional aid from international aid. One may argue that assistance, be it 
financial or technical, received from African states or African organisations is regional aid while that 
received from entities beyond the African continent is international aid. The Commission clearly 
establishes the obligation of states to seek international aid, emphasising that: ‘All states have the 
obligation to engage in international cooperation for the realisation’ of economic, social and cultural 
rights.307 States parties to the African Charter are a collection of developing countries, so the 
Commission’s requirement that these states must seek regional or international aid is 
understandable, but the Commission goes further to declare that ‘It is particularly incumbent upon 
developed countries, as well as others which are in a position to assist others, to do so.’308 However, 
it is not clear how the African Charter can bind developed countries, requiring them to assist 
developing countries when they are not parties to the Charter.  
The African Commission has developed some requirements with regard to resource allocation, 
namely to prioritise economic, social and cultural rights in resource allocation regardless of whether 
resources were raised through taxation or obtained through regional or international aid. The 
Commission has underscored that ‘there is an obligation on the state to institute […] a budgeting 
process that ensures that economic, social and cultural rights are prioritised in the distribution of 
resources.’309 Surprisingly, it derives this obligation from an individual duty under Article 29(6) of the 
Charter rather than the general obligation provision under Article 1. Likewise, states must prioritise 
allocation of assistance obtained through international cooperation towards the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.310 The Commission also requires further prioritisation within the 
resources allocated for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. It has stressed that the 
‘essential needs of members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups should be prioritised in all 
resource allocation processes’.311 
Prioritisation presupposes classification. This is more apparent in the case of members of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups, who include persons belonging to groups such as women, children, 
persons with disabilities, indigenous people and refugees, according to the Commission.312 For 
example, prioritisation of resource allocation in this case could mean that essential needs of women 
should be given preference over those of men or that essential needs of children should be 
addressed before proceeding to deal with those of adults. However, such classification is not readily 
apparent in the case of the general requirement to prioritise economic, social and cultural rights in 
budgeting. Does it mean priority should be given to economic, social and cultural rights over civil and 
political rights? 
The preamble to the African Charter provides that ‘the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural 
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights’. Early studies on the Charter cite 
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this clause as evidence that the Charter gives priority to economic, social and cultural rights over civil 
and political rights. Gittleman argues that the Charter’s ‘language indicates the possibility that 
deference will be given to economic and social programs where they collide with civil and political 
rights’.313 Others argue that African governments attach more importance to economic, social and 
cultural rights in practice.314 For this reason, one may conclude that economic, social and cultural 
rights should be prioritised over civil and political rights in resource allocation. However, this 
conclusion would be contrary to the view that all human rights are ‘universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated,’315 a view that has been affirmed by the Commission itself.316 
Therefore, the prioritisation of economic, social and cultural rights in resource allocation does not 
imply priority over civil and political rights. Then what does giving priority to economic, social and 
cultural rights mean? 
An alternative view is to give budgetary priority to departments or ministries of a government that 
are directly concerned with the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights over others 
whose contribution is less direct. For example, a ministry or a department of health will in this case 
have priority over that of defence in budgetary allocation. States have undertaken this obligation in 
the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), which the 
Commission monitors. The Maputo Protocol requires states to ‘take the necessary measures to 
reduce military expenditure significantly in favour of spending on social development in general’.317     
The Commission’s budgetary prioritisation approach differs from the approach adopted under the 
ICESCR, which requires a state party to take steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources’.318 
Central to the ICESCR’s requirement is not only avoiding resource wastage but also producing the 
best possible outcome. Instead, the Commission uses in its definition of progressive realisation the 
terms ‘within the resources available to a state’ which implies that it does not incorporate a 
requirement for optimal utilisation of resources into its definition.319 Thus, avoiding resource wastage 
does not seem to fall within the purview of the Commission’s definition. The question of how states 
use their resources is particularly relevant to Africa, since the low implementation of economic, 
social and cultural rights there is usually attributed to mismanagement of resources.320 The reason 
why the Commission chose to omit this element from its definition is subject to speculation: It could 
be an inadvertent omission or a deliberate strategic decision intended to avoid the technical 
complexity of assessing whether resources are put to maximum use or not. 
Corruption is one of the factors that undermine maximum use of resources. Resources may be 
allocated for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. However, efficient 
utilisation of such resources would not be possible in states where corruption is rampant.321 The 
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Commission does not provide clear guidance to states with respect to corruption in the Nairobi 
Principles. Nevertheless, in some instances, the Commission has recognised corruption as a factor 
that limits the enjoyment of the rights in the Charter and has thus required states to adopt adequate 
anti-corruption measures.322 It has commended states when they adopted measures for combating 
corruption.323 At times, the Commission has identified the failure of a state to provide accurate 
information on anti-corruption measures in its report as an area of concern.324  
2.4.2 Non-retrogression under the African Charter 
The African Commission introduced the principle of non-retrogression in its Nairobi Principles, 
following the CESCR’s understanding of the principle as it did with the concept of progressive 
realisation.325 Its approach is not necessarily identical to that of the CESCR insofar as it departs from 
the CESCR’s approach in classifying retrogressive measures along the dichotomy of progressive and 
immediate obligations. The Commission identified the prohibition of retrogressive steps as one kind 
of state obligations that are immediate on ratification of the African Charter.326 On the other hand, 
the CESCR derived a prohibition of retrogressive measures from the principle of progressive 
realization and avoided a general classification of such measures under immediate obligations.327  
The African Commission does not define ‘immediate obligation’. If it means part of state obligations 
that cannot be delayed for lack of resources, then as Chenwi argues, the prohibition of retrogressive 
measures is ‘an immediate obligation not subject to the availability of resources’.328 However, this 
view does not sound logical because lack of resources can justify retrogressive measures as the 
Commission indicated in the Nairobi Principles: retrogressive measures can be ‘justified in the light of 
the totality of the rights provided for in the African Charter and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources’.329  
The African Commission defines retrogressive measures as steps ‘that reduce the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights by individuals or peoples’.330 Its practice does not provide clear 
guidance on how to identify specific measures that constitute retrogressive measures: unlike the 
CESCR, the African Commission does not provide examples. Central to the Commission’s definition is 
the decrease in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. However, not every decrease 
constitutes a retrogressive measure. For example, in the Ogoniland case, the African Commission 
found a violation of the right to shelter because the Nigerian ‘government has destroyed Ogoni 
houses and villages’.331 The Commission also found a violation of the right to food, as the Nigerian 
government had ‘destroyed food sources through its security forces and state oil company’.332 In the 
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Darfur case, the African Commission held that ‘the destruction of homes, livestock and farms as well 
as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells exposed the victims to serious health risks and 
amounts to a violation’ of the right to health (Article 16).333 In both cases, the measures taken by the 
respondent states—destruction of houses, homes, livestock and farms and poisoning of water 
sources—decreased the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights collectively affecting the 
Ogonis in Nigeria and the people of Darfur in Sudan. However, the Commission did not consider 
these state conducts retrogressive measures.  
The African Commission seldom deals with retrogressive measures in its concluding observations – 
even when it had an opportunity to condemn such measures, it has never been thorough in its 
analysis. While examining Uganda’s report in 2015, for instance, one of the main concerns of the 
Commission with regard to the right to health was the reduction of HIV/AIDS funding due to both 
insufficient budget as well as the global economic crisis.334 In its recommendation, the Commission 
required Uganda to increase its budget for the health sector to 15% of its annual budget.335 However, 
it avoided condemning Uganda for taking retrogressive measures. Decreasing funds allocated for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights would have constituted retrogressive measures 
according to the CESCR, as it observed with regard to Egypt’s withdrawal of food subsidies.336 
The African Commission clearly specifies the consequence of taking retrogressive measures, stating 
that retrogressive measures are ‘prima facie in violation of the African Charter’ unless they are 
justified by states.337 The Commission adopted the wording of the CESCR and laid down two grounds 
for justifying retrogressive measures: they ‘must be justified in the light of the totality of the rights 
provided for in the African Charter and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources’.338 One of the grounds is lack of available resources. Resource justification is acceptable 
when states show that they faced resource constraints after making full use of their maximum 
available resources. The Commission followed the practice of the CESCR and explained that 
international assistance and cooperation are considered available resources.339 However, it does not 
identify types or elements of ‘resources’. As discussed above, available resources should not be 
limited to financial resources.340  
Second, retrogressive measures that increase the total enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights are permissible. Whether there is an increase in the total enjoyment, as Liebenberg argues, 
depends on the meaning given to the terms ‘total enjoyment’.341 If the total enjoyment is calculated 
based on those individuals or groups who are negatively affected by retrogressive measures, there 
will be no increase. Such an interpretation ‘can obstruct redistributive measures which reduce or 
even eliminate the benefits received by more advantaged groups in order to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of benefits’.342 If the total enjoyment is calculated based on the total 
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population in a given state, retrogressive measures negatively affecting certain individuals or groups, 
particularly those most advantaged, may increase the total enjoyment of the rights.343 Even the total 
increase based on the entire population is not flawless because ‘the purpose of human rights norms 
is precisely concerned with the well-being of each individual and group’ who should be treated with 
care and concern.344 
Moreover, the Commission stipulated seven criteria for evaluating retrogressive measures. With little 
modification, at times distortion, these criteria have been taken from General Comment No 19 of the 
CESCR as the text of the Nairobi Principles themselves testifies:  
In determining whether a state party has violated the Charter by implementing a 
retrogressive measure the Commission will consider whether: a) there was reasonable 
justification for the action; b) alternatives were comprehensively examined and those which 
were least restrictive of protected human rights were adopted; c) there was genuine 
participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; d) the 
measures were directly or indirectly discriminatory; e) the measures would have a sustained 
impact on the realisation of the protected right; f) the measures had an unreasonable impact 
on whether an individual or group was deprived of access to the minimum essential level of 
the protected right; and g) there was an independent review of the measures at the national 
level.345 
The first criterion requires states to provide a reasonable justification for taking a retrogressive 
measure. One may argue that states comply with this criterion when the reason for their measures is 
one or both of the grounds provided by the Commission. These grounds are resource constraints and 
increase in the total enjoyment of the rights, as discussed above, but the grounds are not stated as 
part of the criterion.  
The second criterion requires states to identify all possible measures that can be taken in the 
circumstances under consideration. This is because the Commission ascertains whether an impugned 
retrogressive measure was adopted after ‘alternatives were comprehensively examined’.  The 
purpose of identifying all alternatives is to find a measure or a combination of different measures 
that can most advance the rights guaranteed under the Charter, because the Commission requires 
states to adopt the least restrictive measure from the alternatives identified.  
The third criterion sets one of the procedures to be observed during the process of identifying and 
selecting a retrogressive measure from a range of other alternatives. It requires participation in the 
process of adopting those measures. Genuine participation of the affected group is necessary, 
however, the Commission does not make a distinction between those who benefit from the 
measures and those who do not. Whether the rights holders are affected negatively or positively, the 
Commission requires a genuine participation.  
The fourth criterion requires states to comply with the principle of non-discrimination, which 
permeates all the provisions of the Charter. Any discrimination, direct or indirect, is prohibited. 
States may not pass a measure that targets a particular group identified on any of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. According to the Commission, if a retrogressive measure has ‘an adverse 
impact disproportionately on one group or other,’ the measure would be indirectly discriminatory.346 
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Unlike the CESCR, the Commission does not expressly require states to reduce inequalities that may 
grow in times of crisis.347 One may question the usefulness of this criterion, considering that any 
discrimination in the implementation of the rights guaranteed in the Charter is a violation of the 
Charter. States have expressly undertaken the obligation of non-discrimination in implementing the 
Charter rights under Article 2, so adopting the principle of non-discrimination as one of the criteria 
for evaluating the conformity of a retrogressive measure with the Charter does not add any value.    
The fifth and the sixth criteria are concerned with the impact of retrogressive measures. The fifth 
criterion deals with temporal impact, and is used to assess the duration of the impact of 
retrogressive measures. The impact of retrogressive measures may end with the termination of the 
measures; however, sometimes the impact of such measures may last much longer than the lifespan 
of the measures themselves. One may argue that the level of scrutiny should be higher when the 
measures have a sustained impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under 
the Charter, that is, when a decrease in the enjoyment continues over a long period. Instead of 
evaluating the long-term impact of the measures, the CESCR requires that retrogressive measures 
remain in place only so far as they are necessary.348  
The sixth criterion deals with the magnitude of the impact and determines how far a decrease in the 
enjoyment of the rights can go. The Commission draws the line below which the decrease in the 
enjoyment of the rights should not fall. That line is drawn by the requirement that states comply with 
the minimum core content of the rights. That is, states should perform their minimum core 
obligations even during times of crisis when they are allowed to take retrogressive measures.  
The last criterion deals with another procedural guarantee: state parties taking retrogressive 
measures should put in place mechanisms for review at national level. Individuals or groups who are 
negatively affected by the measures must have the opportunity to be heard before an independent 
body. For that purpose, the Commission does not require the establishment of a separate body. The 
Commission’s position is not clear on the relationship of this criterion with Article 26 of the Charter, 
which stipulates that the state parties have the duty to guarantee the independence of the courts 
and to allow the establishment of national institutions for the protection of the rights under the 
Charter. One may argue that states have the obligation to put in place an independent national 
review mechanism under this provision whether they are taking retrogressive measures or not. The 
Commission itself stressed that a violation of ‘economic, social and cultural rights protected under 
the African Charter must entitle affected individuals and peoples to effective remedies and redress 
under domestic law’.349  
To summarise, the African Commission has followed the practice of the CESCR in defining the 
principle of non-retrogression; however, minor differences are still noticeable. The CESCR derives the 
principle of non-retrogression from the principle of progressive realisation while the Commission 
categorises the prohibition of retrogressive measures among immediate obligations, as opposed to 
progressive obligations. The other difference relates to the criteria for evaluating the 
appropriateness of retrogressive measures. The CESCR adopted criteria that are more general in 
2016. Because the Nairobi Principles were adopted earlier in 2011, the Commission relies on the 
criteria developed by the CESCR in 2008. As a result, the Commission’s criteria, unlike that of the 
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CESCR, do not expressly require states to ensure that retrogressive measures do not 
disproportionately affect the rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged individuals and groups.350    
2.5 Justifications for introducing progressive realisation into the African Charter 
The strength of the justifications supporting a particular interpretation of the African Charter – or any 
international human rights treaty, for that matter – is obviously important to generate the required 
acceptance. The reasons for choosing a particular interpretation over a range of other alternatives 
must persuade at least, as Tobin calls it, ‘the relevant interpretive community’, which is not limited to 
states but also includes non-state actors such as international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, and even multinational corporations.351 The African Commission does not dwell much 
on providing justifications for its interpretation. With regard to the principle of progressive 
realisation, its interpretation seems to fit into the principle of systemic integration.  
Systemic integration is a general principle of treaty interpretation, which requires the construction of 
treaties in accordance with general international law.352 This is because treaties are the creatures of 
international law.353 The principle is incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).354 The African Commission does not expressly refer to the principle of systematic integration 
by name. Nor does it rely on the relevant provisions of the VCLT. From the provisions of the African 
Charter referenced in the Nairobi Principles, the Commission’s approach falls under this principle as 
argued in the following sub-section. In addition, lack of resources or conditions of underdevelopment 
can be another reason for interpreting the African Charter as incorporating the principle of 
progressive realisation. In the academic literature, commentators usually recommend the 
progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter. The main 
reason for this recommendation is resource constraints. Although the Commission does not 
expressly state resource constraints as a reason for introducing progressive realisation, resource 
issues will also be examined below.   
2.5.1 Systemic Integration  
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT ‘gives expression to the objective of “systemic integration”‘.355 The 
principle of systemic integration ‘emphasizes both the "unity of international law" and the sense in 
which rules should not be considered in isolation of general international law’.356 Despite the 
importance of this provision, international judicial and quasi-judicial organs appear to be reluctant to 
refer to it.357 A lack of reference to this provision does not mean that the principle is not applied, 
though. This is because, in most cases, the principle operates ‘as an unarticulated major premise in 
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the construction of treaties’.358 Judicial or quasi-judicial reference to ‘other rules of international law 
in the course of interpreting a treaty is an everyday, often unconscious, part of the interpretation 
process’.359 Thus, international human rights bodies usually apply the principle of systemic 
integration.360  
The principle of systemic integration may minimise the possibility of diverging or conflicting 
interpretation of similar or identical rules of international law.361 The adoption of this principle 
requires harmonious interpretation of the African Charter with international human rights treaties. 
The African Charter seems to have adopted this principle by authorising the Commission and the 
Court to draw inspiration from international human rights law under Article 60.362 The Charter also 
requires the Commission and the Court to consider general international law in its interpretation 
under Article 61.363  
Article 60 of the African Charter authorises drawing ‘inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples' rights’364 as well as provides for an illustrative list of instruments that includes constitutions 
of two international organisations: the UN and the AU. The choice of the word ‘instruments’ instead 
of, for example, ‘treaties’ shows the breadth of sources from which inspiration is to be drawn. The 
Charter does not distinguish ‘hard’ law from ‘soft’ law and no precedence is given to one over the 
other. While the Charter does not refer to any human rights treaty in force at the time of its 
adoption, it lists the Universal Declaration on Human Rights along with the UN Charter and the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union to serve as sources of inspiration.365 This can be taken as 
evidence indicating the importance accorded to ‘soft’ law. In fact, the Commission and the Court do 
refer to ‘soft’ law.366 
The Charter directs the Commission and the Court to draw inspiration from human rights 
instruments adopted within the framework of the UN. Although the Charter does not name the 
ICESCR, the ICCPR and other UN human rights treaties, they obviously fall under ‘other instruments 
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adopted by the United Nations’.367 The Commission frequently relies on them in its jurisprudence.368 
Respondent states before the Commission are usually state parties to most universal human rights 
treaties. In one instance, the Commission implied that it would not draw inspiration from a treaty not 
ratified by a respondent state.369  The Commission expanded the scope of Article 60 when it 
interpreted the Charter in such a way that other instruments adopted by the United Nations ‘include 
decisions and general comments by the UN treaty bodies’.370 It seems more appropriate to refer to 
cases of the UN treaty bodies as ‘legal precedents’ that fall under Article 61 rather than under Article 
60. 
The African Charter requires the Commission and the Court to draw inspiration from instruments 
adopted by the Specialised Agencies of the UN when state parties to the African Charter are 
members thereof. Instruments adopted by organisations such as the International Labour 
Organisation provide sources of inspiration to the Commission.371 The criterion here is the 
membership of an Organisation rather than the ratification of a treaty. The Commission should also 
draw inspiration from instruments adopted by African countries. The Commission went beyond 
drawing inspiration, however, and despite its lack of a mandate to monitor, found violations of the 
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.372  Since the Charter 
does not limit the Commission to instruments adopted by the AU, the Commission can draw 
inspiration from sub-regional human rights instruments adopted by, for example, regional economic 
communities or from intercontinental instruments such as the Arab Charter on Human Rights.373  
The African Charter provides for the role of general international law in its interpretation. Under 
Article 61, it refers to a modified version of the list provided under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Like the Statute, the list under the Charter includes conventions, 
custom, general principles, and judicial decisions. While the ICJ should apply international 
conventions, international customs, and the general principles, the African Commission considers 
them ‘as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law’. The Charter adds some 
qualifications, however, stating that not every international convention should be taken into 
consideration—only the conventions that lay down rules expressly recognized by member states of 
the African Union. Ratification of a treaty is an obvious form of express recognition of rules contained 
in it. The general principles to be taken into consideration should be recognised by African states. 
The Charter also increased the items on the list. Article 61 requires the Commission to take into 
consideration ‘African practices consistent with international norms on human and peoples’ rights’.   
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In sum, the African Charter determines, albeit blurredly, the role of treaty bodies with regard to 
itself, international human rights law, and general international law. The mandate of the Commission 
and the Court is to interpret and apply the Charter. To carry out this task, they draw inspiration from 
international human rights law and take into consideration general international law. In practice, 
there is no difference between drawing inspiration from an instrument and taking it into 
consideration. At least the Commission does not make such distinction, although the Court’s position 
is yet to be seen. The Commission usually refers to Articles 60 and 61 together. The African Court has 
even wider power than the Commission, with a jurisdiction over any human rights treaty ratified by 
the respondent state.374 In other words, the Court can declare a violation of international human 
rights treaties such as the ICESCR and the ICCPR. 
The Commission relies entirely on its power to draw inspiration from Articles 60 and 61 of the 
Charter to justify its introduction of the concept of progressive realisation into the Charter. It 
proclaimed that ‘While the African Charter does not expressly refer to the principle of progressive 
realisation, this concept is widely accepted in the interpretation of economic, social and cultural 
rights and has been implied into the Charter in accordance with Articles 61 and 62 [sic] of the African 
Charter’.375 Ratification of a treaty is not a prerequisite for drawing inspiration from it, but the fact 
that the majority of state parties to the African Charter are also parties to the ICESCR and other 
treaties that contain the principle of progressive realisation could be a relevant factor.376 However, 
some considerations may militate against the persuasive power of this justification. 
The scope of the Commission’s power is one of such considerations. The Commission’s power to 
draw inspiration from international human rights law is limited. It cannot transform the African 
Charter into a different treaty. The Charter cannot be taken as a gigantic treaty that contains all the 
rules laid down in all human rights treaties. The ‘application of the principle of systemic integration is 
limited by the explicit language of the treaty under interpretation’.377 The text of the Charter does 
not allow such interpretation, as discussed above. The drafting history of the Charter can be another 
consideration, insofar as it also shows that the principle of progressive realisation was deliberately 
omitted from the Charter, as discussed above.  
Moreover, the omission of the principle of progressive realisation from the Charter could have been 
justified by a reference to other principles. The pro homine principle could have been one such 
justification, because it requires the application of rules more favourable to the individual.378 If one 
accepts the principle of progressive realisation as a limitation, a treaty that does not contain the 
principle is more favourable to the individual.379 The other is the lex specialis maxim: ‘[t]he principle 
that special law derogates from general law’.380 The principle provides that ‘if a matter is being 
regulated by a general standard as well as a more specific rule, then the latter should take 
precedence over the former’.381 In cases of conflict of norms, ‘it is the role of lex specialis to point to 
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a set of considerations with practical relevance: the immediate accessibility and contextual sensitivity 
of the standard’.382 The African Charter, a regional instrument, can be considered both as lex specialis 
concerning universal human rights treaties such as the ICESCR,383 as well as providing practical 
relevance to the African socio-economic contexts. Therefore, it can be submitted that the Charter 
takes precedence over the universal human rights treaties even in cases of conflict, provided that the 
latter are not pre-emptory norms of international law.  
2.5.2 Resources and underdevelopment 
Resources by their nature are scarce. The scarcity of resources is closely related to the concept of 
progressive realisation. The underlying assumption is that a lack of resources at least partly prevents 
the immediate realisation of economic, social and cultural rights as opposed to civil and political 
rights. Thus, the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is said to be necessary, 
as discussed earlier.  
Similarly, commentators recommend the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights under the African Charter. Some make the recommendation based on views of ‘the majority’. 
A claim is usually made that ‘the majority’ calls for progressive achievement while ‘the minority’ 
considers the rights justiciable. Ankumah, for example, argues that economic, social and cultural 
rights under the African Charter ‘must be achieved progressively’ according to the majority view.384 
She states that ‘even if the African Commission were to find a state to be in violation of its duty to 
provide work, health care etc., in most cases due to underdevelopment, misallocation of resources 
etc. the complaint cannot get immediate relief’.385 Nmehielle agrees with her that those ‘who argue 
that economic, social and cultural rights, as guaranteed by the Charter, are justiciable, appear to be 
in the minority’.386 He calls for ‘progressive realization of the rights, taking into consideration the 
circumstances faced by the states Parties’.387 Concurring with Nmehielle, Mbazira refers to Ankumah 
and argues that ‘[i]t is important that the socio-economic rights in the African Charter be realised 
progressively due to the underdevelopment of most African countries’.388 One of the problems with 
this view is the conflation of two separate concepts: justiciability and progressive realisation. 
Justiciability, understood as ‘a concept denoting the suitability of a case for judicial or quasi-judicial 
scrutiny,’389 cannot be an issue under the African Charter.390 In recognising justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights, the Charter is the pioneer among other human rights treaties.391 Besides, 
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who constitutes ‘the majority’ or ‘the minority is not clear. Is it the majority of the state parties? 
Could it be the majority of academic writers? 
Other commentators acknowledge that the Charter requires immediate implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights but argue that such implementation would not be practical due 
to a lack of resources or underdevelopment in Africa. Umozurike argues that the inclusion of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter as ‘progressive development is more 
realistic than as definite rights to be immediately enjoyed’ because ‘the possibility of achievement 
seems to be beyond the capability of most African states at present’.392 Heyns finds the Charter 
problematic because the economic, social and cultural rights it recognises ‘are not explicitly made 
subject to the usual internal qualifiers […] such as the provision that the state is only required to 
ensure progressive realisation, subject to available resources’.393 This unconditional way in which the 
rights are stated ‘could easily create unrealistic expectations, and as such could undermine the 
legitimacy of the Charter’.394 Along the same line, Yeshanew concludes that one of the major lacunae 
in the African Charter is the fact that the resource-dependent obligations relating to many economic, 
social and cultural rights provisions ‘are not expressly qualified by the conventional requirement of 
“progressive realization”‘.395 Yeshanew recommends that the African Commission and the Court 
should read progressive realisation into the Charter.396 However, Yeshanew limits his 
recommendation to only resource-dependent obligations.397 
However, this recommendation is wanting on some considerations. The recommendation fails to 
adopt a holistic view towards the rights under the Charter. It is generally accepted that the 
implementation of civil and political rights requires resources, yet the application of progressive 
realisation is recommended with regard to economic, social and cultural rights only. The 
recommendation also ignores the concern that progressive realisation may be used by recalcitrant 
states to escape their obligations.398 Finally, the recommendation is made on the assumption that 
the Charter creates unrealistic expectations, an assumption that has been taken for granted without 
examination. First of all, whose expectations are unrealistic? Assuming that the reference is to the 
expectations of rights holders, the claim should have been made on empirical data, since the Charter 
has been in force for more than three decades. If the creation of unrealistic expectations were a fact, 
the Commission would have been flooded with cases, as Umozurike predicted long ago.399  
The African Commission acknowledges the lack of resources as its major challenge. In Purohit and 
Another v The Gambia, the Commission held that ‘millions of people in Africa are not enjoying the 
right to health maximally because African countries are generally faced with the problem of 
poverty’.400 Because of poverty the African states are incapable of providing ‘the necessary 
                                                          
392 Oji U Umozurike The African charter on human and peoples' rights (1997) 95. See Ankumah (n 394) 144; Nmehielle (n 50) 
124.  
393 Christof Heyns, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’ (2004) 108/3 Penn state Law Review 
679 – 702, 690. 
394 Christof Heyns, The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ (2001) 1/2 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 155 – 174, 161. 
395 Yeshanew (n 268) 266. 
396 Ibid 267 – 268, 272 – 273. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Leckie (n 234) 94. 
399 U O Umozurike ‘The protection of human rights under the Banjul (African) Charter on Human and People's Rights’ (1988) 
1 African Journal of International Law 65, at p. 81, cited in J Oloka-Onyango ‘Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the 
Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa’ (1995) 26/1 California Western International Law Journal 1-73, 52. 
400 Purohit and Another v The Gambia, para 84. 
 76 
amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of this right’.401 The 
Commission espoused a similar view with regard to the right to development. In the Southern 
Cameroon case, the Commission held that ‘the realisation of the right to development is a big 
challenge to the respondent state, as it is for state parties to the Charter, which are developing 
countries with scarce resources’.402 Despite this trend in the case law, the Commission has not raised 
scarcity of resources as its justification for introducing progressive realisation into the African 
Charter. 
2.6 Implications of introducing progressive realisation into the African Charter: An 
assessment 
The African Commission has introduced the principle of progressive realisation into the Charter. To 
do so, it has heavily relied on its mandate to draw inspiration from international law, which includes 
the UN treaties, particularly the ICESCR and the practice of the CESCR. The Commission has made a 
fundamental change to the Charter, and while the Charter is not Holy Scripture, advantages and 
disadvantages should be weighed in the process of developing it; therefore, this section examines 
and evaluates the implications of introducing the principle into the African Charter. 
The implications of introducing the principle of progressive realisation, it is submitted, can be 
examined from normative, structural and institutional perspectives. Here, a normative perspective 
relates to the nature of economic, social and cultural rights as legal rights and the extent to which 
they can be enjoyed or limited. An examination from a structural perspective looks at how the 
introduction of the principle affects the African Charter as a whole. An institutional perspective 
examines the consequences of introducing the principle for the Commission as an institution.    
From the outset, it is worth restating that the principle of progressive realisation does not mean the 
same thing for the critics and supporters alike. From a normative perspective, one version of the 
principle has a positive consequence for economic, social and cultural rights. This version of 
progressive realisation ensures the maximum possible performance of human rights as discussed 
above. In this sense, the principle does not replace, rather supplements, immediate obligations of 
states with regard to economic, social and cultural rights. The principle puts in place an additional 
tool for holding states accountable. Therefore, one may argue that introducing the principle in this 
sense strengthens the accountability of states under the African Charter by monitoring a) whether 
they have allocated sufficient resources and properly used the allocated resources for the realisation 
of economic, social and cultural rights; and b) whether they have made improvement in the 
enjoyment of these rights.     
Another version of the principle of progressive realisation has negative consequences for the 
recognition as well as the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. The principle is not 
invoked in political discourse. Instead, different reasons are provided to argue that economic, social 
and cultural rights are not human rights. For example, Jeane Kirkpatrick, a US Ambassador to the UN 
during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, was reported to have argued that economic, social and 
cultural rights cannot be human rights because ‘they must be provided by others through forceful 
extraction (taxation) and that that negates other peoples' inalienable rights’.403 Neier considers these 
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rights dangerous ‘particularly because there will always be different stages of development and 
different resources to consider in determining benefits’.404 However, when it comes to legal 
discourse, a finger is pointed to the principle of progressive realisation to prove that these rights are 
not legal in nature, as discussed earlier. One may be quick to dismiss this view as a twentieth-century 
perspective or as an attitude prevalent during the Cold War. Certainly, there has been an undeniable 
transformation in the legal recognition and judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural 
rights. However, there is little evidence showing that these rights have achieved the same level of 
recognition as civil and political rights today.405  Thus, the introduction of progressive realisation 
poses a risk of further marginalisation to economic, social and cultural rights under the African 
Charter. Even in the absence of the principle, the Commission received very few economic, social and 
cultural rights cases despite the fear that it would be flooded with cases.406  The Commission itself 
has already been criticised for neglecting these rights in its activities.407 In its promotional mandate, 
the Commission has focused on civil and political rights and ‘paid lip service to economic, social and 
cultural rights’.408  
The conception of progressive realisation as a limitation is another negative consequence on 
economic, social and cultural rights under the Charter, but less damaging than the denial of their 
legal nature. This view does not question the legal nature of the rights. Rather, the principle is 
understood as a restriction of the enjoyment of the rights.409 It is needless to state that most rights 
are not absolute since they can be limited. Economic, social and cultural rights can also be limited. 
However, the conception of progressive realisation as a limitation creates a second layer of 
restriction; the principle would provide states with an additional defence for their failure to make 
improvements over time. In Africa, however, ‘poor governance and economic mismanagement 
rather than lack of resources’ is identified as a problem for low implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights.410 It is a truism that resources are scarce everywhere in the world. Instead, how 
resources are used is central to the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. That is why 
supranational supervision mechanisms like the African Commission are established to hold states 
accountable through international law.411 Introducing progressive realization might offer an incentive 
for states to invoke lack of resources for their failure to comply with their obligations. Some states 
might view this as an opportunity to act in bad faith. As a result, the Commission has given an 
incentive to states to prioritise civil, political and peoples’ rights over economic, social and cultural 
rights in the allocation of their resources, which may ultimately lead to the marginalisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
From the structural perspective, the introduction of the principle is risky even when it is understood 
in a positive sense. Its introduction is not necessary in the first place. The same purpose can be 
achieved partly by utilising the tool provided under Article 62 of the Charter, on state reporting. The 
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provision requires states to submit reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to the 
rights under the Charter. If an issue concerning the failure of a state arises in communication 
procedures, nothing in the Charter prohibits the Commission or the Court from examining whether a 
respondent state has allocated resources or properly used the allocated resources. The African 
Commission and the Court can hold states accountable and promote maximum human rights 
performance under the existing provisions of the Charter. Therefore, the introduction of progressive 
realisation into the Charter does not add any value but is in fact problematic.  
The introduction of progressive realisation into the text of the African Charter would undermine the 
integrity of the Charter itself. This problem does not arise from the introduction of the principle per 
se, but rather from the limitation of the principle to economic, social and cultural rights only. The 
realisation of other rights under the African Charter (civil, political and peoples’ rights) depends on 
the availability of resources too. Because of the scarcity of resources, their full realisation does not 
happen overnight. One then wonders why the African Commission does not monitor these factors 
for the realisation of other Charter rights, for example, whether states have allocated resources; 
whether they have properly utilised the allocated resources; and whether such resource allocation 
and utilisation have advanced the enjoyment of other Charter rights. There is no reason to limit the 
potential benefits of progressive realisation.  
However, the African Commission has limited the application of progressive realisation to economic, 
social and cultural rights only. This raises another issue. Have state parties achieved full realisation of 
civil, political, and peoples’ rights? It is common knowledge that the answer is negative. Then why 
does the African Commission avoid monitoring progress in the enjoyment of civil, political, and 
peoples’ rights? Does that mean the Commission is less concerned with monitoring the enjoyment of 
other Charter rights? Here, one should acknowledge the challenges that the Commission may face. 
There is no jurisprudential experience for the Commission or the Court to draw on even if they found 
it necessary to extend progressive realisation to civil, political and peoples’ rights, because 
international human rights bodies that supervise civil and political rights do not use the principle of 
progressive realisation. 
From the institutional perspective, the form in which the principle of progressive realisation has been 
introduced has some ramifications for the Commission itself. The Commission has risked its 
credibility in at least two ways. First, the Commission compromised its consistency and predictability 
by contradicting its earlier approach. As discussed above, the Commission has taken the view that 
the Charter provides for immediate obligations. Now it adopts contrary views by introducing 
progressive realisation and treating economic, social and cultural rights in a different way. The 
Commission undermined its authority by failing to provide convincing reasons. In the Southern 
Cameroon case, the Commission adopted a sweeping statement for which it did not provide any 
reason at all: a ‘state is under obligation to invest its resources in the best way possible to attain the 
progressive realisation of the right to development, and other economic, social and cultural rights’.412 
When the concept was adopted in the Nairobi Principles, the Commission relied on Articles 60 and 61 
of the Charter. That is, it introduced the concept because other human rights treaties include it. The 
Commission does not bother to show how the Charter is identical or at least similar to those treaties 
in this respect.  
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Second, the Commission casts doubt on the quality of its expertise. The Commission heavily relies on 
the work of the CESCR when it deals with economic, social and cultural rights. In principle, there is 
nothing wrong with that and the Commission has indeed the mandate to do so. Because its mandate 
springs from the Charter, the Commission should make the necessary adaptations to dovetail the 
lessons it learns from the CESCR (and other similar organs) with the Charter’s context. The African 
regional context is obviously the raison d’être of the Charter and cannot be ignored in any 
interpretive exercise. Therefore, if the Commission interprets the Charter by introducing a new 
concept such as progressive realisation, it must do so in such a way that the concept is adapted to 
keep the Charter’s central features intact. Otherwise, it runs the risk of being perceived as an organ 
that lacks the required expertise to distinguish the contextual difference of the ICESCR from that of 
the Charter or as an organ that has no ability to understand the Charter’s nuanced approach. All of 
these factors, namely, consistency, predictability, expertise and reasoned decisions, have 
implications for the legitimacy of the Commission.413 
2.7 Conclusion 
The principle of progressive realisation can be understood as a tool necessary for ensuring maximum 
human rights performance. In this sense, the principle can be used to hold states internationally 
accountable for a failure to make progress in the enjoyment of human rights – including economic, 
social and cultural rights. The principle coexists with immediate state obligations. This is implicit in 
the raison d'être of international human rights treaties such as the African Charter and their 
monitoring organs such as the African Commission and the African Court. Therefore, the African 
Charter cannot be interpreted to exclude mechanisms of supervising progress made in the 
enjoyment of human rights. Progress a priori does not happen overnight and varies from one state to 
another depending on their resources, whether they come in financial, natural, human, or 
technological form, whether they are private or public, or from within state parties or from outside 
sources.  
However, the principle of progressive realisation has also been invoked as evidence that economic, 
social and cultural rights are not legal or human rights. It is also understood as an additional 
limitation applicable to these rights only. The African Charter does not incorporate the principle in 
this sense and should not be interpreted to do so. The absence of the principle from the Charter does 
not exclude its potential benefits from the Charter. Nevertheless, interpreting the Charter to include 
the principle of progressive realisation brings into the Charter meanings that have serious 
repercussions for economic, social and cultural rights. This understanding of the principle 
undermines the recognition of these rights and subjects them to additional restrictions.  
Irrespective of what the principle of progressive realisation might entail, the form in which the 
principle has been introduced has negative consequences for the Commission itself. In introducing 
the principle, the Commission has not taken into consideration the drafting history of the Charter. 
Neither has it justified the introduction of the principle on the ground of changes in the 
circumstances in which the Charter was drafted and adopted. It has also failed to adapt lessons from 
other human rights organs to the African Charter and its contexts, and has not examined the 
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consequence of introducing the concept on its earlier jurisprudence. As a result, the Commission has 
been inconsistent and unpredictable, exposing itself to the accusation that it has shown a 
questionable professional expertise. These factors may undermine its legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIMITATION AND PROPORTIONALITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Progressive realisation, as indicated in Chapter 2, is a form of limitation. Young identifies progressive 
realisation among six modes of limiting economic, social and cultural rights. She argues that 
‘expressly protected economic and social rights are commonly limited by the obligation of 
"progressive realization".’1 Alston and Quinn also consider progressive realisation a different kind of 
limitation.2 Understood in this sense, progressive realisation is an additional limitation to economic, 
social and cultural rights. This is because progressive realisation is associated only with economic, 
social and cultural rights, not with civil and political rights. If progressive realisation is an additional 
limitation, then, what is a limitation on economic, social and cultural rights? 
Limitations (also called restrictions) are justified infringements permitted under human rights 
instruments. Limitations on human rights do not constitute violations if they respect certain 
conditions, which are specified in the treaty and/or developed by human rights monitoring bodies. In 
this kind of assessment, proportionality analysis generally plays an important role. The second 
section of this chapter begins with the discussion of the concepts of limitations and proportionality in 
theories. It examines the application of proportionality to negative as well as to positive obligations. 
The third section examines the normative bases of limitations in the European Social Charter,3 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)4 and the Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Protocol of San Salvador).5 The third section also examines the application of limitations by the 
European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee), the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American 
Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court). The purpose of 
the second and third sections is to set a theoretical as well as a comparative framework for the 
discussion of the remaining sections on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter or Charter).6 
The African Charter provides for limitation clauses with regard to provisions that guarantee civil and 
political rights. The Charter, however, does not provide for a general limitation clause unlike the 
European Social Charter, the ICESCR, and the Protocol of San Salvador. In contrast, provisions of the 
Charter on economic, social and cultural rights are not circumscribed by limitation clauses. Yet that 
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does not mean that there are no justifiable restrictions of these rights, nor does it imply that there 
are no conditions determining the justifiability of restrictions. The fourth section of this chapter 
examines limitations under the African Charter with a particular reference to Article 27(2) of the 
Charter, which requires individuals to exercise their rights with due regard to rights of others, 
collective security, morals and common interest.  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (African Commission or Commission) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court or Court) have assigned the role of a 
general limitation clause to Article 27(2) of the African Charter. This provision has evolved into a full-
fledged limitation clause. They also employ the principle of proportionality to evaluate restrictions to 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed under the Charter. The fifth section of this chapter examines 
the practice of the African Commission and the African Court in light of the theoretical and 
comparative framework in the second and third sections. This section deals with components of the 
principle of proportionality in general, which has evolved mainly in relation to negative obligations 
arising from civil and political rights. The sixth section deals with the application of this principle to 
economic, social and cultural rights. Finally, the chapter provides concluding remarks in the last 
section. 
3.2 An overview of limitation and proportionality analysis   
In general, human rights, whether guaranteed in national constitutions or international treaties, are 
not absolute. With limited exceptions - such as the right to protection against torture - human rights 
can be limited. Human rights instruments usually contain provisions authorising limitations, which 
are called limitation clauses. Judicial and quasi-judicial organs evaluate compliance of state conduct 
with the limitation clauses and thereby determine the scope of state obligations. They usually 
employ the judicial doctrine of proportionality. The use of proportionality analysis is ubiquitous. The 
principle has attracted wide scholarly interest. Not every court applies proportionality analysis, 
however,7 which implies that there is an alternative.  
In this section, I examine limitation and proportionality analysis. I will first discuss the concept of 
limitation (restriction), distinguishing it from the concept of progressive realisation. I will then discuss 
proportionality analysis, and summarise the components of proportionality analysis in relation to 
negative obligations, discussing whether the identified components are equally applicable to positive 
obligations.  
3.2.1 Limitation  
A limitation on human rights means their infringement.8 According to Barak, ‘a limitation occurs 
whether the effect on the right is significant or marginal; whether the limitation is related to the 
right’s core or to its penumbra; whether it is intentional or not; or whether it is carried out by an act 
or an omission.’9 Not every infringement is a limitation, though: only justified infringements 
constitute a limitation. When justified, a limitation determines the scope of a right and the scope of 
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state obligations corresponding to that right. Thus, states are ‘both a protector of rights and the site 
for the unavoidable infringement and violation of these same rights.’10  
A limitation on human rights in general may take two forms: internal and external limits.11 Rights that 
have internal limits are restrictively defined.12 Internal limits determine the definitional scope of a 
right.13 That is, restrictively defined rights have qualifying terms.14 The right to food under Article 11 
of the ICESCR can be an example.15 This provision guarantees ‘the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food.’ Insofar as this provision 
contains the qualifying term ‘adequate’, by definition, it limits the amount of food to be provided by 
states. Of course, providing insufficient food in terms of quantity and quality falls below the 
requirement of the right when states’ obligation to provide is triggered.  
External limits are permissible restrictions.16 Human rights treaties and constitutional texts introduce 
external limits in two ways.17 Some use specific limitation clauses, which are applicable to a particular 
right. For example, Article 8 of the ICESCR provides for a specific limitation clause. It guarantees the 
right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of one’s choice. The specific 
limitation clause of this provision stipulates that: ‘No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of 
this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’18 This limitation clause is specific because it does not apply to other provisions of the ICESCR. 
The other form of external limit is a general limitation clause. This is applicable to all rights 
guaranteed in a particular legal instrument. Article 4 of the ICESCR is quintessentially a general 
limitation clause. This provision applies to all rights guaranteed in the ICESCR unless they contain 
specific limitation clauses. 
Both general and specific limitation clauses in international human rights treaties permit states to 
impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed in those treaties. These clauses burden 
rights with qualifications.19 They were included in different treaty texts for a couple of reasons. 
Limitation clauses are political compromises. As such, these clauses serve ‘to reassure countries 
hesitating to embrace’ a certain treaty regime.20 Limitation clauses also provide a protective 
function.21 They are ‘primarily intended to be protective of the rights of individuals rather than 
permissive of the imposition of limitations by the State.’22 The limitation clauses are protective since 
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they restrict the limitation itself. States cannot restrict rights guaranteed under these treaties as they 
choose. Therefore, states must comply with requirements of limitation clauses.  
In terms of procedure, internal limits and external limits are determined at different stages. Of 
course, this assumes that the adjudication of a human rights dispute, at least in theory, proceeds in 
two stages.23 Internal limitations are determined at the first stage, which deals with defining the 
scope of a right. A party alleging a violation has the burden of proof at the first stage. If the claimant 
succeeds in establishing a prima facie violation, the adjudication proceeds to the second stage. 
Otherwise, the proceeding ends there. The second stage is about external limits and the burden 
shifts to the respondent. The processing of human rights complaints in two stages has the advantage 
of distributing the burden of proof between parties. The examination at the second stage is whether 
a state has complied with the criteria in the limitation clause. In other words, the examination 
ascertains that limitations are determined by law (legality); that they serve legitimate goals 
(legitimacy); that they are necessary (necessity); that they are suitable (suitability); and that they are 
proportional (balancing or proportionality in the narrow sense). The assessment of the last four 
criteria is usually called proportionality analysis in the literature although suitability and balancing 
are not clearly apparent from the text of limitation causes. I now discuss proportionality analysis.  
3.2.2 Proportionality analysis 
Proportionality is ‘a doctrinal tool for the resolution of conflicts between a right and a competing 
right or interest, at the core of which is the balancing stage which requires the right to be balanced 
against the competing right or interest.’24 The origin of proportionality is traced to philosophical 
thoughts.25 As a positive legal concept, proportionality was developed in German public law.26 From 
Germany, the principle has migrated to other jurisdictions.27 International courts including the 
European Court of Human Rights have accepted the proportionality analysis.28 Proportionality is now 
the main feature of limitation clauses in international human rights instruments.29 The principle of 
proportionality ‘creates a conceptual framework in which to define the appropriate relationship 
between human rights and considerations that may justify their limitation.’30 Courts around the 
world use proportionality tests to adjudicate human rights disputes.31 They use the principle as ‘a 
test to determine whether an interference with a prima facie right is justified.’32  
In the application of proportionality analysis, a distinction may be made between positive and 
negative obligations. A positive obligation under a human rights treaty means that states should 
‘undertake specific affirmative tasks.’33 It is an obligation to take action.34  It contrasts with a negative 
                                                          
23 Gardbaum, structure of constitutional rights, (n 11) 388. 
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obligation, which requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights.35 
That is, states have to do something to carry out their positive obligations. This dichotomy between 
negative and positive obligations may subsume the tripartite obligations to respect, to protect and to 
fulfil. Thus, the obligation to respect is negative obligations while the obligations to protect and to 
fulfil are positive obligations.36  
In principle, states have both positive and negative obligations with respect to each right. In 
particular, economic, social and cultural rights impose a negative obligation to respect and positive 
obligations to protect and to fulfil. However, some authors distinguish positive rights from negative 
rights, instead of a negative obligation from a positive one. ‘Negative rights forbid to destroy, 
obstruct, or interfere with a legal interest.’37 They ‘impose limits or duties of forbearance on (mostly) 
government action, on what governments can lawfully do.’38 On the other hand, positive rights imply 
an entitlement to a positive action by state authorities.39 ‘They impose affirmative obligations – 
rather than limits – or duties of action on (mostly) government actors.’40 This dichotomy is different 
from the traditional division between economic, social and cultural rights on the one hand and civil 
and political rights on the other hand. The right to vote (a political right) and the right to education (a 
social right) are equally positive rights.41 This, however, might create the wrong impression that a 
positive right, for example a right to vote, does not impose a negative obligation. For the sake of 
clarity, I use positive obligation instead of positive right.  
The application of proportionality analysis to negative obligations is common. Positive obligations 
have attracted little attention in this regard. Therefore, I discuss them separately. I begin with the 
discussion of proportionality analysis in negative obligations. 
3.2.2.1 Limitation and proportionality in negative obligations 
The application of proportionality analysis is well-developed in the area of negative obligations, but 
the formulation of the proportionality test is not uniform – there are slight variations. In theory, the 
proportionality analysis has essentially four aspects: legitimate goal, suitability, necessity and 
proportionality in the narrower sense (balancing).42 Not all theorists, however, consider that 
legitimate goal is one of the components of the proportionality test. Robert Alexy, for example, 
argues that this requirement is superfluous43 and limits the components to suitability, necessity and 
proportionality in the narrower sense.44 Although national and international courts do not 
necessarily employ all four of these components of the proportionality analysis, I briefly discuss them 
as identified in the literature.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
34 Laurens Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive State: Rethinking the relationship between positive and negative obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia 2016) 11. 
35 Lavrysen (n 34) 11. 
36 Lavrysen (n 34) 12. 
37 Matthias Klatt & Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2012) 88. 
38 Gardbaum, structure of constitutional rights, (n 11) 397. 
39 Klatt & Meister (n 37) 85. 
40 Gardbaum, structure of constitutional rights, (n 11) 397. 
41 Gardbaum, structure of constitutional rights, (n 11) 397. 
42 Möller, Challenging the critics, (n 24) 711; Urbina, Critique of Proportionality, (n 31) 49; Klatt & Meister (n 37) 8. Robert 
Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2010) 4/1 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 19—32, 24; Robert Alexy, 
‘Constitutional Rights and Proportionality’ (2014) 22 Revus 51–65, 52. 
43 Robert Alexy, ‘Proportionality and Rationality’ in Vicki C Jackson & Mark Tushnet (Eds) Proportionality: New frontiers, new 
challenges (CUP 2017) 14 (hereafter ‘Proportionality and Rationality’). 
44 Alexy, Proportionality and Rationality, (n 43) 14. 
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The first component of the principle of proportionality is legitimate goal, or the requirement of 
legitimacy. This component requires that the measure or the policy that interferes with a right must 
have a legitimate goal.45 The goal of ‘the legislation setting out the limitation must be of sufficient 
importance to warrant infringing a right.’46 The limitation must serve a proper purpose.47 Limitation 
clauses in national constitutions and human rights treaties identify proper purposes for restricting 
human rights.48 Barak identifies the protection of human rights and the promotion of public interest 
as the most pertinent to the proper purpose component of the principle of proportionality.49  
Suitability is the second component. Suitability requires that ‘the measure that interferes with the 
right has to be apt to attain the legitimate aim.’50 This requirement precludes restrictions on human 
rights that obstruct the realisation of a particular right without promoting any other right or goal for 
which such restrictions have been adopted.51 There should be a rational connection between the 
restrictions on the rights and the purposes intended to be achieved by such restrictions.52 The 
‘practical relevance of the sub-principle of suitability is relatively low’ because the measures 
restricting rights usually promote legitimate aims to a certain degree.53   
Necessity is the third component of the principle of proportionality. The rule of necessity requires 
that ‘the means should impair the right as little as possible.’54 If the state can choose a measure from 
a range of alternatives to achieve a legitimate goal, it must choose one that least restricts the rights 
in question.55 States can resort to the restriction of human rights only if there is no other method 
through which they can achieve the legitimate goal.56  
The fourth component is balancing (proportionality in the narrower sense). Balancing is ‘a 
consequential test and requires an appropriate relationship between the benefit gained by the law 
limiting a human right and the harm caused to the right by its limitation.’57 This component requires 
that the restriction of a right must be justified ‘in light of the gain in the protection for the competing 
right or interest.’58 The balancing test may proceed in three stages.59 It begins with establishing the 
degree to which a human right has been restricted.60 This is followed by determining the importance 
of achieving the legitimate goal. Finally, whether the importance of achieving a legitimate goal 
justifies the restriction of a human right should be determined.61 If we picture a scale, decision-
makers are expected to place rights on one side of the scale and legitimate goals on the other side.62 
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However, the decision-makers do not expect the scale to tilt to one side mechanically; the weighing 
process involves value judgment.63  
There are two major ways of applying these four components. One is sequential. A court checks 
whether a limitation complies with each component. For example, if a court finds that the goal of 
limitation is not legitimate, it does not proceed to examine whether such limitation is suitable. This is 
a vertical proportionality test first adopted by German courts and later spread to other 
jurisdictions.64 The other alternative is the horizontal proportionality test whereby a court examines 
the components of proportionality as a whole without following any predetermined order.65  
To conclude, justifications for limitation are evaluated based on limitation clauses and components 
of proportionality derived from those clauses. The evaluation is usually raised in relation to state 
interference with the enjoyment of civil and political rights contrary to their negative obligation to 
respect. However, the application of components of proportionality to positive obligation is not 
frequently discussed. I examine the application of proportionality analysis to positive obligations 
below.   
3.2.2.2 Does proportionality analysis apply to positive obligations?   
Courts all over the world apply the proportionality analysis in settling human rights disputes.66 
However, courts do not apply proportionality to all rights. In particular, the application of a four-
pronged proportionality analysis (i.e., proportionality in a broad sense) to positive obligations is not 
common.67 It does not matter whether the positive obligations arise from economic, social and 
cultural rights or from civil and political rights. A number of reasons may explain this reluctance.  
First, the application of proportionality to positive obligations raises a conceptual issue.68 As 
Gardbaum argues, the core application of proportionality across different areas of international law 
is ‘to situations of prima facie prohibitions on government conduct.’69 Proportionality applies to what 
states cannot do, not to what they must do.70 Put differently, ‘proportionality is most essentially a 
condition for permitting limited exceptions to negative duties.’71 Second, applying proportionality to 
positive obligations raises a normative tension. Gardbaum argues that applying proportionality to 
positive socio-economic rights creates ‘certain tensions with the ideal of human dignity that prompts 
their recognition in the first place.’72 He adds that human dignity itself may require that socio-
economic rights be met, particularly when these rights seek to ensure the conditions of basic 
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survival, ‘rather than not disproportionately infringed.’73 For this reason, courts might focus on 
defining the contents of these rights and on identifying whether there is a violation.74 
Third, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation may bar the application of proportionality to 
positive obligations. Young argues that courts have not invoked the proportionality analysis in 
prominent economic and social rights cases ‘because the “margin of appreciation” that attends a 
proportionality inquiry is more likely to be triggered under present conceptions of economic and 
social rights.’75 She distinguishes the proportionality analysis from the principle of proportionality. 
She summarises the proportionality principle as the view that “the graver the impact of the decision 
upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required”.’76 She 
proposes proportionality inflected reasonableness for a better protection of economic, social and 
cultural rights.77 
Finally, the scarcity of resources can also be a reason why proportionality does not apply to positive 
obligations. As Möller argues, proportionality does not make much sense with regard to economic, 
social and cultural rights ‘because in almost all circumstances the realization of those rights requires 
scarce resources.’78 Of the four components of the proportionality test, states can easily satisfy the 
requirement of three of them by invoking resource scarcity. Thus, Möller concludes, ‘any limitation 
will always further the legitimate goal of saving resources and will always be suitable and necessary 
to the achievement of that goal.’79 This argument is not compelling since scarcity of resources is not 
one of the legitimate reasons specified in most limitation clauses.80 
Despite such reluctance in practice and the reasons thereof, the proportionality analysis may have a 
potential application in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. The scholarly writings provide 
some options in this regard. The broadest option is to employ other criteria in addition to the 
proportionality test, particularly when the case involves conflicts of economic, social and cultural 
rights according to Vandenhole. Additional criteria are necessary because ‘the proportionality test as 
used in the context of civil and political rights is not sufficient.’81  The additional criteria involve two 
kinds of prioritisation. One is to prioritise vulnerable groups while the other is to give priority to the 
implementation of core content of rights or to the performance of core obligations.82   
Another option makes no distinction between positive and negative obligations. Proportionality in 
the broad sense also applies to positive obligations. That is, all four components of proportionality 
discussed above are applicable to positive obligations in the same way these components apply to 
negative obligations. As Barak argues, positive rights, which include economic and social rights, are 
subject to proportionality analysis in the same way as negative rights.83 He argues that the 
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‘determination that an omission is disproportional in relation to a positive right is reached much in 
the same way as the determination that a limitation on a negative right was disproportional.’84 A 
state can justify the omission only when there is a partial protection.85 A state cannot justify a total 
omission. 
Still another option involves applying proportionality on a miniature scale. This can be done by 
dropping all the components but one: of the four components, only proportionality in the narrow 
sense (balancing) is applicable to positive obligations. According to Möller, the balancing stage 
applies to economic, social and cultural rights.86 Likewise, Contiades and Fotiadou emphasise 
balancing.87 They suggest skipping some of the components of proportionality analysis when applying 
the principle to economic, social and cultural rights.88 They argue that proportionality gradually 
develops into a balancing technique,89 and state that ‘Proportionality is balancing and balancing is 
proportionality.’90 When applied to economic, social and cultural rights, ‘proportionality operates as 
a limit to limitations.’91 Contiades and Fotiadou further argue that proportionality also determines 
substantive contents of economic, social and cultural rights by balancing conflicting interests.92 
However, this view is contested: according to Bilchitz, the view that proportionality determines the 
contents of economic, social and cultural rights is ‘a serious misunderstanding of the proportionality 
inquiry.’93  He argues that ‘application of the proportionality test to socio-economic rights involves 
much complexity and needs to be thought through in some detail.’94 Bilchitz suggests that 
proportionality applies to economic, social and cultural rights but he does not provide detailed 
analysis of the application. 
In sum, three possible proposals have been identified with respect to a potential application of 
proportionality analysis to positive obligations. The first proposes that proportionality alone is not 
enough and calls for coupling the principle with additional criteria. The second proposal posits that 
proportionality applies to positive obligations in the same way it applies to negative obligations. The 
last proposal suggests that only one component of the proportionality test applies to positive 
obligations. In the following sections, I analyse limitation clauses and the practice of treaty bodies to 
identify whether these proposals have practical application or not. 
3.3 Limitation clauses and practice of treaty bodies 
Human rights treaties that guarantee economic, social and cultural rights provide for limitation 
clauses.95 This section discusses the texts of limitation clauses and examines how human rights treaty 
bodies, namely, the CESCR, the European Committee, the Inter-American Court and the Inter-
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American Commission interpret limitation clauses in their respective treaties. After discussing 
limitation clauses in the first sub-section, I will identify components of proportionality analysis from 
the practice of treaty bodies in the second subsection.    
3.3.1 Limitation clauses 
The European Social Charter, the ICESCR, and the Protocol of San Salvador all include both general 
and specific limitation clauses. The ICESCR contains a general limitation clause under Article 4, which 
provides that: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided 
by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
In terms of its scope of application, it is submitted, Article 4 seems to extend beyond the rights 
guaranteed in the ICESCR. This provision refers to limitations on ‘the enjoyment of those rights 
provided by the State in conformity’ with the ICESCR. The exercise of the rights subjected to a 
limitation need not be guaranteed in the ICESCR. This is evident from the comparison of terms used 
in other provisions in part II. For example, Article 2(1) refers to ‘rights recognised’ in the ICESCR while 
Article 3 refers to rights set forth in the ICESCR.  
Article 4 also applies to all rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. This provision is located in part II, which 
provides for general principles and rules applicable to all substantive rights in part III. This makes it a 
general limitation clause. In other words, the exercise of all the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR is 
subject to a limitation, and as a result, none of the economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in 
the ICESCR are absolute. This can be contrasted with the ICCPR, which guarantees some absolute 
rights partly because such rights are not circumscribed by limitation clauses.96  
The scope of Article 4 can also be determined in relation to specific limitation clauses. Article 4 does 
not specify its relationship with other limitation clauses. Nevertheless, it is a trite rule of 
interpretation that special rules prevail over general ones. Article 4 is a general rule. Its application 
can be set aside by a special rule. That is, Article 4 does not apply when provisions in part III of the 
ICESCR (Articles 6-15) contain a limitation clause. In particular, Article 4 does not apply to rights 
guaranteed in Article 8 of the ICESCR (trade union rights).  
Article 8 of the ICESCR is the only substantive provision in part III that contains detailed specific 
limitation clauses.97 One such clause relates to the right of everyone to form trade unions and join 
the trade union of one’s choice, a right which also falls under the category of civil and political 
rights.98 It provides that:  
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and 
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.99 
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Article 8 also places a similar limitation on the right of trade unions to function freely. This right is 
subject to restrictions, which are ‘prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’100 Besides, states can impose additional restrictions on the exercise of trade union rights by 
soldiers, police and civil servants.101  
The formulation and content of Article 8 is different from Article 4. Article 8 shares more features 
with Article 22(2) of the ICCPR. Apart from the number of legitimate grounds, these provisions are 
the same. Public safety, public health and morals are legitimate grounds for restricting trade union 
rights under Article 22(2) of the ICCPR. These three grounds are omitted from Article 8. National 
security, public order, and rights and freedoms of others are common to both Article 22(2) of the 
ICCPR and Article 8 of the ICESCR. Still, Article 8 contains more legitimate goals than Article 4 does; 
the latter contains only one legitimate goal, implying narrow states discreation.    
Like the ICESCR, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) contains general and specific 
limitation clauses. Article 5 of the Protocol states the general limitation clause: 
The State Parties may establish restrictions and limitations on the enjoyment and exercise of the rights 
established herein by means of laws promulgated for the purpose of preserving the general welfare in 
a democratic society only to the extent that they are not incompatible with the purpose and reason 
underlying those rights.  
This provision shares more common features with the general limitation clause of the ICESCR than it 
shares with the general limitation clauses of the American Convention on Human Rights. The latter 
provides for two general limitation clauses. Article 30 of the Convention provides that: 
The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the 
rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for 
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been 
established.  
In addition, Article 32(2) of the Convention provides that: ‘The rights of each person are limited by 
the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a 
democratic society.’ 
Like the ICESCR, the Protocol of San Salvador mentions only one legitimate ground for restricting the 
rights it guarantees: the preservation of the general welfare. On the other hand, the American 
Convention provides for two additional legitimate goals: rights of others and security of all. Like the 
ICESCR again, the Protocol of San Salvador requires that restrictions to the rights it guarantees must 
be compatible with the purpose and reasons underlying those rights. On the other hand, the 
American Convention does not expressly state such requirement.  
Regarding its scope, Article 5 of the Protocol of San Salvador applies to all rights guaranteed in the 
same Protocol. This is particularly the case when other provisions of the Protocol do not contain 
specific limitation clauses. However, Article 5 does not apply to trade union rights (Article 8 of the 
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Protocol of San Salvador) because there is a specific limitation clause applicable to these rights.102  
This view is in line with the Inter-American Court’s position on the relationship between general and 
specific limitation clauses under the American Convention. The Inter-American Court has explained 
that a general limitation clause under Article 32(2) of the American Convention is applicable when 
there are no specific limitation clauses under other provisions. It held that ‘Article 32(2) contains a 
general statement that is designed for those cases in particular in which the Convention, in 
proclaiming a right, makes no special reference to possible legitimate restrictions.’103  In the same 
line, the general limitation clause under Article 5 of the Protocol of San Salvador is not applicable 
because the specific limitation clause under Article 8 of the same Protocol prevails as a special rule. 
Under Article 8(2), the specific limitation clause in the Protocol of San Salvador stipulates that: 
The exercise of the rights set forth above may be subject only to restrictions established by law, 
provided that such restrictions are characteristic of a democratic society and necessary for 
safeguarding public order or for protecting public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others. Members of the armed forces and the police and of other essential public services shall be 
subject to limitations and restrictions established by law. 
This provision shares little with the general limitation clause under Article 5 of the Protocol of San 
Salvador. Instead, it shares more features with restrictions under Article 16 of the American 
Convention (freedom of association). Article 8 of the Protocol contains fewer legitimate goals than 
Article 16 of the Convention does. Apart from this, the two provisions are essentially the same.  
In terms of formulation and content, the general limitation clause in the European Social Charter is 
different from those clauses in the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador. The European Social 
Charter states that: 
The rights and principles set forth [in the European Social Charter] shall not be subject to any 
restrictions or limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the 
protection of public interest, national security, public health, or morals.104 
This provision is similar with specific limitation clauses relating to trade union rights guaranteed in 
the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador. As a result, the European Social Charter provides for 
more legitimate grounds for restricting rights it guarantees than the ICESCR and the Protocol of San 
Salvador. One may wonder whether the general limitation clauses in the ICESCR and the Protocol of 
San Salvador represent a change in the way limitation on economic, social and cultural rights is 
understood in international human rights law in general. The European Social Charter is the pioneer. 
It predates both the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador. Therefore, one may argue, the ICESCR 
and the Protocol of San Salvador represent a trend towards allowing fewer legitimate goals to 
restrict the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, apart from the trade union rights 
which are akin to civil and political rights. 
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3.3.2 Application of limitation clauses  
The ICESCR, the European Social Charter, and the Protocol of San Salvador, provide for limitation 
clauses as discussed above. Their respective treaty bodies, namely, the CESCR, the European 
Committee, the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court, refer to at least some 
components of proportionality analysis highlighted in the previous section. They use these 
components when they assess whether restrictions by states comply with the limitation clauses 
although the use of these components is not uniform.  
Based on the general limitation clause under Article 4 of the ICESCR, the CESCR requires that 
‘restrictions must be in accordance with the law, […] in the interest of legitimate aims pursued, and 
strictly necessary.’105 It also requires limitations to be proportional.106 These components can also be 
traced in the practice of the European Committee of Social Rights, which has held that a restriction is 
compatible with the European Social Charter ‘if the requirements of Article G are met, i.e. if the 
restriction is established by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is objectively necessary in a democratic 
society, that is to say proportionate to the aim pursued.’107  
The Inter-American Court also uses similar components. The Court has established requirements of 
permissible restrictions to the enjoyment and exercise of rights under the American Convention: ‘a) 
they must be established by law; b) they must be necessary; c) they must be proportional, and d) 
their purpose must be to attain a legitimate goal in a democratic society.’108 In addition, in cases 
involving conflicts between indigenous communal property and individual private property, the 
restrictions should not amount to a denial of traditions and customs of indigenous people in a way 
that endangers the very survival of the group and of its members.109 I will begin with the requirement 
of legality as emphasised by these treaty bodies. 
3.3.2.1 Legality  
Limitation clauses usually require that restrictions be ‘prescribed by law’.110 In the Limburg Principles, 
it has been suggested that limitations under Article 4 of the ICESCR should be ‘provided for by 
national law of general application which is consistent with the Covenant and is in force at the time 
the limitation is applied.’111 Such national law should ‘be clear and accessible to everyone.’112 States 
should not use arbitrary or unreasonable or discriminatory laws to limit rights.113 Müller argues that 
the term ‘law’ in Article 4 should not be limited to statute law.114 Relying on the drafting history of 
the ICESCR, she suggests that the term ‘law’ should mean ‘the whole body of legal precedent and 
practice’ although that is not apparent from the ICESCR and the practice of the CESCR.115  
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The European Committee does not seem to give such a broad definition to the term ‘law’ under the 
general limitation clause of the European Social Charter.116 It has emphasised that laws that restrict 
the rights guaranteed under the European Social Charter should be passed by a democratic 
legislature. In GSEE v Greece, the Committee held that restrictive ‘measures must have a clear basis 
in law, i.e. they must have been agreed upon by the democratic legislature.’117 Thus, the Committee’s 
emphasis on the agreement by the legislature implies that rights guaranteed in the European Social 
Charter cannot be restricted by laws emanating from the other branches of the government, which 
includes subsidiary legislation and judicial precedents.  
The Inter-American Court has limited the term ‘laws’ under Article 30 of the American Convention to 
mean legislative enactment. The Court has stressed that  ‘the word "laws" in Article 30 of the 
Convention means a general legal norm tied to the general welfare, passed by democratically elected 
legislative bodies established by the Constitution.’118 The Court has developed a particularly 
demanding interpretation of the requirement of legality included in the general limitation clause of 
the American Convention:119 not every law that provides for restrictions on human rights complies 
with the American Convention. The Court has underlined the importance of the organ that 
promulgates the laws. Not every legislative body can restrict human rights; only ‘democratically 
elected’ ones can do. Moreover, the formal proclamation of the laws is not sufficient by itself. The 
Court has emphasised that ‘there must also be a system that will effectively ensure their application 
and an effective control of the manner in which the organs exercise their powers.’120 Since this 
interpretation of the Inter-American Court relates to the general limitation clause, it applies to all 
rights recognised in the American Convention.             
3.3.2.2 Legitimacy 
Limitation clauses usually specify few legitimate aims for adopting restrictions to rights. The reasons 
for justifying restrictions are limited, not infinite. Under the general limitation clause of the ICESCR, 
there is only one legitimate aim: promoting ‘the general welfare.’121 The American Convention and its 
Protocol of San Salvador also provide for a single legitimate aim. Under the American Convention, 
the only legitimate aim is ‘general interest.’122 In the Protocol of San Salvador, the legitimate aim is 
preservation of ‘the general welfare.’123  
The meaning of the phrase ‘general welfare’ is not clear from the drafting history of the ICESCR, nor 
from the practice of the CESCR. In the Limburg Principles, it has been suggested that the phrase 
‘promoting the general welfare’ should be ‘construed to mean furthering the well-being of the 
people as a whole.’124 This phrase should not be construed to include the protection of public order, 
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morals, national security and rights and freedoms of others because such grounds were intentionally 
left out from the ICESCR.125 
The Inter-American Court has explained the concept of ‘general welfare’ under Article 32(2) of the 
Convention. The Court held that the concept of general welfare refers to ‘the conditions of social life 
that allow members of society to reach the highest level of personal development and the optimum 
achievement of democratic values.’126 This concept requires ‘the organization of society in a manner 
that strengthens the functioning of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full 
realization of the rights of the individual.’127 The Court has stressed that states may under no 
circumstances invoke ‘general welfare’ ‘as a means of denying a right guaranteed by the Convention 
or to impair or deprive it of its true content.’128 Since Article 32(2) of the American Convention is a 
general limitation clause, the meaning of ‘general welfare’ under this provision applies to all rights 
guaranteed in the same Convention.  
In contrast, the European Social Charter does not include ‘general welfare’ among the legitimate 
aims. Instead, the Charter permits limitations when they are intended ‘for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health, 
or morals.’129 These aims have hardly been examined in the practice of the European Committee of 
Social Rights.130 It has indicated the meaning of ‘public interest’, though. In GSEE v Greece, the 
Committee has explained that the legislature, although not free to ignore international obligations, 
has a margin of appreciation in legitimising and defining ‘the public interest by striking a fair balance 
between the needs of all members of society.’131 The Committee is of the opinion that restrictive 
measures can serve the public interest when they are taken to alleviate a very high unemployment 
rate and a dramatic shrinkage of the national economy.132 It should be noted that the European 
Committee has given this explanation in the context of alleged interferences with the enjoyment of 
rights guaranteed in the European Social Charter.   
3.3.2.4 Suitability  
Suitability is a sub-principle of proportionality, as discussed above. This sub-principle requires that 
there must be a rational connection between the restrictive measure and the legitimate aim.133 The 
texts of limitation clauses do not include this element. Still some treaty bodies require that restrictive 
measures should be a suitable way of achieving legitimate aims. An example is the decision of the 
Inter-American Commission in National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security 
Institute et al v Peru.134 The Inter-American Commission has examined Peruvian legal reforms 
affecting pension schemes. The reforms, among other things, revised the equalisation of pensions 
with the wages earned by active employees, introduced maximum limits of payable amount, and 
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established mechanisms for periodically adjusting pensions.135 The Inter-American Commission has 
found that the reforms ‘are suitable to achieve’ the legitimate aim of ensuring the financial stability 
of the state and of eliminating the inequity in the social security system.136  
Another example is the European Committee of Social Rights. In GSEE v Greece, the Committee has 
emphasised that ‘even under extreme circumstances the restrictive measures put in place must be 
appropriate for reaching the goal pursued.137 It added that such measures should be the most 
suitable for responding to a pressing social need.138 The European Committee ensures compliance 
with the requirement of suitability by rejecting a restrictive measure that has no connection with the 
legitimate goals. In European Confederation of Police (EuroCOP) v Ireland, the European Committee 
dealt with the restriction on the right to organise of members of the police guaranteed under Article 
5 of the European Social Charter. 139 The respondent State did not prohibit members of the police 
from forming their representative organisation; however, it prohibited them from joining national 
trade unions on the ground of public safety and public interest. The European Committee held that ‘a 
prohibition on police associations from becoming members of a national organisation of trade unions 
has no inherent connection with enhancing public safety and other important public interests.’140 
Suitability, one may submit, is in principle an ex ante evaluation, since it examines whether there is a 
rational connection between the restrictive measures and the legitimate goal. It is not an ex post 
examination of whether the restrictive measures have actually achieved the intended outcome (i.e. 
the legitimate goal). A brief discussion of GSEE v Greece may illustrate this point. In this case, the 
European Committee has examined the legislation adopted by the respondent State ‘between 2010 
and 2014 in response to the economic and financial crisis.’141 These measures, so-called austerity 
measures, are restrictive of the rights under the European Social Charter. In particular, the measures, 
among other things, exclude the application of collective agreements, dismantle existing collective 
bargaining arrangements, and favour ‘a balance of power that allows employers to downgrade 
recruitment, pay and working conditions.’142 The aims of these measures are to improve ‘the 
dramatic shrinkage of the Greek economy’ and reduce ‘the very high rate of unemployment’.143 The 
assumption of this solution is that deregulation of the labour market provides incentives for 
investments, which may in turn create jobs and improve the Greek economy. One may argue that if 
the European Committee were examining these measures in 2010 when they were adopted, it would 
have given the respondent State the benefit of doubt by finding that the austerity measures would 
have been suitable. Of course, the reality is much more complex.144 
However, the European Committee decided GSEE v Greece in 2017 when it had the data:  
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The information produced by the Government itself shows that over a period of six years 
unemployment has increased by 26%, poverty by 27%, while the gross domestic product (GDP) has 
fallen by more than 25% and the measures adopted have not made it possible either to restore the 
labour market or sustainable growth or to achieve the main objective of the support programmes 
since during the same period public debt increased from 109% to 175% of GDP.145 
The Committee decided the case when it had the outcome of restrictive measures adopted by the 
respondent State. Therefore, the Committee made an ex post evaluation. It held that ‘the legislative 
measures in the present case, if construed as aimed at restoring the economic and financial situation 
of Greece and of the labour market, did not achieve any of these objectives.’146 For this reason, the 
European Committee concluded that the restrictions are not permitted under Article 31 of the 1961 
Charter.147   
3.3.2.3 Necessity 
As a component of the proportionality analysis, the requirement of necessity prohibits adopting a 
restriction, when there is ‘a less restrictive but equally effective alternative’ as discussed above.148  
This requirement, one may argue, can be derived from limitation clauses, which usually require that 
restrictions to human rights should be ‘necessary in a democratic society.’149 However, this criterion 
is not readily clear from the text of general limitation clauses in the ICESCR, the American Convention 
and its Protocol of San Salvador.150  
In practice, the CESCR requires that restrictions be necessary although this requirement is not clear 
from Article 4 of the ICESCR. Explaining restrictions that may be imposed on the right to health in 
accordance with Article 4 of the ICESCR, the CESCR has underlined that 
Such restrictions must be in accordance with the law, including international human rights standards, 
compatible with the nature of the rights protected by the Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims 
pursued, and strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society.151      
The CESCR has made similar pronouncements with regard to the rights guaranteed under Article 
15(1) of the ICESCR. It explained that limitations can be imposed on the exercise of the right 
guaranteed under Article 15(1)(c) and emphasised that such limitations ‘must be determined by law 
in a manner compatible with the nature of these rights, must pursue a legitimate aim, and must be 
strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society.’152 The CESCR 
does not define the requirement of necessity as the least restrictive means as discussed above;. 
rather, it explains that ‘limitations must be proportional, i.e. the least restrictive alternative must be 
adopted where several types of limitations are available.’153 Put differently, the CESCR takes 
proportionality to mean the least restrictive alternative. 
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The requirement of necessity as the least restrictive means is traceable in the practice of the 
European Committee of Social Rights. In GSEE v Greece, the European Committee held that 
restrictive measures are permissible on the condition that such ‘measures could be regarded as […] 
the least restrictive’ of the rights guaranteed in the European Social Charter.154 The Committee has 
found a violation because ‘there has been no real examination or consideration of possible 
alternative and less restrictive measures’ by the respondent State.155  
Moreover, the European Committee considers other grounds when it evaluates whether a restriction 
to the rights under the European Social Charter is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in accordance 
with the general limitation clause of the European Charter. For example, it held that a restrictive 
measure is not necessary when there is no ‘pressing social need’.156 In GSEE v Greece, the Committee 
indicated what can be considered a ‘pressing social need’: ‘the dramatic shrinkage of the Greek 
economy and the very high rate of unemployment represented a pressing social need which could 
have necessitated the adoption of measures restricting or limiting the rights guaranteed by the 
Charter.’157 In EuroCOP v Ireland, the European Committee indicated that providing services in 
relation to immigration and state security does not constitute a pressing social need for placing a 
complete ban on the exercise of the right to strike. In this case, it has examined an absolute ban on 
the right to strike by members of the police under Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter. The 
respondent State has justified such a ban on the ground that it relies on its police in the context of 
immigration control and state security.158  According to the European Committee, however, these 
reasons ‘do not demonstrate the existence of a concrete pressing social need.’159 As a result, the 
European Committee held that the law that places an absolute prohibition on the right to strike ‘is 
not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and, accordingly, is not necessary in a democratic 
society.’160  
A restriction is not necessary when a state fails to provide sufficient information as to why it has put 
such a restriction in place. The European Committee has emphasised this requirement in European 
Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) v Ireland.161 In this case, it examined a complaint 
concerning the respondent State’s failure to ensure the participation of members of the armed 
forces in national pay negotiations under Article 6(2) of the European Social Charter:        
The Committee has been provided with little information as to why the practical exclusion of the 
armed forces from the scope of direct pay negotiations is necessary within the meaning of Article G of 
the Charter, nor why such a near total exclusion could be considered as proportionate. The Committee 
therefore considers that the nearly total exclusion of the representative military organisations from 
direct negotiations concerning pay cannot be considered as necessary under Article G of the 
Charter.162 
The requirement of necessity as least restrictive means is traceable in the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court has stressed that a restriction ‘must be 
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necessary, which means that it must be shown that it cannot reasonably be achieved through a 
means less restrictive of a right protected by the Convention.’163   
3.3.2.5 Balancing  
Texts of limitation clauses do no refer to proportionality or balancing. In practice, treaty bodies 
require states to conduct a thorough balancing analysis when they subject human rights to 
restrictions. The CESCR requires that ‘limitations must be proportional’164 and has also declared that 
the ‘right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary 
and artistic productions is subject to limitations and must be balanced with the other rights 
recognized in the Covenant.’165 This may show that the CESCR has inclined towards requiring states 
to conduct balancing. However, it has yet to require balancing in concrete cases before it. 
The European Committee requires states to conduct a thorough balancing analysis as it has indicated 
in GSEE v Greece. It has found ‘no evidence, especially from the side of the Government, that a 
thorough balancing analysis of the effects of the legislative measures has been conducted by the 
authorities.’166 Therefore, the Committee has not found restrictive measures adopted by Greece to 
be proportionate and in conformity with Article 31 of the European Social Charter.167 
To summarise the practice of applying limitation clauses, one may make two general observations. 
First, one or more components of proportionality (i.e., legitimate goal, suitability, necessity and 
balancing) are traceable in the practice of the CESCR, the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court. All components are traceable in the practice of the European Committee. While the 
European Committee seems to employ all the components, it does not examine each component in a 
sequential order. That is, it does not conduct a vertical proportionality analysis. Second, these treaty 
bodies employ the components of proportionality with regard to interference with the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in the respective treaties. In other words, they invoke proportionality in 
relation to the negative obligation to respect.      
3.3.3 Limitation and retrogression 
The CESCR and the European Committee do not treat limitation and retrogression in the same way. 
The CESCR does not establish a clear relationship between limitation and retrogression. Although it 
has yet to develop detailed criteria for evaluating restrictive or retrogressive measures, its 
rudimentary criteria for assessing both categories of measures have some similarities. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the CESCR explained that: ‘If the adoption of retrogressive measures is 
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unavoidable, such measures should be necessary and proportionate.’168 In López Rodríguez v Spain, 
the CESCR held that a social security benefit cannot be withdrawn, reduced or suspended ‘unless the 
measure is provided for by law, is reasonable and proportionate, and guarantees at least a minimum 
level of benefits [...]. The reasonableness and proportionality of the measure should be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis.’169 In this case, the CESCR does not clearly classify a reduction, withdrawal or 
suspension of a social security benefit of an individual as a retrogressive or a restrictive measure. It 
has not evaluated such a measure based on the requirements in Article 4, nor has it assessed the 
measure according to the criteria it developed for evaluating retrogressive measures. However, it 
employs the principle of proportionality. If one understands this requirement to mean compliance 
with the principle of proportionality in the broad sense, one may expect the CESCR to use the same 
criteria for evaluating whether retrogressive or restrictive measures comply with the obligations 
under the ICESCR. The Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission follow the practice 
of the CESCR as discussed in chapter 2.170  
On the other hand, the European Committee does not distinguish retrogression from restrictions. 
Thus, its practice differs from that of the CESCR. Regarding the right to work, for example, ‘the 
abrogation of legislation protecting the employee against unlawful dismissal’ is a retrogressive 
measure according to the CESCR.171 Such a measure is considered a restrictive measure according to 
the European Committee. In GSEE v Greece, when the respondent State shifted ‘the regulation of 
employment, pay and working conditions from branch level to company level or even down to the 
individual worker’, it favoured ‘a balance of power that allows employers to downgrade recruitment, 
pay and working conditions.’172 In essence, the respondent State abrogated at least in part the 
legislation protecting workers from dismissal. However, the European Committee does not call such 
measures retrogressive; although it does take note of the CESCR’s criteria for evaluating 
retrogressive measures.173  
The European Charter does not provide for the progressive realisation of rights it guarantees. One 
may argue that this could be one of the reasons why the European Committee does not make a 
distinction between retrogressive and restrictive measures. This point can be buttressed by the 
Committee’s reference to ‘retrogressive steps’ in relation to Article 12(3) of the European Charter. 
This provision guarantees the right to social security and requires states ‘to raise progressively the 
system of social security to a higher level.’ Thus, one may conclude that since Article 12(3) requires 
progressive increase in the enjoyment of the right to social security, the Committee has legal ground 
to identify measures that may constitute a retrogressive step.174 
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Despite these differences, some areas of common concern for both the CESCR and the European 
Committee can still be identified. Both committees pay particular attention to the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights by members of vulnerable groups. According to the CESCR, 
retrogressive measures should ‘ensure that the rights of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals 
and groups are not disproportionately affected.’175 The European Committee considers whether 
states have assessed possible impacts of restrictive measures on ‘the most vulnerable groups’ to 
determine the proportionality of such measures.176 
Consultation or participation is another element that both committees have stressed in their 
practice. In addition to the requirement that retrogressive measures be proportionate, the CESCR 
requires a ‘genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and 
alternatives.’177 In contrast, the European Committee considers that consultation is an element of the 
proportionality analysis. To determine the proportionality of a restrictive measure, the European 
Committee first ascertains whether ‘a genuine consultation has been carried out with those most 
affected by the measures.’178  
Ensuring a certain level of protection of economic, social and cultural rights is also another common 
concern of both committees. The CESCR emphasises that retrogressive measures ‘should not affect 
the minimum core content of the rights protected’ under the ICESCR.179 Article 4 of the ICESCR 
requires that limitations should be compatible with the nature of the rights provided in conformity 
with the ICESCR. This requirement ensures compliance with minimum core content of those rights 
according to Müller. She argues that limitations that affect the minimum core content of rights in the 
ICESCR are not compatible with the nature of those rights.180  According to the CESCR, states should 
bring limitations in line with Article 4 of the ICESCR and ensure that such limitations ‘do not interfere 
with the core minimal content of the rights.’181 However, the CESCR does not clearly establish that 
the core content of a right represents the nature of that right. The European Committee does not use 
the language of minimum core content of a right. It still requires that restrictive measures ‘must 
maintain a level of protection which is adequate.’182 
To sum up, the CESCR distinguishes between a restrictive measure (limitation) and a retrogressive 
measure (retrogression). In contrast, the European Committee does not make such distinction. It 
evaluates the proportionality of restrictive measures, which include both limitation and 
retrogression.  
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3.4 Limitation under the African Charter 
Limitation on human rights including economic, social and cultural rights can be either internal or 
external as discussed above. The African Charter uses both forms of limitation, but it does not 
contain a general limitation clause. Despite the textual omission, the African Commission and the 
African Court have explained that Article 27(2) of the Charter serves as a general limitation clause. 
This section examines the context and historical origin of Article 27(2), a provision that has evolved 
into a general limitation clause in the practice of the African Commission and the African Court. To 
provide a full picture, I will start this section with a discussion of types of limitation under the African 
Charter. After that, I will return to the discussion of Article 27(2).  
3.4.1 Types of limitations in the African Charter    
Limitations in the African Charter are internal as well external. The African Charter qualifies some 
Charter rights with internal limitations that are applicable to economic, social and cultural rights as 
well as to civil and political rights.183 Two provisions on economic, social and cultural rights contain 
expressly internal limitations. These are Articles 15 (the right to work)184 and 16 (the right to 
health).185 The qualification in Article 15 relates to conditions of work, which should be ‘equitable 
and satisfactory’. Conditions of work include work place safety and hygiene, remuneration, rest, 
leisure and limitation of working hours, periodic holidays, public holidays and parental leave.186 The 
right to work does not entitle an individual, for example, to a certain number of holidays. States are 
required to ensure ‘satisfactory’ conditions – what goes beyond that is not part of the right. Of 
course, what constitutes satisfactory conditions should be defined based on the types of work. Not 
all aspects of the right to work have qualifications, though (e.g. the right of every individual to 
‘receive equal pay for equal work’ has no qualification). 
The internal limitations on the right to health in Article 16 are implied by two qualifications. One is 
expressed by the phrase ‘the best attainable state’ of health. It is not humanly possible to ensure 
that every person becomes and remains healthy. It is common knowledge that there are several 
incurable diseases occurring anywhere, irrespective of the resources and technologies at the disposal 
of a particular state. Thus, by definition, the right to health does not entitle one to be healthy. The 
other qualification relates to the measures that states should take to ensure the protection of health 
and provision of medical attention during sickness. Such measures should be ‘necessary’. While this 
qualification gives broad latitude to states, their discretion is subject to the supervisory mechanisms 
of the Charter, the African Commission and the African Court. Thus, not every measure is necessary. 
Some commentators read these qualifications as a requirement of resource availability as discussed 
in chapter 2.187 
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The African Charter guarantees the right to education (Article 17(1)) and the right to participate in 
cultural life (Article 17(2)) without any qualification. Does the absence of an express qualification 
have any implication? One reading, as Viljoen suggests, is to consider it to mean no qualifications 
were intended. Thus, a qualification should not be inferred, as in ‘the “unqualified” right to 
education.’188 For example, a failure to provide tertiary education may constitute a violation 
according to this reading. In terms of procedure, such reading implies bypassing the first stage of 
rights analysis, the stage at which the scope of a right is defined as discussed above. It also implies an 
expansive definition of a right, since this reading assumes an allegation as a prima facie violation and 
proceeds to the second stage to determine external limits. In a way, this may be considered a right 
inflation because the reading appears to protect ‘every interest that could be understood to fall 
within the semantic reach’ of the concerned right.189    
An alternative reading is to regard the absence of express qualification as no bar on limitation. As 
Gardbaum argues, there are implied internal limits to human rights in general.190 The right to 
education, for example, does not include everything that comes within the semantic reach of the 
term ‘education’. Thus, the right to education under the African Charter may include free and 
compulsory primary education. A similar guarantee under the ICESCR may support this position.191 
The right to education may also include tertiary education. Are states obliged to make tertiary 
education free and compulsory? The answer to this question may not be necessarily clear from the 
absence of any qualification from Article 17(1) of the African Charter.    
External limitations are further divided into general and specific limitations. The African Charter 
provides for two types of specific external limitations. According to Viljoen, one category is ‘norm-
based limitations’.192 The limitation clause in Article 11 of the African Charter is quintessentially a 
norm-based one. It provides that the right to freedom of assembly ‘shall be subject only to necessary 
restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the 
safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.’  This limitation clause is similar to those 
clauses applicable to the trade union rights under the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador 
discussed above. Norm-based limitation clauses identify criteria for restricting Charter rights. None of 
the economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in the Charter is subject to a norm-based 
limitation clause.  
In the other category of specific external limitations are clawback clauses.193 A clawback clause is a 
provision ‘which permits a state, in its almost unbounded discretion, to restrict its treaty obligations 
or the rights guaranteed by the African Charter.’194 Most civil and political rights in the African 
Charter contain clawback clauses, the incorporation of which is a much criticized feature of the 
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Charter.195 Clawback clauses refer to domestic law of states,196 and they permit the state to restrict 
Charter rights including the right to property ‘to the extent permitted by domestic law.’197 The 
clauses allow restrictions that are ‘almost totally discretionary.’198 They ‘do not provide the external 
control over State behaviour.’199 For these reasons, critics of the Charter text recommend that it is 
necessary to eliminate clawback clauses, since the clauses are insidious.200  
Of economic, social and cultural rights, only the right to property provides for a clawback clause. 
Article 14 of the Charter states: ‘[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.’ However, Odinkalu observes that ‘the 
economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed by the Charter are free of both clawbacks and 
limitations.’201 Like some other commentators, Odinkalu seems to exclude the right to property from 
the category of economic, social and cultural rights.202 The African Commission, however, considers 
the right to property among economic, social and cultural rights.203 
Article 14 allows states to limit the right to property when it is ‘in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community.’  Although Article 14 appears to provide two legitimate goals, it 
seems that there is not much difference between ‘public need’ and ‘general interest of the 
community’. Article 14 appears to limit state discretion to a certain degree. States cannot limit the 
right to property for any reasons they choose since there are only two legitimate grounds. 
Accordingly, one may argue, states cannot limit the right to property on grounds such as the 
protection of national security, public order, public health or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. However, the grounds under Article 14 are very broad. For this reason, one may 
argue that ‘general interest of the community’ might include, for example, the protection of national 
security or public order.     
In sum, provisions of the African Charter on economic, social and cultural rights fall into three 
categories: those with internal limitations, those with specific external limitation, and those with no 
limitations. The rights to work and health have internal limitations. The right to property has specific 
external limitation (clawback clause). The Charter does not circumscribe the right to education and 
the right to participate in cultural life with any limitation.  
3.4.2 General Limitation clause in the African Charter 
The African Charter does not contain a general limitation clause unlike the ICESCR, the European 
Social Charter or the Protocol of San Salvador. This is problematic according to some 
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commentators.204 Heyns argues that the absence of a general limitation clause from the Charter 
‘means that there are no general guidelines on how Charter rights should be limited.’205 According to 
Heyns, ‘[a] society in which rights cannot be limited will be ungovernable, but it is essential that 
appropriate human rights norms be set for the limitations.’206  
The drafting history of the African Charter shows that the drafters considered including a general 
limitation clause into the Charter. This is evident from a document prepared for discussion by Kéba 
Mbaye, the Chairperson of the Group of African Experts convened to draft the African Charter. 
Mbaye prepared a draft African Charter, which was largely drawn from the ICESCR and the American 
Convention on Human Rights.207 Mbaye’s draft provides for a separate provision on limitations of 
rights guaranteed in his draft African Charter.208  Article 36 of Mbaye’s draft stipulates that: 
The restrictions that, pursuant to this Charter, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the 
rights or freedoms recognised herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for 
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been 
established.209 
As Mbaye indicated, this is a verbatim reproduction of Article 30 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights except for replacing the word ‘convention’ with the word ‘Charter’.210 It seems that 
the Group of African Experts that Mbaye was chairing did not accept this proposal. This is clear from 
the preliminary draft of the African Charter that the Group of Experts produced at the end of their 
meeting in Dakar. The preliminary draft does not contain the general limitation clause proposed by 
Mbaye.211 However, the reason for dropping the proposed general limitation clause is not clear from 
the drafting history of the Charter. 
One may also examine another provision in Mbaye’s Draft African Charter. Mbaye included a 
provision on the relationship between duties and rights in his draft. This provision states that: ‘The 
rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just 
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.’212 Mbaye took the verbatim copy of Article 
32(2) of the American Convention and reproduced it in his draft.213  The Group of Experts that Mbaye 
was chairing did not drop Mbaye’s proposal altogether. It is clear from their preliminary draft of the 
African Charter that the Group of Experts adopted a modified version of this provision. Article 27(2) 
of the preliminary draft provides that: ‘[t]he rights and freedoms of each person shall be exercised 
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with due respect to the rights of others, by collective security and by morals and common 
interest.’214  With few editorial changes, this provision has become the present Article 27(2) of the 
African Charter, which stipulates that: ‘The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’  
Therefore, the origin of Article 27(2) of the African Charter is Article 32(2) of the American 
Convention. Although Article 32(2) of the American Convention deals with the relationship between 
rights and duties, it expressly deals with grounds for limiting individual rights. However, Article 27(2) 
of the African Charter does not use the language of limitation. Coupled with the rejection of the 
proposed general limitation clause, dropping the language of limitation from Article 27(2) may 
indicate the reluctance of the drafters to embrace limitations of a general application. From the 
foregoing, one may conclude that it was not the intention of the drafters to make Article 27(2) of the 
African Charter a general limitation clause.  
Article 27(2) is in the part of the African Charter that provides for duties.215 From its physical location 
under the Charter, one can tell that Article 27(2) deals with duties of individuals. It requires 
individuals to exercise their rights in a manner that does not affect the rights of other individuals, 
collective security, morality and common interest. From the cumulative reading of Articles 27(2) and 
1 of the African Charter, one may argue for an indirect limitation clause. Under Article 1 of the 
African Charter, states have undertaken the obligation to give effect to the duties provided in the 
Charter. This obligation requires states to implement the duties of individuals to exercise their rights 
‘with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’216 As a 
result, states can limit the rights of individuals on these grounds to give effect to individual duties. 
Some issues still arise even if one successfully establishes Article 27(2) as a general limitation clause. 
One of the issues is whether Article 27(2) applies to all Charter rights, particularly to peoples’ rights. 
The Charter deals with individual duties. It does not provide for peoples’ duties as opposed to 
peoples’ rights. In particular, the duties under Article 27(2) are with regard to exercising ‘the rights 
and freedoms of each individual’. It does not relate to the exercise of peoples’ rights. As a result, one 
may conclude, Article 27(2) can serve as a general limitation clause only with regard to individual 
rights (Articles 2 to 18 of the Charter). That is, a general limitation clause derived from Article 27(2) 
of the Charter cannot apply to people’s rights (Articles 19 to 24 of the Charter).  
Another issue relates to some common elements of limitation clauses, whether general or specific. 
Limitation clauses usually require that restrictions on human rights be provided by law; that they 
should be necessary; and that they should serve some interests or be based on some grounds. An 
evaluation of Article 27(2) of the Charter in light of these elements is worth considering. First, one of 
the elements common in the general limitation clauses is the requirement of legality. According to 
this requirement, limitations or restrictions should be provided by law. The general limitation clauses 
of the ICESCR and the European Social Charter expressly require that limitations or restrictions be 
determined or prescribed by law as discussed above.217 This element is, however, missing from 
Article 27(2) of the African Charter. Since the drafters of the African Charter had no intention to 
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make Article 27(2) a general limitation clause, one may argue, the omission of the requirement of 
legality from this provision is logical. Besides, the drafters included that requirement in other 
provisions of the Charter when their intention was to limit the exercise of some other rights.218 
Second, limitation clauses usually require that restrictions on human rights be necessary. This 
element is also missing from Article 27(2) of the African Charter. The component of necessity is 
missing from this provision, but not from the Charter. For example, the Charter permits only 
necessary restrictions to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.219 Therefore, it would be 
difficult to conclude that the omission of necessity is made inadvertently.  
Third, limitation clauses usually specify legitimate goals, grounds for imposing restrictions on human 
rights. Limitation clauses identify interests to be served by restrictions on human rights. Such goals or 
interests, for example, include 'the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or the protection 
of public interest, national security, public health, or morals.’220  Article 27(2) of the Charter includes 
some elements, which can be regarded as grounds of limitations. These are ‘rights of others, 
collective security, morality and common interest.’ Of all elements common to limitation clauses, 
Article 27(2) provides for one element only – the legitimate goals.  
Article 27(2) mentions four legitimate goals. The protection of the rights of others and morality are 
usually stated in the limitation clauses of other treaties.221 One may also argue that ‘common 
interest’ carries a meaning similar to the meaning of ‘general welfare’ used under Article 4 of the 
ICESCR. The meaning of ‘collective security’, however, may be more ambiguous and worth 
considering more in depth. Article 27(2) of the African Charter refers to ‘collective security’ instead of 
‘national security’. The latter phrase is common in limitation clauses permitting restrictions on the 
exercise of some rights, particularly the right to freedom of association, assembly, expression and 
movement.222 The Charter itself refers to the protection of ‘national security’ with regard to 
restrictions on the exercise of the right to the freedom of assembly and movement.223  Therefore, 
one may automatically rule out the interpretation of ‘collective security’ to mean ‘national security’. 
It is a trite rule of interpretation that the same word or phrase is expected to have the same meaning 
throughout a single legal document. Accordingly, the phrase ‘collective security’ under Article 27(2) 
of the Charter should have a meaning different from that of the phrase ‘national security’ under 
Articles 11 and 12(2) of the Charter.  
The use of ‘collective security’ under Article 27(2) of the African Charter can be examined in light of 
general international law. In the law of use of force in particular, the concept of collective security is 
linked to the relationship among states as opposed to the relationship between states and their 
citizens. The concept ‘implies an arrangement by which states act collectively to guarantee one 
another’s security.’224 The preservation of international peace is central to the concept of collective 
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security. It is one of the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace through 
collective security measures.225  
Obviously, the African Charter is a human rights treaty. However, it provides for relationships among 
states. Article 23(1) of the Charter refers to the United Nations Charter with regard to peoples’ right 
to ‘national and international peace and security.’ It provides that the ‘principles of solidarity and 
friendly relations [...] shall govern relations between States.’226 It permits restrictions on the exercise 
of the right of asylum for ‘the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations’ 
among states.227 Therefore, the African Charter deals with international peace, which is central to the 
concept of collective security. Moreover, the Charter specifically puts restrictions on the right of 
asylum to strengthen peace. Still, it would be difficult to conclude that ‘collective security’ under 
Article 27(2) refers to the collective security as understood in the law of use of force. This provision 
refers to the exercise of rights by individuals within the jurisdiction of states.  
From its drafting history, one may conclude, Article 32(2) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights served as the basis for the formulation of Article 27(2) of the African Charter as discussed 
above. Article 32(2) of the American Convention provides that the rights of each person are limited 
‘by the security of all’. This may mean that the exercise of individual rights must not endanger the 
security of other persons. One may therefore read Article 27(2) as imposing duties on individuals to 
exercise their rights in a manner that does not expose others to danger or threat of danger.      
This reading of Article 27(2) of the Charter may apply to some of the Charter rights. The applicability 
of this reading to economic, social and cultural rights is still questionable. This is because the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by some individuals does not affect the security of 
others. It is for this reason that Article 4 of the ICESCR does not provide for the protection of the 
security of others as a reason for imposing restrictions on the enjoyment of rights guaranteed 
therein.  
In sum, the African Charter does not provide for a general limitation clause. Article 27(2) does not 
expressly permit states to restrict rights guaranteed under the African Charter. Moreover, this 
provision does not have some common elements of limitation clauses. However, the African 
Commission and the African Court have assigned the function of a general limitation clause to Article 
27(2). In the next section, I will discuss the practice of the African Commission and the African Court 
in relation to Article 27(2) of the African Charter. I will demonstrate that this provision has evolved 
into a full-fledged general limitation clause, despite the original intention. 
3.5 The African Commission and the African Court on limitation and proportionality 
The African Charter does not contain a general limitation clause similar to those contained in the 
ICESCR, the Protocol of San Salvador and the European Social Charter discussed above. Despite the 
textual omission, both the African Commission and the African Court have discovered that Article 
27(2) of the Charter is the general limitation clause or serves the purpose thereof. I begin the section 
with this discovery. In examining the compliance of states with the requirements of limitation 
clauses, both the African Commission and the African Court employed at least some of the 
components of the proportionality analysis discussed above. In the second subsection, I trace the use 
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of these components in relation to negative obligations that mainly arise from civil and political rights 
since they are the locus for the development of these components. In the third subsection, I will 
identify kinds and stages of proportionality analysis. I will return to economic, social and cultural 
rights in the next section.    
3.5.1 The discovery of a general limitation clause in the African Charter 
The African Commission and the African Court recognise that the African Charter does not contain a 
general limitation clause. According to the Commission, the omission of a general limitation clause is 
one of the distinguishing features of the African Charter: 
[O]ne of the peculiarities of the African Charter is that it does not include any general limitation 
clause. The spirit behind the absence of such a general limitation must be understood as the desire to 
avoid abusive restriction of rights, a restriction which will be applied only under very limited and 
legally circumscribed conditions.228 
The Commission has also explained the rationale for omitting a general limitation clause. It is ‘the 
desire to avoid abusive restrictions of rights,’ as the above passage indicates. It qualifies the kinds of 
restrictions intended to be avoided. Not every restriction is prohibited – only ‘abusive restrictions’ 
should be avoided, but no explanation of that term is provided. Still, one may submit, the 
Commission does not suggest that the absence of a general limitation clause turns the Charter rights 
into absolute rights, even if those rights are not circumscribed by specific limitation clauses.   
Moreover, the African Court acknowledges that Article 27(2) of the African Charter was not intended 
to serve the role of a general limitation clause.229 In his separate opinion in Mtikila v Tanzania, Judge 
Fatsah Ouguergouz (then Vice-President of the Court) stressed that  
[Article 27(2)] is a priori intended to prevent the abuse that the individual might likely commit in the 
exercise of his or her rights and freedoms rather than to protect the individual from abusive 
limitations to his or her rights and freedoms by the State, as it is emphatically suggested in the 
formulation of this Article and its location in the Charter relating to the duties of the individual.230 
According to Ouguergouz, Article 27(2) does not permit states to restrict the exercise of Charter 
rights. That is, this provision does not serve one of the functions of a limitation clause, which is 
permitting states to impose restrictions. Ouguergouz derives this reading from the text of Article 
27(2) and its location in the structure of the Charter.  
The purposive interpretation of the Commission and the contextual reading of the Court, it is 
submitted, bear out at least two conclusions. Both the Commission and the Court recognise that the 
African Charter does not contain a general limitation clause. According to the Commission, the 
absence of a general limitation clause serves a protective function by excluding abusive restrictions. 
Moreover, the African Court acknowledges that Article 27(2) was not intended to serve the purpose 
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of a general limitation clause. However, the African Commission has assigned the role of a general 
limitation clause to Article 27(2) of the Charter.231 The African Court has also affirmed this view. 
In Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, the African Commission held that: ‘The only legitimate 
reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in Article 27(2).’232 
It added that ‘the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely 
necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained.’233 The Commission followed this ruling in its 
later decisions.234 Article 27(2) is not the only place to find legitimate goals. The African Charter 
provides additional legitimate goals under other provisions.235 Article 27(2) of the Charter does not 
contain elements of a conventional limitation clause except the legitimate goals as discussed above. 
For this reason, it seems, the African Commission adds the missing elements.  
The African Court has adopted the Commission’s view. In Mtikila v Tanzania, it held that 
The Court agrees with the African Commission, that the limitations to the rights and freedoms in the 
Charter are only those set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter and that such limitations must take the 
form of “law of general application” and these must be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.236 
Like the Commission, the Court mistakenly limits legitimate goals to those listed under Article 27(2) 
of the African Charter. Despite its holding in Mtikila v Tanzania, the Court recognised other grounds 
as a legitimate goal in a later case as discussed below.237 Like the Commission, the Court also adds 
elements of limitation clauses missing from Article 27(2). In Umuhoza v Rwanda and Konaté v 
Burkina, the African Court listed the criteria used to evaluate restrictions to Charter rights.238 It has 
underlined that it examines ‘whether such restriction was admissible, in that, it was provided by law, 
served a legitimate purpose, and was necessary and proportional in the circumstances of the case.’239 
None of these criteria can be derived from the text of Article 27(2) of the African Charter. The Court 
does not claim that, neither in Umuhoza v Rwanda nor in Konaté v Burkina. It still regards this 
provision as a general limitation clause.240  
Therefore, it is submitted, the African Commission and the African Court have identified criteria used 
for evaluating restrictions to Charter rights. These criteria require that limitations be provided by law; 
that they be legitimate; that they be necessary; and that they be proportionate. The criteria are 
much broader than the content of Article 27(2) of the African Charter. As a result, one would not be 
able to fit them under this provision. They have outgrown the text of Article 27(2). I will discuss these 
criteria below. 
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3.5.2 Limitation analysis and proportionality in practice  
The African Commission and the African Court have developed criteria for evaluating limitations on 
rights guaranteed under the African Charter, as already indicated above. These criteria include 
components of proportionality analysis. I discuss below each of these criteria. I begin with the 
requirement of legality, which is employed by both the Commission and the Court.  
3.5.2.1 Legality  
The limitation clauses in the other treaties, particularly the ICESCR, the European Social Charter and 
the Protocol of San Salvador, stipulate that limitation to a right should be provided by law. Article 
27(2) of the African Charter does not contain this element, as discussed above, nevertheless, both 
the African Commission and the African Court require that limitations be provided by law. In 
Interights and Others v Mauritania, the African Commission summarised the requirements for 
evaluating limitations:  
[F]or a restriction imposed by the legislators to conform to the provisions of the African Charter, it 
should be done ‘with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest’, that it should be based on a legitimate public interest and should be ‘strictly proportionate 
with and absolutely necessary’ to the sought after objective. And moreover, the law in question 
should be in conformity with the obligations to which the state has subscribed in ratifying the African 
Charter and should not render the right itself an illusion.’241  
In this passage, the African Commission refers to ‘a restriction imposed by the legislators.’ While the 
passage suggests that it is the power of the legislators to restrict rights guaranteed under the African 
Charter, it does not lay down stringent requirements that the restrictions should be by law 
promulgated by democratically elected representatives, unlike the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.242 
In Mtikila v Tanzania, the African Court adopted the Commission’s position on requirements for 
evaluating limitations: 
The Court agrees with the African Commission, that the limitations to the rights and freedoms in the 
Charter are only those set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter and that such limitations must take the 
form of “law of general application” and these must be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.243 
The Court does not expressly require that the law limiting the exercise of rights be passed by a 
legislature, but it lays down other requirements. The Court states that the law restricting rights 
should be ‘law of general application.’244 The African Commission has also adopted this requirement. 
In Prince v South Africa, the Commission accepted restrictions on the right to work on the ground 
that ‘the limitations are of general application.’245 When a restrictive law is promulgated to regulate 
behaviour of a single person, it does not qualify as ‘law of general application’. Although the 
Commission did not refer to the element of generality in Constitutional Rights Project and Others v 
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Nigeria, where the respondent State proscribed some publications by name, it found a violation.246 
The Commission held that ‘laws made to apply specifically to one individual or legal personality raise 
the serious danger of discrimination and lack of equal treatment before the law’, and are therefore 
contrary to the African Charter.247   
Clarity is another requirement of law that limits the exercise of rights. In Umuhoza v Rwanda, the 
African Court emphasised that ‘domestic laws on which restrictions to rights and freedoms are 
grounded must be sufficiently clear, foreseeable and compatible with the purpose of the Charter and 
international human rights conventions.’248 In Konaté v Burkina Faso, the Court explained the 
purpose of clarity in the law. It held that the objective of requiring laws to be clear is ‘to enable an 
individual to adapt his/her conduct to the Rules and to enable those in charge of applying them to 
determine’ what constitutes a legitimate restriction.249 Therefore, the clarity of laws is useful not only 
to the rights-holders but also to the courts with the power to determine the rights and obligations of 
individuals. 
A related issue is the requirement in some provisions of the Charter that some rights should be 
exercised ‘within the law’ or ‘in accordance with the law’ or similar requirements.250  As discussed 
above, some commentators criticised the African Charter for providing states with wide discretion 
through clawback clauses.251  The African Commission seems to dispel this fear. In Interights and 
Others v Mauritania, the Commission explained that: 
To allow national legislation to take precedence over the Charter would result in wiping out the 
importance and impact of the rights and freedoms provided for under the Charter. International 
obligations should always have precedence over national legislation, and any restriction of the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter should be in conformity with the provisions of the latter.252 
In sum, both the African Commission and the African Court require states to comply with the 
requirement of legality, although Article 27(2) of the Charter does not expressly state such a 
requirement. According to this requirement, limitations should be provided by a law of general 
application, which should be clear.  
3.5.2.2 Legitimacy  
The component of legitimate goal in proportionality analysis identifies aims that justify a restriction 
being imposed on rights. Article 27(2) of the African Charter requires individuals to exercise their 
rights ‘with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’ The 
African Commission and the African Court have identified these four grounds as legitimate goals 
whose protection justifies limitations on the rights under the African Charter.  
Since its decision of 1998 in Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, the African Commission often 
quotes this statement: ‘The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the 
African Charter are found in Article 27(2), that is, that the rights of the Charter "shall be exercised 
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with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest".’253 The 
African Court has also held that ‘the limitations to the rights and freedoms in the Charter are only 
those set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter.’254 The Court has added that the states should provide 
‘evidence that the restriction serves one of the purposes set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter.’255 
From the use of the term ‘only’ in both quotes of the Commission and the Court, it appears that the 
legitimate goals are limited. No reason other than those stated in Article 27(2) justifies the restriction 
of the rights guaranteed in the Charter. If one reads Article 27(2) of the Charter only, its formulation 
buttresses this reading since the provision restrictively lists the goals. That is, Article 27(2) is not 
illustrative.   
However, the list of legitimate goals is not hermetically sealed. The text of the African Charter and 
the practice of both the African Court and the African Commission all show that there are other 
legitimate goals that can justify restrictions of Charter rights. Some provisions of the Charter itself 
provide for other legitimate goals, such as national security, law and order, public health, safety, 
ethics, general interest and public need.256 In Good v Botswana, the Commission held that ‘national 
security or public interests are recognised as justifiable grounds to limit freedom of expression under 
the African Charter.’257 The Court has also recognised legitimate goals other than those specified 
under Article 27(2) of the Charter. In Umuhoza v Rwanda, the Court held that restrictions on freedom 
of expression ‘may be made to safeguard the rights of others, national security, public order, public 
morals and public health.’258   
The African Commission and the African Court require that restrictions to Charter rights advance one 
of the legitimate goals, whether those goals are provided under Article 27(2) or identified by the 
Court and the Commission. In Konaté v Burkina Faso, the African Court held that restrictions, which 
are provided by Burkinabé libel laws limiting the exercise of the right to freedom of expression 
contrary to Article 9(2) of the Charter, serve a legitimate goal since they are passed ‘to protect the 
honour and reputation of the person or a profession.’259 One may argue that this falls under the goal 
of protecting ‘the rights of others’ under Article 27(2) although the Court does not squarely place it 
under this provision.   
The African Commission has referred to ‘collective security’ in Sudan Human Rights Organisation and 
Another v Sudan.260 The Commission dealt with eviction and displacement of the civilian population 
in Darfur because of an internal armed conflict. It did not clearly rule that the eviction is a restriction 
to the exercise of the right to housing, however, it seems to suggest that evictions conducted for the 
protection of the civilian population from attacks or threats of attacks may serve the purpose of 
ensuring ‘collective security’.261 Both the Commission and the Court hardly examined cases in which 
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states claim that their goals are the protection of ‘morality and common interest’. However, they 
have examined other legitimate goals that are not stipulated in Article 27(2). 
In Scanlen and Holderness v Zimbabwe, the African Commission defined ‘public order’ as ‘conditions 
that ensure the normal and harmonious functioning of institutions on the basis of an agreed system 
of values and principles.’262 It explained that the concept of public order ‘demands the greatest 
possible amount of information. It is the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and opinions as 
well as the widest access to information by society as a whole that ensures this public order.’263 The 
Commission concluded that ‘the restrictions imposed on the practice of individual journalists can 
thus not be justified on the grounds of public order.’264 In Umuhoza v Rwanda, the Court found that 
restrictions to the right to freedom of expression, which criminalises expressions minimising 
genocide committed in Rwanda, serve ‘the legitimate interests of protecting national security and 
public order.’265 
Sometimes, the African Commission does not clearly identify the legitimate goal intended to be 
served by the restrictions to the rights. In Prince v South Africa, for example, the African Commission   
examined restrictions to the right to work due to the complainant’s use of cannabis. The Commission 
held that such restrictions serve a legitimate purpose,266 however, did not identify a particular 
legitimate goal from among those listed in Article 27(2) of the Charter or those added by the 
Commission.  
In sum, the African Commission and the African Court recognise that states can limit rights 
guaranteed in the African Charter if there is evidence that those restrictions serve the protection of 
the rights of others, collective security, morality or the common interest. Moreover, the Commission 
and the Court have also accepted restrictions to Charter rights that serve the public interest, national 
security, public order or public health. Therefore, both the Court and the Commission have expanded 
the list of legitimate goals that justify restrictions to some Charter rights.  
3.5.2.3 Suitability  
The African Commission and the African Court hardly examine the suitability of restrictions to 
Charter rights. At the suitability stage, as discussed above, a decision-maker examines whether there 
is a rational connection between the restrictions and the legitimate goal.267 In Umuhoza v Rwanda, 
the African Court clearly identified each component of the proportionality analysis against which it 
evaluated the conduct of the respondent State.268 However, it did not identify suitability among 
these components. 
In the Ogiek case, the African Court passed a suitability analysis as an examination of the legitimate 
goal stage. In this case, Kenya evicted Ogiek indigenous peoples from their ancestral land to preserve 
the environment in the Mau Forest. Because of the eviction, the Ogieks were unable to carry out 
their cultural practices. The Court accepted the preservation of the environment as a legitimate goal 
and held that ‘the restriction of the cultural rights of the Ogiek population to preserve the natural 
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environment of the Mau Forest Complex may in principle be justified to safeguard the "common 
interest" in terms of Article 27 (2) of the Charter.’269  
However, the respondent State was not able to establish that the environmental degradation of the 
Mau Forest was caused by the Ogieks or their activities. This is evident from the Court’s holding: 
‘Although the Respondent alleges generally [...] that certain cultural activities of the Ogieks are 
inimical to the environment, it has not specified which particular activities and how these activities 
have degraded the Mau Forest.’270 In essence, the Court is saying that the respondent State did not 
establish a rational connection between the eviction of the Ogieks and the preservation of the 
environment. In proportionality theory, this kind of analysis is conducted at the suitability stage. 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that ‘the purported reason of preserving the natural environment 
cannot constitute a legitimate justification for the Respondent's interference with the Ogieks' 
exercise of their cultural rights.’271 Therefore, the African Court merges the suitability stage with the 
legitimate goal stage – at least in the Ogiek case. 
3.5.2.4 Necessity 
The component of necessity in proportionality analysis requires that restrictions to rights ‘should 
impair as little as possible the affected right’ as discussed above.272 The African Charter expressly 
requires that restrictions to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly be necessary273, but this 
requirement is missing from Article 27(2) of the African Charter. Despite the textual silence, both the 
African Commission and the African Court require that restrictions to Charter rights be necessary.274   
As discussed above, restrictions to rights under the European Social Rights are necessary when there 
is a pressing social need,275 but neither the African Commission nor the African Court have yet 
required the existence of a pressing social need. Although the Commission and the Court have not 
explained the requirement of necessity, they require that states choose the least restrictive means. 
In the Nubian Community case, the African Commission underlined that ‘any limitations should be 
the least restrictive measures possible.’276 In another case, the Commission added that ‘where it is 
necessary to restrict rights, the restriction should be as minimal as possible.’277  
Likewise, the African Court has emphasised that states should adopt ‘less restrictive measures’ to 
attain their objectives.278 In terms of procedure, the Court expects respondent states to show that 
the restrictions to the exercise of the rights are necessary. In Konaté v Burkina Faso, the Court has 
found that the respondent State ‘failed to show how a penalty of imprisonment was a necessary 
limitation to freedom of expression.’279  
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3.5.2.5 Balancing  
Proportionality in the narrow sense is called balancing, as discussed above.280 Balancing lies at the 
core of proportionality in the broad sense.281 Balancing requires decision-makers to compare the 
evils of restrictions to rights with the benefits of achieving the legitimate goals. However, the African 
Charter does not clearly stipulate that restrictions to rights under the African Charter should be 
proportionate to the legitimate goal. In their practice, both the African Commission and the African 
Court examine whether restrictions on rights are proportionate to legitimate goals sought to be 
achieved.282   
In Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Zimbabwe, the African Commission examined 
a complaint alleging that Zimbabwean police stopped the work of a newspaper organisation and 
seized its property because of the organisation’s failure to register according to a new law.283 
Emphasising that the respondent State ‘ought to have responded proportionally,’ the African 
Commission explained that the ‘principle of proportionality seeks to determine whether, by the 
action of the state, a fair balance has been struck between the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of the individual and the interests of the society as a whole.’284 Moreover, the Commission identified 
five questions that should be asked to determine whether state conduct is proportionate: a) ‘Were 
there sufficient reasons supporting the action?’ b) ‘Was there a less restrictive alternative?’ c) ‘Was 
the decision-making process procedurally fair?’ d) ‘Were there any safeguards against abuse?’ and e) 
‘Does the action destroy the very essence of the Charter rights in issue?’285  
Some of these questions, however, do not seem helpful for the balancing stage. The first question 
relating to whether the limitation is supported by sufficient reasons should be asked at the legitimate 
goal stage, whereas the second question about the less restrictive alternative should be answered at 
the necessity stage. Thus, these two questions are redundant, particularly when the proportionality 
analysis is conducted in a sequential order. The other questions relate to new elements. The 
Commission usually emphasises the point reflected in the last question relating to whether the 
limitation destroys ‘the very essence of the Charter rights.’ In Media Rights Agenda and Others v 
Nigeria, the Commission underlined that ‘a limitation may not erode a right such that the right itself 
becomes illusory.’286 When a limitation is so severe that ‘a right becomes illusory, the limitation 
cannot be considered proportionate — the limitation becomes a violation of the right.’287  
The practice of the African Commission and the African Court shows that both determine the 
proportionality of a restriction irrespective of how they go about it. In Amnesty International and 
Others v Sudan, the African Commission held that prohibiting any assembly for a political purpose ‘in 
all places is disproportionate to the measures required by the government to maintain public order, 
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security and safety.’288 In another communication, the Commission found that proscribing ‘a 
particular publication, by name, is thus disproportionate and not necessary.’289  
The African Court has also found a number of restrictions contrary to the principle of proportionality. 
In Umuhoza v Rwanda, the African Court has held that the conviction and sentencing of an 
opposition political figure for making a statement that negates genocide in Rwanda was not 
proportionate to the legitimate goals said to be achieved.290 In Konaté v Burkina Faso, the African 
Court found that a custodial sentence ‘constitutes a disproportionate interference in the exercise of 
the freedom of expression.’291 In Mtikila v Tanzania, the African Court also held that a restriction on 
the exercise of the right to participate in government ‘through the prohibition on independent 
candidacy is not proportionate’ to the legitimate aim.292   
3.5.3 Stages of limitation analysis and kinds of proportionality 
The adjudication of rights in general proceeds in two stages as discussed above. The first stage 
concerns internal limitation and involves defining the scope of a right. The assessment of restrictions 
to rights against the criteria established in limitation clauses usually takes place in the second stage. 
Proportionality or the compliance with its components is determined at the second stage. The 
African Court emphasised these stages in Mtikila v Tanzania: 
Once the complainant has established that there is a prima facie violation of a right, the respondent 
state may argue that the right has been legitimately restricted by “law”, by providing evidence that 
the restriction serves one of the purposes set out in Article 27(2) of the Charter.293 
From this passage, it is clear that the Court’s evaluation of limitations has two stages in line with the 
Commission’s practice. The Commission established that ‘there has to be a two-stage process. First, 
the recognition of the right and the fact that such a right has been violated, but that, secondly, such a 
violation is justifiable in law.’294 As the Court emphasised, the complainant has the burden of proving 
that ‘there is a prima facie violation of a right.’295  
Once a complainant has shown that there is a prima facie violation, the burden of proof shifts to the 
respondent state. In principle, rights guaranteed in the Charter should be enjoyed without any 
limitation or restriction. The Commission emphasised that: ‘Any restrictions on rights should be the 
exception.’296 While dealing with a specific limitation clause under Article 12(2) of the Charter, the 
Commission cautioned states ‘against a too easy resort to the limitation clauses in the African 
Charter’.297 However, in exceptional circumstances where a state resorts to subjecting a right to 
limitation, the onus is on itself ‘to prove that it is justified to resort to the limitation clause.’298  Thus, 
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a respondent ‘State is required to convince the Commission that the measures or conditions it had 
put in place were in compliance with’ the provisions of the African Charter.299 
In terms of kinds of proportionality test, one may distinguish a vertical proportionality test from the 
horizontal one as discussed above. The African Commission does not evaluate each component of 
the proportionality analysis. Since it does not evaluate the components in a sequential order, the 
Commission applies a horizontal proportionality test. In Amnesty International and Others v Sudan, 
the Commission held that prohibiting any assembly for a political purpose ‘in all places is 
disproportionate.’300 In Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, the Commission held that 
proscribing ‘a particular publication, by name, is disproportionate.’301 However, the Commission did 
not examine each component of the proportionality analysis to reach these conclusions.  
On the other hand, the African Court applies a vertical proportionality test. In both Umuhoza v 
Rwanda and Konaté v Burkina Faso, the Court identified each component of the limitation analysis 
and proportionality and evaluated conduct of respondent states against each component.302 In these 
cases, it first examined the requirement of legality,303 and proceeded to the legitimate aim stage only 
after finding that the restrictions were provided by law.304 After ascertaining that the restrictions 
serve a legitimate goal, the Court proceeded to evaluate whether the restrictions were necessary and 
proportionate,305 however, the Court does not assess whether a restriction complies with the 
suitability criterion as discussed above.     
To summarise, both the African Commission and the African Court evaluate the proportionality of 
limitations on Charter rights. This is in line with the practice of other treaty bodies. They assigned the 
role of a general limitation clause to Article 27(2) of the Charter. They expanded legitimate goals that 
may justify restrictions on the Charter rights. The Commission applies a horizontal proportionality 
test while the Court applies a vertical proportionality test. With few exceptions, most of the practice 
of the African Commission and the African Court relates to the Charter rights traditionally regarded 
as civil and political rights. In the following section, I will examine the scanty practice of the 
Commission and the Court to identify whether the same conclusion about limitations and 
proportionality also applies to economic, social and cultural rights. 
3.6. Limitation on economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter 
Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter are not circumscribed by external limits as 
discussed above. An exception is the right to property, which falls under the economic, social and 
cultural rights category according to the African Commission. I will examine the implication of the 
absence of limitation clauses from these rights in the first sub-section. This will be followed by an 
examination of how the African Commission and the African Court apply the proportionality analysis 
to economic, social and cultural rights.        
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3.6.1 Absence of limitation clauses 
Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter are free from external limitations, unlike 
the traditional civil and political rights.306 Nevertheless, these rights do not become absolute rights 
because of the absence of a limitation clause from the Charter as the practice of the African 
Commission and the African Court indicates. In Centre for Minority Rights Development and Others v 
Kenya (Endorois case), the African Commission examined, among other things, an alleged violation of 
cultural rights of the Endorois Indigenous peoples under Article 17 of the Charter, which does not 
permit restrictions or limitations.307 The Commission held that ‘Article 17 has no claw-back clause. 
The absence of a claw-back clause is an indication that the drafters of the Charter envisaged few, if 
any, circumstances in which it would be appropriate to limit a people’s right to culture.’308 Therefore, 
the absence of a clawback clause or a limitation clause from the text does not mean that the Charter 
prohibits limitation, implying that states can limit or restrict economic, social and cultural rights.  
The Commission’s observation on the right to work supports this conclusion too. The right to work 
under Article 15 of the African Charter does not contain any external limitation. In Prince v South 
Africa, the Commission noted that one of the purposes of Article 15 of the Charter ‘is to ensure that 
states respect and protect the right of everyone to have access to the labour market without 
discrimination.’309 It also emphasised that the ‘protection should be construed to allow certain 
restrictions depending on the type of employment and the requirements thereof.’310 Accordingly, the 
Commission held that a state does not violate the right to work by subjecting this right to 
restrictions.311   
The African Commission and the African Court established that Article 27(2) is a general limitation 
clause as discussed above. Although the African Commission has held that the right to work (Article 
15 of the Charter) and cultural rights (Article 17 of the Charter) permit restrictions on their exercise 
both in Prince v South Africa and the Endorois case, the Commission has avoided pronouncing the 
normative basis of imposing those restrictions. In contrast, the African Court’s position is clear: in an 
application submitted to it by the African Commission on behalf of the Ogiek indigenous people 
against Kenya (Ogiek case), the African Court stressed that ‘Article 17 of the Charter does not provide 
exceptions to the right to culture. Any restrictions to the right to culture shall accordingly be dealt 
with in accordance with Article 27 of the Charter.’312  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court did not suggest that the absence of a limitation clause implies 
fewer restrictions. On the other hand, in the Endorois case, the Commission seems to suggest that 
provisions of the Charter that do not have a clawback clause or a limitation clause permit fewer 
restrictions than other provisions with a clawback or limitation clauses. The Commission stressed 
that the ‘absence of a claw-back clause is an indication that the drafters of the Charter envisaged 
few, if any, circumstances’ for restricting rights.313 One may read the suggested fewer restrictions to 
mean fewer legitimate goals. This reading holds when Article 27(2) applies only to those provisions 
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without their own norm-based specific limitation clauses because Article 27(2) contains fewer 
legitimate goals than specific limitation clauses do. For example, Article 11 of the Charter lists more 
legitimate goals than Article 27(2) does. In that case, one may conclude, the only legitimate grounds 
for restrictions to economic, social and cultural rights in the Charter are those listed in Article 27(2) 
(i.e., the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest). A common rule of 
interpretation supports this view, although the African Commission and the African Court have not 
clarified how Article 27(2) of the African Charter applies to the Charter rights, which are 
circumscribed by norm-based specific limitation clauses. Here, the rule of interpretation that a 
special rule prevails over the general one is relevant. That is, as a general limitation clause, Article 
27(2) is not applicable to the provisions of the African Charter that contain norm-based specific 
limitation clauses. This reading is similar to the view of the Inter-American Court that a general 
limitation clause applies only when a provision in the American Convention does not have a specific 
limitation clause.314 
An objection may be raised against this conclusion. Based on the drafting history of the Charter 
discussed above, one may argue that economic, social and cultural rights cannot be limited on the 
grounds listed under Article 27(2). This provision was not intended to serve as a general limitation 
clause, as both the African Commission and the African Court recognise.315 Still, it would be difficult 
to claim that economic, social and cultural rights are absolute, because there are few absolute rights 
in international human rights law. Thus, one may propose a middle ground. Economic, social and 
cultural rights in the African Charter are not absolute, but they can be limited to serve only one 
legitimate goal. This proposal may draw on comparative international law. The general limitation 
clauses of the ICESCR and that of the Protocol of San Salvador allow only one legitimate goal for 
justifying restrictions to the exercise of the rights they guarantee. As discussed above, the only 
legitimate goal is ‘the general welfare’.316 The drafting history of the ICESCR shows that grounds such 
as the protection of rights of others, public order or morals cannot be considered legitimate for 
restricting the exercise of rights under the ICESCR.317  Therefore, economic, social and cultural rights 
in the African Charter can be limited on the ground of general welfare. This conclusion still faces a 
practical hurdle. In practice, both the African Commission and the African Court have expanded 
legitimate goals beyond those provided in Article 27(2) of the Charter as discussed above. The 
expansion was made in cases concerning civil and political rights, but whether these legitimate goals 
are also applicable to economic, social and cultural rights is not clear.   
An evaluation of the adoption of Article 27(2) of the African Charter as a general limitation clause can 
still be made. An important function of limitation clauses is a protective function.318 Limitation 
clauses reduce state discretion when they limit the number of legitimate goals justifying restrictions 
to the exercise of rights. As evident from the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador, only one 
legitimate goal (i.e., general welfare) justifies restrictions. By adopting Article 27(2) as a general 
limitation clause applicable to economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter, the 
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African Commission and the African Court expand legitimate goals that justify restrictions when 
compared to the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador. That is, states can invoke rights of others, 
collective security, morals and common interest to justify limitations on the exercise of economic, 
social and cultural rights under the African Charter. Therefore, the African Court and the African 
Commission give states wider discretion than the text of the Charter does.  
In sum, the African Commission and the African Court have interpreted the African Charter as 
permitting restrictions on economic, social and cultural rights despite the absence of a limitation 
clause. They have adopted more legitimate goals than allowed under the ICESCR and the Protocol of 
San Salvador. This interpretation of the African Charter might widen the discretion of states, and in 
that sense, it might be less protective of the Charter rights. In the next sub-section, I will discuss the 
application of the proportionality analysis to economic, social and cultural rights. 
3.6.2 Limitation analysis and proportionality 
The African Commission and the African Court conduct limitation analysis and apply proportionality 
to civil and political rights as discussed above. They apply proportionality analysis to economic, social 
and cultural rights as well. I discuss below the application of limitation analysis and proportionality to 
economic, social and cultural rights. In this regard, I distinguish negative state obligations from 
positive state obligations.  
3.6.2.1 Negative obligations 
The interpretation that the African Charter permits limitations on the exercise of economic, social 
and cultural rights does not give states unlimited discretion. Like other treaty bodies, both the 
African Commission and the African Court require states to comply with a test including the principle 
of proportionality. In general, the practice of the Commission and the Court on economic, social and 
cultural rights is very scanty. Still, the Commission and the Court clearly require compliance with the 
components of proportionality with regard to negative obligations arising from the right to property 
(Article 14) and cultural rights (Article 17 (2) & (3)). Both hardly address the suitability stage, as 
discussed above, but the other components of limitation analysis and proportionality are traceable. 
The African Commission required that limitations should comply with the components of 
proportionality analysis in the Endorois case. In this case, the Commission examined restrictions to 
the exercise of cultural rights of indigenous people under Article 17 of the Charter. The restrictions 
were due to the eviction of the indigenous people from their ancestral land. The Commission held 
that ‘if the respondent state were to put some limitation on the exercise of such a right, the 
restriction must be proportionate to a legitimate aim that does not interfere adversely on the 
exercise of a community’s cultural rights.’319 Obviously, it is not enough to have a legitimate goal. 
States should ensure that restrictions are proportional to the legitimate goal. That is, the Commission 
addressed two components of the proportionality analysis: legitimate goal and proportionality in the 
narrow sense (balancing).  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court also examined an alleged violation of cultural rights under Article 
17 of the Charter in circumstances similar to those in the Endorois case. A violation was alleged due 
to the eviction of Ogiek indigenous people from their ancestral land. After establishing that the 
respondent State interfered with the enjoyment of cultural rights of the Ogiek people, the African 
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Court proceeded to examine whether such interference was justified.320 The Court emphasised that 
‘any interference with the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter shall be necessary and 
proportional to the legitimate interest sought to be attained by such interference.’321 Thus, the Court 
also adds the requirement of necessity. 
With regard to the right to property under Article 14 of the Charter, both the Commission and the 
Court affirmed these components. In Dino Noca v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Noca v DR 
Congo), the Commission held that  
[T]he limitations to the right to property should be determined in the light of the principle of 
proportionality, meaning that interference in the right to property must be “proportional to a 
legitimate need, and should represent the least restrictive measure possible”.322 
The African Court also stated the components of proportionality while examining an alleged violation 
of the right to property under Article 14 of the African Charter. In the Ogiek case, the Court held that 
‘Article 14 envisages the possibility where a right to property including land may be restricted 
provided that such restriction is in the public interest and is also necessary and proportional.’323 Thus, 
the Commission and the Court clearly establish the components of legitimate goal, necessity and 
balancing.   
The African Commission has also addressed the requirement of legality. In Mbiankeu Geneviève v 
Cameroon, the African Commission underlined that limitations on the right to property must be 
‘determined by the relevant laws.’324 Moreover, the Commission laid down some particular 
requirements in relation to Article 14 of the Charter, allowing states to encroach upon the right to 
property ‘in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.’ According to the Commission’s 
holding in the Endorois case, for a restriction to the right to property to be ‘in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate laws,’ the respondent State must avoid forced eviction;325 it must ensure 
effective participation;326 and it must provide adequate compensation.327 The African Court examines 
the requirement of legality as a separate stage as discussed above.328 In the Ogiek case, however, the 
Court skipped examining this requirement while assessing restrictions to the right to property and 
the right to culture. The restrictions to these rights arose from an eviction of the Ogieks from their 
ancestral land.329 Despite the respondent State’s claim that the eviction was conducted in accordance 
with the law, the Court did not examine whether the eviction was ‘provided by law’.330 
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The African Commission has addressed the requirement of the legitimate goal with regard to the 
right to work in Elgak and others v Sudan.331 The interference was due to the respondent State’s 
conduct of closing down a human rights non-governmental organisation that provided employment 
opportunity for the complainants. The respondent State closed down the organisation because its 
employees (the complainants) allegedly helped the investigation of the International Criminal Court 
in the Sudan,332 however, the respondent ‘State has not provided any information showing that the 
activities of the organization endangered national security, morality, or the rights of other people in 
Sudan.’333 Thus, the Commission did not find that there was a legitimate goal for restricting the 
freedom of association (Article 10 of the Charter). As a result of a violation of the right to freedom of 
association, the Commission found a violation of the right to work contrary to Article 15 of the 
Charter because the respondent State had no legitimate reasons for interfering with the enjoyment 
of the right to work.334   
In the Endorois case, the African Commission found that the creation of a game reserve is a 
legitimate goal for restricting the exercise of cultural rights under Article 17 of the Charter.335 
Nevertheless, the Commission did not examine whether this goal falls under Article 27(2) or not. 
Examining an alleged violation of the same provision in the Ogiek case, the African Court accepted 
that the preservation of the natural environment is a legitimate goal for limiting the exercise of 
cultural rights. According to the Court, a ‘common interest’ under Article 27(2) of the Charter 
includes the preservation of the natural environment. It held that ‘the restriction of the cultural 
rights of the Ogiek population to preserve the natural environment of the Mau Forest Complex may 
in principle be justified to safeguard the "common interest" in terms of Article 27 (2) of the 
Charter.’336 However, the respondent State was unable to prove that the Ogiek’s culture had caused 
the degradation of the Mau Forest Complex. For this reason, the Court ruled that ‘the purported 
reason of preserving the natural environment cannot constitute a legitimate justification for the 
Respondent's interference with the Ogiek’s exercise of their cultural rights.’337 This point could have 
been dealt with at the suitability stage as discussed above. Incidentally, the Court’s application of a 
vertical proportionality analysis is noticeable. Because of its finding that there was no legitimate 
justification, the Court considered it ‘unnecessary to examine further whether the interference was 
necessary and proportional to the legitimate aim invoked by the Respondent.’338   
Regarding the right to property, Article 14 of the Charter itself provides for legitimate goals. 
Restrictions to this right should serve ‘the interest of public need’; or they should be ‘in the general 
interest of the community.’ In the Endorois case, the African Commission accepted that the creation 
of a game reserve advances a legitimate goal. That is, the creation of the game reserve advances 
public interest or general interest of the community. Besides, the Commission emphasised that this 
requirement ‘is met with a much higher threshold in the case of encroachment upon indigenous land 
rather than individual private property. In this sense, the test is much more stringent when applied to 
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ancestral land rights of indigenous peoples.’339 While examining an alleged violation of the same 
provision in the Ogiek case, the African Court seemingly accepted ‘the preservation of the natural 
ecosystem’ as a legitimate goal furthering public interest.340 
The requirement of necessity follows the legitimate goal stage since neither the African Commission 
nor the African Court engaged in the analysis of suitability as discussed above. In the Endorois case, 
the Commission underlined that limitation on rights ‘should be the least restrictive measures 
possible.’341 In Noca v DR Congo, the Commission affirmed that limitations on Charter rights, when 
permitted, should be by the least restrictive measure. Although this is the requirement of necessity 
as discussed above in the literature, the Commission does not define it as such. In the Endorois case, 
the Commission indicated that it was possible to create the game reserve (the legitimate goal) 
through an alternative means less restrictive of the right to property, i.e. without the eviction. 
According to the Commission, the alternative means was possible because the Endorois people were 
cooperative, but it did not indicate what that alternative means was.  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court did not examine whether there were less restrictive means, even 
though it found that the limitation to the right to property did not pass the requirement of necessity. 
The respondent State argued that the purpose of evicting Ogiek indigenous people from their 
property (the Mau Forest) was to preserve the natural ecosystem.342 According to the Court, 
however, the respondent State was unable to prove that the Ogiek people actually caused the 
degradation of the Mau Forest.343 Instead, the Court identified that ‘the main causes of the 
environmental degradation are encroachments upon the land by other groups and government 
excisions for settlements and ill-advised logging concessions.’344 For this reason, the Court held that 
‘the continued denial of access to and eviction from the Mau Forest of the Ogiek population cannot 
be necessary or proportionate to achieve the purported justification of preserving the natural 
ecosystem of the Mau Forest.’345  
The African Commission and the African Court have been inclined to engage in the balancing stage. In 
the Endorois case, the African Commission seems to have made a balancing analysis in relation to 
alleged violations of the right to property and cultural rights. To create a game reserve, the 
respondent State not only evicted the Endorois community from their ancestral land but also denied 
them access to the land for the purpose of cultural practices. With regard to the right to property 
guaranteed under Article 14 of the Charter, the Commission held that: 
[I]n the pursuit of creating a game reserve, the Respondent State has unlawfully evicted the Endorois 
from their ancestral land and destroyed their possessions. … [T]he upheaval and displacement of the 
Endorois from the land they call home and the denial of their property rights over their ancestral land 
is disproportionate to any public need served by the game reserve.346 
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The Commission’s finding of disproportionality is different from its findings on the requirement of 
legitimate goal and necessity. The respondent State can create the game reserve, which is accepted 
as a legitimate goal as indicated above. The Commission does not seem to suggest that Article 14 of 
the Charter prohibits all kinds of evictions. Of course, one may argue, this particular eviction was not 
necessary because the Commission indicated that there was a less restrictive alternative.347 Rather, 
the disproportionality relates to the type and the effect of the eviction. By type, the eviction was 
unlawful because ‘the Respondent State has not been able to prove without doubt that the eviction 
of the Endorois community satisfied both Kenyan and international law.’348 Besides, the respondent 
State failed to ensure the effective participation of members of the Endorois community.349 It had 
the effect of nullifying the right to property for the Endorois Community because the respondent 
State failed to provide prompt and full compensation.350 For these reasons, the eviction was 
disproportional to the legitimate goal.  
The Commission has also found that the restrictions to cultural rights under Article 17(2) and (3) of 
the Charter were disproportional to the legitimate goal. On top of the unlawful eviction, the 
respondent State denied members of the Endorois community access to cultural rights on their 
ancestral land.351  The Commission concluded that:  
Thus, even if the creation of the game reserve constitutes a legitimate aim, the Respondent State's 
failure to secure access, as of right, for the celebration of the cultural festival and rituals cannot be 
deemed proportionate to that aim. The Commission is of the view that the cultural activities of the 
Endorois community pose no harm to the ecosystem of the game reserve and the restriction of 
cultural rights could not be justified.352 
The eviction of members of the Endorois community from their communal property means removal 
from their cultural sites. This, it seems, was sufficient for the creation of the game reserve. However, 
when the respondent State denied them access to their ancestral land for celebrating cultural 
festivals and rituals, it went far beyond what it needed. Access to their ancestral land for this purpose 
does not affect the game reserve. Therefore, one may submit, the Commission found the restriction 
disproportional to the legitimate goal.  
Addressing similar issues and facts in the Ogiek case, the African Court held that ‘the continued 
denial of access to and eviction from the Mau Forest of the Ogiek population cannot be necessary or 
proportionate to achieve the purported justification of preserving the natural ecosystem of the Mau 
Forest’ as indicated above.353 Denial of access to the Mau Forest goes far beyond what is needed for 
preserving the natural ecosystem. As a result, the restriction was not proportional to the legitimate 
goal.           
In sum, the African Commission and the African Court examine the proportionality of limitations on 
the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights. They have adopted the same approach whether 
they are evaluating limitations on economic, social and cultural rights or on civil and political rights. 
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So far, their examination is limited in two ways. They have assessed only interference with the 
exercise of Charter rights. That is, their evaluation deals with the negative obligation to respect. The 
assessment is also limited to two rights, the right to property and cultural rights. I will discuss below 
whether proportionality also applies to positive obligations.  
3.6.2.2 Positive obligations 
Different proposals have emerged on whether the four-pronged proportionality analysis applies to 
positive obligations in general and to those arising from economic, social and cultural rights in 
particular, as discussed above. The African Commission and the African Court have not engaged with 
this issue in a concrete case. The main reason, one may argue, has to do with the kind of issues 
brought to them. The issue whether the respondent states have taken sufficient positive steps in the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights rarely arises before them.354 If they address the 
issue at all, it would be in passing. In the Endorois case, for example, the African Commission 
underlined that ‘the Respondent State has a higher duty in terms of taking positive steps to protect 
groups and communities like the Endorois, but also to promote cultural rights including the creation 
of opportunities, policies, institutions, or other mechanisms.’355  
Unlike the African Court, the African Commission has the mandate to lay down rules and principles 
without waiting for a concrete case to be decided.356 It is in this capacity that the Commission 
adopted the Nairobi Principles, which show an indication of the applicability of the principle of 
proportionality. The Nairobi Principles seem to affirm the Commission’s earlier decision in Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Zimbabwe. In this case, while examining an alleged violation 
in relation to the negative obligation to respect discussed above, the Commission stated that the 
‘principle of proportionality seeks to determine whether, by the action of the State, a fair balance has 
been struck between the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and the interests of 
the society as a whole.’357  
In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission stresses that the principle of proportionality requires 
‘striking a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.’358 The Commission has 
transplanted this description of proportionality from the European Court of Human Rights. This is 
clear from a reference to Soering v the United Kingdom in the earlier draft of the Nairobi 
Principles.359 In this and other cases, the European Court usually emphasises that ‘a search for a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’ is inherent in the European Convention on Human 
Rights.360 As the quote from the European Court shows, the African Commission used a verbatim 
reproduction of the European Court’s formulation. The Commission clearly states that it provides this 
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description for the purpose of the Nairobi Principles.361 Although it does not state that the principle 
of proportionality is inherent in the African Charter too, the practice of the African Court and the 
Commission discussed above suggest a tendency towards this position. 
The African Commission also uses an explanation that can be related to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Explaining the principle of proportionality under the European 
Convention in the 2009 edition of their book, Harris and others observed that: 
A limitation upon a right, or steps taken positively to protect or fulfil it, will not be proportionate, […] 
where there is no evidence that the state institutions have balanced the competing individual and 
public interests when deciding on the limitation or steps, or where the requirements to be met to 
avoid or benefit from its application in a particular case are so high as not to permit a meaningful 
balancing process.362 
The African Commission uses the same explanation although there is no reference to this work. The 
Nairobi Principles were adopted in 2011.363 Since the principles were adopted later than the 
publication of the book, one may argue that the Commission uses the verbatim reproduction of the 
explanation given by Harris and others. This is evident from the text of the Nairobi Principles: 
A limitation upon a right, or steps taken positively to protect or fulfil it, will not be proportionate, 
where there is no evidence that the state institutions have balanced the competing individual and 
public interests when deciding on the limitation or steps, or where the requirements to be met to 
avoid or benefit from its application in a particular case are so high as not to permit a meaningful 
balancing process.364 
The Commission’s definition can be traced to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Nairobi Principles do not acknowledge the origin of the definition of proportionality, 
though, so it is not clear whether the Commission’s intention is to transplant the principle as 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights.  
From the definition, it seems that the Commission applies the principle of proportionality to all three 
typologies of obligations. Defined as an interference with the exercise of a right, a limitation is 
contrary to a state obligation to respect, which is a negative obligation. In the passage quoted above, 
the Commission expressly refers to ‘steps taken positively to protect or fulfil’ a right. This implies the 
application of the principle to positive obligations. In other words, proportionality applies to all state 
obligations, negative or positive. 
In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission gives states at least two instructions, which spring from the 
definition of proportionality. One of the instructions relates to handling interests underlying state 
conduct. When states take actions, they should balance individual and public interests. They should 
provide the Commission with evidence that their authorities have weighed metaphorically individual 
interest against the public interest. The other instruction relates to the requirements to be met by 
individuals to avoid limitation on the enjoyment of their rights or to benefit from protection provided 
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by states. States should not lay down very high requirements. With regard to the right to social 
security, for example, qualifying conditions for social benefits must be reasonable.365         
The Commission’s brief definition of the principle of proportionality is wanting in certain aspects. The 
definition does not make clear that the principle is applicable to assess whether a state has taken 
sufficient steps to ensure the realisation of a right. The ‘steps taken positively to protect or fulfil’ a 
right may mean a limitation. At times, there is no difference in substance. In other words, state 
conduct can be a limitation with respect to some rights holders while the same state conduct can be 
a step taken to protect or fulfil a right with regard to other rights holders at least in some 
circumstances. The facts submitted to the Inter-American Commission with regard to the right to 
social security may illustrate this point.366 The respondent State introduced a reform reducing the 
amount of pension payment of the complainants whose payments were relatively high. The objective 
was to increase payment for low-paid pensioners and to extend the pension system to new 
categories of people. From the perspective of the complainants (victims of the reform), this is an 
interference or a limitation on their right. The reform is a step taken to fulfil a right from the 
perspective of other people concerned (beneficiaries of the reform). Therefore, the mere fact that 
the African Commission refers to ‘steps taken positively to protect or fulfil’ a right is not conclusive. 
There are circumstances where such steps themselves can be a limitation. 
Moreover, an assessment of eligibility requirements may not always mean an assessment of state 
compliance with the positive obligations to protect or fulfil. In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission 
suggests that states should not put in place eligibility requirements that are too difficult to meet. It 
appears that the Commission is likely to find disproportionality when the eligibility requirement to 
benefit from steps taken to protect or fulfil a right is high. However, the eligibility requirements only 
arise if there is a sufficient protection or provision in the first place. An assessment may be 
conducted to determine whether the eligibility requirements are stringent or not. Nevertheless, such 
assessment does not necessarily address whether a state has taken sufficient steps to ensure the 
protection or provision for which individuals have to be eligible.  
The Commission emphasises balancing in its definition. Balancing could mean only one of the four 
components of the principle of proportionality. Indeed, some commentators argue that only the 
balancing stage applies to economic, social and cultural rights as discussed above.367 From the 
Commission’s definition, it is not clear whether the principle of proportionality also includes 
components other than the balancing stage (ie, legitimate goal, suitability and necessity).  
To summarise, the African Court has yet to deal with the application of proportionality in positive 
obligations. The African Commission defines the principle of proportionality in the Nairobi Principles. 
When states take steps to protect or fulfil a right, the Commission requires them to balance 
competing individual and public interests and set reasonable requirements to benefit from the step 
taken. From this, one may conclude, the Commission applies the principle of proportionality to 
positive state obligations to protect and to fulfil. However, two issues are still outstanding. One 
relates to the components of proportionality. Since the Commission focuses on balancing, it is not 
clear if the other components of proportionality analysis are also applicable. The other issue relates 
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to the Commission’s assessment of the level of realisation. Even when states balance individual and 
public interests and set reasonable requirements, their level of achievement in implementing 
economic, social and cultural rights can still be inadequate. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Human rights treaties usually provide for limitation clauses, whether general or specific, to permit 
restrictions on the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights. The European Social Charter, the 
ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador are among these treaties. Limitation clauses are also 
protective of these rights since they require states to comply with certain criteria. The European 
Committee of Social Rights, the CESCR, the Inter-American Commission, and the Inter-American 
Court frequently use the principle of proportionality to evaluate whether interferences with the 
exercise of economic, social and cultural rights are justified. They usually apply this principle to the 
negative obligation to respect. There are no apparent trends applying the principle to positive 
obligations, but some differences in approach are noticeable. The CESCR does not employ identical 
criteria for evaluating retrogressive measures and restrictive measures. For the European 
Committee, both limitation and retrogression are restrictive measures. 
The African Charter does not provide for a general or specific limitation clause applicable to 
economic, social and cultural rights except with regard to the right to property. The African 
Commission and the African Court have assigned Article 27(2) of the Charter the role of a general 
limitation clause applicable to economic, social and cultural rights. Compared to the limitation 
clauses in the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador, the discovery of a general limitation clause 
under the African Charter expands the list of legitimate goals for justifying restrictions to the exercise 
of economic, social and cultural rights. As a result, collective security, morality and rights of others 
are legitimate goals under the African Charter, whereas they are not under the ICESCR and the 
Protocol of San Salvador. Therefore, the African Commission and the African Court have interpreted 
the African Charter in a way that gives more discretion to states. This consequence arises because 
Article 27(2) of the African Charter is made to serve a purpose different from originally thought, as 
both the Commission and the Court recognise. 
The African Commission and the African Court apply the principle of proportionality to evaluate 
limitations on the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights. They apply the principle to 
negative obligations in the same way, whether such obligation arises from economic, social and 
cultural rights or from civil and political rights. The African Commission applies a horizontal 
proportionality analysis. In general, the African Court evaluates restrictions against each component 
of the principle of proportionality in a sequential order. The Court uses a vertical proportionality 
analysis. This is not always the case, however – at times, the Court skips some components. It does 
not examine the suitability stage at all; even when circumstances arise, it has merged the 
examination of the suitability stage with that of the legitimate goal stage.  
The African Commission and the African Court have not yet explored the applicability of 
proportionality analysis to positive obligations. It does not matter whether the positive obligations 
correspond to economic, social and cultural rights or to civil and political rights. Still, the 
Commission’s definition of the principle of proportionality in the Nairobi Principles might show its 
signal towards applying the principle to positive obligations. The definition requires states to balance 
competing individual and public interest when they take steps positively to protect or fulfil a right. 
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This definition emphasises balancing, which is just one component of the four-fold proportionality 
analysis. Therefore, it is not conclusive on the application of all the components to positive 
obligations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of minimum core obligation has emerged as one of the exceptions to the progressive 
realisation obligation, as indicated in Chapter Two. As the principal obligation corresponding to the 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights, progressive realisation represents the idea that 
the full realisation of these rights cannot be achieved immediately while minimum core obligations 
are exceptions that have immediate effect irrespective of resource availability. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter or Charter) contains neither the concept of 
progressive realisation,1 nor the concept of minimum core. Nevertheless, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or Commission) has explained that states have 
undertaken to implement minimum core obligations immediately when they become parties to the 
African Charter.2 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court or Court) has not 
yet dealt with the concept.  
This chapter examines minimum core obligations under the African Charter by analysing the practice 
of the African Commission. The minimum core obligations correspond to the minimum core content 
of rights. The performance of minimum core obligations by states implies the realisation of the 
minimum core content of economic, social and cultural rights. The minimum core content of a right is 
essential for the existence of the right. Without minimum core content, a right loses its essence. The 
concept of minimum core content or minimum core obligations has been first articulated in 
academic publications.3 For this reason, the chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of the 
minimum core concept as a background in the next section. 
This chapter draws insight from experiences under other treaties, particularly the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).4 The ICESCR does not provide for the 
minimum core concept. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) derives this 
concept from the raison d'être of the ICESCR.5 It identifies and defines state obligations to elaborate 
the normative content of the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. When it introduced the concept, it 
defined ‘minimum core obligations’. As time goes by, it appears, the CESCR shifted to ‘core 
obligations’ instead. It has now identified core obligations for almost all rights guaranteed in the 
ICESCR, however, the methods or criteria used to identify core obligations are not clear. The third 
section analyses the practice of the CESCR to discover some elements common to core obligations. It 
                                                          
1 Adopted 27 June 1981 & came into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 
(1982). 
2 Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, para 16 (hereafter ‘Nairobi Principles’). 
3 David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (OUP 2007) 
186 (hereafter ‘Poverty and Fundametnatl Rights’); Phillip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New 
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9/3 Human Rights Quarterly 332—381, 351. 
4 Adopted 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN 
Doc. A/6316 (1966); 993 UNTS 3, art 2(1). 
5 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties’ obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant), E/1991/23, 
1990, para 10 (hereafter ‘General Comment 3’). 
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also identifies their characteristics. Although the concept of minimum core is hardly elaborated in the 
practice of the European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee), the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission), and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Inter-American Court), the fourth and fifth sections discuss these systems. 
The African Commission draws on the practice of the CESCR to explain the concept of minimum core 
obligations under the African Charter. Interesting questions arise from how the African Commission 
uses the experience of the CESCR. Does the concept of minimum core under the African Charter have 
the same meaning, content and characteristic as the concept of minimum core defined and identified 
by the CESCR? While transplanting the concept into the African Charter, does the Commission make 
any modification? If the Commission makes modifications, how do those modifications affect the 
normative content of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter? The sixth 
section answers these questions by examining the findings of the African Commission. The section 
identifies points of divergence between the practice of the African Commission and that of the 
CESCR. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter by indicating the consequences of diverging 
interpretation.  
4.2 An overview of the minimum core concept 
The concept of the minimum core has emerged in academic publications as a conceptual tool for 
clarifying the normative content of economic, social and cultural rights. Commentators have been 
attempting to define ‘the seemingly crude obligation of “progressive realisation”’.6 This section deals 
with the meaning, purposes, and characteristics of minimum core obligations in scholarly 
publications, thereby providing a background for examining the concept in practice in the next 
sections. 
4.2.1 Meaning of minimum core obligations 
Minimum core is a concept applicable to rights as well as obligations. When applied to a right, it is 
submitted, the concept presupposes the division of a right’s content into parts. These are core and 
non-core parts. The minimum core content of a right refers to its nature or essence.7  It implies the 
essential element or elements without which a right ‘loses its substantive significance as a human 
right’.8 The concept implies ‘an absolute minimum entitlement’.9 Thus, the minimum core content of 
a right is its irreducible part. The concept of the minimum core also applies to obligations when a 
right is examined from the vantage point of the duty-bearer. Rights and obligations are inseparable. 
They are different sides of the same coin. A right of someone is usually an obligation of another 
person. Therefore, every ‘right has a minimum core content which gives rise to minimum core 
entitlements to individuals and groups and corresponding minimum core state obligations’.10 This 
chapter discusses the concept of minimum core in relation to obligations because the concept is 
                                                          
6 Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, ‘Approaches to the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights in the jurisprudence of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Progress and perspectives’ (2011) 11/2 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 317—340, 321. 
7 Audrey R Chapman & Sage Russell, ‘Introduction’ in Audrey Chapman & Sage Russel (Eds) Core Obligations: Building a 
Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002) 9. 
8 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 9.  
9 Alston (n 3) 353. 
10 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Reflections on state obligations with respect to economic, social and cultural rights in international 
human rights law’ (2011) 15/6 The International Journal of Human Rights 969—1012, 978. 
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usually applied to identify and explain state obligations rather than the content of rights both in 
theory and practice.  
The minimum core concept presupposes a classification of obligations into core obligations and 
others. Chapman and Russell define minimum core obligations in terms of timing. They argue that 
the concept implies steps that a state must take immediately to realise the right.11 Such obligation 
directs the state to what it must do first to achieve the ultimate goal of full realisation.12 It appears 
that prioritisation is central to the definition provided by Chapman and Russell. These authors order 
state obligations over time. Core obligations are positive obligations if one defines them as steps to 
be taken, as Chapman and Russell do.13 That is, core obligations require states to take actions. 
Contrary to their definition, however, Chapman and Russell argue that core obligations include the 
obligations to respect.14 These are negative obligations because states can perform obligations to 
respect by refraining from interfering with the enjoyment of a right. States do not need to take steps. 
Similarly, Young argues that a ‘minimum core points to the content of the state’s negative obligation 
to respect rights’.15   
Craven defines minimum core obligation as ‘actions and omissions which may reasonably be required 
of a State in any circumstance, and hence limited to those actions and omissions that are not 
contingent upon resource availability’.16 Craven’s definition includes both negative and positive 
obligations. Actions imply positive obligations, while omissions imply negative obligations. Craven’s 
definition, it is submitted, includes the obligation to respect among core obligations. This is because 
the obligation to respect is a negative obligation. An additional element in his definition is ‘resource 
availability’, meaning core obligations are not conditional upon available resources. States must carry 
out these obligations in all circumstances, and the fact that they do not have resources cannot justify 
their failure.  
Bilchitz explains the concept of minimum core by specifying ‘thresholds of resources that must be 
provided to individuals’.17 He distinguishes three thresholds. The first threshold ensures ‘the general 
conditions necessary to be free from threats to survival’.18 This is a ‘survival threshold’ and 
represents an absolute minimum core.19 At this threshold, states provide resources to protect 
minimal interest, which ‘reflects the respect in which people are most vulnerable, and most needy’.20 
In other words, by providing the first threshold of resources, states discharge their minimum core 
obligations. In the case of the right to housing, for example, minimum core obligations may include 
the protection of individuals from elements such as cold and wet conditions that are fatal. This can 
serve as ‘a universal objective standard that applies across the world that flows from the most basic 
                                                          
11 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 9.  
12 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 9. 
13 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 9. 
14 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 11-12. They use the terms ‘minimum State obligations’. 
15 Katharine G Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33 Yale 
Journal of International Law 113-175, 158. 
16 Matthew Craven, ‘Assessment of the Progress on Adjudication of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in John Squires, 
Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele (eds), The Road To A Remedy: Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (University of New South Wales Press 2005) 39. 
17 David Bilchitz, ‘Socio-economic rights, economic crisis, and legal doctrine’ (2014) 12/3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 710–739, 730 (‘Socio-economic rights’). 
18 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 730. 
19 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 733. 
20 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 189. 
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needs and interests of human beings in being free from threats to survival’.21 Thus, the obligation to 
provide the first threshold of resources is urgent. 
The second threshold addresses less urgent obligations. This is the sufficiency threshold, which 
concerns ‘achieving the general necessary conditions to be in a position to realize one’s purposes or 
to live a life of dignity’.22 Thus, the second threshold of provision concerns maximal interest.23 Put 
differently, the obligation to ensure the provision of the second threshold of resources is not urgent. 
When states carry out this obligation, they perform beyond their minimum core obligations and 
ensure progressive realisation. Bilchitz originally limits his analysis to the first and the second 
thresholds, only later adding the third threshold, which was largely triggered by the 2008 financial 
crisis that affected the enjoyment of rights particularly in Europe.24  
The third threshold, which is called the relative minimum core, falls between survival and sufficiency 
thresholds. The relative minimum core applies to developed countries, particularly during economic 
crisis, and addresses some drawbacks of the absolute minimum core.25 The absolute minimum core 
does not address the suffering of individuals in developed countries, who have suffered severe losses 
to their economic security and well-being due to the economic crisis but who still have resources to 
be free from threats to their survival.26 It encourages selective appraisal by ‘focusing attention on 
poorer, rather than wealthier countries’.27 Such understanding may ‘ignore the victims who find 
themselves living in undignified conditions in wealthier countries’.28 Therefore, the relative minimum 
core avoids the tendency of defining the minimum core on the basis of deprivation in relatively poor 
states.  
Moreover, it is submitted, the determination of an absolute minimum core applicable across the 
world would not be practically possible. The resources required for physical survival are different 
even within one country let alone across the globe. For example, the type and number of resources 
needed to provide basic shelter vary depending on the climate of a place. The shelters suitable in 
lowland deserts are totally different from those required in rainy highlands. Diseases common in the 
tropical zone may not even exist in the temperate zone showing variation of health needs. Moreover, 
the resources needed for physical survival may depend on the perception or culture prevalent in a 
place. An example contrasting extreme differences can be illustrative. The number and type of 
resources required for the physical survival of a person in Rio de Janeiro are different from those 
required by a person who lives in the Amazon forests of Brazil. This is particularly true when one 
recognises indigenous peoples' way of life and world outlook. Because of these variations, minimum 
core obligations cannot be the same for all states. Some states are endowed with abundant 
resources when compared to others. For wealthy states, it would be easy to discharge much more 
                                                          
21 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 732. 
22 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 730. 
23 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 188—189.  
24 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17). 
25 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 732-733. 
26 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 732. 
27 Craven (n 16) 41. 
28 Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele, ‘Introduction: The Road to a Remedy’ in John Squires, Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele 
(eds), The Road To A Remedy: Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (University of New 
South Wales Press 2005) 7. 
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than their minimum core obligations. Poor states, those with relatively fewer resources, should meet 
at least their minimum core obligations.29  
As Craven rightly observes, it is necessary ‘to contextualise the minimum by insisting upon the 
development of national benchmarks to which states might commit themselves’.30 States with more 
resources have a higher level of core content or obligations than those with fewer resources.31 
Therefore, the minimum core is essentially relative. The adoption of a relative minimum core also 
reflects economic measures such as poverty lines, which vary across different nations. Beyond 
national levels, different poverty lines have been adopted to indicate variations across wider 
geographical or economic regions.32 Just like poverty lines, the minimum core is dynamic, and 
changes over time. It evolves with the advancement of science and technology.33  
The view that minimum core obligations change over time may give rise to the issue of the ‘rising 
floor’. This concept considers that the minimum core metaphorically represents the ‘floor’ while full 
realisation represents the ‘ceiling’. As the human rights history shows, a minimum core today will 
change and expand over time.34 That is, the floor rises towards the ceiling, which is not static either, 
but more akin to a horizon line that recedes into the distance as someone tries to reach for it.35 
Therefore, the conception of the minimum core as relative in terms of time and place is plausible and 
does not contradict the principle that human rights are universal. Rather, it reflects contextual 
variations in their implementation.  
Unlike some authors,36 Bilchitz does not include the negative obligation to respect among minimum 
core obligations. In his view, the purpose of the minimum core concept is to clarify the positive 
obligation to fulfil. It is also intended to prioritise the identified minimum core obligations.37 Bilchitz 
provides another reason for excluding negative obligations. He argues that prioritising negative 
obligations over positive ones ‘may have unwarranted practical implications’38 because ‘giving 
priority to the interests of the worst off may involve interference with the higher levels of socio-
economic goods enjoyed by the better off’.39 For example, it may be necessary to interfere with the 
enjoyment of the right to property of the owners (the better off) to guarantee the right to housing of 
the tenants (the worst off). Similarly, Landau demonstrates that the prohibition of interference with 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by the middle and upper classes (the better off) 
‘may prevent or slow necessary structural reforms’, which can benefit the poor (the worst off).40 In 
short, the definition of minimum core obligations, which include the negative obligation to respect 
                                                          
29 cf Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Regional Human 
Rights System: Theory, practice and prospect (Intersentia 2013) 280; Craven (n 16) 39—40. Yeshanew argues that it may 
be too much to expect poor States to provide the minimum core content of each right for all citizens. 
30 Craven (n 16) 39—40. 
31 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights As Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas (eds), 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 27. 
32 World Bank adopts different poverty lines by levels of income (US$1.90 for low income, US$3.20 for lower-middle 
income, US$5.50 for upper-middle income and US$21.70 for high income countries). See World Bank Group, Piecing 
Together the Poverty Puzzle (World Bank 2018) 69. 
33 Christian Courtis, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative experiences of 
justiciability (International Commission of Jurists 2008) 23; Yeshanew, Approaches to justiciability, (n 6) 321. 
34 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 14. 
35 Eva Brems ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights Law Review 349-372, 355. 
36 cf Chapman & Russell (n 7) 11-12; Young, Minimum core, (n 15) 158. 
37 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 195. 
38 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 195. 
39 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 195. 
40 David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53/1 Harvard International Law Journal 189-247, 240. 
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particularly in regard to higher levels of enjoyment, bars redistribution of resources. That is, such 
definition is contrary to the central concern of economic, social and cultural rights.                   
Defining core obligations as inclusive of negative obligations may also give rise to other concerns. It is 
submitted that such definitions water down state obligations. The purpose of defining core 
obligations in the first place is to identify elements of economic, social and cultural rights that states 
should not postpone indefinitely under the pretext of progressive realisation. Defining core 
obligations as negative obligations implies that states have nothing to do except refraining from 
interfering with the exercise of the rights. Therefore, such definition thwarts the purpose of 
identifying core obligations. One can also explain this point from the perspective of rights-holders. 
Central to the minimum core concept is addressing the deprived, those who have no means of their 
own. In the case of extreme deprivation, the obligations to respect and protect have no relevance. 
For example, these obligations make no sense for a person who has no shelter: there is no 
enjoyment to respect and protect, as there is no shelter in the first place. These obligations are 
relevant only to those who are already exercising their rights. Therefore, this definition maintains the 
status quo.  
Another concern relates to the conceptual confusion that such a definition creates. States have the 
negative obligation to respect corresponding to civil and political rights, but this obligation is not 
defined as a core obligation. For example, the Human Rights Committee does not employ the 
language of minimum core obligation in relation to the negative obligation to respect, nor does it use 
the progressive realisation language with regard to positive obligations corresponding to civil and 
political rights guaranteed in the ICCPR.41 Nevertheless, it emphasises that states have positive 
obligations to ‘adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in 
order to fulfil their legal obligations’.42 For example, a state takes educative measures (or discharges 
its obligation to promote) when it trains people (police officers, judges, prosecutors, members of the 
general public) on proper treatment of persons suspected or accused of committing a crime.  
Therefore, minimum core obligations can be better defined as state obligations to provide resources, 
which are required for acquiring goods and services necessary for physical survival, to individuals 
who do not have their own means for reasons beyond their control. This definition is narrow, as it 
relates to the sub-obligation to provide. By determining that the minimum core obligations are 
positive by nature, the definition avoids the wrong impression that states have nothing to do but 
refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights.  
Despite the concerns related to defining minimum core obligations as negative obligations, human 
rights treaty bodies, particularly the African Commission and the CESCR, unfortunately consider that 
core obligations include the negative obligations to respect as discussed below in the third and the 
sixth sections.  
4.2.2 Purposes and characteristics of minimum core obligations 
The minimum core approach seeks to identify the irreducible minimum core content of a right or its 
corresponding obligation.43 In other words, it ‘entails a definition of the absolute minimum needed, 
                                                          
41 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, para 6. 
42 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para 7. 
43 Diane A Desierto, ‘ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non-Expropriation Compensation 
Model during Financial Crises’ (2012) 44 The George Washington International Law Review 473—520, 487. 
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without which the right would be unrecognizable or meaningless’.44 Obviously, such identification 
must serve some purpose.45 The concept of minimum core may improve the normative clarity of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Critics consider that economic, social and cultural rights are 
vague.46 As a response to this criticism, the concept of minimum core may serve as a conceptual tool 
for better understanding. According to Coomans, the concept is ‘a useful means or instrument in 
helping to analyse and clarify the normative content of economic, social and cultural rights, which 
are often described as vague and open-ended’.47 The concept does not appear in the text of human 
rights treaties. As Alston observes, the existence of a minimum core content of a right is ‘a logical 
implication of the use of the terminology of rights’.48  
The minimum core obligations derive some characteristics from their purposes. The objective is to 
identify obligations that are not subject to progressive realisation. Since progressive realisation is 
attained over time, minimum core obligations have to be implemented in a short time. The 
recognition of minimum core obligations emphasises the fact that some elements of economic, social 
and cultural rights are not subject to progressive realization.49 Therefore, immediate effect is an 
important characteristic of minimum core obligations.  
Another characteristic of minimum core obligations relates to resources. Unlike progressive 
realisation, minimum core obligations do not depend on available resources. States should carry out 
these obligations under any circumstances, ‘irrespective of their available resources’.50 This does not 
mean that the implementation of minimum core obligations happens without resources; rather, it 
means that ‘the lack of sufficient resources does not exonerate a state party, including developing 
states, from a threshold or the “minimum core obligation” to ensure, at the very least, “minimum 
essential levels” of each of the rights’ guaranteed in a particular treaty.51 
Prioritisation is another characteristic of minimum core obligations. Identifying the minimum core 
has a consequence for states. Minimum core obligations should be given priority in the allocation of 
state resources52 because the minimum core is immediate and applicable irrespective of available 
resources.53 The prioritisation of resource allocation is not an end in itself. States should meet the 
core obligations relative to a particular right, otherwise, they ‘will be in prima facie breach of their 
obligations’.54 Prioritisation is also applicable to rights-holders. States should give attention to the 
most vulnerable. The minimum core, by definition, addresses the most urgent situations ‘in which 
people are most vulnerable, and most needy’.55 The fact that minimum core obligations have an 
                                                          
44 Courtis (n 33) 23. 
45 Malcolm Langford ‘Substantive Obligations’ in Malcolm Langford et al (eds) The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (PULP 2016) 234. 
46 Ida Elisabeth Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 7. 
47 Fons Coomans, ‘Exploring the Normative Content of the Right to Education as a Human Right: Recent Approaches’ (2004) 
50 Persona & Derecho 61—100, 73.  
48 Alston (n 3) 352. 
49 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 66; Brigit Toebes, 
‘The Right to Health’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 176. 
50 Toebes (n 49) 176. 
51 Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (n 49) 66. 
52 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 730; Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (n 49) 65. 
53 Radhika Balakrishnan & Diane Elson, ‘Auditing Economic Policy in the Light of Obligations on Economic and Social Rights’ 
(2008) 5/1 Essex Human Rights Review 1—19, 6. 
54 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 729. 
55 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 189. 
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immediate effect, implies that ‘it is the duty of the state to prioritize the rights of the poorest and 
most vulnerable people’.56 Because of the urgency of interests it addresses, the minimum core 
‘strongly justifies recognizing an unconditional obligation to realize it as a matter of priority’.57     
The minimum core approach divides state obligations into core and non-core. In the words of Craven, 
the approach distinguishes ‘between minimal and less than minimal obligations’.58 A caveat must be 
added, though, for the identification of minimum core obligations should not lead to conceptual 
confusion; it does not mean that other obligations are unimportant.59 It should not foster ‘the 
normalisation of disadvantage beyond the level of subsistence’.60 States must go beyond realising the 
minimum core content,61 and not postpone indefinitely parts of obligations that are not core.62 It is 
necessary to emphasise that discharging core obligations does not mean full compliance. It is only 
the starting point for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.63 States should move 
beyond the achievement of the minimum core. They ‘must set benchmarks to move progressively 
beyond the core content and to harness the national resources for that purpose’.64      
4.3 Minimum core obligations in the practice of the CESCR 
In its practice, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has been developing 
the concept of the minimum core to clarify the normative content of rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. 
It defines minimum core obligations using different terms and determining their content by 
identifying core obligations corresponding to most rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. From the 
description of these obligations, some characteristics emerge. This section examines the meaning, 
content, and characteristics of core obligations in the practice of the CESCR. It begins with the use of 
terms.  
4.3.1 Use of terminology 
The ICESCR does not contain the concept of minimum core or similar concepts in its text. The CESCR 
introduced the concept to overcome one of the challenges it was facing. The rights guaranteed in the 
ICESCR lack normative clarity. Philip Alston, one of the initial members of the CESCR, observed that 
the vagueness of the normative implications of these rights was one of the challenges of the CESCR.65  
It was the intention of the drafters that the CESCR ‘should seek to identify some minimum core 
content of each right that cannot be diminished’.66 
The CESCR does not derive the concept of minimum core from the text of the ICESCR. Rather, it 
derives the concept from the purpose of the ICESCR. The CESCR emphasises that if the ICESCR ‘were 
to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d’être’.67 It expresses the concept in a range of phrases used in its documents. 
These phrases include minimum core obligations, core obligations, minimum core content, core 
                                                          
56 Balakrishnan & Elson (n 53) 6. 
57 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, (n 3) 189. 
58 Craven (n 16) 39. 
59 Toebes (n 49) 176. 
60 Craven (n 16) 41. 
61 Chapman & Russell (n 7) 9.  
62 Toebes (n 49) 176. 
63 Bilchitz, Socio-economic rights, (n 17) 730. 
64 Eide (n 31) 27. 
65 Alston (n 3) 351.  
66 Alston (n 3) 352.  
67 General Comment 3. 
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content, and minimum essential levels. In its general comment on state obligations, the CESCR 
explains that ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party’.68 From this passage, the 
‘minimum core obligation’ is the duty to ensure the realisation of ‘minimum essential levels’ of each 
of the rights. In other words, if a state discharges its minimum core obligations, it will be able to 
achieve the realisation of minimum essential levels of each right. Moreover, ‘minimum essential 
levels’ of a right may mean a ‘minimum core content’ of that right although this point does not 
clearly come out from the CESCR’s practice. The CESCR uses the term ‘minimum core content’69 in 
some documents while it uses ‘minimum essential levels’70 in others.  
The CESCR identifies ‘core obligations’ for almost all the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. When it 
began explaining the normative content of the rights in its general comment on the right to food in 
1999, the CESCR included the explanation of both ‘core content’ of the right and ‘core obligations’ of 
states.71 It explains that ‘the core content of the right to adequate food implies’ availability and 
accessibility of food.72 It also emphasises that ‘States have a core obligation to take the necessary 
action to mitigate and alleviate hunger’.73 In other words, states achieve the realisation of core 
content of a right when they carry out their core obligations in relation to that right. Since then, the 
CESCR frequently uses the term ‘core obligations’ instead of ‘minimum core obligations’. It hardly 
refers to minimum core obligations in its documents issued since its general comment on state 
obligations adopted in 1990. Of course, it refers to the minimum core obligations when it quotes this 
general comment in more recent documents,74 but otherwise, the ‘minimum core obligations’ have 
fallen into disuse, giving way to ‘core obligations’. The CESCR does not explain the changes in the use 
of terminologies, so it is not clear whether the change is intentional.  
However, the CESCR is not consistent. Its relatively recent documents evidence a couple of changes. 
First, it appears that the CESCR has connected minimum essential levels of rights with core 
obligations. That is, it has continued using ‘minimum essential levels’ and its equivalent (minimum 
core content). It has emphasised that each state party must meet ‘core obligations by ensuring that 
the minimum essential levels relating to the rights to housing, health, social security and education 
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are respected, protected and fulfilled’.75 Second, from the general comment on the right to food, it is 
clear that in the beginning the CESCR took up the task of explaining the core content of rights as well 
as the core obligations of states.76 As time goes by, it has limited itself to explaining core obligations 
only. It has begun stressing that the responsibility to identify the minimum core content of the rights 
under the ICESCR lies with the states themselves. It emphasises that ‘policy reforms should identify 
and protect the minimum core content of Covenant rights at all times’.77 The CESCR requires states 
to determine the minimum core content of rights, especially when states adopt austerity measures.78 
From the ordinary meaning of the words, core obligations are a sub-category of obligations. Similarly, 
minimum core obligations are a sub-category of core obligations. However, the CESCR does not make 
a clear distinction between them. The term ‘core obligation’ is adopted in the following discussion, 
since the CESCR uses this term most frequently.   
4.3.2 Meaning and content of core obligations 
The CESCR defines core obligation as duties of states to ensure the minimum essential levels of each 
of the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR.79 It emphasises that ‘a state party in which any significant 
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic 
shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations’ under the ICESCR.80 The CESCR does not determine core obligations in terms of each 
individual, but rather suggests a collective determination. It requires that the number of individuals 
deprived of their rights should be significant to condemn a state for its failure to discharge core 
obligations. Accordingly, one has to first assess the number of individuals deprived of essential levels 
of each right.  
The CESCR does not determine how many individuals constitute a ‘significant number’; it does not 
establish a fixed threshold, nor does it set this number in terms of the ratio of the deprived 
individuals to the total population in a given country. Despite the absence of a defined number, the 
CESCR sometimes identifies a proportion of the population suffering from the deprivation of their 
rights and condemns the states concerned for their failure, particularly when such states are 
developing countries. For example, it has expressed its concern that ‘half of the population does not 
have access to basic health services’ in the Sudan.81 Thus, the state should ‘take measures to ensure 
access to the essential primary health package for all’.82 It made a similar assessment with regard to 
Chad, condemning it for ‘the chronic food insecurity experienced by a large section of the 
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population’.83 It recommended that Chad ensure ‘physical and economic access to the minimum of 
essential food that is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe to ensure freedom from hunger’.84  
Diplomatic language aside, the CESCR established that the Sudan violated the right to health, while 
Chad violated the right to food. It clearly condemned these states for their failure to ensure 
minimum essential levels of the rights to health and to food for a large section of their population, 
which constituted as much as 50% of the total population in the case of Sudan. In both cases, the 
CESCR took into account the magnitude of the number of individuals deprived of the rights. However, 
it avoided saying that it takes as high as 50% of the population to consider them significant. 
Therefore, it is submitted, the reference to the number of people deprived of minimum essential 
levels of rights should be understood as an emphasis on the magnitude of the deprivation.  
In principle, the number of individuals deprived of their rights should be immaterial. A violation due 
to the failure to carry out core obligations should not be based on whether the number of individuals 
deprived of a right is significant or not. By definition, human rights are inherent in every individual. It 
is still a violation even if one individual is deprived of his or her right. The violation is more serious 
when an individual is deprived of the core content of his or her rights. States realise core content of 
rights when they discharge minimum core obligations corresponding to those rights. Indeed, the 
CESCR has the mandate to receive and examine communications alleging violations under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR even if those violations affect only a single individual.85 Therefore, 
defining core obligations in terms of the number of individuals deprived of their rights is not useful 
but misleading.  
Another element in the definition of core obligations is the ‘minimum essential levels’ of each right. 
The CESCR does not identify minimum essential levels of each of the rights. For example, one may 
ask, what is the minimum amount of water a person needs per day? The general comment on the 
right to water explains that a state violates the right to water if it fails ‘to ensure that the minimum 
essential level of the right is enjoyed by everyone’.86 However, it does not specify the quantity in 
litres or other measurements. In contrast, the Inter-American Court has held that 7.5 litres are a 
minimum requirement, as discussed below.87 The CESCR does not express the essential minimum 
levels of any right in figures. Whether the CESCR has the expertise to make such a specific 
determination is, of course, a different issue.  
The CESCR explains that states have the core obligation to ensure access to minimum essential food, 
basic housing, a minimum essential amount of water, and a social security scheme that provides the 
minimum essential level of benefits.88 These obligations can be examined from the perspective of the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. More relevant in this regard is the obligation to fulfil, 
particularly the sub-obligation to provide. In the general comment on the right to water, for example, 
the CESCR explains that a state violates its obligation to fulfil when it fails ‘to ensure that the 
minimum essential level of the right is enjoyed by everyone’.89 Although the CESCR does not clearly 
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state this point with regard to other rights, one may argue that the failure to provide minimum 
essential levels of a right is a violation of the sub-obligation to provide.  
In principle, individuals depend on their own resources to enjoy their rights. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, ‘available resources’ in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR include those coming from both 
state coffers and private sectors. Individuals have the primary responsibility to obtain the resources 
necessary for the enjoyment of their rights. In that case, the state obligations to respect and protect 
are relevant. However, these obligations are not relevant to individuals who are unable to exercise 
their rights for reasons beyond their control. For such individuals, it is submitted, the obligations to 
respect and protect would not be relevant. The deprived are unable to exercise their rights. As a 
result, there is no point in requiring states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment that does 
not exist in the first place. Similarly, there is no objective to be achieved by requiring states to 
prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment where there is none. Once states carry out 
their core obligation to provide the deprived with minimum essential levels of each right, the 
obligations to respect and protect would come into the picture.  
The CESCR does not distinguish stages when each level of obligation becomes relevant. It generally 
emphasises that states must meet their ‘core obligations by ensuring that the minimum essential 
levels relating to the rights to housing, health, social security and education are respected, protected 
and fulfilled’.90 This statement obscures the difference among levels of state obligations in relation to 
the provision of minimum essential levels. The core obligation to fulfil, particularly the sub-obligation 
to provide, is limited to minimum essential levels because of resource scarcity. Nevertheless, other 
levels of obligations are not limited to minimum essential levels. States have the obligations to 
respect and protect even when the enjoyment is much more than minimum essential levels. This is 
particularly true with regard to the obligation to respect.  
In its general comments (summarised in table 1 below), the CESCR identifies the obligations to 
respect and protect as core obligations, even when they do not relate to the provision of minimum 
requirements. Regarding the right to education, for example, it explains that the obligation ‘to 
ensure free choice of education without interference from the State’ is a core obligation.91 Similarly, 
with regard to the right to social security, it explains that the obligation to ‘respect existing social 
security schemes’ is a core obligation.92 In both examples, the CESCR identifies the obligation to 
respect as a core obligation. Examples of core obligations to protect include the protection of 
material interest of authors (cultural rights),93 the prohibition of harmful practices and gender-based 
violence (right to health),94 and the prohibition of sexual harassment (right to just and favourable 
conditions of work).95 In sum, the core obligations identified by the CESCR contain all levels of state 
obligations (ie, to respect, to protect and to fulfil). 
The concept of ‘minimum essential levels’ of each right is central to the CESCR’s definition of core 
obligations, however, this trend has not continued over time. It seems that the change occurred 
when the CESCR identified core obligations for each right. The general comments do not specify the 
obligation to provide minimum essential levels for every right. In its general comment on the right to 
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food adopted in 1999, the CESCR did not identify the obligation to provide minimum essential food. A 
year later, it explained that the right to health requires states to provide not only minimum essential 
food but also basic shelter and water. This shows that core obligations corresponding to some rights 
overlap. This is particularly true with regard to the rights to health, food and water. In some general 
comments, the CESCR does not specify the obligation to provide minimum essential levels. Examples 
are the general comments on the right to work and cultural rights.96 
Table 1: Summary of core obligations 
Common Core Obligations Other Core Obligations  
1. Right to Food (art 11), General Comment 12 (1999) 
 ▪ mitigating and alleviating hunger 
2. Right to Education (art 13), General Comment 13 (1999) 
▪ national educational strategy 
▪ non-discrimination in access to institutions and 
programmes 
▪ appropriate educational objectives 
▪ primary education for all  
▪ free choice of education  
3. Right to Health (art 12), General Comment 14 (2000) 
▪ national health strategy and plan of action  
▪ non-discrimination 
▪  equitable distribution of goods and services 
▪ minimum essential food  
▪ basic shelter, water and sanitation 
▪ essential drugs 
4. Right to water (art 11), General Comment 14 (2002) 
▪ national water strategy and plan of action 
▪ non-discrimination in access to water and water 
facilities and services  
▪ equitable distribution  of facilities and services 
 ▪ monitoring the realization of the right to water  
▪ minimum essential amount of water  
▪ physical access to water facilities or services  
▪ personal security while accessing water  
▪ low-cost targeted water programmes  
▪ access to sanitation (prevent water borne diseases) 
5. Right to Culture [benefits of authors] (art 15(1)(c)), General Comment 17 (2005) 
▪ equal access to remedies ▪ protection of the interests of authors 
▪ Recognition of authors as creators 
▪ protection of the material interests of authors 
▪ balancing the interests of authors with rights of others 
6. Right to Work (art 6), General Comment 18 (2005)  
▪ national employment strategy and plan of action  
▪ non-discrimination and equal treatment  
▪ access to employment 
 
7. Social security (art 9), General Comment 19 (2007) 
▪ national social security strategy and plan of action  
▪ non-discrimination  
▪ monitoring the extent of the realization 
▪ minimum essential level of benefits  
▪ non-interference in existing social security schemes  
▪ taking steps to implement social security schemes  
8. Right to Take part in cultural life (art 15(1)(a)), General Comment 21 (2009) 
▪ participation in the design and implementation of 
laws and policies  
▪ non-discrimination and gender equality 
▪ right to identify oneself with one or more communities  
▪ right of everyone to engage in cultural practices  
▪ elimination of barriers preventing access to culture 
9. Right to Reproductive health (art 12), General Comment 22 (2016) 
▪ national strategy and action plan 
▪ universal and equitable access to goods and 
services  
▪ access to effective remedies  
▪ access to facilities, services, goods and information  
▪ prohibition of harmful practices  
▪ Safe abortions and post-abortion care and counselling   
▪ access to education and information  
▪ essential medicines, equipment and technologies  
10. Right to Just and favourable Conditions of work (art 7), General Comment 23 (2016) 
▪ national policy 
▪ Non-discrimination  
▪ combat gender discrimination 
▪ establishing minimum wages  
▪ prohibition of harassment  
▪ minimum standards for conditions of work 
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In addition to the provision of minimum essential levels, the CESCR identifies other elements of core 
obligations. Some of these elements are peculiar to state obligations corresponding to a particular 
right.  For example, one of the core obligations relating to the right to water is ensuring personal 
security while accessing water.97 The implementation of this obligation is important in areas where 
right-holders, particularly women and children, travel for several hours to fetch water. Given that the 
ICCPR guarantees the protection of personal security, one may question the significance of 
identifying such protection as a core obligation under the ICESCR.98 This example may indicate that 
the CESCR sometimes regards the protection of civil and political rights as a core obligation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
Other elements are applicable to almost all rights for which the CESCR has identified core 
obligations.99 These include the obligations (1) to adopt a national strategy; (2) to ensure non-
discrimination in the enjoyment of rights; (3) to ensure equitable distribution of facilities and 
services; (4) to monitor the levels of realisation; and (5) to provide remedies. These core obligations 
appear in relation to two or more rights. Although the CESCR omits these obligations in relation to 
some rights, one may argue that they are applicable to all rights. Thus, they are labelled as ‘common 
core obligations’ in Table 1 shown above. They are discussed below separately.  
4.3.2.1 Obligation to adopt a national strategy 
A strategy, by definition, is a plan of action.100  It involves setting goals, identifying actions to achieve 
the goals and mobilising the necessary resources to execute those actions.101 The CESCR usually 
emphasises the need to adopt and implement a national strategy. In its first general comment on 
state reporting, it explained that states have an obligation to ‘adopt a detailed plan of action for the 
progressive implementation’ of each of the right guaranteed in the ICESCR.102 This obligation springs 
from the undertaking to take steps by all appropriate means provided under Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR.103 The CESCR emphasised that the obligation to devise strategies and programmes for the 
implementation of these rights is ‘not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints’.104 
The CESCR identifies the obligation to adopt and implement a strategy as a core obligation for most 
of the rights.105 It omits this obligation from some rights, particularly the rights to take part in cultural 
life, housing, and food. It is not clear why the CESCR omits this obligation from some rights. As the 
CESCR has already explained, the obligation to adopt a strategy is implied in Article 2(1) of the 
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ICESCR, a progressive realisation provision applicable to all substantive rights in the ICESCR.106 From 
this, one may argue, states have the obligation to adopt a strategy for every right guaranteed in the 
ICESCR.  
The CESCR stipulates what a national strategy should contain. It provides more details with regard to 
some rights than it does with regard to others. In its general comment on the right to water, for 
example, it stipulates that a state has an obligation: 
To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole 
population; the strategy and plan of action should be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis 
of a participatory and transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to water indicators 
and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and 
plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all disadvantaged 
or marginalized groups.107 
In this passage, the CESCR indicates the scope and content of a national strategy. As to the scope, it 
explains that a national strategy should address the entire population of the concerned State party. It 
also explains that states should give particular attention to vulnerable groups as an important part of 
the population. In principle, one may argue, a strategy adopted for the whole population is 
applicable to vulnerable groups. Still, it is in relation to these groups that the obligation to provide 
usually arises. Therefore, any national strategy should set separate goals to be achieved with regard 
to them. Such strategy should also identify actions to be taken to achieve the goals. In terms of 
content, a national strategy should provide for methods of monitoring the progress. Thus, strategies 
should include indicators and benchmarks. Moreover, the CESCR specifies other requirements. The 
process of adopting a national strategy should be participatory and transparent.108 A strategy should 
be reviewed from time to time.  
In its concluding observations, the CESCR frequently expresses its concern that the State concerned 
has no strategy in place and calls upon it to adopt one.109 Sometimes, it requires the adoption of a 
strategy on a very specific aspect of a right, such as ‘teenage and youth health’,110 ‘child poverty’,111 
‘domestic and gender-based violence’,112 and ‘homelessness’.113 For the states that have already 
adopted various strategies, the CESCR calls on them to implement or monitor the implementation.114 
However, it hardly explains that states should adopt strategies because it is among their core 
obligations.  
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4.3.2.2 Obligation to prohibit discrimination and inequitable distribution  
In the general comment on state obligations, the CESCR explains that the obligation to prohibit 
discrimination is an obligation of immediate effect as opposed to progressive realisation.115 I will 
discuss equality and non-discrimination in detail in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to state that 
the CESCR identifies non-discrimination as a core obligation in relation to most of the rights 
guaranteed in the ICESCR.116 It usually emphasises that states should ensure access to facilities, 
institutions, and services on a non-discriminatory basis.117 Given that non-discrimination is an 
obligation of immediate effect, one may wonder about the significance of identifying it among core 
obligations. Besides, it is useful to note the practice under the ICCPR in this regard. Article 26 of the 
ICCPR prohibits discrimination. The Human Rights Committee interprets this provision to cover the 
prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.118 The Human 
Rights Committee does not use the language of core obligations. Thus, it does not identify the 
prohibition of discrimination as a core obligation.       
A related obligation is the duty to ensure equitable distribution of facilities, services and goods. The 
CESCR identifies this obligation among the core with respect to the right to health and the right to 
water.119 An inequitable distribution of facilities, services and goods is certainly discrimination if it is 
based on prohibited grounds or on analogous grounds. Distribution based on other grounds such as 
geographic factors may not constitute discrimination. The CESCR still condemns imbalanced 
geographic distribution of facilities, goods and services in its concluding observations.120 It sometimes 
requires equitable distribution based on the obligation to ensure non-discrimination in the 
enjoyment of rights guaranteed in the ICESCR.121 
4.3.2.3 Obligations to monitor the implementation of rights  
The CESCR emphasises that states have a core obligation to ‘monitor the extent of the realization, or 
the non-realization’ with regard to the right to water and the right to social security.122 However, the 
CESCR does not identify this obligation as a core obligation with regard to other rights guaranteed 
under the ICESCR. This is surprising given its emphasis on monitoring since its first general comment 
on state reporting in 1989. It underlines that one of the objectives of state reporting is  ‘to ensure 
that the State party monitors the actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis 
and is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by all 
individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction’.123 
States may provide the CESCR with national aggregate data on the extent of realisation, but that is 
not sufficient. In addition, they should monitor the level of enjoyment of economic, social and 
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cultural rights by members of vulnerable groups. Thus, the CESCR stresses that states should give 
special attention ‘to any worse-off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which 
appear to be particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged’.124 
Monitoring realisation is not a simple process, nor is it cost-free, and the CESCR does not ignore this. 
It acknowledges that monitoring the degree of realisation requires resources, which may sometimes 
be beyond the capacity of states.125 However, the lack of resources does not extinguish their 
obligation: in that case, states should seek international assistance and cooperation.126 In its general 
comment on state obligations, the CESCR explained that ‘the obligations to monitor the extent of the 
realization, or more especially of the non-realization, of economic, social and cultural rights […] are 
not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints’.127 
4.3.2.4 Obligation to provide remedies 
The ICESCR does not expressly require states to provide judicial remedies – unlike Article 2(3)(b) of 
the ICCPR.128  The CESCR acknowledges the textual omission. In its general comment on the domestic 
application of the ICESCR adopted in 1998, it derives the obligation to provide remedies from Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR.129 Article 2(1) requires states to take steps ‘by all appropriate means’, among 
other things. The CESCR explains that 
[A] State party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic legal remedies for violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights would need to show either that such remedies are not 
“appropriate means” within the terms of Article 2.1 of the Covenant or that, in view of the other 
means used, they are unnecessary.130  
In the 1998 general comment on domestic application, the CESCR does not label the obligation to 
provide remedies as a core obligation. The same is true in almost all general comments on 
substantive rights in which the CESCR usually emphasises that states have an obligation to ensure 
access to remedies in cases of violations.131     
The obligation to provide remedies is considered a core obligation with regard to two rights, the right 
to health and cultural rights.132 The CESCR issued two general comments on cultural rights under 
Article 15 of the ICESCR. In 2005, it adopted the first one in relation to the benefits of authors from 
their scientific, literary or artistic productions (Article 15(1)(a)).133 In 2009, it adopted another general 
comment on the right to take part in cultural life (Article 15(1)(a)).134 With regard to the former, the 
CESCR recognises that states have a core obligation to ensure access to remedies. Similarly, the 
CESCR issued two general comments on the right to health under Article 12 of the ICESCR. It issued 
the first one in 2000 on the right to health in general.135 It adopted another one on the right to 
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reproductive health in 2016.136 It is only with regard to the right to reproductive health that the 
CESCR requires states to ensure access to remedies as their core obligation. It emphasises that states 
should ‘ensure access to effective and transparent remedies and redress, including administrative 
and judicial ones, for violations of the right to sexual and reproductive health’.137 The CESCR does not 
identify the obligation to ensure access to remedies as a core obligation of states with regard to 
other rights. Even in the cases of the right to health and cultural rights, it considers access to 
remedies a core obligation in relation to aspects of them, not to the whole rights. However, the 
CESCR does not provide any reason why the obligation to provide remedies is core in relation to 
some rights but not in relation to other rights. It would be difficult to justify such a distinction. 
4.3.3 Characteristics of core obligations 
Core obligations arguably have some characteristics that distinguish them from other state 
obligations. The CESCR does not provide a list of characteristics that describe core obligations. Yet 
from the qualifications it uses, there are some identifiable characteristics. Therefore, I would argue 
that core obligations are of immediate effect; that they are not subject to resource availability; that 
they should be prioritised over other obligations; that they are absolute; and that they are non-
derogable.  
First, core obligations are immediate. The minimum core approach aims at discovering immediate 
obligations as opposed to progressive realisation. As the CESCR emphasises, the principal obligation 
under the ICESCR is progressive realisation.138 Still, the CESCR recognises that the ICESCR ‘imposes 
various obligations which are of immediate effect’.139 Core obligations are among obligations of 
immediate effect.140 The CESCR explains immediate obligation in contrast to progressive realisation. 
Put differently, states should implement core obligations forthwith.  
Second, core obligations do not depend on the availability of resources. However, these apparent 
distinctions between progressive realisation and immediate obligations collapse into one if one 
recognises that progressive realisation is not immediate because of resource scarcity. Moreover, the 
CESCR does not expressly say that the implementation of core obligations does not require 
resources. Still, it explains the relationship between core obligations and resources. In its 2007 
Statement, it explains that:     
As regards the core obligations of States parties in relation to each of the Covenant rights, General 
Comment No. 3 states that, in order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet its core 
obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those core 
obligations.141 
From this passage, it is clear that states can attribute their failure to discharge their obligation to lack 
of resources; all they have to do is to explain two conditions, the first of which relates to resources. 
The explanation should relate to the efforts made, not to the actual use of resources: they should 
explain that they made every effort to use all resources at their disposal. The other condition relates 
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to the attention given to core obligations: states should show that they have prioritised core 
obligations. According to this view, the significance of the immediate nature of core obligations is 
weakened. The reason is simple. In principle, a state must justify why it has failed to achieve the full 
realisation of rights. Otherwise, there is no point in requiring progressive realisation. For this reason, 
it is submitted, it does not make much difference whether core obligations are subject to resource 
availability or not. In fact, the CESCR at times gives the impression that it requires progressive 
achievement of core obligations. In its concluding observations, it has declared that a ‘State party 
should take measures to progressively bring its State social standards in line with its core obligations 
under Articles 7, 9 and 11 of the Covenant’.142 
Third, core obligations are absolute. One may explain core obligations in terms of defences available 
to states. States have no defence if they fail to comply with their core obligations. Indeed, the CESCR 
underlines that ‘a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-
compliance with the core obligations’.143 In other words, core obligations are not subject to 
limitation. This view has a radical consequence. It makes the core content of economic, social and 
cultural rights absolute, exposing some states as permanent violators, especially when minimum core 
is defined as absolute minimum core.  
Fourth, core obligations should be given priority. The CESCR emphasises that a state must make 
every effort to meet its core obligations ‘as a matter of priority’.144 According priority to core 
obligations implies that they are more important than other obligations. The concept thus involves 
comparison insofar as states should execute core obligations before proceeding to others. Priority, 
one may argue, refers to the importance of core obligations over other obligations. In fact, the CESCR 
suggests this meaning in one of its statements, explaining that ‘after a State party has ensured the 
core obligations of economic, social and cultural rights, it continues to have an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of all the rights in the 
Covenant’.145 Thus, it appears that the CESCR arranges the obligations under the ICESCR in 
hierarchical order. 
Finally, core obligations are non-derogable according to the CESCR. It explains that ‘because core 
obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural 
disaster’.146 Taken to its logical conclusion, this description has a certain ramification: the CESCR 
creates two categories of state obligations, one of which is core obligations, which correspond to the 
minimum core content of a right. If core obligations are non-derogable, the corresponding minimum 
core rights are also non-derogable. The other category relates to the remainder of state obligations. 
One may call these non-core obligations, although the CESCR does not use these terms. There are 
aspects of a right that correspond to these non-core obligations, which one could call the peripheral 
content of a right. Qualifying core obligations as non-derogable implies that non-core obligations and 
the corresponding peripheral content of a right are derogable. There is no point of qualifying core 
obligations as non-derogable unless one wants to distinguish them from derogable obligations. As a 
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result, all rights under the ICESCR have derogable and non-derogable aspects. Both derogability and 
non-derogability run through the ICESCR, since the CESCR identifies core obligations for almost all 
rights under the ICESCR. However, this does not sit well with the conventional concept of derogation 
and its place under the ICESCR.       
The ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause, a provision that allows states to suspend rights 
guaranteed by a treaty during a state of emergency.147 In contrast, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides for a derogation clause.148 It permits states to suspend the 
enjoyment of some of the rights it guarantees. These are derogable rights. It clearly prohibits 
derogation from some provisions that guarantees rights such as the right to life.149 These are non-
derogable rights. States cannot suspend them during a state of emergency. The CESCR does not use 
the concept in this sense. It does not distinguish derogable rights from non-derogable ones. One may 
argue that it regards a single right as having both derogable and non-derogable aspects. This flows 
from qualifying core obligations as non-derogable. 
The CESCR does not address the absence of a derogation clause from the ICESCR. The absence of 
such clause may mean that the ICESCR does not permit states to derogate from rights it guarantees. 
In other words, states cannot suspend rights guaranteed under the ICESCR during times of 
emergency. The purpose of the ICESCR is to ensure that a state implement the rights it guarantees. 
The drafters would have included any exception, as is the case with the ICCPR, if that were necessary. 
As Alston and Quinn convincingly argue, a combination of three factors explains the absence of a 
derogation clause.150  These are the nature of the rights, the general limitation clause, and the nature 
of state obligations under the ICESCR.151 Müller justifies the absence on the ground of the purpose of 
derogation such as the protection of public order.152 She argues that ‘it is hard to imagine a situation 
in which it is necessary to deny people their rights to food, health care or basic shelter in order to 
maintain or restore the public order’.153 She rightly concludes that it is not necessary to suspend 
economic, social and cultural rights in times of emergency.154  
From the foregoing, one may wonder whether the concept of non-derogability has any significance 
at all. According to Coomans, ‘the qualification of core obligations as non-derogable would greatly 
strengthen their legal character’ since they would apply under all circumstances.155 This conclusion 
assumes that the nature of rights under the ICESCR, or at least core obligations corresponding to 
such rights, have been derogable or have some comparable nature before the CESCR introduces the 
qualification. However, if one acknowledges that the ICESCR rights or their corresponding obligations 
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are non-derogable in the first place, the CESCR’s qualification has no significance. It might even have 
a worse consequence and create a wrong perception that non-core obligations are derogable.  
4.4 Minimum core obligations in the practice of the European Committee  
The European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee) does not identify the core 
obligations of each right guaranteed under the European Social Charter. While it does not follow the 
practice of the CESCR, it sometimes refers to core obligations for a different purpose, for advancing a 
particular view, for example. An example is its decision in Conference of European Churches (CEC) v 
The Netherlands.156 It has examined, among other things, an alleged violation of the right to social 
and medical assistance of undocumented adult migrants under Article 13(4) of the European Social 
Charter. The Charter limits this right to individuals, who are lawfully in the territories of states parties 
and who are from other states. Accordingly, the respondent State argued that it does not have an 
international obligation to provide social and medical assistance to adult migrants in an irregular 
situation.157 The European Committee has rejected this argument. It has established that ‘all persons 
without resources […] have a legally recognised right to the satisfaction of basic human material 
need (food, clothing, shelter) in situations of emergency’.158 It has supported its argument with 
reference to the ICESCR and the practice of the CESCR. It observed that: 
It firstly notes in this regard that also the relevant instruments of the United Nations guarantee an 
adequate standard of living, that is, food, clothing and housing, to everyone without limitations based 
on the regularity of residency […]. The Committee secondly takes note of the so-called core obligations 
defined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations.159 
Thus, the European Committee has established the view that undocumented adult migrants have the 
right to assistance in emergencies under the European Social Charter. 
Moreover, the European Committee uses a couple of concepts that share some characteristics of 
core obligations. These are the European averages and the sufficient level of protection. The 
European averages relates to evaluating compliance with the right to health. The averages represent 
statistical mean achievements such as maternal or infant mortality rates.160 According to Lougarre, 
the European Committee has established that states have ‘an obligation to perform “comparably” 
with European averages, in the field of healthcare’.161 Any achievement below these statistical 
averages does not automatically result in violation of the European Social Charter.162 The 
achievement must be significantly below the European average to constitute a violation. Therefore, 
Lougarre argues, the European Committee draws ‘a legal threshold where significantly poor results in 
healthcare are unacceptable, regardless of external factors such as the availability of resources 
within the State’.163 This, she concludes, is in line with the minimum core approach developed by the 
CESCR.164 
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The European Committee relates the sufficient level of protection to the right to social security under 
Article 12(3) of the European Social Charter. It has decided a series of cases against Greece alleging a 
violation of the right to social security due to decreases in social security benefits that followed the 
economic crisis in Greece.165 It has held that:  
In general, the Committee thus concludes that the Government has not established, as is required by 
Article 12§3, that efforts have been made to maintain a sufficient level of protection for the benefit of 
the most vulnerable members of society, even though the effects of the adopted measures risk 
bringing about a large scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the population.166 
As a result, the European Committee has found Greece in violation of the European Social Charter.167 
The reduction in itself does not constitute a violation. The European Committee emphasised that 
‘reductions in the benefits available in a national social security system will not automatically 
constitute a violation of Article 12§3’.168 However, the reduction violates the Charter when it falls 
below a sufficient level of protection. This shows that the European Committee adopts the minimum 
core approach according to Letnar Černič.169  
4.5 Minimum core obligations in the practice of the Inter-American Commission and 
Court  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights do 
not seem to follow the CESCR. However, the Inter-American Commission at times refers to core 
obligations in a different sense. In its guidelines on progress indicators, for example, it has identified 
the collection of disaggregated data as a core obligation. It has emphasised that ‘the generation of 
information suitably disaggregated to identify […] disadvantaged sectors or groups deprived of the 
enjoyment of rights is not only a means to ensure the effectiveness of a public policy, but a core 
obligation that the State must perform in order to fulfil its duty to provide special and priority 
assistance to these sectors’.170 However, the Inter-American Commission has yet to identify 
minimum core content or obligations for each right guaranteed under the Protocol of San Salvador. It 
sometimes chooses to dispose of a case on a different ground, although the parties’ arguments 
revolve around whether measures taken by the respondent state affect the core content of a 
particular right. In National Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al 
v Peru, the parties addressed the Inter-American Commission on the core content of the right to 
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social security.171 In particular, the respondent state submitted that its pension reform ‘did not entail 
an impairment of the core content of the right to a pension’.172 However, the Inter-American 
Commission did not examine whether the core content of the right was affected. 
Some commentators, however, argue that the Inter-American Commission also adopts the minimum 
core approach. According to Ssenyonjo, the Inter-American Commission echoes the position of the 
CESCR.173 It requires members of the Organisation of American States ‘to guarantee a minimum 
threshold’ of economic, social and cultural rights regardless of their level of economic 
development.174 Melish derives the minimum core from the discussion of the Inter-American 
Commission on the right to judicial personality (Article 3 of the American Convention) in the context 
of forced disappearance.175 
The Inter-American Court does not use minimum core language either, but rather provides a more 
specific explanation of the minimum core concept in relation to some rights. The Court provides this 
explanation as part of the right to a dignified life (vida digna) under Article 4 of the American 
Convention.176 In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, the Court found a violation of Article 
4(1) because the respondent State had failed to take measures that ensure members of the Yakye 
Axa indigenous community a decent life.177 The Court held that ‘detriment to the right to health, and 
closely tied to this, detriment to the right to food and access to clean water, have a major impact on 
the right to a decent existence’.178  
In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay, the inter-American Court examined the 
provision of water, food, health and education services to determine whether there was a violation 
of the right to a dignified life.179 It determined a minimum requirement of provision of water and a 
minimum provision of food, finding.  that the water supplied by the respondent State ‘amounted to 
no more than 2.17 liters per person per day’.180 It explained that: 
[A]ccording to international standards, most people need a minimum of 7.5 liters per day per person 
to meet all their basic needs, including food and hygiene. Also according to international standards, 
the quality of the water must represent a tolerable level of risk. Judged by these standards, the State 
has not proved that it is supplying sufficient amounts of water to meet the minimum requirements’.181 
With regard to food, the Court has ascertained that the respondent State provided approximately 
0.29 kilograms of food per person per day.182 It has held that ‘the amount of food provided was 
insufficient to satisfy, even moderately, the basic daily dietary needs of any individual’.183 The Court 
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has not determined the exact minimum kilograms of food needed by an individual in a day, but it 
indicated that 0.29 kilograms per person per day or anything falling below this amount is below the 
minimum requirement.  
4.6 Minimum core obligations under the African Charter 
The African Charter does not provide for a minimum core content of a right, nor does it provide for 
its corresponding minimum core obligations of states. For that matter, there is no human rights 
treaty that incorporates this concept. Even under the ICESCR as discussed above, a minimum core 
obligation is an implied duty.184 The African Commission employs the concept of minimum core in the 
interpretation of the African Charter as discussed below. The Commission does not derive the 
concept from any provision of the Charter. One may argue that the Commission has a mandate under 
Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter. Article 60 requires the Commission to draw inspiration from 
international human rights treaties and instruments while Article 61 requires the Commission to take 
into consideration legal precedents and doctrine.  
On the other hand, the African Court has not yet employed the minimum core concept in its 
interpretation. This does not relate to the application of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter. Of 
course, these provisions refer to the African Commission since the African Court was not envisaged 
when the Charter was drafted. The African Court has an even wider power than the African 
Commission has. While the Commission’s power is to draw inspiration from other treaties, the 
African Court can directly apply them as far as a respondent State is a party to those treaties.185 One 
may argue that other factors account for the absence of the minimum core concept from the 
practice of the African Court. The length of the Court’s experience could be one factor. The African 
Court is relatively young, although it has been operating for more than a decade. Another factor may 
relate to the types of cases that usually come to the Court: cases dealing with economic, social and 
cultural rights had hardly come to the African Court by March 2020.  
Moreover, the African Commission and the African Court are different in terms of institutional 
nature. As a judicial organ, the African Court has to receive a concrete case to interpret the African 
Charter. Unlike quasi-judicial organs like the African Commission, it does not adopt general 
comments or similar documents to interpret the Charter. For this reason, it may not even adopt the 
minimum core or similar concepts that apply to all economic, social and cultural rights. Justice Rafâa 
Ben Achour stresses this point, emphasising that the African Court renders judgments on a case-by-
case basis.186 It is therefore not possible to give a definitive theoretical answer to a question whether 
the Court will apply a concept such as a minimum core.187   
On the other hand, the African Commission can interpret the African Charter in advance without 
referring to any particular case. It does not need to wait for a case to adopt a particular 
interpretation. It has the mandate to lay down rules and principles under Article 45(1)(b) of the 
African Charter. Consequently, the African Commission has dealt with the minimum core in a range 
of documents including cases, principles and guidelines, declarations and resolutions. For this reason, 
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I begin with the evolution of the concept and discuss the minimum core in the practice of the African 
Commission.           
4.6.1 Evolution of minimum core obligations in the practice of the African Commission 
The African Commission introduced the concept of minimum core around a decade later than the 
CESCR. The CESCR introduced the concept in 1990 as discussed above, whereas the African 
Commission began employing the concept in 2001. The concept first appeared in its decisions on 
individual communications. The African Commission expressly refers to ‘minimum core’ or minimum 
obligations in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (Ogoniland 
case).188 This was followed by an elaboration in other documents, namely the 2004 Pretoria 
Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Pretoria Declaration)189 and the 2011 Principles 
and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles). I discuss these in the following sections. 
4.6.1.1 Minimum obligations: The Ogoniland case 
Yeshanew argues that the concept of minimum core is traceable in earlier decisions of the African 
Commission.190 One such case is Free Legal Assistance Group & Others v Zaire decided in 1995.191 In 
this case, the African Commission has found the respondent State in violation of the right to health 
under Article 16 of the African Charter because of the ‘failure of the Government to provide basic 
services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of medicine’.192 Here, the 
Commission uses the term ‘basic’. According to Yeshanew, this is a reference to basic elements of 
economic, social and cultural rights central to the minimum core concept.193 
The African Commission expressly introduced the concept of minimum core in its interpretation of 
the African Charter in the Ogoniland case decided in 2001.194 In this case, the African Commission has 
examined alleged violations of the African Charter due to oil exploitation in areas where Ogoni 
people of Nigeria live. The oil development ‘poisoned much of the soil and water upon which Ogoni 
farming and fishing depended’.195 The case involves collusion between oil companies and State 
security forces, which attacked and displaced villagers, rendering thousands homeless.196 The 
security forces ‘destroyed crops and killed farm animals’ creating a state of terror and insecurity.197 
As a result, the Ogoni people were unable to return to their fields and animals. This led to 
malnutrition and starvation among the Ogoni people.198 The African Commission has examined, 
among other things, the rights to housing and food in this case, although the African Charter does 
not expressly recognise either of those rights.199 
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The African Commission identified ‘two minimum obligations’ regarding the right to housing. It 
emphasised that: ‘At a very minimum, the right to shelter obliges the Nigerian Government not to 
destroy the housing of its citizens and not to obstruct efforts by individuals or communities to rebuild 
lost homes’.200 The Commission held that 
[T]he Government of Nigeria has failed to fulfil these two minimum obligations. The government has 
destroyed Ogoni houses and villages and then, through its security forces, obstructed, harassed, 
beaten and, in some cases, shot and killed innocent citizens who have attempted to return to rebuild 
their ruined homes. These actions constitute massive violations of the right to shelter, in violation of 
Articles 14, 16, and 18(1) of the African Charter.201 
One minimum obligation, according to the Commission, is to refrain from destroying the existing 
shelters. The other is to abstain from interfering with individual efforts of building shelters. Both 
involve acts of commission interfering with the exercise of the right to housing. In terms of the level 
of obligations involved, both acts are contrary to the obligation to respect. It appears that the 
Commission divides the obligation to respect with regard to the right to housing into two minimum 
obligations. In terms of terminological preference, it uses ‘minimum obligations’, not ‘minimum core 
obligations’.  
In the same case, the African Commission has identified ‘three minimum duties’ of states 
corresponding to the right to food: 
[T]the minimum core of the right to food requires that the Nigerian Government should not destroy or 
contaminate food sources. It should not allow private parties to destroy or contaminate food sources, 
and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves. […] The government’s treatment of the Ogonis has 
violated all three minimum duties of the right to food. The government has destroyed food sources 
through its security forces and state oil company; has allowed private oil companies to destroy food 
sources; and, through terror, has created significant obstacles to Ogoni communities trying to feed 
themselves.202 
As is the case with the right to housing, the African Commission divides the obligation to respect into 
two with regard to the right to food. One is violated by acts of security forces destroying food 
sources. The violation of the other minimum duty is due to acts of security forces preventing Ogoni 
people from obtaining their own food. Both acts of the security forces are acts of interference with 
the exercise of the right to food contrary to the respondent State’s obligation to respect. The 
Commission identifies one more obligation, which it has not identified with respect to the right to 
housing: the obligation to protect. The respondent State failed to prevent third parties from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right to food. In the Commission’s words, the respondent 
‘allowed private oil companies to destroy food sources’. Regarding the choice of terminologies, the 
Commission appears to use ‘minimum core’ to refer to core content of the right to food, while it uses 
‘minimum duties’ instead of ‘minimum obligations’ regarding its holding on the right to housing. 
Concerning the violation of the rights to food and housing, the Ogoniland case does not involve a 
violation due to the failure to carry out the sub-obligation to provide. The violations arise from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
protection of family (Article 18(1)). It drives the right to food from the cumulative reading of the right to life (Article 4), 
the right to health (Article 16) and the right to development (Article 22). 
200 Ogoniland case, para 61. 
201 Ogoniland case, para 62. Italics added. 
202 Ogoniland case, paras 65 & 66. Italics added. 
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respondent State’s failure to perform its obligations to respect and protect. Thus, the Commission 
regards the obligations to respect and protect as minimum duties.  
Surprisingly, however, the African Commission is not consistent, not even within one case. In the 
Ogoniland case, the rights to food and housing are not the only violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights; the Commission also found violations of the rights to health and property. It has found 
a violation of the right to health due to the respondent State’s conduct of directly ‘participating in 
the contamination of air, water and soil and thereby harming the health of the Ogoni population’.203 
The Commission emphasised that Article 16 of the African Charter (right to health) requires states ‘to 
desist from directly threatening the health’ of their citizens.204 Further, it explained that the State is 
‘under an obligation to respect the [right to health] and this entails largely non-interventionist 
conduct from the state for example, not [...] carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, 
policy or legal measures violating the integrity of the individual’.205 Although the Commission 
identified the obligation to respect as a minimum obligation with regard to the rights to food and 
housing, it does not regard the obligation to respect as a minimum obligation when it comes to the 
right to health. In particular, the Commission has not attempted to identify minimum obligations 
despite the allegation of the complainants that the respondent State had failed to discharge its 
‘minimum duties’.206 Similarly, the Commission has found a violation of the right to property (Article 
14 of the African Charter) due to wanton destruction of shelter.207 As is the case with the right to 
housing, the destruction of shelters is contrary to the State’s obligation to respect, yet the 
Commission does not consider this a minimum obligation.  
In the Ogoniland case, the African Commission has adopted inconsistent approaches. In Sudan 
Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan decided in 2009, the African Commission has found 
a violation of the rights to property and health.208 The facts of this case are similar to those in the 
Ogoniland case. The Commission found a violation of the right to property (Article 14 of the Charter) 
because the military forces of the respondent State and armed groups ‘acting on their own, or 
believed to be supported by the Respondent State’ destroyed the property.209 According to the 
Commission, ‘the Respondent State had failed to show that it refrained from the eviction, or 
demolition of victims' houses and other property. It did not take steps to protect the victims’.210 With 
regard to the right to health, the Commission has held that ‘the destruction of homes, livestock and 
farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells exposed the victims to serious health 
risks and amounts to a violation of Article 16 of the Charter’.211 The violations of both rights are due 
to the failure of the respondent State to carry out its obligations to respect and protect. However, 
the Commission does not consider these obligations to be minimum obligations. In other words, the 
commission does not follow its holding in the Ogoniland case that the obligations to respect and 
protect are minimum obligations.   
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In the Nubian Community in Kenya v the Republic of Kenya (Nubian Community case) decided in 
2015, the African Commission has found violations of Article 15 (right to work), Article 16 (right to 
health), and Article 17(1) (right to education).212 The violations occurred because the respondent 
State subjected members of the Nubian Community to discriminatory treatment in the process of 
issuing identity documents, which are required in the respondent State to obtain basic services 
related to health, education and employment in the public service.213 While discriminatory treatment 
is interference with the enjoyment of the rights contrary to the duty to respect, the African 
Commission has not declared that such treatment constitutes a failure to discharge core obligations. 
In contrast, the CESCR considers non-discrimination among core obligations as discussed above.   
In the Ogoniland case, the African Commission does not tackle issues central to the concept of 
minimum core even with regard to the rights to food and housing. In principle, it has recognised the 
State obligation to fulfil,214 yet it does not identify the obligation to provide minimum essential levels 
of the rights to food and housing. It could have stated the obligation to provide minimum essential 
levels of these rights as a matter of principle, but since it fails to state the principle, it is not clear 
whether states have minimum obligations, core or otherwise, with respect to their obligation to 
fulfil, especially their sub-obligation to provide. Unlike the CESCR, the Commission has limited itself 
to the obligations to respect and protect only. For this reason, Chirwa rightly observes that the 
Commission’s view in the Ogoniland case reflects ‘a misunderstanding of the concept of minimum 
core obligations’.215   
4.6.1.2 Core content: The Pretoria Declaration 
The Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Pretoria Declaration) was adopted 
after the African Commission’s decision in the Ogoniland case. The Commission considers the 
Declaration a soft law instrument.216 The Declaration is the outcome of a seminar that the 
Commission organised in Pretoria from 13 to 17 September 2004.217 One of the objectives of the 
seminar was to specify the nature of state obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights guaranteed in the African Charter.218 Later, the African Commission passed a resolution 
adopting the ‘Declaration of the Pretoria Seminar on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Africa’.219  
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The Pretoria Declaration specifies that ‘States parties have an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, 
at the very least, the minimum essential levels of each of the economic, social and cultural rights 
contained in the African Charter’.220 This requirement obviously comes from the CESCR’s general 
comment on state obligations.221 While the Declaration uses the CESCR’s definition of ‘minimum core 
obligation’, it eschews using these terms. It puts more emphasis on the content of the rights rather 
than on the obligations of states. Thus, it identifies the core content of each economic, social and 
cultural right expressly guaranteed in the African Charter.222 It recognises that some rights such as 
the rights to food, housing, and social security are implied from expressly guaranteed Charter 
rights.223 However, the Declaration does not specify the core content of such implied rights.  
The Pretoria Declaration makes recommendations to states and other stakeholders.224 However, it is 
not clear if any of these recommendations correspond to the core content of rights specified in the 
Declaration. For example, states should adopt national action plans for the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights.225 According to the CESCR, adopting a national strategy or a plan 
of action is one of the core obligations corresponding to most rights as discussed above. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration does not clearly identify the adoption of a national strategy as part of 
the core of any right or state obligation in regard to that right. 
The Pretoria Declaration focuses on the core content of rights. In contrast, the general comments of 
the CESCR identify core obligations instead, except with respect to the right to food.226  A comparison 
of the Pretoria Declaration with the general comments of the CESCR reveals that there are some 
common elements. One may argue that the sources of the Pretoria Declaration include the general 
comments of the CESCR. For example, the Declaration provides that the right to health under Article 
16 of the African Charter entails ‘[a]ccess to basic shelter, housing and sanitation and adequate 
supply of safe and potable water’.227 This is a verbatim reproduction of one of the core obligations 
from the CESCR’s general comment on the right to health.228 However, the Declaration as a whole is 
not a mere reproduction and consolidation of the content of the CESCR’s general comments in 
regard to core obligations. One may still submit that what the CESCR considers core obligations to a 
certain degree overlaps with what the African Commission considers core content, at least in the 
Pretoria Declaration.  
In sum, the African Commission identified ‘minimum obligations’ or at least referred to ‘minimum 
core’ in passing in the Ogoniland case. However, it has not made such identification or reference in 
later cases where it found a violation of economic, social and cultural rights for similar reasons. 
Likewise, the Commission does not seem to follow its Ogoniland rulings in developing the Pretoria 
Declaration. Since the Declaration does not deal with the obligation to respect as a core content of 
any particular right, one may argue that the Declaration has no seeds from the Ogoniland case. One 
may also wonder whether the Declaration has influenced later developments, particularly the 
Nairobi Principles. The Declaration deals with core content. Some core content in the Declaration 
corresponds to some core obligations in the CESCR’s general comments. From this perspective, one 
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may wonder how the minimum core obligations adopted in the Nairobi Principles are related to core 
content of the Pretoria Declaration and to core obligations identified by the CESCR. I will discuss 
minimum core obligations under the Nairobi Principles and examine their relationship with other 
instruments below.  
4.6.1.3 Minimum core obligations: The Nairobi Principles 
The Pretoria Declaration recommends that the African Commission elaborate ‘principles and 
guidelines on economic, social and cultural rights and establish a working group for this purpose’.229 
According to this recommendation, the African Commission has developed the Nairobi Principles and 
launched them in 2011. The Nairobi Principles define the concept of minimum core obligations. 
Moreover, the Principles identify and list minimum core obligations corresponding to each right 
expressly or impliedly guaranteed in the African Charter.  
As noted above, a clear relationship between the rulings in the Ogoniland case and the Pretoria 
Declaration is not apparent. On the other hand, there are elements in the Nairobi Principles that are 
traceable in the Ogoniland case as well as in the Pretoria Declaration. The Ogoniland case identifies 
minimum duties to respect and protect citizens from the destruction and/or contamination of food 
sources.230 This obligation is affirmed as a minimum core obligation with regard to the right to food in 
the Nairobi Principles.231 As a result, the Nairobi Principles incorporate rules laid down in the 
Ogoniland case. However, the Nairobi Principles diverge from the practice of the CESCR on this point. 
As discussed above, the CESCR does not specify the obligation to respect as a core obligation with 
respect to the right to food. 
The Nairobi Principles also incorporate elements of the Pretoria Declaration. They emphasise that 
‘States parties have an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum 
essential levels of each of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the African Charter’.232 
Some minimum core obligations under the Nairobi Principles are taken from the core content of 
rights identified in the Pretoria Declaration. An example is the ‘immunisation against major infectious 
diseases’. The Nairobi Principles identify this item as one of the minimum core obligations relating to 
the right to health.233 Under the Pretoria Declaration, ‘immunisation against major infectious 
diseases’ is a core content of the right to health.234 As already noted, the Pretoria Declaration does 
not identify the minimum core obligations for each right. 
Therefore, some elements of the Nairobi Principles are traceable in earlier documents of the 
Commission. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the main source of the Nairobi Principles is the 
general comments of the CESCR. This is clear from the numerous references in an earlier draft and 
the similarity of the texts. Moreover, by 2011 when the African Commission adopted the Nairobi 
Principles, the CESCR had already identified core obligations corresponding to most rights in the 
ICESCR. Thus, a comparison of minimum core obligations in the Nairobi Principles with core 
obligations in the general comments of the CESCR may shed light on some issues, especially on points 
of divergence between the CESCR and the African Commission.  
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Concerning the choice of terms, the African Commission identifies ‘minimum core obligations’ in the 
Nairobi Principles.235 Unlike the Pretoria Declaration, the Nairobi Principles do not identify the 
content of rights. Rather, the Commission focuses on the content of obligations in the Nairobi 
Principles. It refers to two other related phrases. These are ‘minimum core content’ and ‘minimum 
essential levels’. The Commission appears to use these phrases interchangeably. It is submitted that 
minimum core content or minimum essential levels of a right are achieved when a state carries out 
the minimum core obligations corresponding to that right. Unlike the list of minimum core 
obligations, the Commission does not provide a list of minimum core content or minimum essential 
levels. 
The Commission’s choice of terms can be examined from the perspective of the CESCR’s practice. The 
CESCR has apparently shifted from minimum-core-obligation language to core-obligation language as 
discussed above. In contrast, the African Commission identifies and describes ‘minimum core 
obligations’. These are summarised in Table 2. The Commission does not use the term ‘core 
obligation’. Thus, there is a clear mismatch in the use of terms. The remainder of this section deals 
with meaning, content and characteristics of ‘minimum core obligations’ identified by the African 
Commission in the Nairobi Principles. I will refer to the practice of the CESCR to show points of 
convergence as well as points of divergence. 
4.6.2 Meaning of minimum core obligation 
The Commission defines the ‘minimum core obligation’ as ‘the obligation of the State to ensure that 
no significant number of individuals is deprived of the essential elements of a particular right’.236 This 
is similar with the CESCR’s definition adopted in its general comment on state obligations.237 Like the 
CESCR, the African Commission does not specify the exact number of persons considered to be 
‘significant’, thus it is not easy to tell when a state fails. For example, of the estimated 108 million 
people in Ethiopia,238 close to eight million people require critical humanitarian care according to an 
assessment of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.239 A similar 
estimate by the World Vision disclosed that around eight million people need food or cash 
assistance.240  Are eight million people (around 7% of the population) significant in number? The 
Commission is not clear on how many people it considers a ‘significant number of individuals’. 
Irrespective of the lack of clarity, defining the minimum core obligation in terms of the number of 
deprived is problematic. As discussed above, it does not matter whether the Commission provides 
the exact figure or not. In principle, it should not require the suffering of millions to constitute a 
violation. The failure of a state to carry out its minimum core obligations even in respect to one 
single individual should be considered a violation.  
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Table 2: Summary of minimum core obligations in the Nairobi Principles: A comparison with the 
ICESCR 
No Charter Rights 
Minimum Core Obligations 
(Nairobi Principles) 
Core Obligations 
(General Comments of CESCR) 
1 Right to  
 
Work 
 
[Article 15] 
▪ prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour  
▪ right to freedom of association  
▪ protection against dismissal 
 
  ▪ access to employment 
▪ establishing minimum wages  
▪ prohibition of harassment  
▪ minimum standards for conditions of 
work  
▪ national strategy and plan of action  
▪ non-discrimination and equal treatment 
▪ combat gender discrimination 
2 Right to  
 
Health  
 
[Article 16] 
▪ essential drugs to all 
▪ education and access to information 
▪ non-discrimination 
▪ essential drugs 
▪ education and access to information 
▪ non-discrimination 
▪ universal immunisation against 
major infectious diseases; 
▪ control epidemic and endemic 
diseases 
  
 ▪ minimum essential food  
▪ basic shelter, water and sanitation 
▪ access to facilities, services, goods and 
information  
▪ prohibition of harmful practices  
▪ Safe abortions and post-abortion care  
▪ essential medicines, equipment and 
technologies 
▪ national strategy and plan of action  
▪  equitable distribution 
▪ access to effective remedies  
3 Right to 
 
Education 
 
[Article 17(1)] 
▪ primary education for all;  ▪ primary education for all  
▪ Elimination/reduction of the costs of 
attending primary school 
 
  ▪ appropriate educational objectives  
▪ free choice of education 
▪ national educational strategy 
▪ non-discrimination  
4 Right to 
Protection of 
the Family 
[Article 18] 
▪ entry into marriage with consent 
▪ abolition of laws and practices 
affecting the choice of a spouse 
▪ Prohibition of child marriage 
[the CESCR has not identified core 
obligations] 
5 Right to  
Housing 
[Articles 14, 16 
& 18(1)] 
▪ basic shelter for everybody 
▪ protection against and refraining 
from forced evictions; 
▪ ensuring security of tenure 
[the CESCR has not identified core 
obligations] 
6 Right to 
 
 Social 
Security 
 
[Articles 4, 5, 6, 
▪ minimum essential level of benefits ▪ minimum essential level of benefits  
 ▪ non-interference in existing social 
security schemes  
▪ taking steps to implement social security 
schemes 
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15, 16 & 18] ▪ national strategy and plan of action  
▪ non-discrimination  
▪ monitoring level of realization 
7 Right to 
 Food 
[Articles 4, 16 & 
22] 
▪ mitigating and alleviating hunger  ▪ mitigating and alleviating hunger 
▪ preventing destruction of food  
▪ avoiding destruction of food 
▪ avoid using food as a political tool 
 
8 Right to 
 
Water and 
Sanitation 
 
Articles 4, 5, 15, 
16, 22 & 24 
▪ minimum essential amount of water 
▪ access to water facilities/services; 
▪ minimum essential amount of water  
▪ access to water facilities/services  
▪ avoid using water as a political tool   
 ▪ personal security while accessing water  
▪ low-cost targeted water programmes  
▪ access to sanitation  
▪ national strategy and plan of action 
▪ non-discrimination  
▪ equitable distribution   
▪ monitoring level of realization  
Another element of the Commission’s definition is the provision of ‘essential elements’ of a right. 
These terms are slightly different from the terms ‘minimum essential levels’ used by the CESCR.241 It 
is submitted that the Commission’s definition has a wider scope. Like the CESCR’s definition, 
‘essential elements’ include the provision of minimum levels of a right. That is, a state must provide, 
for example, the minimum amount of food an individual needs to survive. Like the CESCR, the 
Commission does not set the minimum requirements of a particular right. As discussed above, it may 
not be easy to determine a minimum requirement given the differences among states in terms of 
several factors such as climate, resources and cultural attitudes.  
The Commission usually frames its findings in general terms. For example, in its concluding 
observation on Ethiopia adopted in 2015, the Commission expressed its concern about a section of 
the population who ‘lack access to basic amenities such as food, health care, education, housing and 
employment’.242 The Commission reaches this conclusion without determining, for example, what 
constitutes ‘basic food’. Nor does it indicate the number of people deprived of ‘basic amenities’. In 
contrast, it must be noted, the Inter-American Court determines the minimum amount of water a 
person needs in a day as discussed above.243  
Sometimes, the Commission hints at the minimum requirements. For example, in the same 
concluding observations on Ethiopia, it quantified the deprivation with regard to the right to work. 
The Commission does not require that the minimum core obligations relating to the right to work 
include the obligation to ensure access to employment.244 Nevertheless, it indicated that Ethiopia’s 
performance was not adequate because of a ‘high rate of unemployment which in urban areas is 
officially 17.5 percent for 2011/2012’.245 The Commission does not set an acceptable rate of 
unemployment by reference to what economists call a natural rate of unemployment.246 This rate is 
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somewhere between three and five per cent.247 Indeed, the unemployment of 17.5% is very high if 
the Commission made two assumptions: that states have the obligation to ensure access to 
employment; and that they must bring the unemployment rate down to its natural rate. Even in the 
absence of such an assumption, the Commission implies that there is a violation of the right to work 
under the African Charter if a state experiences an unemployment rate of 17.5% or above. 
The compondent of ‘essential elements’ in the Commission’s definition also includes items other 
than the provision of minimum levels. These items include minimum core obligations identified by 
the African Commission, which has identified minimum core obligations for almost all rights 
guaranteed explicitly or implicitly in the African Charter (See the summary in Table 2).248 Under the 
minimum core obligations corresponding to the right to work, for example, the Commission identifies 
three minimum core obligations: (a) prohibition of slavery and forced labour,249 (b) the right to 
freedom of association,250 and (c) the protection against dismissal from employment.251 The 
Commission considers that these obligations represent ‘essential elements’ of the right to work. 
However, the essential nature of some of the elements identified by the Commission is questionable 
(I will return to the discussion of this issue below).  I begin discussing the identified elements, that is, 
the content of the minimum core obligations. 
4.6.3 Content of minimum core obligation 
By ‘content’, I mean the items or the elements identified as minimum core obligations. Since the 
main source of the Nairobi Principles is the general comments of the CESCR, I will discuss the content 
of ‘minimum core obligations’ identified by the African Commission with a reference to the ‘core 
obligations’ identified by the CESCR. They are summarised in Table 2. As mentioned above, the 
African Commission and the CESCR have the same views on some elements, but differ on others. I 
begin with points of convergence. 
4.6.3.1 Converging practice of the African Commission and the CESCR  
For some rights, particularly the rights to health, education, food, social security, and to water and 
sanitation, the African Commission considers minimum core obligations the same elements already 
identified by the CESCR as core obligations. Regarding the right to health, the Commission considers 
that states have minimum core obligations under the African Charter to provide essential drugs and 
to provide education and information about health problems. It emphasises that states must ensure 
‘the provision of essential drugs to all those who need them, as periodically defined under the WHO 
Action Programme on Essential Drugs, and particularly anti-retroviral drugs’.252 The Commission 
specifically requires the provision of anti-retroviral drugs although the CESCR does not mention any 
particular drugs.  
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The African Charter guarantees an unqualified right to education.253 The Charter does not expressly 
require states to provide free and compulsory primary education. In contrast, the ICESCR expressly 
guarantees the right to free and compulsory education.254 On top of this express requirement, the 
CESCR specifies that the provision of primary education is among the core obligations.255 In line with 
this practice, the African Commission considers that states have a minimum core obligation to 
provide primary education for all. It stresses that states must ‘ensure that all children enjoy their 
right to free and compulsory primary education’.256  
The African Charter does not expressly guarantee the right to food. In line with its holding in the 
Ogoniland case, the Commission derives the right to food from expressly guaranteed Charter 
rights.257 The Commission confirms that ‘the right to food is inherent in the Charter’s protection of 
the rights to life, health and the right to economic, social and cultural development’.258 In relation to 
the implied right to food, the Commission considers that states have a minimum core obligation to 
ensure ‘the right of everyone to be free from hunger and to mitigate and alleviate hunger’.259 This is 
in line with the practice of the CESCR.260           
Unlike the ICESCR, the African Charter does not expressly guarantee the right to social security. The 
African Commission acknowledges the textual silence of the Charter. Nevertheless, it derives this 
right ‘from a joint reading of a number of rights guaranteed under the Charter including (but not 
limited to) the rights to life, dignity, liberty, work, health, food, protection of the family and the right 
to the protection of the aged and the disabled’.261 After deriving the right to social security from 
other provisions of the Charter, the Commission explains that states have a minimum core obligation 
to ensure ‘access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits’.262 
As already noted, the Commission has taken this formulation verbatim from the CESCR.263  
The right to water and sanitation is another implied right. The African Charter does not expressly 
guarantee this right. The African Commission derives the right to water and sanitation from ‘the 
rights to life, dignity, work, food, health, economic, social and cultural development and to a 
satisfactory environment’.264 In line with the practice of the CESCR, the Commission explains that 
states have a minimum core obligation to ensure ‘access to the minimum essential amount of water 
that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic use, including preventing disease, together with 
access to adequate sanitation’.265 States also have a minimum core obligation to ensure ‘physical 
access to water facilities or services’.266 Unlike the Inter-American Court, the African Commission 
does not define the ‘minimum essential amount of water’ in terms of litres or other units of 
measure.267 
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4.6.3.2 Diverging practice of the African Commission and the CESCR 
The African Commission differs from the CESCR on many elements. As indicated in Table 2, one 
identifies more points of divergence than points of convergence. For some rights, the Commission 
omits some elements from core obligations identified by the CESCR. For other rights, the Commission 
adds elements, which are not considered core obligation according to the practice of the CESCR. The 
major area of omission relates to cross-cutting obligations. These are obligations that are relevant to 
all rights. As discussed above (sections 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4), the CESCR considers that some core 
obligations (ie, the obligations to adopt a national strategy, to prohibit discrimination and inequitable 
distribution, to provide remedies, and to monitor the implementation of rights) are applicable to 
most rights. For the Commission, however, these are not minimum core obligations.268 The 
Commission still emphasises the importance of these cross-cutting obligations: it requires states to 
devise and periodically review national plans and policies for each protected right ‘on the basis of a 
participatory and transparent process’;269 it relates the obligation of adopting national plans and 
policies to the obligation of monitoring the implementation of rights, explaining that the ‘plans and 
policies should include information on indicators, time-frames and benchmarks, by which progress 
can be closely monitored’;270 it underlines that states have the obligation to provide effective 
domestic remedies which include establishing legal aid schemes for vulnerable and marginalised 
groups;271 and it stresses that ‘any discrimination against individuals in their access to or enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights on any of the prohibited grounds is a violation of the African 
Charter’.272  
Another omission relates to elements of core obligations corresponding to each right. The African 
Commission drops some elements from the CESCR’s list of core obligations. For example, The CESCR 
considers that the obligations to ensure access to the minimum essential food and ‘to basic shelter, 
housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water’ are core obligations with 
respect to the right to health.273 These are also part of the core content of the same right in the 
Pretoria Declaration.274 In the Nairobi Principles, however, these obligations are not among the 
minimum core obligations. By omitting these core obligations, the Commission at times gives the 
impression that ‘minimum core obligation’ and ‘core obligation’ do not mean the same thing. The 
obligations corresponding to the right to social security may illustrate this point.  
The CESCR identifies six core obligations with respect to the right to social security.275 The African 
Commission reproduces only one of these six obligations in the Nairobi Principles. This is shortened 
in Table 2 as the obligation to provide a ‘minimum essential level of benefits’. The Commission 
reproduces this obligation verbatim from the general comment of the CESCR.276 It emphasises that 
states have a minimum core obligation to ensure ‘access to a social security scheme that provides a 
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minimum essential level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at 
least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most 
basic forms of education’.277 It omits the remaining five obligations. In addition, both the Commission 
and the CESCR recognise that there are obligations that are not core. Like the CESCR, for example, 
the African Commission emphasises that states have the obligation to take ‘effective measures to 
fully realise the right of all persons to social security’.278 
Compared to the practice of the CESCR as indicated in Table 2, one finds that three layers of state 
obligations would apparently emerge, although the Commission does not expressly use these layers. 
It appears that the inner layer is minimum core obligations (the obligation to provide a minimum 
essential level of benefits). The middle layer is core obligations (five core obligations identified by the 
CESCR but omitted by the Commission). The remaining obligations may form the outer layer 
(obligations that do not fall under (minimum) core obligations). In other words, the minimum core 
obligations identified in the Nairobi Principles are part of, but fewer than, the CESCR’s core 
obligations. Terminologically, this reading seems to hold. Since the term ‘minimum’ qualifies the 
term ‘core’, a minimum core appears to be within the core or at least part of the latter. Moreover, 
one may wonder whether the Commission considered the African regional context. From almost all 
rights, the Commission omits some elements of core obligations specified by the CESCR. It is not clear 
whether the Commission has made the omissions because states in Africa are developing countries. 
Regarding the rights to work and culture, the African Commission drops all core obligations identified 
by the CESCR. It specifies new minimum core obligations in relation to the right to work as indicated 
in Table 2. It identifies none for the right to culture. Similarly, the Commission does not specify 
minimum core obligations in relation to the right to property. The CESCR does not identify core 
obligations for the right to property either, but its reason is understandable because the ICESCR does 
not guarantee the right to property. That is, the Nairobi Principles do not identify corresponding 
minimum core obligations for all economic, social and cultural rights expressly guaranteed in the 
African Charter. In contrast, the Pretoria Declaration includes some core content of these rights. An 
example is peaceful ‘enjoyment of property and protection from arbitrary eviction’.279 Two general 
comments of the CESCR identify core obligations corresponding to cultural rights under Article 15 of 
the ICESCR.280 The Pretoria Declaration also highlights the core content of the right to culture under 
Article 17 of the African Charter. Despite these precedents, the Nairobi Principles do not identify 
minimum core obligations corresponding to property and cultural rights. The omission raises the 
issue relating to the scope of application of minimum core obligations. One may argue that the 
concept is not applicable to all rights as adopted in the Nairobi Principles. Only some rights have 
corresponding minimum core obligations while others do not.  
The African Commission also deviates from the practice of the CESCR by adding new elements that 
are not identified as core obligations by the CESCR. As indicated in Table 2, for almost all rights, the 
Commission specifies minimum core obligations that are not identified by the CESCR. With respect to 
the right to health, for example, the minimum core obligations to ensure ‘universal immunisation 
against major infectious diseases’ and to ‘control epidemic and endemic diseases’ are peculiar to the 
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Nairobi Principles.281 The CESCR recognises that states have the obligation to ‘provide immunization 
against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community’.282 It also recognises the obligation 
to ‘take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases’.283 However, the 
CESCR does not consider them core obligations. 
The Commission does not explain why its new minimum core obligations are essential. From the 
identified new elements, the essential nature of the new elements is questionable. Some examples 
can be illustrative. Article 15 of the African Charter guarantees the right to work. In relation to this 
right, the African Commission explains that states have minimum core obligations to prohibit slavery 
and forced labour and to ensure the right to freedom of association.284 These obligations clearly 
correspond to other rights guaranteed in the Charter, namely, the prohibition of slavery (Article 5) 
and the right to freedom of association (Article 10).   
Article 5 of the Charter provides that ‘All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
slavery [...] shall be prohibited’. The Commission has found a violation of this provision in Malawi 
African Association and Others v Mauritania.285 It has held that ‘there was a violation of Article 5 of 
the Charter due to practices analogous to slavery and [...] that unremunerated work is tantamount to 
a violation of the right to respect for the dignity inherent in the human being’.286 Article 5 of the 
Charter does not expressly deal with forced labour. It can still be understood as prohibiting forced 
labour, particularly in light of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘No one shall be required to perform 
forced or compulsory labour’.287  
Article 10 of the Charter guarantees the right to freedom of association. It provides that ‘Every 
individual shall have the right to free association’. Article 10 is brief compared to Article 22 of the 
ICCPR. The latter expressly states that the right to freedom of association includes ‘the right to form 
and join trade unions’. Article 10 of the African Charter does not contain such an explicit reference. It 
does not contain a provision similar to Article 8 of the ICESCR, which requires states to ensure the 
‘right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice’. It is submitted that 
this provision includes the protection of trade union rights. This is because the right to ‘form and join 
trade unions is merely a special case of freedom of association’.288  
A violation of the right to dignity or a failure to prohibit slavery (Article 5) may lead to a violation of 
the right to work (Article 15) since human rights are interdependent. Slavery by definition nullifies 
the right to work because slaves have no choice to work or not to work and derive income from their 
labour.  Similarly, a violation of the right to freedom of association, especially trade union rights, 
(Article 10) affects the enjoyment of the right to work (Article 15). However, such correlation does 
not make one right a core part of the other right. Therefore, the Commission merely duplicates rights 
recognised in the Charter when it identifies the obligation to prohibit slavery and forced labour and 
the obligation to ensure the right to freedom of association as minimum core obligations relating to 
the right to work. 
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Another example is the right to food. In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission explains that states 
have a minimum core obligation to refrain from and ‘protect against destruction and/or 
contamination of food sources’.289 This obligation is traceable in the Ogoniland case, where the 
Commission has emphasised that the respondent State ‘should not destroy or contaminate food 
sources. It should not allow private parties to destroy or contaminate food sources’.290 In the 
Ogoniland case, the respondent State not only failed to prevent but also participated in the 
destruction of farmlands, crops and animals.291 These are not only food sources. They are also 
subject of ownership although the Commission did not find a separate violation of Article 14 (right to 
property) in the Ogoniland case.  
In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission explains that each state has an obligation to ensure 
peaceful enjoyment of property by protecting ‘the enjoyment in all its forms, from interference by 
third parties as well as its own agents’.292 If one accepts that things such as farmlands, crops and farm 
animals are property, the destruction of such things, whether by state agents or third parties, is an 
interference with the enjoyment of the right to property. Therefore, it would be a duplication of the 
right to property when the Commission specifies the obligation to refrain from and protect against 
destruction of food sources as a minimum core obligation of states in relation to the right to food.        
4.6.4 Characteristics of minimum core obligations 
The characteristics of minimum core obligations in the Nairobi Principles and those of core 
obligations in the CESCR’s general comments are more or less similar. Like the CESCR, the African 
Commission considers that minimum core obligations are immediate; that states should give them 
priority; and that they are not subject to suspension during a state of emergency.    
In the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission explains that minimum core obligations are 
immediate:  
Despite the obligation to progressively realise economic, social and cultural rights, some of the 
obligations imposed on States parties to the African Charter are immediate upon ratification of the 
Charter. These obligations include but are not limited to […] minimum core obligations.293  
Like the CESCR, the African Commission describes the immediate nature of the minimum core 
obligations in contrast to progressive realisation. This means that states should perform such 
obligations forthwith. The immediate nature of an obligation cannot be dissociated from the 
availability of resources. Obligations subject to progressive realisation are not immediate mainly 
because of resource scarcity. The Nairobi Principles explain that a minimum core obligation ‘exists 
regardless of the availability of resources’.294 However, this does not mean resources are not 
required to carry out these obligations. As the African Commission explains, when ‘a State claims that 
it has failed to realise minimum essential levels of economic, social and cultural rights it must be able 
to show that it has allocated all available resources towards the realisation of these rights and 
particularly towards the realisation of the minimum core content’.295 That is, the Commission 
requires that resources be allocated to implement minimum core obligations. Therefore, states that 
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fail to perform their minimum core obligations violate these rights irrespective of whether they have 
resources or not.  
The African Commission further explains that when ‘the State does suffer from demonstrable 
resource constraints, caused by whatever reason, including economic adjustment, the State should 
still implement measures to ensure the minimum essential levels of each right to members of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’.296 The Commission defines members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups. They ‘are people who have faced and/or continue to face significant 
impediments to their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights’.297 Given the breadth of this 
definition, one may argue, a state facing demonstrable resource constraints does not have fewer 
minimum core obligations or a lighter burden of proof than other states do. This position of the 
African Commission is strict in contrast to that of the CESCR. The latter appears to accept 
justifications for failing to carry out core obligations it has identified.298  
Priority is another characteristic of minimum core obligations. While the CESCR emphasises that core 
obligations should be given priority, it does not clearly identify other obligations over which core 
obligations have precedence as discussed above. In contrast, the African Commission is clearer in the 
Nairobi Principles. Even during times of demonstrable resource constraints, states should ‘implement 
measures to ensure the minimum essential levels of each right to members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, particularly by prioritising them in all interventions’.299 In other words, states 
should give priority to members of vulnerable groups. States should first perform minimum core 
obligations corresponding to the rights of members of these groups before proceeding to others. 
Here, it seems, individuals who are not members of vulnerable groups are assumed to have the 
means necessary for enjoying minimum levels of their economic, social and cultural rights. 
The African Commission emphasises the priority of minimum core obligations; however, this does 
not mean that neglecting other obligations is tolerable. The Nairobi Principles underscore that: 
‘While the obligation to realise the minimum core content of the rights means that the state should 
prioritise the realisation of the rights for the poorest and most vulnerable in society it does not 
remove the obligation to progressively realise the rights for all individuals’.300 The fact that a state 
party gives priority to minimum core obligations is not a defence for failing to implement progressive 
realisation obligations.     
The African Commission considers that minimum core obligations are non-derogable.301 In principle, 
this description makes them applicable at all times. That is, states cannot suspend them during a 
state of emergency.302 In this regard, the Commission adopts the CESCR’s description of core 
obligations. While there is no harm in adopting the CESCR’s view, it seems that the Commission fails 
to consider the text of the African Charter and its own jurisprudence in adopting this view.  
All rights under the African Charter are non-derogable. This point is clear from the text of the African 
Charter and the jurisprudence of the African Commission. The African Charter does not contain a 
                                                          
296 Nairobi Principles, para 17. 
297 Nairobi Principles, para 1(e). 
298 cf Statement on Available Resources, para 6. 
299 Nairobi Principles, para 17. 
300 Nairobi Principles, para 17. 
301 Nairobi Principles, para 17. 
302 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The Development of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2015) 4 International Human Rights Law 
Review 147—193, 152—153. 
 171 
derogation clause. This is a problem in the Charter according to some commentators.303 Ouguergouz 
argues that the absence of a derogation clause cannot be interpreted as a prohibition of a state from 
suspending rights during a state of emergency.304 However, the African Commission has interpreted 
the absence of a derogation clause to mean a prohibition of derogation in a number of cases.305 That 
is, all state obligations under the African Charter are non-derogable. It does not matter whether such 
obligations relate to economic, social and cultural rights or civil and political rights. As a result, non-
derogability does not distinguish minimum core obligations from other kinds of obligations under the 
African Charter. Therefore, this description does not have any significance. 
4.6.5 Minimum core obligations vis-à-vis levels of obligations  
The African Commission has explained in the Ogoniland case that all rights under the African Charter 
generate obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil.306 This framework of analysis is in line 
with the practice of the CESCR, except for the obligation to promote. According to the CESCR, the 
obligations to promote, facilitate, and provide are part of the obligation to fulfil.307 In the Nairobi 
Principles, the African Commission does not identify minimum core obligations relating to all rights 
under the African Charter. It exclusively deals with economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed 
explicitly or implicitly under the African Charter. The minimum core obligations identified in relation 
to these rights can be examined from the analytical framework of the obligations to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil.   
The African Commission does not frame all minimum core obligations it identifies along these four 
levels of obligations. Yet one can find an item for each level. For example, with regard to the right to 
housing, the Commission follows its rulings in the Ogoniland case and explains that states have a 
minimum core obligation to ‘[r]efrain from and protect against forced evictions from home(s) and 
land, including through legislation’.308 It makes a similar statement in relation to the right to food, 
declaring that states have a minimum core obligation to ‘[r]efrain from and protect against 
destruction and/or contamination of food sources’.309 Thus, the obligation to refrain from forced 
eviction or destruction of food sources is an obligation to respect while the obligation to protect 
individuals against forced eviction or destruction of food sources is an obligation to protect.  
An example of the obligation to promote is found under the right to health. The Commission explains 
that the minimum core obligations of the right to health include, among other things, the obligation 
to provide ‘education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the 
community, including methods of preventing and controlling them’.310 The Commission requires 
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states to raise awareness. Incidentally, the Commission reproduces this formulation verbatim from 
the CESCR’s general comment on the right to health.311 However, the CESCR does not consider the 
obligation to provide education and access to information to be a core obligation in relation to the 
right to health. The obligation to fulfil, especially the sub-obligation to provide, is implicit in a number 
of minimum core obligations. For example, the Commission emphasises that states have the 
minimum core obligation to ensure ‘at the very least basic shelter for everybody’.312 It is not possible 
to ensure basic shelter for everyone unless states provide shelter for those who do not have their 
own means. 
The minimum core obligations identified by the Commission consist of obligations to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil. However, the Commission does not apply this analysis to all rights. For 
some rights, the Commission identifies the obligation to fulfil only. An example is the right to social 
security. As noted above, states have the minimum core obligation to ensure ‘access to a social 
security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits’.313 For this right, the 
Commission does not identify minimum core obligations to respect and protect. For other rights, the 
Commission does not specify the obligation to fulfil. For example, it does not identify a minimum 
core obligation to fulfil in relation to the right to work. Therefore, the Commission’s minimum core 
obligations are hotchpoth of items when considered against the framework of obligations to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil. 
Each right is different in nature, which may explain why minimum core obligations relating to some 
rights do not contain all levels of obligations. As Koch argues, ‘there are rights which do not lend 
themselves easily to grading’ along the respect-protect-fulfil framework.314 She argues that it is 
hardly possible to identify state obligations to provide in relation to trade union rights.315 However, 
the Commission’s inconsistency in identifying different levels of obligations as minimum core 
obligations does not seem to arise from the specific nature of a particular right. In relation to the 
right to social security, for example, the Commission does not consider the obligation to respect 
among minimum core obligations – although such an obligation is identifiable. As the CESCR 
emphasises, states have a core obligation to ‘respect existing social security schemes’.316 Therefore, it 
is not clear why the Commission considers one level of obligation (eg, the obligation to respect) in 
relation to one right (eg, the right to food) but not in relation to other rights (eg, the right to social 
security) to be a minimum core obligation. Defining a minimum core obligation as inclusive of the 
obligations to respect and protect is self-defeating, as discussed above (Section 4.2.1). By adopting 
this definition, the Commission allows states to tolerate deprivation.  
Another issue relates to the scope of application. Is the concept of the minimum core applicable to 
all rights guaranteed under the African Charter? In the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission 
identifies minimum core obligations corresponding to economic, social and cultural rights. It is not 
clear if the Commission is going to do the same for other Charter rights (ie, civil, political and group 
rights). If minimum core obligations include the obligations to respect and protect, it is submitted, 
the concept is applicable to all Charter rights. This is because all Charter rights engender the 
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obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil as the Commission has held in the Ogoniland 
case.317 Such a conclusion, however, defeats the purpose of identifying minimum core obligations. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the concept of the minimum core in the literature and the practice of 
treaty bodies (the CESCR, the European Committee, the Inter-American Commission, the Inter-
American Court and the African Commission). The concept represents irreducible minimum elements 
of economic social and cultural rights, which are minimum essential levels or minimum core content 
of rights. The obligations of states to ensure the minimum core content of a right are minimum core 
obligations. These obligations exist irrespective of resource availability. In practice, the CESCR and 
the African Commission have adopted the concept of the minimum core. The CESCR was the first to 
introduce the concept into its practice. The African Commission followed in the CESCR’s footsteps a 
decade later, however, they differ on the content and characteristics of state obligations.  
The CESCR identifies core obligations for almost all rights under the ICESCR. The core obligations 
relate to different rights, but have some elements common to core obligations corresponding to two 
or more rights. These include the obligations to adopt a national strategy, to ensure access to goods 
and services on a non-discriminatory basis, to monitor the realisation of the rights and to ensure 
access to remedies. It is not clear why these obligations are core with respect to some rights but not 
with respect to others. The CESCR does not expressly relate core obligations to members of 
vulnerable groups, although it does require that attention be paid to them. It requires that states 
discharge core obligations as a matter of priority. However, the point that core obligations have 
priority over other obligations does not strongly come out from the CESCR’s practice. The CESCR 
states that core obligations are of immediate effect. This effect seems to disappear when one 
considers that the CESCR accepts the justification of resource scarcity. Therefore, the characteristics 
and implications of core obligations have been watered down in the practice of the CESCR.  
Both the CESCR and the African Commission define minimum core obligations in terms of the 
number of individuals deprived of a minimum core content of each economic, social and cultural 
right. Both are yet to determine the number of individuals considered to be significant in concrete 
terms. This element of the definition gives the wrong perception, an implied approval of trampling 
some people’s rights if they are insignificant in number. Both the CESCR and the African Commission 
are yet to determine the minimum core content of each right in the way they determined (minimum) 
core obligations.  
The practice of the African Commission challenges the assumed universal content of rights. The 
Commission provides content, which is, at least in part, different from that identified by the CESCR. 
The African regional context may justify such differences. However, this justification would not be 
convincing since the national context in each state would have justified different minimum core 
obligations. The Commission clearly specifies that states should give priority to members of 
vulnerable groups. In addition, it does not accept any justification for a failure to carry out minimum 
core obligations. Therefore, the African Commission has adopted a stricter view of state obligations 
than the CESCR has developed. 
The African Commission has transplanted the concept of minimum core into the African Charter from 
the practice of the CESCR, making some changes in the process. It is not clear whether the changes 
                                                          
317 Ogoniland case, para 44. 
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are intentional and necessary due to the textual requirements of the African Charter or the reality in 
African countries, because the Commission does not give any explanation. Whichever change is made 
to the concept, the implication is clear: Economic, social and cultural rights do not have the same 
normative content under the ICESCR and the African Charter so far as the minimum core obligations 
clarify the normative content of rights. The changes are numerous, including terminological ones.  
The major change relates to the content. The Commission’s minimum core obligations at times differ 
from the CESCR’s core obligations in relation to a single right. Of course, the practice of both organs 
converges when the Commission takes items from the practice of the CESCR. The divergence occurs 
when the Commission leaves out items from the CESCR’s core obligations or when it identifies its 
own minimum core obligations. The Commission sometimes specifies other rights guaranteed in the 
African Charter as minimum core obligations, which is a mere duplication. In cases of duplication, the 
identification of minimum core obligations is not helpful to states and complainants because the 
duplication does not add clarity to the rights under the African Charter or to their corresponding 
state obligations.  
The divergence of interpretation has a serious consequence for different stakeholders, including the 
complainants, states and treaty bodies. The Commission’s interpretation may encourage forum 
shopping by the complainants. Almost all states parties to the African Charter are also parties to the 
ICESCR.318 It is submitted that states naturally tend to choose the less onerous interpretation if one 
right has different content under the ICESCR and the African Charter. The judicial organs such as the 
African Court have jurisdiction over both the African Charter and the ICESCR.319 The Commission’s 
interpretation puts the African Court in a difficult position. The African Court has to choose either the 
CESCR’s core obligations or the Commission’s minimum core obligations to the extent they are 
different. The Court usually follows the Commission’s interpretation. Still, nothing prohibits the Court 
from developing its own interpretation, which can be different from the Commission’s or the CESCR’s 
interpretations. 
 
 
                                                          
318 The exceptions are Botswana, Comoros, Mozambique and South Sudan. See 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en (accessed 21 December 
2018).  
319 African Court Protocol, arts 3 & 7. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed minimum core obligation as an exception to the concept of 
progressive realisation. Another exception to progressive realisation is non-discrimination. States 
have the obligation to ensure economic, social and cultural rights without discrimination on 
prohibited grounds. The prohibition of discrimination relates to the right to equality. In this chapter, I 
discuss equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.  
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are central to international human rights law.1 
Human rights treaties usually guarantee the enjoyment of rights they recognise without any 
discrimination on prohibited grounds.2 Treaty bodies have explained and further developed these 
principles. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) considers the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination peremptory norms (jus cogens).3 According to the European 
Committee of Social Rights (European Committee), the principles require states to pay particular 
attention to vulnerable groups.4 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
explained that the non-discrimination provision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) envisages a substantive conception of equality.5 Other treaty bodies also 
distinguish a formal from a substantive conception of equality in line with scholarly writings and 
theories.6 Scholars, however, do not agree on a single meaning of equality: equality is a contested 
concept that ‘has been given all forms of meanings and characteristics’.7 Some of the concerns of a 
substantive conception of equality overlap with state obligations to implement economic, social and 
cultural rights.8 Examining relevant aspects of substantive equality theories, the second section of 
this chapter argues that addressing the plight of vulnerable groups is common to the requirements of 
ensuring substantive equality and implementing economic, social and cultural rights. The section 
                                                          
1 The principle constitutes one of the rules of customary international law. See Malcolm N Shaw International Law (CUP 
2008) 275.  
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN 
Doc. A/6316 (1966); 993 UNTS 3, Art 2(2); See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted UN 
Doc.A/61/611, adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008, 2515 UNTS 3, Art 5; Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3, Art 2(2); African Charter, Art 
2; American Convention on Human Rights, adopted 21 November 1969 & entered into force 18 July 1978, OAS Treaty 
Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123, Art 1(1); 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Art 2(2). 
3 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 23 September 2003, para 101. 
4 See European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v the Czech Republic, Complaint No. 104/2014, para 112; European Roma 
Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria, Complaint No. 46/2007, para 45; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) v 
Ireland, Complaint No. 110/2014, 12 May 2017, para 140. 
5 CESCR, General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para. 2, of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, para 7. 
6 See Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 23 September 2003, paras 103 & 112. 
7 Matthew C R Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Clarendon Press 1995) 154. 
8 Sandra Fredman, ‘Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide’ (2005) 21 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 163 – 190, 164. 
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examines practice under the European Social Charter, the ICESCR and the American Convention on 
Human Rights along with its Protocol of San Salvador. The purpose of this section is to set a general 
background for the remaining sections on equality and non-discrimination under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter or Charter).9 
The African Charter guarantees economic, social and cultural rights along with civil, political and 
peoples’ rights. States have undertaken general obligations to give effect to the rights guaranteed in 
the Charter.10 The Charter does not distinguish state obligations corresponding to each category of 
rights. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or Commission) classifies state obligations into two: progressive 
and immediate obligations.11 I have discussed progressive realisation obligations in Chapter 2. The 
African Commission identifies a few immediate obligations.12 In this chapter, I will focus on only one 
such obligation – non-discrimination. The African Commission derives a non-discrimination obligation 
from the principles of equality and non-discrimination guaranteed in a number of provisions of the 
Charter.13 However, the scope of these provisions and their relationship are not clear. I will discuss 
that issue in the third section of this chapter. 
The African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court or Court) 
have interpreted the principles of equality and non-discrimination. How do the Commission and the 
Court define discrimination in their practice? How do they interpret prohibited grounds of 
discrimination? What criteria do they use to determine whether a distinction amounts to 
discrimination? Do they establish any relationship between the right to equality and the right to non-
discrimination? The fourth section of this chapter attempts to answer these questions by the practice 
relating to non-discrimination and equality provisions of the Charter. The Commission is older and 
has more experience than the Court. For this reason, the fourth and fifth sections of this chapter 
focus on the practice of the Commission. 
The African Commission adopts a substantive conception of equality, maintaining that the right to 
equality requires states to accord particular attention to members of vulnerable groups, to adopt 
temporary special measures in favour of them, and to modify social structures that constitute a 
barrier to their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.14 Who are members of vulnerable 
groups? What is the significance of identifying them for their enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights? What does it mean to pay particular attention to them? What are the purposes of 
temporary special measures? What are the implications of modifying social structures for the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by vulnerable groups? The fifth section attempts to 
answer these questions. I will make some concluding remarks in the sixth section. 
                                                          
9 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981 & came into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
10 African Charter, Art 1. 
11 African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter (Nairobi Principles), 2011, para 14. 
12 Immediate obligations ‘include but are not limited to the obligation to take steps, the prohibition of retrogressive steps, 
minimum core obligations and the obligation to prevent discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights’. Nairobi Principles, para 16.  
13 African Charter, Arts 2, 3, 18(3), 19 & 28. 
14 Nairobi Principles, paras 32—35. 
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5.2 General overview of substantive equality 
This section discusses a substantive conception of equality as distinguished from a formal conception 
of equality. The section argues that prioritising vulnerable groups, adopting affirmative action 
(temporary special measures), and modifying social structures at the root of inequality are central to 
a substantive conception of equality. The section begins with the discussion of theories of equality in 
general and focuses on substantive equality. The section also examines the extent to which the 
CESCR addresses the plight of vulnerable groups, and then checks whether the practice of the 
European Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American 
Court are similar to or different from that of the CESCR.  
5.2.1 Equality and non-discrimination: Some conceptions and theories  
Defining equality is not an easy task. It is ‘extraordinarily difficult to forge consensus regarding the 
proper definition of equality in any legal context’.15 As Dworkin notes, ‘[e]quality is a contested 
concept: people who praise or disparage it disagree about what it is they are praising or 
disparaging’.16 The concept is even dismissed as an empty idea, as Westen concludes: ‘Equality will 
cease to mystify—and cease to skew moral and political discourse—when people come to realize 
that it is an empty form having no substantive content of its own’.17 Still others emphasise that 
equality has more than one meaning.18 I will focus on formal and substantive conceptions of equality.  
5.2.1.1 Formal equality and non-discrimination 
Equality can mean ‘sameness of treatment or a prohibition on discrimination’.19 In this sense, it 
simply means non-discrimination.20 Thus, non-discrimination expresses equality from the negative 
point of view.21 This meaning is the most pervasive interpretation of the right to equality.22 This 
understanding of equality is similar to formal equality or the principle of equal treatment.23 Formal 
equality refers to a symmetrical treatment of individuals or groups in a similar situation.24 Its 
articulation is traced back to Aristotle’s formulation that ‘things that are alike should be treated alike, 
while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness’.25 The goal 
of formal equality is ‘to ensure that all are treated identically’.26 It is ‘concerned with ensuring that 
laws or policies do not impose disadvantages on individuals by treating them according to false 
stereotypes associated with irrelevant personal characteristics’.27  
                                                          
15 Paul Stancil, ‘Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice (2017) 102 Iowa Law Review 1633—1689, 1640. 
16 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press 2000) 2. 
17 Peter Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95/3 Harvard Law Review 537 – 596, 596. 
18 Nicholas Bamforth, Maleiha Malik, Colm O'Cinneide & Geoffrey Bindman, Discrimination Law: Theory & Context, Text and 
Materials (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 174. 
19 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20/1 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism 1- 23, 3. 
20 Mark Bell, ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination’ in Tamara K Hervey & Jeff Kenne, Economic and Social Rights 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart Publishing 2003) 92—94. 
21 Craven (n 7) 155. 
22 Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14/3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 712–738, 716. 
23 See Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 716; Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 2. 
24 Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Courts (Routledge 2015) 15. 
25 Aristotle, Ethica Nicoimachea V3 1131a-1131b (W Ross tr 1925), quoted in Westen (n 17) 543. 
26 Stancil (n 15) 1640. 
27 Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria and Emily Lawrence, ‘What’s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights 
Decisions’ (2004) 24 Supreme Court Law Review 104 – 136,105 – 106. 
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Scholars usually criticise formal equality as a limited way of achieving equality.28 According to 
Fineman, a formal conception of equality is limited since this conception of equality does not prohibit 
discrimination on all grounds.29 According to Fredman, it usually requires ‘active engagements with 
the political process’ to recognise a new prohibited ground of discrimination.30 Another reason for 
criticising formal equality lies in the assumption that ‘the same treatment is always appropriate’.31 
According to Fineman, formal equality ‘fails to take into account existing inequality of 
circumstances’.32 She argues that formal equality does not disturb ‘existing institutional 
arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage others’.33 Formal equality cannot achieve 
genuine equality. In addition, formal equality is also criticised for failing to address historical 
injustices. It is contrary to affirmative action that might generate remedies for past inequalities.34   
Finally, it would be difficult to find a breach of formal equality unless there is a perpetrator of 
discrimination.35 However, forms of discrimination are ‘frequently embedded in the structure of 
society, and cannot be attributed clearly to any one person’.36  
Despite these criticisms, a formal conception of equality is still relevant. This conception prohibits 
discrimination in the enjoyment of all rights including economic, social and cultural rights. This 
conception, however, is not capable of addressing the most egregious deprivation of economic, 
social and cultural rights.  
5.2.1.2 Substantive equality theories 
Equality theorists propose a substantive conception of equality to remedy the limitations of formal 
equality. There are as many versions of a substantive conception of equality out there as there are 
theorists. I limit my discussion to a selected few, discussing aspects of Fineman’s vulnerability theory, 
Fredman’s framework of analysis, and Parfit’s priority view, which are relevant to my later analysis of 
the practice of human rights bodies. I begin with the vulnerability theory.  
Fineman proposes vulnerability theory to analyse equality.37 The theory replaces a liberal subject 
with a vulnerable subject and considers vulnerability a human condition. Vulnerability, according to 
the theory, is universal, not limited to individuals for belonging to a particular group for reasons of 
their race, colour, language, and religion or similar other characteristics.38 Human beings are by 
nature vulnerable to harm, natural or artificial because ‘we are born, live and die within a fragile 
materiality’.39 The purpose of societal institutions is to provide protection against vulnerability. These 
institutions, private or public, are the creation of the state through law.40 They provide individuals 
with assets to withstand vulnerability,41 and distribute those assets.42 The assets may take different 
                                                          
28 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 2—5. 
29 Ibid 3. 
30 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 718. 
31 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 718. 
32 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 3. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 4. 
35 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 720. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 20). 
38 Frank Rudy Cooper, ‘Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory’ (2015) 93 North Carolina Law Review 1339—
1379, 1371. Instead of one universal human condition, Cooper suggests that people are ‘universally vulnerable’. 
39 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 12. 
40 Ibid 8. 
41 Ibid 13. 
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forms: ‘physical, human, social, ecological or environmental, and existential’.43 In the distribution of 
the assets, individuals may find themselves in different positions: ‘some are more privileged, while 
others are relatively disadvantaged’.44 In this process, institutions create and replicate inequalities. 
The state is thus not a bystander by any means; it determines, through law, the creation and 
dissolution of those institutions.45 It also shapes ‘the ways in which those institutions produce and 
replicate inequalities’.46 For this reason, the state should be responsive – it must ensure ‘that the 
distribution of such assets is equitable and fair’.47  One may read Fineman to mean that if the state 
fails in equitable and fair distribution of assets or resources, the result will be discrimination in the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights – as well as any other right, for that matter.  
Fineman also addresses issues of affirmative action, arguing that affirmative action plans are 
‘perceived as temporary adjustments to the formal equality paradigm necessitated by past 
discrimination’.48 Affirmative action plans are limited since their focus is on historic individual identity 
categories.49 Rather, Fineman argues, the more complicated forms of disadvantage can be addressed 
by focusing on institutions.50  
Fineman’s call that the state should be responsive is central to discharging international human 
rights obligations, particularly with regard to obligations to protect and fulfil. Her theory examines 
‘the organization, operation, and outcomes of the institutions and structures through which societal 
resources are channelled’.51 Again, addressing issues concerning institutions and structures is 
important in the implementation of economic social and cultural rights. For this reason, vulnerability 
theory is useful for the analysis of economic, social and cultural rights.52 I will discuss below how 
human rights bodies employ the concept of vulnerability (sections 2.2 (a) and 5.1) and examine how 
they deal with structural barriers (sections 2.2(c) and 5.3). 
Another theory of substantive equality is Fredman’s framework of analysis. Fredman stipulates ‘a 
four-dimensional framework of aims and objectives of the right to equality’:53 the distributive, 
recognition, participative and transformative dimensions.54 The distributive dimension of substantive 
equality should aim to redress disadvantage. The recognition dimension should counter prejudice, 
stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence arising from prohibited grounds of discrimination. The 
participative dimension should address political and social exclusion, whereas the transformative 
dimension should accommodate difference and achieve structural change. When these dimensions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
42 Ibid 256. 
43 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 60 Emory Law Journal 251—275, 
270. 
44 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 15. 
45 Fineman, The Responsive State, (n 43) 274. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 15. 
48 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 18 (footnote 47). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Fineman, The Responsive State, (n 43) 274. 
52 Carolina Yoko Furusho, ‘Uncovering the human rights of the vulnerable subject and correlated state duties under 
liberalism’ (2016) 5(1) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 175—205, 199. 
53 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 727; Sandra Fredman ‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality 
and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 273–301, 281—284; 
Sandra Fredman, ‘The Potential and Limits of an Equal Rights Paradigm in Addressing Poverty’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 566—590, 577; Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 179; Fredman, Providing Equality (n 8) 167. 
54 Fredman, Substantive Equality and Article 14, (n 53) 282. Cf Catharine A MacKinnon ‘Substantive Equality Revisited: A 
Reply to Sandra Fredman’ 14/3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 739 – 746, 741.  
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conflict, the aim is to look for synthesis or compromise.55 All dimensions of Fredman’s substantive 
equality are relevant for the analysis of economic, social and cultural rights, but I will save the issue 
of participation for later discussion under a separate topic, and for now, will focus on the distributive 
and transformative dimensions. 
The distributive dimension should redress primarily socio-economic disadvantage.56 It ‘operates to 
address under-representation in jobs, under-payment for work of equal value, or limitations on 
access to credit, property, or similar resources’.57 It should also redress other forms of disadvantage 
such as ‘the constraints which power structures impose on individuals because of their status’.58 A 
‘deprivation of genuine opportunities to pursue one’s own valued choices’ is also a disadvantage.59  
The distributive dimension focuses on the groups that have suffered disadvantage, such as women, 
ethnic minorities, black people, and disabled people, because they ‘tend to be among the lowest 
earners, to experience the highest rates of unemployment, and to predominate among those living in 
poverty or social exclusion’.60 The distributive dimension is expressly asymmetric and permits 
affirmative action.61 Affirmative action advances substantive equality by taking steps to redress the 
disadvantage.62 Thus, Fredman treats affirmative action as part of the distributive dimension, and 
also recognises that the role of affirmative action ‘is limited and must not be a substitute for a more 
thoroughgoing and radical programme of structural change’.63  
The transformative dimension of substantive equality requires that ‘existing social structures must be 
changed to accommodate difference’.64 Fredman derives this dimension from duties of 
accommodation in relation to religion and disability,65 arguing that sexism, racism, and other forms 
of discrimination are frequently embedded in the structure of society.66 Fredman does not define 
‘social structures’, but does provide an example: ‘working hours have always been patterned on the 
assumption that childcare takes place outside the labor market’.67 In this case, changing the structure 
means that working hours should be changed to suit workers with family responsibilites.68 Another 
example is the built environment, which should be changed to become accessible to persons with 
disabilities.69 Fredman’s transformative dimension, it is submitted, is similar to Fineman’s emphasis 
on institutions, defined as ‘the structures and arrangements that can almost invisibly produce or 
exacerbate existing inequality’.70      
Finally, Prioritarianism, or the priority view, is another theory worth considering. The priority view 
holds that ‘[b]enefiting people matters more the worse off these people are’.71 This holds when 
                                                          
55 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 728. 
56 Ibid 729. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 728—729. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid 729. 
63 Sandra Fredman, ‘Affirmative Action and the European Court of Justice: A Critical Analysis’ in Jo Shaw (ed) Social Law and 
Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing 2000) 172. 
64 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 733. 
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67 Ibid 733. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 19) 21. 
71 Derek Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’ (1997) 10 Ratio 202—221, 213. 
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those who are worse off are not ‘substantially responsible for their condition in virtue of their prior 
conduct’.72 The priority view is ‘concerned only with people’s absolute levels’.73 It is not concerned 
with ‘how each person’s level compares with the level of other people’.74 At times, equality could 
mean giving priority to the disadvantaged. In such cases, equality is used in a rhetorical sense and is 
‘relevant to the distribution of goods’.75 Wesson, it seems, employs this sense of equality when he 
argues that the notion of prioritising worse-off groups is a key feature of substantive equality.76 This 
prioritization, he argues, is central to the enforcement of social rights.77  Affirmative action policies, 
one may submit, can be an example of the priority view. This is because such policies accord 
preferences to one group over another.78 Fredman argues that the distributive dimension of 
substantive equality is compatible with a prioritarian theory.79 I will examine, later in this chapter, 
whether the human rights bodies under consideration understand equality in a sense that includes 
priority (sections 2.2 and 5.2). 
5.2.1.3 Substantive equality and economic, social and cultural rights 
Commentators attempt to connect a substantive conception of equality with economic, social and 
cultural rights in jurisdictions such as South Africa, where the Constitution guarantees economic, 
social and cultural rights. Fredman argues that they raise overlapping concerns.80 She distinguishes 
their applicability, though. She explains that socio-economic disadvantage per se should be 
addressed by social rights such as the right to social security. However, when such disadvantage is 
associated with ‘stigma, lack of voice, or structural factors which lock individuals and their families 
into a cycle of disadvantage,’ the right to equality applies.81 Fredman does not discuss the cause of 
socio-economic disadvantage. However, if one takes the view that the state creates the socio-
economic disadvantage through its laws and institutions,82 it would be difficult to see the distinctions 
Fredman makes. This is because, one may submit, socio-economic disadvantage arises from 
structural factors.   
Wesson argues that economic, social and cultural rights expand the purview of a substantive 
conception of equality by extending ‘principles of substantive equality to the fields of poverty and 
welfare’.83 Substantive equality does not reach these areas on the basis of discrimination law alone. 
Courts do not have sufficient legitimacy to expand substantive equality in the absence of an express 
mandate. Therefore, he concludes, the added value of economic, social and cultural rights ‘lies partly 
in the fact that they authorise the extension of principles of substantive equality to areas’ of poverty 
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74 Ibid. 
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79 Ibid. 
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81 Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, (n 22) 735. 
82 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (n 17); Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, (n 20). 
83 Wesson (n 76) 749. 
 182 
and welfare.84 Bilchitz, however, dismisses the interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights 
on the basis of equality as a conflation of issues of scope with issues of contents.85  
Wesson examines the added value of economic, social and cultural rights to principles of substantive 
equality. For an international treaty such as the ICESCR, which guarantees economic, social and 
cultural rights only, a different question should be asked. What is the added value of a substantive 
conception of equality to the interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights? Before answering 
this question, it will be useful to examine the similarities and differences between a substantive 
conception of equality and economic, social and cultural rights.  
Both substantive equality and economic, social and cultural rights address issues of the distribution 
of resources. Both require positive actions. This, it is submitted, does not imply that they are one and 
the same thing. A couple of imaginary scenarios may clarify their differences. If everyone in a 
particular state has an equal amount of resources, the issue of inequality does not arise. However, 
equality in the distribution of resources does not automatically translate into the full realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Even if everyone in this imaginary State has sufficient means to 
enjoy the basic requirements of these rights, the State still has the obligation to make improvements 
according to the principle of progressive realisation. This State does not have any obligation with 
regard to achieving substantive equality as long as the equal distribution of resources does not 
change. One may assume the State met its obligation with regard to economic, social and cultural 
rights apart from the obligation to make progress. Certainly, this imaginary State is rich. This by itself 
does not mean that this State has achieved substantive equality – it is still possible that the 
distribution of wealth is unequal along racial, religious and other lines.  
The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights and the achievement of substantive equality 
share a similar concern, which is the distribution of resources. However, it is submitted that their 
focus is different. A substantive equality approach focuses on the structural factors that give rise to 
inequalities in the first place. At least some theories of substantive equality identify the state as a 
culprit that creates and maintains structures and institutions that result in the unequal distribution of 
resources. This approach, however, does not identify specific state obligations when it comes to the 
provision of goods and services such as food, medicine, education and health. On the other hand, 
economic, social and cultural rights imply specific state obligations in the provision of goods and 
services. However, they do not directly require states to address structural problems – at least in 
theory. For example, so far as a state carries out, say, its duty to provide food, its obligations as 
regards the right to food do not require it to address the cause of food shortage. Nonetheless, in 
practice, it would be futile to talk about executing state obligations with regard to a particular right 
without addressing the causes of the problem.         
Therefore, the added value of a substantive conception of equality lies in identifying the causes of 
rights deprivation. Put differently, the lack of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
results, at least partly, from laws and institutions in place and the way they function. This, in turn, has 
some advantages. First, it debunks one of the objections against the recognition of economic, social 
and cultural rights. The classification of these rights as human rights is sometimes questioned on the 
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ground that they are provided for by others through taxation.86 The underlying assumption of this 
objection is the neutrality of the laws and institutions of the state. However, the theories of 
substantive equality demonstrate that state laws and institutions may privilege taxpayers or the rich 
and disadvantage the poor. The wealth of taxpayers is not only the result of their hard work but also 
the production of the legal order, to use Dworkin’s phrase.87 This understanding would render the 
objection groundless.  
Second, a substantive conception of equality can address the side effects of programmes intended 
for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Sometimes stigma and stereotype 
may accompany programmes designed to implement these rights. For example, studies show that 
welfare recipients are characterised as lazy,88  or as irresponsible freeloaders dependent on public 
welfare.89 A proper understanding of the role of laws and institutions in the distribution of resources 
would eliminate the misconception that gives rise to the stigma and the stereotype.  
Third, a substantive conception of equality provides stronger justification. This is because a 
substantive conception of equality identifies the state as part of the problem. Substantive equality 
emphasises that the inability to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights is not a matter of individual 
blameworthiness.90 Rather, it results from ‘choices about how we organise our society and economy 
and about deeply inscribed patterns of group discrimination’.91 Obviously, the state determines the 
organisation of society and economy. States should recognise that such organisation might 
disadvantage some individuals. Finally, achieving substantive equality is an immediate obligation, 
especially in the context of the ICESCR as discussed below. 
5.2.2 Equality and non-discrimination: A comparative view of treaty bodies’ practice  
The ICESCR guarantees the enjoyment of rights ‘without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status’.92 The ICESCR also guarantees that women and men have the equal right to enjoy these 
rights.93 The Revised European Social Charter prohibits discrimination in the exercise of the rights it 
guarantees.94 The American Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law in addition to the general prohibition on discrimination.95 The 
Protocol of San Salvador guarantees the enjoyment of rights it recognises without any 
discrimination.96 
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The ICESCR does not guarantee equality and non-discrimination as independent rights; it physically 
separates them from the part that guarantees substantive rights.97 That is, a violation of equality and 
non-discrimination is examined only in conjunction with substantive rights.98 In the European Social 
Charter, the location of the non-discrimination provision is outside the part that guarantees 
substantive rights.99 For this reason, the European Committee held that the provision ‘has no 
independent existence and has to be combined with a substantive provision of the Charter’.100 In the 
American Convention on Human Rights, the non-discrimination provision (article 1(1)) is located in 
the section dealing with general obligations.101 It also guarantees the right to equality (article 24), 
which is a substantive right in a different section. With regard to their difference, the Inter-American 
Court held that the non-discrimination provision applies in conjunction with substantive rights when 
the alleged discrimination relates to the rights guaranteed in the Convention, while the right to 
equality applies when the alleged discrimination relates to domestic law or its application.102 
Non-discrimination provisions impose an immediate obligation on states. Under the ICESCR, the 
states have undertaken ‘to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind’.103 The ICESCR uses the term ‘guarantee’ to convey that 
the state obligation under this provision is immediate.104 The physical separation of the non-
discrimination obligation (article 2(2)) from the obligation of progressive realisation (article 2(1)) 
buttresses this view.105 The drafting history of the ICESCR shows that the drafters intended an 
immediate obligation under article 2(2).106 In most of its general comments, the CESCR has identified 
non-discrimination as one of the immediate obligations under the ICESCR.107 It also explained that 
the ‘equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
mandatory and immediate obligation of States parties’.108 The text and drafting history of the ICESCR 
are not clear on whether non-discrimination requires the achievement of substantive equality. The 
CESCR has cleared the doubt by explaining that article 2(2) envisages substantive equality.109  
5.2.2.1 Definition and forms of discrimination 
The ICESCR, the European Social Charter, and the American Convention on Human Rights do not 
define the term ‘discrimination’, unlike other treaties such as the International Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).110 Referring to definitions from other 
treaties and treaty bodies, the CESCR has provided that:  
[Discrimination means] any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential 
treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which 
has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of Covenant rights.111  
The definitions of discrimination by the European Committee and the Inter-American Court contain 
fewer details than that of the CESCR. The Inter-American Court defines discrimination as ‘any 
exclusion, restriction or privilege that is not objective and reasonable, and which adversely affects 
human rights’.112 In CFDT v France, the European Committee held that ‘[t]he notion of discrimination 
within the meaning of Article E includes, in general, cases where a person or group is treated, 
without proper justification, less favourably than another’.113 
Identifying forms of discrimination adds some clarity to the definition. The treaty bodies identify 
other forms of discrimination with qualifiers such as direct, indirect, multiple, intersectional, 
systemic, formal and substantive discrimination. Direct discrimination is overt because it involves a 
differential treatment based on a prohibited ground. It ‘occurs when an individual is treated less 
favourably than another person in a similar situation for a reason related to a prohibited ground’.114 
In contrast, indirect discrimination is covert in the sense that ‘laws, policies or practices which appear 
neutral at face value’ disproportionately impact the enjoyment of rights by individuals or groups 
based on prohibited grounds.115 According to the European Committee, ‘indirect discrimination may 
arise by failing to take due and positive account of all relevant differences or by failing to take 
adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages that are open to all are genuinely 
accessible by and to all’.116  
Systemic discrimination refers to ‘legal rules, policies, practices or predominant cultural attitudes in 
either the public or private sector which create relative disadvantages for some groups, and 
privileges for other groups’.117 When discrimination involves differential treatment based on two or 
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more grounds, it is called multiple discrimination.118 The intersection of discrimination on two or 
more prohibited grounds gives rise to intersectional discrimination.119  
Discrimination is formal when entrenched in constitutions, laws and policy documents.120 Elimination 
of formal discrimination does not ensure substantive equality under article 2(2) of the ICESCR.121 
States should also address discrimination in practice (de facto or substantive discrimination) by 
‘paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice’.122 
To eliminate substantive discrimination, states should adopt ‘special measures to attenuate or 
suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination’.123   
5.2.2.2 Criteria for identifying discrimination 
States usually classify and distinguish individuals. Thus, not every distinction amounts to 
discrimination. The CESCR evaluates differential treatment based on legitimacy of purpose, 
proportionality of means and aims, and objectivity and reasonability of criteria. The CESCR explained 
that 
Differential treatment based on prohibited grounds will be viewed as discriminatory unless 
the justification for differentiation is reasonable and objective. This will include an 
assessment as to whether the aim and effects of the measures or omissions are legitimate, 
compatible with the nature of the Covenant rights and solely for the purpose of promoting 
the general welfare in a democratic society. In addition, there must be a clear and reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realized and the measures or 
omissions and their effects.124  
In López Rodríguez v Spain, the CESCR reaffirmed these criteria although it appears to omit the 
proportionality element.125 The European Committee does not have to develop these criteria as the 
Revised Charter itself allows a differential treatment based on ‘an objective and reasonable 
justification’.126 However, it has added proportionality and legitimacy elements.127 The Inter-
American Court uses similar criteria to assess the appropriateness of differential treatment.128 I 
discussed proportionality in Chapter 3. 
5.2.2.3 Convergence of substantive equality and economic, social and cultural rights 
The distinction between formal and substantive discrimination is similar to the distinction between 
formal and substantive equality. The CESCR considers that formal (de jure) equality is concerned with 
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neutral treatment by a law or policy.129 It recognises a substantive conception of equality as 
concerned ‘with the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not 
maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular groups experience’.130 I will 
examine below three areas on which the requirements of a substantive conception of equality 
converge with state obligations corresponding to the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights. These are priority to members of vulnerable groups, temporary special measures, and 
structural changes. I use the term ‘social structures’ to refer to the organisation and operation of 
society including legal or customary rules, institutions, practices, procedures and attitudes that cause 
inequality, particularly in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. By ‘structural 
changes’, I mean modification of the social structures.     
a) Identifying and prioritising vulnerable groups 
The protection of members of vulnerable131 groups is central to the interpretation of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Human rights treaty bodies identify members of vulnerable groups. The 
purpose of distinguishing vulnerable groups from those who are not, one can argue, is to give priority 
to the vulnerable. I will further examine whether human rights treaty bodies adopt prioritarianism by 
requiring states to accord priority to vulnerable groups. 
According to Fineman, vulnerability is ‘universal and constant, inherent in the human condition’.132 In 
practice, however, treaty bodies use a different vulnerability concept. The CESCR accords importance 
to the subject of vulnerability,133 however, it does not offer a clear-cut conception or definition of 
vulnerability or related terminology,134 nor does it ‘provide criteria for identifying which individuals 
or groups qualify as vulnerable or disadvantaged in general or in specific contexts’.135  
The CESCR does not list vulnerable groups in a particular document. It is still possible to extrapolate a 
non-exhaustive list of vulnerable groups from its documents. The list, for example, includes women, 
infants, children, adolescents, older persons, ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, 
impoverished segments of the population, informal workers, landless persons, non-nationals, people 
living in disaster-prone areas, persons with disabilities, victims of natural disasters, persons with 
HIV/AIDS, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, refugees, persons with persistent 
medical problems and persons with albinism.136 The European Committee and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights recognise similar groups as vulnerable.137 Paradoxically, vulnerability is 
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both universal and particular at the same time.138 It is worth noting that being identified as 
vulnerable might put one at risk of further stigmatisation.139  
Irrespective of its side effect, the purpose of this classification, it is submitted, is to give priority to 
vulnerable groups. This is prioritarianism. As discussed above, prioritarianism is one of the meanings 
of equality in general, particularly in philosophical discourse. The concept also conveys an aspect of 
the meaning of a substantive conception of equality.140  Prioritarianism implies giving priority to the 
worse-off. Largely, the treaty bodies under consideration seem to adopt this view. The CESCR 
recognises that effective enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is ‘often influenced by 
whether a person is a member of a group characterized by the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination’.141 Thus, it is necessary to ensure enjoyment of these rights without discrimination. 
States should ensure that members of vulnerable groups have equal access to the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
Accessibility is one of the normative elements of economic, social and cultural rights. With regard to 
the right to adequate housing, for example, accessibility requires that housing law and policy should 
take into account the special needs of vulnerable groups.142 Accessibility also requires that states 
should ensure enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by members of vulnerable groups 
without discrimination.143  
However, the formal equal treatment of individuals does not guarantee that members of vulnerable 
groups have equal access to the enjoyment of the rights compared to other members of society who 
are better off.144 Therefore, different treatment of members of vulnerable groups is necessary. Such 
treatment involves allocation of resources, which are scarce by nature. As a result, states should 
attend to the needs of members of vulnerable groups before addressing needs of other members of 
society. For this reason, the CESCR emphasises that eliminating substantive discrimination ‘requires 
paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice’.145 
It is submitted that paying sufficient attention to vulnerable groups implies priority. That is to say, 
while discharging their positive obligations to protect or to fulfil, states should accord priority to 
members of vulnerable groups.  
The priority requirement seems to emanate from another source too. In its first general comment 
adopted in 1989, the CESCR stressed that the implementation of the ICESCR requires that ‘special 
attention be given to any worse-off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which 
appear to be particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged’.146 This requirement applies even when states 
face a shortage of resources. The CESCR  explained that ‘even in times of severe resource constraints 
whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the 
vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-
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cost targeted programmes’.147 In evaluating the reasonableness of the measures taken to implement 
economic, social and cultural rights, the CESCR examines the attention given to members of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.148 
States must pay special attention to members of vulnerable groups. This requirement by itself, one 
may argue, implies that states should give priority to the worse off. This reading is plausible because 
the CESCR expressly requires priority be given to members of vulnerable groups in several instances. 
In the general comment on the right to health, for example, the CESCR underlined that: ‘Priority in 
the provision of international medical aid, distribution and management of resources, such as safe 
and potable water, food and medical supplies, and financial aid should be given to the most 
vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population’.149 The CESCR stresses this requirement in its 
concluding observations as well. For example, it urged Lithuania ‘to ensure that its national housing 
policy prioritizes the needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups who lack access to adequate 
housing and basic facilities and amenities’.150  
The European Committee has a similar practice of paying particular attention to members of 
vulnerable groups:  
In assessing whether the right to protection of health can be effectively exercised, the Committee pays 
particular attention to the situation of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Hence, it considers that 
any restrictions on this right must not be interpreted in such a way as to impede the effective exercise 
by these groups of the right to protection of health. This interpretation imposes itself because of the 
non-discrimination requirement.151 
The European Committee has unequivocally explained that the requirement of paying special 
attention to the vulnerable groups arises from the principle of non-discrimination. It has explained 
this view while supervising the implementation of the right to health. It also made similar 
pronouncements with regard to other rights.152  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requires states to accord priority to members of 
vulnerable groups under the principle of equality. States should first ‘ascertain which groups require 
priority or special assistance in the exercise of social rights’.153 Then, they should ‘adopt concrete 
protection measures for those groups or sectors in their plans of action’.154 In monitoring progress in 
the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, the Inter-American Commission 
ascertains the existence of ‘priorities in resource allocation to poor or vulnerable sectors’.155 
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Therefore, these treaty bodies (the CESCR, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Committee) adopt prioritarianism. This view arises from the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. The link is not straightforward from the practice of the CESCR. Another reading of the 
CESCR’s practice leads to the conclusion that the requirement of priority to the vulnerable group 
arises from the nature of economic, social and cultural rights. This is because the CESCR requires 
states to accord priority to vulnerable groups without deriving this requirement from the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination. As discussed above, affirmative action policies are one form of 
giving priority to vulnerable groups. I will now discuss affirmative action policies (temporary special 
measures).  
b) Temporary special measures 
Theories of a substantive conception of equality address affirmative action. According to Fredman’s 
distributive dimension of substantive equality, affirmative action advances a substantive conception 
of equality.156 The practice of treaty bodies being examined shows that they do address affirmative 
action also called temporary special measures.157 I will examine this practice as to whether the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination allow as well as require temporary special measures. 
Because of its frequent use by the CESCR and the African Commission, I will use the term ‘temporary 
special measures’ (instead of the term ‘affirmative action’).   
The CESCR defines ‘temporary special measures’ as steps taken ‘to bring disadvantaged or 
marginalized persons or groups of persons to the same substantive level as others’.158 It clarifies 
some important points about these measures. First, the CESCR has addressed one of the limitations 
of formal equality. As discussed above, some reject temporary special measures, arguing that they 
are contrary to equality,159 but the CESCR dispelled this concern. It explained that temporary special 
measures are not contrary to the principle of equality, highlighting the idea that the ‘adoption of 
temporary special measures intended to bring about de facto equality for men and women and for 
disadvantaged groups is not a violation of the right to non-discrimination’.160 These measures are not 
discriminatory because ‘they are grounded in the State’s obligation to eliminate disadvantage caused 
by past and current discriminatory laws, traditions and practices’.161 Therefore, the principle of 
equality allows temporary special measures. 
Second, the CESCR explained that the principles of equality and non-discrimination require states to 
adopt temporary special measures. It emphasised that ‘[t]emporary special measures may 
sometimes be needed in order to bring disadvantaged or marginalized persons or groups of persons 
to the same substantive level as others’.162 In line with one of Fredman’s dimensions of substantive 
equality, the CESCR places addressing disadvantage (whether past, present or future) at the core of 
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its conception of substantive equality. It does not identify different forms of disadvantage, although 
disadvantage may take different forms, including stigma, prejudice, stereotyping and exclusion.163 
The CESCR particularly emphasises the need to achieve substantive equality between women and 
men in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. It stated that ‘[t]emporary special 
measures aim at realizing not only de jure or formal equality, but also de facto or substantive 
equality for men and women’.164 Temporary special measures fall under the state obligation to 
fulfil.165 In its concluding observations, it frequently draws states’ attention to the achievement of 
substantive equality between women and men in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights. With regard to Canada, for example, the CESCR identified that women are overrepresented in 
part-time work and in low-paid sectors due to their primary role as caregivers in the family.166 This 
fact is ‘perpetuating the gender segregation in the workplace and the gender wage gap’.167 The 
CESCR includes temporary special measures such as quota among its recommendations for 
addressing the problem.168  
The CESCR also calls on states to adopt temporary special measures in favour of other vulnerable 
groups. With regard to the Lebanon, for example, the CESCR condemned the discrimination against 
‘marginalized groups such as persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV, lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex persons and refugees’ and recommended the adoption of a comprehensive 
legislative framework that provides for temporary special measures.169 
Third, the CESCR requires that temporary special measures be legitimate. It stipulates criteria for 
evaluating the legitimacy of the measures, stating that such ‘measures are legitimate to the extent 
that they represent reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto discrimination 
and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably achieved’.170 Some of these 
criteria are similar to those adopted to evaluate whether a particular distinction, usually based on 
prohibited grounds, amounts to discrimination.  
As one of the legitimacy criteria, the CESCR requires that temporary special measures should not be 
in place for an indefinite period; as the name indicates, such measures ‘should be distinguished from 
permanent policies and strategies undertaken to achieve equality’171 and states should discontinue 
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such measures when they have achieved substantive equality.172 The CESCR warns against 
maintaining ‘a separate system of protection for certain individuals or groups of individuals’.173 Thus, 
it distinguishes temporary special measures from permanent special measures. The latter, for 
example, include measures ‘such as interpretation services for linguistic minorities and reasonable 
accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in accessing health-care facilities’.174 
Like the CESCR, the Inter-American Court considers that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination imply temporary special measures.175 It held that:  
States are obliged to take affirmative action to reverse or change discriminatory situations that exist in 
their societies to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special obligation to 
protect that the State must exercise with regard to acts and practices of third parties who, with its 
tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain or promote discriminatory situations.176 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also stressed that the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination require that states adopt affirmative action measures and policies to ensure that 
vulnerable groups enjoy economic, social and cultural rights.177 
The European Committee requires special considerations for vulnerable groups. In ERRC v Ireland, 
emphasising ‘the imperative of achieving equal treatment by taking differences between individuals 
into account,’ it held that ‘special consideration should be given to the needs and different lifestyle 
of Travellers, which are a specific type of disadvantaged group and vulnerable minority’.178 The 
Committee’s formula of different treatment and special consideration of vulnerable groups, one may 
argue, corresponds to temporary special measures used by other treaty bodies. 
Therefore, the principles of equality and non-discrimination entail temporary special measures 
according to the practice of treaty bodies examined above. Such measures should benefit vulnerable 
groups.    
c) Structural changes 
Theories of a substantive conception of equality require the removal of structural barriers that 
disadvantage some and privilege others, as discussed above. I will examine the extent to which the 
practice of treaty bodies addresses structural barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. I will first discuss the practice of the CESCR and then investigate whether the practice 
of the European Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Court is the same or different.   
The practice of the CESCR shows that it addresses causes of inequality and structural barriers to the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. It requires states to ‘immediately adopt the 
necessary measures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the conditions and attitudes which cause or 
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perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination’.179 With regard to women, for example, it 
identifies the causes of the problem, stating that gender-based assumptions and expectations place 
women at a disadvantage.180 It underlined that ‘strong negative traditional attitudes or practices and 
deep-rooted stereotypes which discriminate against women [...] are root causes for the 
disadvantaged position of women’ in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.181 It 
identified similar factors in relation to the right to work: factors such as gender-biased job evaluation 
or the perception that women are less productive than men are the underlying causes of the pay 
gap.182 Thus, in its concluding observations it frequently recommends that states eliminate the 
gender pay gap.183 
The CESCR recognises that states have the obligation to respect the equal right of women and men in 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights,184 which is mainly a negative obligation to 
refrain from discrimination against women. More important are the positive state obligations to 
address causes of inequality and barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 
These positive obligations fall under both the obligations to protect and to fulfil.185 The obligation to 
protect requires states to eliminate ‘prejudices, customary and all other practices that perpetuate 
the notion of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, and stereotyped roles for men and 
women’.186 To do so, states should take steps including constitutional, legislative, administrative and 
institutional measures.187 They should establish ‘public institutions, agencies and programmes to 
protect women against discrimination’ by third parties.188 
The obligation to fulfil – the obligation to promote in particular – requires states to change gender-
based assumptions and expectations that constitute the root causes of inequality between women 
and men in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. States can bring about such 
changes through teaching, training and raising awareness about the proper role of both sexes, for 
example by integrating the principle in both formal and non-formal education.189 Awareness raising 
programmes can also target specific groups, such as judges and public officials.190 Moreover, states 
should ‘establish appropriate venues for redress such as courts and tribunals or administrative 
mechanisms that are accessible to all on the basis of equality, including the poorest and most 
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disadvantaged and marginalized men and women’.191 They should also provide ‘appropriate 
remedies, such as compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition, 
declarations, public apologies, educational programmes and prevention programmes’.192 However, 
one may question the effectiveness of such venues and remedies unless there are well resourced 
institutions carrying the responsibilities of teaching, training and raising awareness and thereby 
changing prejudices and harmful customary practices against women.       
Similarly, the CESCR has ascertained that prejudice and stigma against other vulnerable groups, such 
as persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex 
persons and refugees, are factors that impede their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights.193  The CESCR requires states to address the social stigma experienced by such groups through 
information campaigns and other awareness-raising efforts.194 
The CESCR also identifies corruption, illicit financial flows and tax evasions as structural factors 
impeding the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and increasing inequalities. The 
CESCR stresses the need to fight corruption usually in relation to the principle of progressive 
realisation.195 It identifies corruption as an obstacle to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights.196 It has explained that corruption reduces available resources, leads to violations of human 
rights, and ‘denies redress to victims’.197 Similarly, the CESCR identifies illicit financial flows and tax 
evasions as factors that impede the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.198 It 
emphasised that these factors are ‘leading to the draining of resources and increasing inequalities 
between geographic regions and social groups’.199 That is to say, corruption, illicit financial flows, and 
tax evasions are causes of inequality in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Some theorists identify the state as the major culprit for the inequalities and barriers to the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. They argue that the state is responsible – through 
its laws and institutions – for the unequal distribution of resources that disadvantage some and 
privilege others.200 In this regard, the CESCR hardly condemns states for causing inequalities or 
barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. That, one may surmise, may be 
because of the non-adversarial nature of examining state reports. Nevertheless, one may argue, the 
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CESCR indirectly condemns states for causing inequalities and barriers to the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights, which may be inferred from its mandate to ‘eliminate disadvantage caused 
by past and current discriminatory laws, traditions and practices’.201 That is, states currently 
promulgate discriminatory laws that are causing the disadvantages. In other instances, the CESCR has 
disapproved of a state party’s tax system since ‘the tax system cannot be used to reduce the high 
level of inequality because it essentially relies on indirect taxes and provides for many unjustified 
exemptions’.202 The CESCR has also condemned a tax system that includes a low level of flat tax on 
personal and corporate income as ‘ineffective in reducing poverty and in ensuring appropriate 
redistribution of income’.203 Here, one may understand the CESCR to be declaring that states are 
causing, at least increasing, inequalities through their tax systems. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requires states to identify social groups such as 
women, indigenous peoples, Afro-American peoples and illegal immigrants, who suffer from 
structural inequalities and provide them priority in their plans of action.204  For example, it recognises 
that colonial domination and slavery have caused discrimination against indigenous people and Afro-
descendants by limiting their ability to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights.205 After finding a 
structural discrimination against women, the Inter-American Court ordered the respondent State to 
implement permanent education and training programs and courses for public officials and the 
public in general.206  The purpose of such programs and courses is ‘to overcome stereotyping about 
the role of women in society’.207 According to the Court’s findings in another case, laws that protect 
property rights of private owners over indigenous peoples’ territorial claims partly result in a de facto 
discrimination, which the respondent State should eliminate.208   
The European Committee identifies barriers, which includes discriminatory laws, to the enjoyment of 
rights under the European Social Charter. In COHRE v Italy, for example, the Committee has found 
that lack of identification documents results in civil marginalisation, which in turn leads to 
segregation and poverty.209 That is, a lack of identification documents, particularly among members 
of vulnerable groups such as Roma and Sinti, ‘is a cause of marginalization and social exclusion’ 
because of the ‘discriminatory treatment with regard to the right to vote or other forms of citizen 
participation’.210 
5.3 Equality and non-discrimination under the African Charter 
The African Charter provides for the principles of equality and non-discrimination in its preamble and 
substantive provisions. In the preamble, the Charter underlines the duty of African states to 
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dismantle ‘all forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, color, sex, 
language, religion or political opinions’. From the outset, the Charter makes it clear that African 
states have a positive obligation to eliminate discrimination; the preamble does not limit state 
obligations to the negative duty of refraining from discrimination. The substantive provisions of the 
Charter deal with the principles of equality and non-discrimination in five instances. These are the 
right to non-discrimination (article 2), the right to equality (article 3), the state duty to eliminate 
discrimination against women (article 18(3)), the right to equality of peoples (article 19), and the 
individual duty to respect others without discrimination (article 28). 
The African Charter does not use the term ‘discrimination’ in article 2, which guarantees the rights 
and freedoms recognised in the Charter without discrimination.211 Article 2 of the Charter provides 
that: 
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or other status.  
Article 2 of the Charter limits prohibition of discrimination to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed’ by the African Charter. To invoke a violation of this provision, Ankumah 
argues, one or more of the substantive provisions of the Charter must be at issue.212 That is, one 
finds a violation of Article 2 only in conjunction with other provisions of the Charter. In this respect, 
Article 2 is similar to most non-discrimination clauses in other treaties.213 However, unlike those 
treaties, the physical location of Article 2 is among the substantive provisions of the Charter.214  In 
addition, Article 2 identifies right-holders unlike non-discrimination clauses in other human rights 
treaties.215 Those treaties often express the non-discrimination provision in terms of state obligations 
rather than individual entitlements; in contrast, the right-holders under Article 2 of the Charter are 
individuals.  
Article 2 expands the prohibited grounds of discrimination listed in the preamble. The provision adds 
‘opinions’ (other than political ones), ‘national and social origin’, ‘fortune’ and ‘birth’ to the list. 
Article 2 does not include ‘age’ and ‘disability’ among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. One 
may argue that Article 18(4) of the Charter prohibits discrimination on the grounds of age and 
disability since this provision requires special protection for ‘the aged and the disabled’.216 It is clear 
from Article 2 and the preamble that the list of prohibited grounds is not exhaustive, as the Charter 
uses the terms ‘such as’ and ‘other status’ in Article 2, and uses the term ‘particularly’ in the 
preamble. The list of prohibited grounds under Article 2 mainly mirrors similar provisions in other 
human rights treaties.217  The Charter uses ‘fortune’ instead of ‘property’ used in the ICESCR and the 
ICCPR. One notable addition is the prohibition of discrimination based on ‘ethnic group’. By adding 
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this ground, Ouguergouz argues, the Charter takes into account ‘an important sociological aspect of 
virtually all African States’.218 By prohibiting discrimination on the ground of one’s ethnic group, 
Article 2 of the Charter may contribute to the promotion of peace on the continent because 
discrimination ‘based on ethnic difference is not only pervasive in much of Africa, it is a major source 
of conflict and the erosion of security in many parts of the continent’.219  
The right to equality under the African Charter immediately follows the non-discrimination clause in 
terms of its physical location. Article 3 of the Charter provides that: ‘1. Every individual shall be equal 
before the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law’. This provision of 
the African Charter is similar to the American Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR in terms of 
the use of words and physical location. Both treaties provide for the right to equality among 
substantive rights.220 Like the American Convention on Human rights, but unlike the ICCPR, Article 3 
of the African Charter does not list prohibited grounds of discrimination. Thus, the African Charter is 
different from the ICESCR and the European Social Charter, which do not provide for a separate 
provision on the right to equality.  
Article 3 of the Charter (the right to equality) is different from the non-discrimination provision 
(Article 2) in at least two respects. First, Article 3 does not refer to the rights guaranteed in the 
African Charter. That is, the equality under Article 3 is not in relation to the enjoyment of the Charter 
rights. Second, Article 3 does not list any prohibited grounds of discrimination. The African Charter 
does not establish a clear relationship between these provisions. Ouguergouz argues that ‘[t]he 
principles of non-discrimination and equality are very closely linked, so much so in fact that the latter 
may be said to be a positive expression of the former’.221 Similarly, Bulto argues that non-
discrimination is the flip side of the right to equality.222  
Given Articles 2 (non-discrimination) and 3 (equality), one may wonder about the relevance of Article 
18(3), which requires the elimination of discrimination against women. Article 18(3) of the Charter 
provides that: ‘The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions’. The protocol to the Charter provides a definition:  
"Discrimination against women" means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential 
treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, 
enjoyment or the exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life.223 
Certainly, both provisions on equality and non-discrimination are applicable to women. Article 2 in 
particular prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex. Obviously, the term ‘every individual’ used in 
both Articles 2 and 3 includes all sexes and genders. With regard to phrasing, the formulation of 
Article 18(3) does not follow the formulation used in Articles 2 and 3. Article 18(3) focuses on a 
positive state obligation to eliminate discrimination. As Ouguergouz argues, a state party to the 
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Charter is ‘bound to eliminate all kinds of discrimination against women, be it de jure or de facto; this 
implies that in certain cases the state should adopt a policy of positive discrimination in their 
favour’.224 Therefore, it is submitted, the value of Article 18(3) is only its additional emphasis on the 
positive state obligations to eliminate all discrimination against women. 
At least two more distinctions are still apparent. First, Article 18(3) is broader than at least Article 2 
of the Charter. Article 18(3) does not limit the prohibition of discrimination to the rights guaranteed 
in the Charter.225 Second, Article 18(3) expands the scope of the Charter itself when it comes to the 
rights of women and requires states to comply with other international instruments – whether 
binding or otherwise226 – insofar as it requires the protection of women’s rights ‘as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions’. Thus, one may argue, Article 18(3) of the African Charter 
incorporates treaties such as the CEDAW by reference. Since 2005, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa has expanded the provision of Article 18(3).  
Articles 2 and 3 specify the right-holder. That is, both Articles 2 and 3 identify ‘every individual’ as a 
right-holder. Although Article 18(3) does not use this formulation, one may argue that the right-
holder is an individual. That is, it envisages an individual woman. The individual orientation of Articles 
2, 3 and 18(3) may raise the issue of their applicability to groups because the Charter has a separate 
provision on all peoples’ right to equality. Under Article 19, the Charter stipulates that: ‘All peoples 
shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights’. 
Identifying individuals as right-holders may not raise any concern under other human rights treaties 
tailored to individual rights. As the Charter also provides relatively extensive groups’ or peoples’ 
rights, one may wonder whether the non-discrimination and equality clauses are applicable to 
groups or peoples because the Charter usually uses the terms ‘all peoples’ to identify right-holders 
when it guarantees peoples’ rights.227 Solomon Dersso, who later became a member of the 
Commission, argues that Article 2 is applicable to groups. He opines that ‘this right can be 
interpreted as giving substantive protection to the right of particular ethno-cultural communities’.228 
On the other hand, Ouguergouz, who later became a judge and a vice-president of the African Court, 
suggests that Article 2 is limited to individual rights, arguing that ‘[t]he equality of peoples' rights is a 
logical consequence of the postulated equality of peoples. Therefore, it might be regarded as a kind 
of principle of non-discrimination; Article 19 would thus be to the collective rights what Article 2 is to 
the individual rights’.229 In terms of formulation, one may submit, Article 19 is similar to Article 3 
(right to equality), not to Article 2 (non-discrimination). 
The Charter furthermore deals with discrimination in inter-personal relations in its second chapter on 
individual duties.230 The provisions of individual duties represent one of the distinguishing features of 
the African Charter.231 Under Article 28, the Charter provides that ‘[e]very individual shall have the 
duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination’, from which we understand 
                                                          
224 Ouguergouz (n 218) 85. 
225 Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, The Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights in the African regional human rights 
system: Theory, practice and prospect (2013) 227. 
226 Viljoen (n 219) 253. Such instruments include binding treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) & African Women’s Protocol. 
227 African Charter, Arts 19 – 24. 
228 Solomon Dersso, ‘The African Human Rights System and the Issue of Minorities in Africa’ (2012) 20/1 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 42-69, 44. 
229 Ouguergouz (n 218) 214. 
230 Ibid 86. 
231 Viljoen (n 219) 239. 
 199 
that not only a state but also an individual has a duty to refrain from discrimination. However, this 
provision does not list prohibited grounds of discrimination. One may submit that the grounds listed 
under Article 2 also apply to Article 28, and the importance of article 28 can be examined given the 
provisions on non-discrimination and equality (Articles 2 and 3). Article 28 seems to extend the scope 
of duty-bearers beyond states. As the Charter is a human rights treaty, states should implement even 
the duties of individuals to refrain from discrimination. Treaty bodies usually recognise a state 
obligation to protect third parties from discriminating others. For this reason, Article 28 adds 
emphasis to the content of Articles 2 and 3.  
In sum, the African Charter includes the principles of equality and non-discrimination in a number of 
provisions. These are non-discrimination in the enjoyment of Charter rights (Article 2), the right to 
equality (Article 3), state obligation to eliminate discrimination against women (Article 18(3)), the 
equal rights of peoples (Article 19), and the duty of individuals to refrain from discrimination (Article 
28). In the following section, I examine how the African Commission and the African Court interpret 
these provisions. I discuss Articles 2 and 3 more in-depth as the practice of the Commission and the 
Court relate to these provisions.  
5.4 Equality and Non-Discrimination: The practice under the African Charter 
In their practice, the African Commission and the African Court have defined ‘discrimination’. Both 
have dealt with – and the Commission in particular has expanded – the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. Moreover, they have laid down criteria for evaluating whether a distinction amounts 
to discrimination. I will discuss definition and prohibited grounds of discrimination in the first 
subsection. In the second sub-section, I will deal with criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of a 
distinction. The Commission and the Court have also dealt with the right to equality by attempting to 
define the similarities and differences between non-discrimination (Article 2) and equality (Article 3). 
I will discuss the right to equality and its relationship with non-discrimination in the third sub-section. 
5.4.1 Definition and prohibited grounds of discrimination  
The African Commission decided Meldrum v Zimbabwe in 2009.232 This communication concerns the 
deportation of a US citizen working as a journalist in Zimbabwe for publishing an article critical of the 
government.233 The deportation took place in defiance of a court order.234 The communication does 
not allege violations of economic, social and cultural rights; however, it is instructive insofar as it 
provides the definition of discrimination that equally applies to economic, social and cultural 
rights.235 The African Commission provided the following definition: 
[Discrimination is any] act which aims at distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose 
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on 
equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.236 
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This definition has expanded the scope of Article 2. It prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment or 
exercise of all categories of rights by employing an all-inclusive phrase, ‘all rights and freedoms’, 
which includes individual rights as well as peoples’ rights. That is, Article 2 applies to group or 
peoples’ rights guaranteed in the Charter. The definition also extends the application of Article 2 
beyond the rights guaranteed in the Charter because rights and freedoms can also be guaranteed in 
other laws, domestic or international. This understanding may be criticised for lack of consistency 
since the Commission decided earlier, in Bissangou v Republic of Congo, that Article 2 ‘only prohibits 
discrimination where it affects the enjoyment of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter’.237     
In 2011, a couple of years after Meldrum v Zimbabwe, the Commission adopted another definition in 
the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles). The Commission defined 
‘discrimination’ as ‘any conduct or omission which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the equal access to and enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights’.238 It has separated 
prohibited grounds of discrimination from the definition, putting out a non-exhaustive list of grounds 
that ‘include but are not limited to race, ethnic group, colour, sex, gender, sexual orientation, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, economic status, birth, 
disability, age or other status’.239 
The definition in the Nairobi Principles has an effect different from Meldrum v Zimbabwe with regard 
to the scope of Article 2. On the one hand, this definition is narrower than the Meldrum definition 
and is very specific to economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, it expands the 
definition in Meldrum in certain aspects. Meldrum defines ‘discrimination’ as an ‘act’ that raises the 
question as to whether an ‘omission’ amounts to discrimination. The Commission dispels that 
concern by clarifying that an ‘omission’ can also constitute discrimination. The definition in the 
Nairobi Principles focuses completely on economic, social and cultural rights. That may raise the 
question as to whether ‘omission’ constitutes discrimination only with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights, not in the cases where a violation of civil and political rights is at issue. This doubt may 
be dismissed on the ground that Article 2 does not make any distinction between these categories of 
rights, but it cannot be conclusive of the Commission’s view since it uses different sources. On the 
one hand, the definition in Meldrum, as the Commission acknowledges, has been taken from the 
Human Rights Committee’s definition in General Comment No. 18.240 On the other hand, the 
definition in the Nairobi Principles was taken from the CESCR, although the Commission does not 
make specific reference to its source.241  
The cross-fertilization of the two definitions does not occur in the Commission’s jurisprudence even 
when it examines communications alleging discrimination that affects economic, social and cultural 
rights as well as civil and political rights. In Nubian Community v Kenya, where the Commission found 
discrimination in the enjoyment of both categories of rights, it reaffirmed only the Meldrum 
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definition.242 Given that the Nubian Community case was decided after the adoption of the Nairobi 
Principles, one may wonder whether the Commission has changed its position.  
There is another problem with the definition in Meldrum: it replaces the list of prohibited grounds 
under Article 2 of the Charter with that of the ICCPR, which are not identical to those under the 
Charter.243 As a result, the definition omits ‘ethnic group’ from the prohibited grounds. The omission 
might undermine the contextual relevance of the Charter given the pervasiveness of discrimination 
based on ethnic group. The Commission also replaces another prohibited ground, ‘fortune’, with 
‘property’. Although the importance of ‘fortune’ to the African context is not clear, the Commission 
contradicts the texts of the Charter when it replaces it with another ground.  
The reaffirmation of Meldrum in the Nubian Community case in 2015 adds another problem. It is 
problematic because the definition in Meldrum ignores other prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
which the Commission had already recognised before 2015. Even before the Meldrum decision in 
2009, the Commission found discrimination on the grounds of mental disability in 2003.244 In 2011, 
the Commission underlined that the list of prohibited grounds under Article 2 is non-exhaustive, and 
added gender, sexual orientation, economic status, disability and age to the list.245 The expansion 
continued after the Nubian Community case. In 2017, the Commission recognised gender identity, 
health status, indigenous status, reason of one’s detention, asylum-seekers, and refugees or others 
under international protection as prohibited grounds.246   
The Commission has modified its definition in Meldrum even though it does not justify the changes. 
In a communication alleging discrimination against the Dioula ethnic group in Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Commission provided that: 
[Discrimination is any] act aimed at distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on one of 
the reasons listed under Article 2 of the Charter, and which aims at or has the effect of annulling or 
restricting recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons and on an equal basis, of all rights and 
freedoms.247  
The Dioula case shortens the definition in Meldrum and avoids the incongruence of prohibited 
grounds under Article 2 and the ICCPR. However, it does not change the uncertainties about the 
scope of application of Article 2 and the fate of the definition adopted in the Nairobi Principles. 
The African Court does not adopt the Commission’s definition. In its judgment on the eviction of the 
Ogiek Community from the Mau Forest by the Republic of Kenya, the Court defines discrimination 
under Article 2 of the Charter as follows: 
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[Discrimination is] any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment.248  
The African Court does not refer to any source in its definition, however, the language used by the 
Court, the type of prohibited grounds and the order in which they were listed all correspond to the 
definition of the term adopted under the International Labour Organisation Convention on 
Discrimination in Employment.249 The list of prohibited grounds in the Ogiek Community case does 
not include all the grounds listed under article 2 of the Charter. Omitted are ethnic group, language, 
fortune and birth. The term ‘other status’ includes those grounds unforeseen during the adoption of 
the Charter.250 Although the Court avoided adopting additional prohibited grounds identified by the 
Commission, it promised to recognise such grounds based on the ‘general spirit of the Charter’.251 
5.4.2 Criteria for identifying discrimination 
The African Commission has developed a test to determine an alleged violation of discrimination. In 
Bissangou v Republic of Congo, a complaint alleging discrimination as a result of the respondent 
State’s failure to execute a judgment of a national court, the Commission emphasised that Article 2 
does not ban all distinctions.252 Rather its violation occurs only when ‘the enjoyment of one of the 
rights guaranteed by the Charter had been hindered in a discriminatory manner […] based on any of 
the grounds of discrimination listed out in Article 2 or on grounds similar to the latter’.253 The 
Commission made the criteria for evaluating discrimination clearer in a later case concerning the 
Zimbabwean courts’ failure to act swiftly enough on disputes arising from the 2000 General 
Elections.254 It held that  
To establish discrimination, it must be shown that, the Complainants have been treated 
differently in the enjoyment of any of the Charter rights by virtue of their race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or any status.255 
The Commission further developed the test by adding other elements. In Good v Botswana, the 
Commission found a violation of Article 2 because of a discrimination based on a political opinion by 
employing the following test: 
The test to establish whether there has been discrimination has been well settled. A violation 
of the principle of non-discrimination arises if:  
a) equal cases are treated in a different manner;  
b) a difference in treatment does not have an objective and reasonable justification; and  
c) […] there is no proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed.256 
                                                          
248 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya (hereafter Ogiek Community case), Application 
No. 006/2012, judgment of 26 May 2017, para 137. 
249 ILO, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), Art 1(1(a)). 
250 Ogiek case, para 138. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Bissangou v Republic of Congo, para 69. 
253 Bissangou v Republic of Congo, para 69. 
254 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Zimbabwe, 
Communication No. 293/04, 43rd Ordinary Session, 7- 22 May 2008 (hereafter Zimbabwe Election case); (2008) AHRLR 
120 (ACHPR 2008). 
255 Ibid, para 121. 
256 Kenneth Good v Botswana, Communication No. 313/05, 47th Ordinary Session, 12 – 26 May 2010 (Banjul); (2010) AHRLR 
43 (ACHPR 2010), para 219. 
 203 
Although the prohibited grounds do not feature among the elements identified in Good v Botswana, 
the Commission emphasised that differential treatment must be based on one of the prohibited 
grounds to constitute discrimination.257 Later, the Commission stated that it would allow different 
treatment ‘to achieve a rational and legitimate purpose’.258 Even in such case, the differential 
treatment should not ‘impair the fundamental dignity of the affected persons or unjustifiably infringe 
on their enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter’.259  
In sum, a differential treatment based on prohibited grounds constitutes discrimination unless it has 
objective and reasonable justification; it has rational and legitimate purpose; and it uses 
proportionate means. The Commission emphasised that the elements of the test are cumulative.260 
The Commission uses a similar test to examine alleged violations of Article 18(3) of the Charter, 
which requires states to eliminate discrimination against women.261 
In most cases, the Commission found violations of Article 2 because the respondent states had not 
passed the justification element of the test. In some cases, the respondent State did not provide any 
justification,262 whereas in other cases, the Commission found unacceptable such justifications as 
national security,263 violation of terms of residence permit,264 and immigration policy.265 In a case 
involving violence and sexual harassment of women demonstrators in Egypt, the Commission found 
discrimination because the respondent State was unable to show that ‘male protesters in the scene 
were also stripped naked and sexually harassed as the women were’.266 In this case, differential 
treatment alone amounted to discrimination without searching for a justification. Obviously, gender-
based violence cannot be justified; but the Commission neither states that point clearly nor makes an 
adequate proportionality or legitimacy analysis. 
The African Court also uses similar criteria. In the Ogiek case, the Court held that ‘[a] distinction or 
differential treatment becomes discrimination, and hence, contrary to Article 2, when it does not 
have an objective and reasonable justification and, in the circumstances where it is not necessary 
and proportional’.267 Kenya’s justification that the eviction of Ogiek Community members was 
necessary ‘to preserve the natural ecosystem of the Mau Forest’ did not meet the Court’s ‘objective 
and reasonable justification’ criteria.268  
The elements of the discrimination test are similar to the Commission’s limitation criteria. In its 
evaluation, the Commission usually requires that limitations to rights be determined by law; 
necessary; proportional; and legitimate.269 In the discrimination test, it does not require 
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differentiations to be determined by law, but they should be proportional and legitimate. They 
should also be necessary since they should be justified.  
5.4.3 The right to equality and its relation to non-discrimination 
The right to equality is important for the enjoyment of other rights according to the African 
Commission. It held that ‘[t]he right to equality is all the more important since it determines the 
possibility for the individual to enjoy many other rights’.270 It emphasised that ‘[e]quality or lack of it 
affects the capacity of a person to enjoy many other rights’.271 Following the text of Article 3, the 
Commission distinguishes ‘equality before the law’ from ‘equal protection of the law’.  
Equality before the law refers to ‘a principle under which each individual is subject to the same laws, 
with no individual or groups having special legal privileges’.272 In other words, ‘existing laws must be 
applied in the same manner to those subject to them’.273 Thus, the concept requires uniformity in 
application of the law. For example, the Commission found a violation of Article 3(1) when the 
Zimbabwean authorities deported a non-national for an offence that would have resulted in the 
payment of a fine if it had been committed by a national in the same circumstances.274  
Equal protection of the law refers to ‘the right of all persons to have the same access to the law and 
courts’.275 The concept ‘includes the guarantee that individuals will have access to mechanisms, 
institutions and processes for vindication of their rights and obtaining remedies when they suffer 
violations’.276 Respondent States’ failure to protect victims from gender-based violence in the first 
place and failure to investigate the crime and prosecute the perpetrators after the violence occurs 
constitutes a violation of Article 3.277 In Meldrum v Zimbabwe, the Commission found a violation of 
equal protection of the law, Article 3(2), for denying the victim ‘the opportunity to seek protection of 
the courts’ because the victim was deported in defiance of court orders while his case was pending 
before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.278 In Bissangou v Republic of Congo, the respondent State 
violated equal protection of the law for failing to execute a court judgment.279 On the other hand, in 
Good v Botswana, the Commission did not find a violation of Article 3(2) since the victim was 
deported after his case was dismissed by Botswana’s Court of Appeal.  
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However, the meaning of the right to equality and its elements under Article 3 is hardly clear from 
the Commission’s jurisprudence. The Commission’s definition is circular at best: In its oft-quoted 
passage, the Commission defines the right to equality as equal treatment: the right to equality means 
that citizens should expect to ‘be assured of equal treatment before the law and equal enjoyment of 
the rights available to all other citizens’.280 In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, the Commission held 
that ‘Article 3 is important because it guarantees fair and just treatment of individuals within a legal 
system of a given country’.281 It made similar pronouncements in subsequent cases.282  
The Commission does not seem to have successfully distinguished the right to equality under Article 
3 from non-discrimination under Article 2. The Commission laid down the requirements for a 
successful claim under Article 3(2): ‘In order for a Complainant to establish a successful claim under 
Article 3(2) of the Charter therefore, it must show that, the Respondent State had not given the 
victims the same treatment it accorded to the others’.283 In essence, this is a different way of asking, 
whether there is a ‘differential treatment’, the term the Commission uses under Article 2. Besides, 
the Commission held that the ‘non-discrimination principle generally ensures equal treatment of an 
individual or group of persons’.284  
Establishing a link between non-discrimination (Article 2) and equality (Article 3) has been a daunting 
task for the Commission. In Negash v Ethiopia, the Commission held that ‘Article 2 embodies the 
principle of non-discrimination which reinforces the equality rights under Article 3’.285 In this case, 
the Commission described equality as the main principle, ie, the principle of non-discrimination only 
strengthens or supplements equality. However, the Commission’s explanation lacks consistency. For 
example, the Commission espoused an opposite view in another case, where it held that ‘Article 3 of 
the African Charter contains a general guarantee of equality which supplements the ban on 
discrimination provided for in Article 2’.286 Here, the Commission represents non-discrimination 
(Article 2) as the main principle, ie, equality (Article 3) only supplements non-discrimination.  
The Commission has also explained whether a violation of non-discrimination (Article 2) also leads to 
a violation of the right to equality (Article 3). In Negash v Ethiopia, the Commission stressed that 
discrimination ‘infringes on the right to equality and equal protection of the law’.287 Similarly, in the 
Dioula case, the Commission explained that ‘where discrimination occurs, equality and equal 
protection of the law are automatically undermined. It follows that whenever a violation of Article 2 
of the Charter is established, the rights under Article 3 have necessarily been violated’.288 It has also 
added that the principle of non-discrimination ‘constitutes a legal guarantee to ensure the 
enjoyment of the rights to equality before the law and equal protection of the law.289  
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Like the Commission, the African Court has also attempted to establish a link between the two 
provisions. In the Ogiek case, the Court held that the ‘right not to be discriminated against is related 
to the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by Article 3’.290 
The Court added that ‘[t]he scope of the right to non-discrimination extends beyond the right to 
equal treatment by the law’.291 The Court is of the opinion that non-discrimination has a broader 
application than the right to equality, thereby holding a view contrary to the Commission on the 
scope of the two provisions: The Court’s view seems to set aside a separate opinion of Fatsah 
Ouguergouz, then vice-president of the African Court, in its earlier judgment. Ouguergouz observed 
that 
The principle of non-discrimination, on one hand, and the principles of equality before the 
law and of equal protection of the law, on the other, are in close relationship. They are so to 
say the two sides of the same coin, the first principle being the corollary of the second ones. 
Their main difference under the African Charter lies in their respective scope. Indeed, 
according to Article 2 and 3 of the Charter, the principle of non-discrimination applies only to 
the rights guaranteed in the Charter, whereas the principles of equality apply to all the rights 
protected in the municipal system of a State party even if they are not recognised in the 
Charter.292 
Judge Ouguerouz’s view is identical to the position adopted by the Inter-American Court on the 
distinction between non-discrimination (Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) 
and the right to equality (article 24 of the American Convention).293 The Commission’s jurisprudence 
shows a trend towards considering equality and non-discrimination as one single principle. However, 
it is not clear whether that trend grew as a response to its attempted failure to distinguish equality 
from non-discrimination.  
In the Dioula case, the African Commission held on the relationship between non-discrimination and 
equality the following: 
[T]he Commission raises an intrinsic inter-connection between equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law, on the one hand, and the right to the enjoyment of rights 
guaranteed by the Charter, on the other hand. This inter-dependence is not specific to the 
African Charter. It is noteworthy that the Inter-American Human Rights Court combines these 
three legal prerogatives and treats them as a single principle.294 
The Commission refers to an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court to show the link between 
equality and non-discrimination, however, it was hesitant to declare that the two concepts form a 
single principle.295 
The Commission avoided separate discussion of equality and non-discrimination in the 2015 Nubian 
Community case. For example, it observed that ‘the principle of equality and non-discrimination does 
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not require all individuals in similar circumstances to be necessarily treated in the same manner’.296 It 
treats them as a single principle without expressly stating their unity. It also found violations of both 
Articles 2 and 3.297 However, the Commission is not consistent, as its subsequent decision in the 
same year suggests.298    
In 2016, the African Commission adopted a draft protocol to the Charter on the rights of persons 
with disabilities.299 The Draft Protocol largely reproduces provisions of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Under the same heading, it provides for equality and non-
discrimination in a single provision just like the CRPD, which does not make distinction between the 
two concepts.300 The CRPD expressly guarantees ‘equality before and under the law’ and ‘equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law’.301 Interestingly, however, the Draft Protocol omits these 
guarantees. A similar trend is traceable in the Commission’s concluding observations. In its 2015 
concluding observation on Uganda, the Commission made recommendations on non-discrimination 
and equality under the same heading.302 
In its major instrument on economic, social and cultural rights, the Nairobi Principles, the 
Commission shows its ambivalence on the differences and similarities between the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. On the one hand, the African Commission has explained that 
equality and non-discrimination imply the same kind of state obligations. Thus, the Commission does 
not make distinctions between equality and non-discrimination while explaining state obligations 
concerning equality and non-discrimination under each economic, social and cultural right.303  
Besides, the Commission seems to suggest that paying attention to vulnerable groups is a 
requirement of equality and non-discrimination.304  
On the other hand, the African Commission has indicated that equality and non-discrimination imply 
different kinds of state obligations. The Commission refers to non-discrimination under Article 2 as 
an immediate obligation.305 It does not specify whether state obligations under the principle of non-
discrimination require states to treat vulnerable groups in a particular way. In a different part of the 
Nairobi principles, the Commission explains that equality requires states to discharge some positive 
obligations, which include the obligation to pay particular attention to vulnerable groups, to adopt 
temporary special measures, and to modify social structures although the Commission does not 
make such classification.306 I will discuss these issues in the next section. 
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5.5 Equal enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights: Vulnerable groups 
under the African Charter 
The African Commission has emphasised the requirement of paying particular attention to members 
of vulnerable groups in its interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights under the African 
Charter. I would argue that this requirement arises from the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. In the first subsection, I first discuss who constitute vulnerable groups, and in the 
remaining subsections, I discuss the purpose of identifying vulnerable groups. 
5.5.1 Identifying vulnerable groups 
The African Commission, unlike the CESCR, provides a definition of vulnerable groups. It defines 
‘vulnerable and disadvantaged’ groups as ‘people who have faced and/or continue to face significant 
impediments to their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights’.307 The Commission 
combines two groups: the vulnerable and the disadvantaged. The use of two terms, one may 
surmise, implies that vulnerable groups are not necessarily disadvantaged groups. It is also possible 
that the same individuals can belong to both groups. Like the CESCR, the Commission is not 
consistent in its use of these terms: even within the same document, it sometimes uses different 
terms. In the Nairobi Principles, for example, it used ‘vulnerable or marginalised’ groups.308 When it 
comes to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, however, distinguishing a vulnerable 
group from a disadvantaged group does not serve any purpose, because the Commission provides 
one definition for both groups. For the sake of consistency, I use the term ‘vulnerable groups’.  
The Commission defines vulnerable groups as ‘people’. It is necessary to avoid the confusion that 
might arise from the use of the term ‘people’. Even the African Charter does not seem to use the 
term to convey a single meaning. Article 16(2) of the Charter, for example, seems to use the term 
‘people’ to refer to all individuals in the jurisdiction of states because this provision is about the 
individual right to health. The provision does not deal with collective rights guaranteed under the 
Charter. The provisions that guarantee collective rights (Articles 19 to 24 of the Charter) use the 
terms ‘people’ and its plural ‘peoples’ in a different sense. In these provisions, the term ‘peoples’ 
refer to ‘any groups or communities of people that have an identifiable interest in common, whether 
this is from the sharing of an ethnic, linguistic or other factor’.309 Thus, the term ‘people’ in the 
definition of vulnerable groups should refer to a collection of individuals, since vulnerable groups 
need not have any interest in common.  
The Commission identifies members of vulnerable groups based on whether they have faced or 
continue to face impediments to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The 
impediments or barriers faced should be significant. Whether the impediments are significant or not 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Instead of impediments, one may wonder whether it 
would have been more appropriate to define vulnerable groups as those enjoying less than the 
minimum essential levels of each right. The Commission recognises state obligations ‘to ensure the 
satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum essential levels of each of the economic, social and 
cultural rights contained in the African Charter’.310 According to the Commission, these are minimum 
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core obligations.311 Moreover, it requires states ‘to ensure the minimum essential levels of each right 
to members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’ even during demonstrable resource 
constraints.312        
The Commission’s definition of vulnerable group, one may argue, is capable of universal application: 
any group of persons who have faced or continue to face impediments to their enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights can qualify as a vulnerable group. In addition to the definition, 
the Commission provides an extensive list of vulnerable groups:  
Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups include, but are not limited to, women, linguistic, racial, religious 
minorities, children (particularly orphans, young girls, children of low-income groups, children in rural 
areas, children of immigrants and of migrant workers, children belonging to linguistic, racial, religious or 
other minorities, and children belonging to indigenous populations/communities), youth, the elderly, 
people living with, or affected by, HIV/AIDS, and other persons with terminal illnesses, persons with 
persistent medical problems, child and female-headed households and victims of natural disasters, 
indigenous populations/communities, persons with disabilities, victims of sexual and economic 
exploitation, detainees, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and intersex people, victims of natural 
disasters and armed conflict, refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced populations, legal or illegal 
migrant workers, slum dwellers, landless and nomadic pastoralists, workers in the informal sector of the 
economy and subsistence agriculture, persons living in informal settlements and workers in irregular forms 
of employment such as home-based workers, casual and seasonal workers.313 
The Commission’s list of vulnerable groups is long, but as the use of the phrase ‘groups include, but 
are not limited to’ indicates, it is not exhaustive. The list is, however, more complete than the 
CESCR’s list. It includes all human beings except adult males in certain age groups. The Commission 
considers children, youth and the elderly among vulnerable groups. One may estimate these age 
groups to constitute more than half of any country’s population. When one adds women, who 
usually constitute more than half of any country’s population, to the above age groups as vulnerable, 
it is possible to imagine that the chance of an individual belonging to at least one of the vulnerable 
groups is very high, indicating the Commission’s definition is very broad.    
The African Charter guarantees economic, social and cultural rights to individuals. However, the 
Commission defines a group, not an individual, as vulnerable. One may still accept the Commission’s 
group based approach. This is because it is more reasonable to expect states to adopt programs or 
measures targeting a certain group, instead of an individual; although ultimately, since groups consist 
of individual members, measures adopted to address a group benefit its individual members.    
Despite providing this long list of vulnerable groups, the Commission does not refer to any criterion 
for identifying the groups in its list. While criteria used to identify the groups, if any, are not readily 
discoverable, the relationship between the groups in the list and the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination appears conspicuous insofar as it is possible to find a vulnerable group for almost all 
prohibited grounds of discrimination that the Commission identifies. Obviously, the Commission has 
used race, sex, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, disability and age to identify a 
vulnerable group. However, the Commission does not establish a clear causal relationship between 
discrimination and vulnerability. That is, the Commission does not clearly conclude whether 
discrimination is a cause or a consequence of vulnerability.  
                                                          
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Nairobi Principles, para 1(e). 
 210 
The Commission does not state the purpose of defining and identifying vulnerable groups clearly. 
However, it identifies steps that states should take under each economic, social and cultural right for 
the benefit of vulnerable groups. For this reason, it is submitted, the Commission has defined and 
listed vulnerable groups to give them priority, although one may doubt the feasibility of according 
them priority due to the breadth of the Commission’s definition of vulnerable groups. According 
priority to vulnerable groups also entails adopting temporary special measures in favour of this 
group. However, vulnerable groups remain vulnerable unless states remove structural barriers that 
impede the enjoyment of their rights. Therefore, it is necessary to remove structural barriers or 
impediments that define vulnerability. I discuss these issues in turn shortly.  
5.5.2 Prioritisation of vulnerable groups 
In a rhetorical sense, equality is ‘a convenient way of drawing attention to the need to give priority to 
a group’ as discussed above.314 In the South African context, Wesson argues that ‘substantive 
equality allows for preference to be accorded to disadvantaged’ and it may be pursued to the extent 
that such preference is consistent with the dignity of others.315  It is submitted that an understanding 
of equality as a requirement to give priority to vulnerable groups is traceable in the practice of the 
African Commission. 
Like the CESCR, the African Commission requires that states ‘pay particular attention to members of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’ to ensure ‘effective equality in the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights’.316 It is clear from this requirement that states should not neglect members 
of vulnerable groups in any measure taken to implement economic, social and cultural rights. As 
observed above with regard to the CESCR, the requirement of paying particular attention to 
vulnerable groups amounts to a requirement of priority. The Commission’s emphasis on priority for 
vulnerable groups buttresses this submission. Under the requirements of equality and non-
discrimination, for example, the Commission has emphasised prioritisation of members of vulnerable 
groups with regard to the right to health and housing. Equality and non-discrimination under the 
right to health require states to ensure that ‘national plans prioritise members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in access to health care’.317 Similarly, the Commission has stressed state 
obligations to ensure that ‘priority in housing and land allocation should be given to members of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’ according to the requirement of equality and non-
discrimination.318 Therefore, the Commission adopts prioritarianism. 
The Commission’s priority view, like the CESCR, also springs from economic, social and cultural rights 
themselves. The Commission specified that this requirement is applicable to both immediate and 
progressive state obligations. With regard to minimum core obligations, which are immediate, the 
Commission observed that ‘the State should still implement measures to ensure the minimum 
essential levels of each right to members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, particularly by 
prioritising them in all interventions’ even when the state faces demonstrable resource 
constraints.319 With regard to state obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights under the 
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African Charter, the Commission stressed that the ‘rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups 
should be prioritised in all programmes of social and economic development’.320 
5.5.3 Temporary special measures 
Temporary special measures are an example of the priority view as discussed above. The principles of 
equality and non-discrimination require states to take temporary special measures in favour of 
vulnerable groups. The African Commission has also adopted a similar view. However, the 
Commission has suggested that the requirement to take temporary special measures can also arise 
from another source. In the Endorois case, the African Commission held that states should take 
special measures to protect the interests and benefits of indigenous communities in their traditional 
land.321 Rejecting an argument by the respondent State that such measures may be perceived as 
discriminatory, it held that ‘in certain cases, positive discrimination or affirmative action helps to 
redress imbalance’.322 The Commission did not link the concept to the right to equality under Article 
3 of the Charter; it drew on international law and held that ‘unequal treatment towards persons in 
unequal situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible discrimination’.323 Two conclusions, 
it is submitted, may flow from the Commission’s holdings in the Endorois case: First, states parties to 
the African Charter should take affirmative action in favour of indigenous people whom the 
Commission recognises as vulnerable groups. Second, affirmative action is not discriminatory. 
In the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission derives temporary special measures directly from 
the right to equality. The Commission has declared that 
The right to equality includes the adoption of special measures for the purpose of securing the 
adequate advancement of members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to enable their equal 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. This means that in some cases States will have to 
take temporary special measures in favour of these groups in order to reduce or suppress conditions 
that perpetuate discrimination and to realise substantive equality.324 
The Commission has explained that the right to equality entails temporary special measures, 
however, it does not refer to Article 3 of the Charter, which guarantees the right to equality. As 
discussed above (Section 3), the African Charter also guarantees a collective right to equality under 
Article 19. Thus, one may wonder whether the right to equality of peoples also entails temporary 
special measures. The Nairobi Principles deal with economic, social and cultural rights, which are 
individual rights. The right to equality in the above quote, one may argue, refers to Article 3 of the 
Charter. This conclusion, however, does not bar the reading of Article 19 as requiring temporary 
special measures because the Commission has already required affirmative action for the benefit of 
indigenous people in the Endorois case.325      
The African Commission clearly specifies that the beneficiaries of temporary special measures are 
vulnerable groups. As the phrase ‘in some cases’ indicates the Commission finds that it is not 
necessary to take such measures in every case. However, the Commission does not identify the cases 
in which it is necessary to adopt temporary special measures. It appears, rather, to give states some 
discretion to identify vulnerable groups that need temporary special measures. Nevertheless, this 
                                                          
320 Nairobi Principles, para 12. Italics added. 
321 Endorois case, para 187 &196. 
322 Endorois case, para 196. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Nairobi Principles, para 34. Italics added. 
325 Endorois case, para 187 &196. 
 212 
does not prevent the Commission from specifying particular cases where states should adopt 
temporary special measures. For example, with regard to women’s right to work, the Commission 
explained that states should take ‘special steps to ensure that women have equal opportunities to 
accept employment’.326 Thus, special education and training programmes should be provided to 
women to equip them to seek decent work of their own choice.327  
The African Commission explains the purpose of temporary special measures. It is to enable the 
beneficiaries to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights on equal footing with others.328 It also 
provides how states should attain this purpose.  
 Such temporary special measures should accelerate the improvement of the position of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups to achieve their de facto or substantive equality, and to effect the 
structural, social and cultural changes necessary to correct past and current forms and effects of 
discrimination, as well as to provide them with compensation.329  
To achieve equality in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, the Commission seems 
to require states:  a) to reduce or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination;330 b) to effect 
the structural, social and cultural changes necessary to correct past and current forms and effects of 
discrimination; c) to achieve de facto or substantive equality; and d) to provide compensation. In 
form, it appears that the Commission requires states to discharge several duties. In effect, the first 
two items (reducing causes of discrimination and effecting structural changes) are the means for 
achieving the third item (achieving substantive equality). Requiring states to provide compensation 
(the last item) appears to be more of a remedy than a temporary special measure.  
In principle, temporary special measures are not permanent – as the name itself indicates. They 
should be discontinued when the disadvantages intended to be removed cease to exist.331 The 
Commission does not mention whether some of those measures can exceptionally be permanent. In 
contrast, the CESCR recognises that special measures can be permanent in exceptional cases.332 
Peculiar examples include ‘interpretation services for linguistic minorities and reasonable 
accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in accessing health-care facilities’.333 According 
to the Committee, denial of a reasonable accommodation, by definition, constitutes 
discrimination.334 Thus, the concept does not fall within the purview of temporary special measures. 
One may examine the Commission’s view on temporary special measures against the limitations 
identified in equality theories. As discussed above, Fineman argues that affirmative action policies, at 
least in the United States, are limited because they focus on historic individual identity categories.335 
The Commission approach, it is submitted, does not suffer from this limitation. This is because the 
Commission requires temporary special measures for all vulnerable groups. Vulnerable groups, 
according to the Commission’s definition examined above, are not limited to historic individual 
identity categories. For example, victims of a natural disaster who had never suffered from historic 
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disadvantage can benefit from temporary special measures because they are members of vulnerable 
groups according to the Commission’s definition.336 
Another limitation that Fineman identifies is that affirmative action policies cannot address the more 
complicated forms of disadvantage entrenched in institutions.337 Fredman also recognises that 
affirmative action policies cannot bring about a radical programme of structural change.338 However, 
the African Commission seems to adopt a different view. The Commission requires states ‘to effect 
the structural, social and cultural changes necessary to correct past and current forms and effects of 
discrimination’ through temporary special measures.339 Noting that structural changes have a lasting 
effect, one may argue that they are not temporary special measures. I will next examine the practice 
of the African Commission to identify whether it requires states to adopt structural changes. 
5.5.4 Structural changes  
According to equality theories discussed above, it is necessary to address the social structures that 
cause inequalities. Like the CESCR, the African Commission requires states to modify the social 
structures that cause inequalities, particularly in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights by vulnerable groups. According to the Commission, ‘States must pay particular attention to 
members of vulnerable’ groups to ensure ‘effective equality in the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights’.340 The Commission explains that two reasons justify this requirement. First, members 
of vulnerable groups ‘are often disproportionately affected by a failure of the State to ensure 
economic, social and cultural rights’.341 Second, members of vulnerable groups ‘are direct victims of 
discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices’.342 In other words, the Commission explains 
that discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices are reasons for the lack of enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights by members of vulnerable groups. In the long list of vulnerable 
groups, the Commission focuses on the situation of women, indigenous peoples, and persons with 
disabilities, occasionally referring to other vulnerable groups. For this reason, I focus on social 
structures that impede the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by women, indigenous 
peoples, and persons with disabilities.  
5.5.4.1 Women 
The African Commission has underlined that because of ‘entrenched patterns of sex/gender 
discrimination, women often do not enjoy equality in relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights’.343 Thus, the Commission recognises that discrimination against women is the cause that 
impedes the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by women. The Commission 
emphasises this causal relationship in almost every right. For example, with regard to women’s right 
to property under Article 14 of the African Charter, the Commission recognises that women 
‘continue to experience difficulty with regard to access to economic opportunities, particularly land 
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holding’ in many parts of Africa’.344 Defined by gender hierarchy, ‘most cultures and traditions often 
deny female children rights of inheritance’.345 Women usually depend on men who are entitled to 
inherit land, which is an essential resource to produce food or to build a house. By requiring states to 
‘ensure equitable and non-discriminatory access, acquisition, ownership, inheritance and control of 
land and housing, especially by women,’ the Commission is indicating that the cause of deprivation is 
discrimination.346 Therefore, states should ‘modify or prohibit harmful social, cultural or other 
practices that prevent women’ from enjoying their right to property.347 
The Commission identifies misrecognition of the economic value of caregiving and other household 
work as one of the structural barriers to the enjoyment of women’s right to work under Article 15 of 
the African Charter. Thus, the Commission has stressed that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination require states to take ‘the necessary measures to recognise the economic value of 
care giving and other household work, for example, subsistence and market gardening, cooking, and 
caring for children and the elderly’.348 They should also ‘adopt systems that record the value of 
women’s unpaid contributions to society’ when they prepare their national budget.349 The Protocol 
to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa expressly requires states to discharge this 
obligation. The Protocol provides that states have the obligation to ‘take the necessary measures to 
recognise the economic value of the work of women in the home’.350 This requirement now forms 
one of the targets under the Sustainable Development Goal 5: ‘Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls’. The target is to ‘[r]ecognize and value unpaid care and domestic work 
through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the 
promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate’.351     
Discrimination against women goes beyond their access to resources. It affects their body and the 
enjoyment of their right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter. Research findings show 
that female genital mutilation and violence against women are some of the cultural practices that 
‘continue to endanger the health and well-being of African women and girls’.352 Therefore, the 
African Commission underscores state obligations to eliminate ‘harmful traditional practices, 
including particularly female genital mutilation, that interfere with the right to health’.353 They should 
also take ‘measures to prevent violence against women’.354 Such measures include, among other 
things, community mobilisation and education, counselling and education of men, and training of 
health and law enforcement personnel.355 
Violence against women, when it occurs despite preventive measures, constitutes a violation of the 
right to health and the right to equality and non-discrimination as the Commission held in the 
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Egyptian GBV case.356 The case involves sexual assault on some women who participated in a 
demonstration, a protest against the government. The police officers expressly told the assaulted 
women that the violence and the assault were because women came ‘to the areas belonging to 
men’.357 This clearly shows that agents of the respondent State actually believe that women should 
not take part in public gatherings. This practice of excluding women from public spaces constitutes a 
structural barrier to the enjoyment of their rights. The Commission has recognised the systemic 
nature of the violence explaining the context in which it happened: ‘perpetrators of the assaults 
seemed to be aware of the context of the Egyptian society; an Arab Muslim society where a woman’s 
virtue is measured by keeping herself physically and sexually unexposed except to her husband’.358  
The Commission has held that: ‘Victims were physically and emotionally traumatized as a result of 
sexual violence and assaults on their person. The trauma and injuries sustained has affected their 
physical, psychological and mental health clearly in violation of Article 16(1) of the African 
Charter’.359 One may acclaim the Commission for identifying structural barriers to enjoyment of the 
right to health by women; at the same time, the Commission’s decision is disappointing for failing to 
provide appropriate remedies that address the identified structural barriers, unlike the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.360   
In Negash v Ethiopia, the African Commission has examined alleged violations of non-discrimination 
(Article 2) and the respondent State’s duty to eliminate discrimination against women (Article 18(3)). 
The communication concerns the abduction, rape and subsequent captivity of a 13-year-old girl. 
Although the communication has been about one girl, the Commission established that the practice 
of marriage by abduction and rape has continued to exist in the respondent State.361  As a result, the 
Commission noted that ‘other girls and women are under a continuing risk of being abducted, raped 
and forcibly married’.362 It has emphasised that ‘the Respondent State is under the obligation to 
adopt escalated and targeted measures to ensure that this practice ceases completely’.363 The 
Commission has ordered the respondent State to take measures, which include ‘launching 
sensitisation campaigns in the area about the illegality of the practice of forced marriage by 
abduction and rape and the attendant penal consequences’.364  
By ordering sensitisation campaigns, one may argue, the African Commission requires states to 
modify social structures that impede the enjoyment of rights by women. However, the Commission 
misses a couple of important points in Negash v Ethiopia. First, the Commission has recognised the 
prevalence of the practice of marriage by abduction and rape in Ethiopia. It ascertained the practice 
is a crime, but the Ethiopian authorities failed to protect the victim. Yet the Commission has failed to 
find a violation of non-discrimination (both Articles 2 and 18(3)) despite the allegations to that effect. 
Such facts would have amounted to structural discrimination against women according to the Inter-
American Court.365 Second, the Commission has stipulated in the Nairobi Principles that equality and 
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to health (Article 16 of the Charter) require states to 
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take ‘measures to prevent violence against women,’366 stressing that such measures include 
criminalisation of rape, punishment of offenders, community mobilisation and education, and 
training of health and law enforcement personnel.367 In Negash v Ethiopia, however, the Commission 
failed to examine a violation of the right to health. 
5.5.4.2 Indigenous peoples 
The African Commission identifies indigenous peoples as vulnerable groups, defining and describing 
them as follows: 
[Indigenous people are] any group of people whose culture and way of life and mode of production 
differ considerably from the dominant society, whose culture depends on access and rights to their 
traditional land and the natural resources thereon, and whose cultures are under threat. They suffer 
from discrimination as they are regarded as less developed and less advanced than other more 
dominant sectors of society, which often prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in 
deciding on their own future and forms of development.368    
Being discriminated against is indigenous people’s defining feature. The Commission, through its 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa, has also found that the dominant 
sectors of society consider indigenous peoples ‘underdeveloped’, ‘backward’, and ‘primitive’.369 They 
have been subjected to negative stereotypes and discrimination.370 The Commission’s Working 
Group has identified deplorable conditions with regard to indigenous peoples’ access to the 
enjoyment of some economic, social and cultural rights,  and has furthermore observed that ‘the 
health situation of indigenous peoples is often very precarious and receives very limited attention’ 
due to ‘the general marginalization that indigenous peoples suffer from economically and 
politically’.371 The Working Group concluded that indigenous people’s ‘health situation is in many 
cases extremely critical and this is a violation of Article 16 of the African Charter’.372 The Working 
Group also examined the level of enjoyment of the right to education by indigenous peoples. For 
most indigenous peoples, the Working Group found poor literacy rates and school attendance.373 For 
example, the Working Group found that the rate of primary school attendance among the Batwa, an 
indigenous community in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is 11% as opposed to 72% nationally.374 
Indigenous peoples face the most serious violation with regard to the enjoyment of their right to 
property. By definition, their culture ‘depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the 
natural resources thereon’.375 Therefore, access to land and natural resources is essential to the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by indigenous people. For this reason, the 
Commission’s Working Group has concluded that dispossession of ‘land and natural resources is a 
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major human rights problem for indigenous peoples’.376 This is because land and other natural 
resources are sources of food, water, and medicine and places of shelter and worship for indigenous 
peoples. By taking away land from indigenous people, states violate their economic, social and 
cultural rights, including the rights to food, to water and to housing. 
The purpose of dispossession of indigenous peoples has been ‘to give way for the economic interests 
of other more dominant groups and to large scale development initiatives that tend to destroy their 
lives and cultures’.377 The Commission’s Working Group has found that the land occupied by 
indigenous peoples is considered terra nullius, which means nobody’s land.378 The assumption that 
their land is ‘empty or not used productively has stimulated land alienation at all levels’.379 Besides, 
the Working Group has found that indigenous peoples have limited ‘legal titles to their land as their 
customary laws and regulations are not recognized or respected and as national legislation in many 
cases does not provide for collective titling of land’.380      
In their case law, the African Commission and the African Court have examined cases alleging 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous peoples. The issue of access to land 
and natural resources is central in all cases. The African Commission identifies Ogoni people of 
Nigeria among indigenous people, ‘who have been denied rights to the rich oil resources’ found on 
their land.381 The drilling operation by Shell Oil Company since 1958 decreased Ogoni people’s 
agricultural production and fishing catches.382 In relation to oil exploration on the Ogoniland, the 
African Commission found violations of some economic, social and cultural rights of the Ogonis. It 
declared a violation of the right to food because the government of Nigeria ‘has destroyed food 
sources through its security forces and state oil company; has allowed private oil companies to 
destroy food sources; and, through terror, has created significant obstacles to Ogoni communities 
trying to feed themselves’.383 It also found violations of the rights to health and to housing.384 
Although the Commission found discrimination contrary to Article 2 of the Charter, it has not clearly 
identified the ground of discrimination.385  
In the Endorois case, the African Commission examined eviction of Endorois Communities of Kenya 
from their ancestral land. It has recognised that indigenous peoples face several challenges, including 
‘exclusion, exploitation, discrimination and extreme poverty; displacement from their traditional 
territories and deprivation of their means of subsistence’.386 The complainants have submitted to the 
Commission that: 
Common problems faced by indigenous groups include the lack of "formal" title recognition of their 
historic territories, the failure of domestic legal systems to acknowledge communal property rights, 
and the claiming of formal legal title to indigenous land by the colonial authorities. This [...] has led to 
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many cases of displacement from a people's historic territory, both by colonial authorities and post-
colonial states relying on the legal title they inherited from the colonial authorities.387 
The African Commission seems to agree with the complainants, since it proposed a solution for these 
common problems. It emphasised that ‘the first step in the protection of traditional African 
communities is the acknowledgement that the rights, interests and benefits of such communities in 
their traditional lands constitute “property” under the Charter’.388 Relying heavily on the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission has drawn the following 
conclusions:  
(1) traditional possession of land by indigenous people has the equivalent effect as that of a state-
granted full property title; (2) traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand official 
recognition and registration of property title; (3) the members of indigenous peoples who have 
unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, 
even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in 
good faith; and (4) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their 
lands, when those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to 
restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.389 
Therefore, the African Commission devised a solution for the problem of indigenous peoples’ limited 
legal entitlement to their land. Based on these conclusions, the Commission declared that ‘the land 
of the Endorois has been encroached upon’.390 It ordered restitution and compensation because the 
eviction of Endorois indigenous people from their ancestral land is a violation of their right to 
property (article 14 of the African Charter).391 The Commission stresses that the right to property 
requires states to ensure that indigenous peoples are ‘adequately compensated for both historical 
and current destruction or alienation of wealth and resources’.392  
In the Ogiek case, the African Commission submitted to the African Court a case concerning the 
Ogiek people, an indigenous community evicted from Mau Forest by the Republic of Kenya. In line 
with its findings in the Endorois case, the African Commission argued before the Court that ‘the 
failure of the Respondent to recognise the Ogieks as an indigenous community denies them the right 
to communal ownership of land as provided in Article 14 of the Charter’.393 The Commission has 
further submitted that ‘the Ogieks' eviction and dispossession of their land without their consent and 
without adequate compensation, and the granting of concessions of their land to third parties, mean 
that their land has been encroached upon’.394 Noting that Article 14 of the Charter is applicable to 
groups and communities, the African Court held that the Ogieks have ‘the right to occupy their 
ancestral lands, as well as use and enjoy the said lands’.395 It concluded that ‘by expelling the Ogieks 
from their ancestral lands against their will, without prior consultation and without respecting the 
conditions of expulsion in the interest of public need, the Respondent violated their rights to land’.396 
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The African Commission argued before the African Court that the differential treatment of the Ogieks 
‘in relation to the lack of respect for their property rights’, among other things, ‘constitutes unlawful 
discrimination and is a violation of Article 2 of the Charter’.397 The African Court in turn ascertained 
that the Ogieks requested recognition as a tribe in 1933, long before Kenya achieved its 
independence, but were denied recognition at that time.398 It also found that the denial of 
recognition ‘denied them access to their own land as, at the time, only those who had tribal status 
were given land,’ and that this condition of the Ogieks has continued after the independence of 
Kenya and came before the Court for determination.399 The Court has concluded that Kenya’s 
conduct, that is, ‘failing to recognise the Ogieks' status as a distinct tribe like other similar groups and 
thereby denying them the rights available to other tribes,’400 constitutes discrimination ‘based on 
ethnicity and/or “other status” in terms of Article 2 of the Charter’.401 
None of these cases clearly demonstrate that discriminatory law is one of the main social structures 
that impede the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by indigenous peoples. As 
discussed above, the African Commission has not stated its reason for finding discrimination in the 
Ogoniland case. It has not even found discrimination in the Endorois case. Based on the 
Commission’s argument, the African Court has found discrimination in the Ogiek case; but the Court 
shied away from identifying discrimination as a structural problem. Still, the decisions in these cases, 
one may argue, address social structures that impede indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights. A comparison with decisions made in the Inter-American system illustrates 
this point.   
The decisions in these cases, at least in some respects, are similar to the arguments of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the decision of the Inter-American Court in Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay as discussed above.402 According to the argument of the 
Inter-American Commission before the Inter-American Court, that case ‘illustrates the persistence of 
structural discrimination factors in Paraguayan law with regard to the protection’ of the right to 
property of the indigenous peoples.403 The Inter-American Commission submitted that legal 
provisions in Paraguayan law ‘result in the discriminatory functioning of the State system, because 
they give preference to the protection of the right to “rationally productive” private property over 
the protection of the territorial rights of an indigenous population’.404  The Inter-American Court has 
found that ‘the prevalence of a vision of property that grants greater protection to the private 
owners over the indigenous peoples’ territorial claims’ is one of the factors that reveals ‘de facto 
discrimination against the members of the Xákmok Kásek Community’.405 
In the Endorois case, the African Commission has dealt with problems similar to those faced by the 
Xákmok Kásek Community. As the African Commission identified in its report on indigenous peoples 
and in the Endorois case, one of the problems is the lack of recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
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customary rules of communal land ownership.406 For this reason, the African Commission has 
recognised collective land ownership by indigenous people without obliging them to have a formal 
title.407 In effect, the African Commission has determined that the systems of private property in 
African States exclude indigenous peoples, and for this reason, they are discriminatory. Unlike the 
Inter-American Commission, however, the African Commission has avoided declaring that the laws 
establishing private property systems constitute structural discrimination against indigenous peoples. 
Similarly, the African Court has also avoided that kind of pronouncement in the Ogiek case. 
The Ogoniland case is, however, different from the Endorois and the Ogiek cases. It does not deal 
with the respondent State’s failure to recognise communal land ownership. One may identify the 
structural problem to be the laws that grant concessions to the oil company without regulating the 
impact of oil extraction on the livelihood of the Ogonis, particularly the enjoyment of their rights to 
food, to housing, to water, and to health. These laws, one may argue, are discriminatory, like the 
laws establishing and maintaining private property systems. The laws benefit members of dominant 
sectors of society, who include, one may assume, users of services funded by tax revenues from the 
companies, the employees receiving income, shareholders reaping profits and others. The benefits 
do not only exclude indigenous people, the Ogonis in this case, but also cause them multiple forms of 
suffering, for example, sickness due to the contamination of water and the pollution of air. One may 
further argue that the orders and remedies made by the African Commission can address these 
problems. The remedies include compensation for the victims and cleaning up of the pollution. The 
Commission has also required environmental and social impact assessments in future oil 
development programmes.408        
5.5.4.3 Persons with Disabilities 
Persons with disabilities are a category of vulnerable groups. In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, the 
African Commission had the opportunity to deal with some structural problems impeding the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by persons with disabilities. It decided this 
communication in 2003. The Commission examined, among other things, the respondent State’s law 
called the Lunatics Detention Act,409 which subjects persons with mental disability to an indefinite 
institutionalisation.410 The Act resulted in ‘the practice of detaining persons regarded as mentally ill 
indefinitely’ in an overcrowded psychiatric unit.411 The Act was archaic since it was promulgated in 
1917 and amended in 1964.412 The respondent State has admitted that there were no significant 
resource shortages, at least with regard to drug supplies.413 The Commission confirmed that persons 
who would be detained under the Act are ‘likely to be people picked up from the streets or people 
from poor backgrounds’.414 The Commission also ascertained that the scheme of Lunatics Detention 
Act was ‘lacking in terms of therapeutic objectives as well as provision of matching resources and 
programmes of treatment’.415 The Commission found the Gambia in violation of the right to health 
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under Article 16 of the African Charter.416 Moreover, the Commission held that the detention of 
persons with mental disabilities without providing them with legal assistance violates both Articles 2 
and 3 of the Charter (non-discrimination and the right to equality).417 
The Lunatics Detention Act itself, one may argue, is a discriminatory law, since this law makes 
disability in itself a justification for the deprivation of liberty. This is not acceptable nowadays. 
Deinstitutionalisation has been attracting the attention of policymakers.418 Human rights treaty 
bodies emphasise that disability cannot justify institutionalisation.419 In particular, the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities usually underlines that an accelerated process of 
deinstitutionalisation is necessary. For example, it has stressed that a state must ‘expedite the 
process of deinstitutionalization and implement, without delay, its action plan for 
deinstitutionalization, including timelines for closing all remaining institutions’.420 Of course, most of 
these developments in the rights of persons with disabilities have taken place after the Commission’s 
decision in 2003. As a result, the African Commission did not find the Act discriminatory. One may 
still argue that the Commission indirectly identified the Act as the major factor impeding the 
enjoyment of the right to health. The Commission has ordered the respondent State to repeal the 
Lunatics Detention Act. Therefore, the Commission’s remedy has the same effect of addressing the 
problem.  
The Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities drafted by the African 
Commission emphasises that ‘The existence of a disability or perceived disability shall in no case 
justify deprivation of liberty’.421 Moreover, the Commission identified in the protocol several 
structural problems that impede the enjoyment of rights by persons with disabilities. For example, 
the protocol stresses that states should take ‘measures to modify or abolish existing policies, laws, 
regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities’.422  
In the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission explained state obligations with regard to persons 
with disabilities. It has underlined that the right to work under Article 15 of the African Charter 
requires states to promote ‘employment opportunities and career advancement for persons with 
disabilities in the labour market, as well as assistance in finding, maintaining and returning to 
employment’.423 They should have ‘effective access to general technical and vocational guidance 
programmes’.424 The Commission emphasises that the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
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and the right to health under Article 16 require the ‘provision of those specific health services 
needed by persons with psychosocial, intellectual and physical disabilities’.425  
In sum, the practice under the African Charter (particularly that of the African Commission) shows 
that equality in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by the vulnerable groups 
requires states to modify social structures that impede their enjoyment. Such social structures 
include discriminatory laws and customary rules and practices. The Commission does not usually 
declare those laws and practices discriminatory; however, the Commission does address these 
structural problems through remedies (eg, recognition of communal land ownership and an order to 
repeal discriminatory laws).    
5.6 Conclusion 
Equality is a contested concept, with as many theories and definitions as there are theorists. This 
chapter has attempted to identify meanings and theories of equality that address problems in the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, and has argued that a substantive conception of 
equality may mean according priority to the worse-off and that this includes the adoption of 
affirmative action policies. The Chapter has also argued that it is necessary to modify disadvantaging 
social structures, including legal or customary rules, institutions, practices, procedures and attitudes, 
to achieve substantive equality. In light of these requirements, the Chapter has investigated the 
practice of the CESCR, the European Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and Inter-American Court of Human Rights.     
The African Charter enshrines the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The African 
Commission draws on the jurisprudence of other international human rights bodies and explains 
state obligations under the African Charter with regard to economic, social and cultural rights. Like 
the CESCR, the Commission has explained that non-discrimination is an immediate state obligation. 
The Commission defines and identifies vulnerable groups, and conceives equality and non-
discrimination as requirements to improve the plight of vulnerable groups. To achieve effective 
equality in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, the Commission requires states to 
give priority to vulnerable groups. The Commission recognises that persons deprived of their 
economic, social and cultural rights largely overlap with those suffering from discrimination based on 
prohibited grounds. In particular, the Commission requires states to adopt temporary special 
measures for the benefit of vulnerable groups. Above all, the Commission requires states to modify 
social structures including discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices in the Nairobi 
Principles. In its case law, the Commission does not declare such structures discriminatory, but 
provides remedies to address the structural problems. The Commission sometimes fails to identify 
discriminatory structural factors, particularly with regard to women’s rights.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE PARTICIPATION 
6.1 Introduction 
Participation is an important element in the assessment of the progressive realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights, the principal state obligation discussed in Chapter 2.1 States have the 
obligation to ensure the participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of their 
economic, social and cultural rights. The obligation to ensure participation corresponds to the 
recognition of participation as a right in international human rights law. Participation is ‘an end in 
itself, which meets a fundamental aspiration of human beings’.2 As social animals, human beings 
value participation in political and social life, which may justify the recognition of participation as a 
right.3 The right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and other related rights such as freedoms 
of assembly, association, expression and information are recognized as political rights. In addition to 
its intrinsic value, participation is an essential means of ‘ensuring the full exercise of human rights’.4 
As is the case with other rights, participation plays an important role in the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. States have the obligation to take measures to implement these 
rights. Such measures can be legislative, judicial, administrative or others. This chapter examines the 
instrumental role of the participation of individuals and groups in measures taken to implement their 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
The chapter examines the theoretical basis of the roles of participation in the second section. In fact, 
the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights involves political decisions. Participation 
in those decisions enables individuals to bring their interests to the attention of public officials and 
demand the realisation of their rights. Participation in political decisions requires the exercise of 
political rights by individuals and groups, and at the same time, has consequences for the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. The deprivation of these rights may arise 
from the lack of participation. In the fight against social exclusion, the notion of indivisibility of 
human rights takes special importance. The second section identifies roles of participation, its 
relation to deprivation and its recognition as a right.   
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)5 and the European 
Social Charter (European Charter)6 do not guarantee the right to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs and other related political rights. These treaties do not provide for participation as a right, and 
as a result, human rights bodies monitoring the implementation of these treaties arguably lack a 
mandate in this sphere. Yet the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the 
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European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee) address participation in their 
supervision. The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) guarantees political 
rights.7 Nevertheless, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) does not 
derive participation in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights from political 
rights, although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) has 
requested such an interpretation. While these treaty bodies establish the obligation to ensure the 
participation of everyone, their practice usually relates to those deprived of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The third section examines the practice of these treaty bodies and their legal basis for 
requiring states to ensure participation. The purpose of this section is to provide a background for 
the discussion of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).8 
The African Charter guarantees all categories of rights. As a result, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Court) have the mandate to supervise the implementation of all rights. The African 
Commission requires states parties to ensure participation in the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights. However, it does not always explain the legal basis of this requirement, and when 
it does, it lacks consistency. The fourth section examines the practice of the African Commission and 
the African Court. This section focuses on the Commission since the Court has yet to develop its 
jurisprudence in this area. The last section provides conclusions.         
6.2 An overview of participation  
Participation has an intrinsic value, which is protected by guaranteeing civil and political rights, as 
already mentioned. Regarding the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, 
participation plays an instrumental role. This section first identifies different roles of participation 
and focuses on the instrumental role. Next, the section explores the relationship between 
participation and the deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights. Finally, this section deals 
with participation as a right recognised in international human rights law.  
6.2.1 Roles of participation 
Participation plays three roles.9 In the first place, it has an intrinsic importance. Participation is 
priceless irrespective of the outcome it produces. The mere fact that people cast their votes or 
attend a meeting about the implementation of a policy is valuable in itself. This is because, as Sen 
explains, it is reasonable for human beings ‘to value unrestrained participation in political and social 
activities’.10 Participation provides a psychological benefit.11 When people increase their 
‘participation in the institutions affecting their lives, they develop a sense of their worth and 
significance’.12 Participation provides a ‘possibility of self-realization through development of the 
social self as a member of the polity’.13  
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Participation also plays a constructive role.14 People develop their preferences through participation. 
In other words, people derive ‘their own preferences through encounters with others’.15 Through 
discussions, people may identify the problems affecting the implementation of their rights. For 
example, a public discussion may concern crises in an education system. Some participants may raise 
the issue of student discipline as a problem. Others may be concerned about shortage of funding. 
Still others may worry about the relevance of school curricula. If the participants conclude that 
school curricula require revision, participation played a constructive role because the public 
discussion led to the conceptualisation of the problem itself.     
The main focus of this chapter is the instrumental role of participation. Participation plays an 
instrumental role when it is a means of achieving a particular objective.16 In national elections, for 
example, people vote to elect a candidate of their choice into an office. Voting is just a means of 
achieving one’s choice of candidate. Similarly, participation in the formulation and implementation of 
a particular policy is to ensure that it takes into account the interests of the participants. In other 
words, participation produces an outcome, including a material benefit.17 In these examples, the 
outcome is the most favourite policy or leader, and participation is thus a means of achieving these 
outcomes. Avoiding an unwanted candidate or an alternative policy can also be an outcome. An 
outcome may include avoiding a dreadful deprivation such as famine.  
Participation can be an instrument of efficiency and effectiveness. According to one empirical study, 
institutions ‘that are more open to the public and more actively seek its input achieve higher results 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness’.18 An institution is effective when it achieves the desired 
results. Thus, effectiveness implies meeting objectives.19 For example, an institution may design a 
project to provide clean water for 100 households. If all the households obtain access to clean water 
after the implementation of the project, it is effective; the objective has been met. On the other 
hand, efficiency requires ‘making the best use of resources’.20 In this example, the project may be 
inefficient if it consumes resources that can provide clean water to more than 100 households. 
Effectiveness is a precondition for efficiency because whether a project has made the best use of 
resources cannot be measured when that project has never been implemented.21 Efficiency and 
effectiveness are principles of good governance.22  
Efficiency and effectiveness result from the quality of decisions reached through participation. 
Citizens work together with experts to identify and resolve collective problems.23 Individuals 
enduring sufferings such as the deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights may approach 
their problems from different perspectives when compared with the approach of bureaucratic 
                                                          
14 Sen (n 3) 148. 
15 Rod Dacombe, Rethinking Civic Participation in Democratic Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 27. 
16 Sen (n 3) 148. 
17 Steiner (n 11) 105. 
18 Milena I Neshkova & Hai (David) Guo, ‘Public Participation and Organizational Performance: Evidence from State 
Agencies’ (2012) 22 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 267–288, 282. 
19 Valencia Declaration, adopted by 15th Conference of European Ministers responsible for local and regional government 
(Valencia, 15-16 October 2007), Annex I, available 
<https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805d47c5> accessed 2 August 2018. 
20 Valencia Declaration, Annex I. 
21 Ulrich Karpen, ‘Good Governance’ (2010) 12 European Journal of Law Reform 16-31, 29. 
22 Valencia Declaration, Annex I. Of the 12 principles of good governance of the Council of Europe, one is efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
23 Dacombe (n 15) 28. 
 226 
experts. Since they bear the brunt of the deprivation, they may provide invaluable inputs in terms of 
identifying the cause of the problem.24 They can propose an effective solution for the problems they 
are facing.25 On the other hand, experts do not necessarily face the problem themselves. As a result, 
they cannot have the lived experiences of the deprived. According to Wesson, ‘legislators, and 
affluent members of society in general, tend to have little social interaction with poor people, or 
people dependent upon welfare, and therefore lack an understanding of their problems’.26 However, 
experts have the technical knowledge. The blend of the lived experience and technical expertise 
produces a better outcome at least in theory. Put differently, ‘public agencies can become more 
efficient and effective by seeking greater input from the public and incorporating it in their decision 
making’.27 In fact, empirical evidence indicates that ‘the public contributes to more economical 
allocation of state resources’.28  
Participation is a means of controlling the mobilisation and allocation of resources. In general, 
participation has the ability ‘to enhance popular control over the actions of public officials and 
representatives working in democratic institutions’.29 Citizen control represents the highest degree of 
participation.30 Citizens are in control of their community development programmes when they 
govern those programmes including both policy and managerial aspects.31 Citizen control has a 
profound effect on how resources are generated and allocated, whether the participation takes place 
at the local level in communities or at higher levels of administrative hierarchies. With respect to 
mobilising resources, for example, a meaningful participation can influence the source and number 
of tax revenues, which in turn affect the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.  
A meaningful participation also influences the allocation of resources. Citizens can put pressure on 
their government to address situations that may lead to catastrophic events such as famine. Famine 
is a serious violation of, among other rights, the right to food. Using empirical evidence, Sen 
demonstrates that famine has never happened in jurisdictions where people exercise a meaningful 
participation in the conduct of public affairs.32 People can draw the attention of their government to 
conditions leading to famine. This can be done through public criticisms including demonstrations. 
Leaders have the incentive to respond to people’s demand when they know that they have to return 
to people for support.33 Of course, a meaningful participation such as this does not happen 
everywhere. 
In addition to the benefits for the mobilisation and allocation of resources, ‘an element of citizen 
control through participatory initiatives can also add to the legitimacy of the actions taken by public 
bodies’.34  An action or a decision is legitimate when it results from a process ‘in which all persons 
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affected by the decision ought to have an equal right to participate in the process’.35 An acceptance 
of a decision enhances its legitimacy. Citizens acquire information about the practicalities of public 
administration and about difficult choices faced by public officials when they participate in decisions 
that affect them.36 In other words, participation has educational benefits; this educational function of 
participation is crucial,37 insofar as it may ‘result in higher levels of acceptance of and trust in the 
actions taken by public bodies’.38 This is particularly important when officials have to make difficult 
decisions such as ‘reallocating funding or changing eligibility criteria for social welfare payments’.39 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the CESCR and the European Committee of Social Rights require 
a genuine participation of rights holders in decisions to reduce social security benefits.  
Related to both control as well as efficiency and effectiveness is the role of participation in 
addressing corruption. Corruption decreases ‘the levels of revenue available to the government, 
which directly reduces the capacity of the government to fund basic services’.40 The reduction of 
available resources undermines the ability of states to meet their obligations with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights.41 Consequently, corruption undermines efficiency and 
effectiveness since it affects the capacity of states to carry out their objectives, such as meeting their 
international obligations while making best use of their resources. Meaningful participation by 
members of vulnerable groups helps them exercise their rights, which in turn plays an important role 
in alleviating the problem of corruption. This is because corruption is reproduced ‘when elites are 
able to perpetuate their privileges while disadvantaged groups have no means to defend their 
interests’.42 As Ely puts it, ‘those with most of the votes are in a positon to vote themselves 
advantages at the expense of the others’.43 Equal citizen participation disrupts the cycle of elite 
privileges and advantages. ‘It can help to prevent corruption at all points of decision-making’.44 Thus, 
participation is ‘part of both the human rights and anti-corruption agendas’.45 The CESCR emphasises 
participation as a means of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness and addressing corruption as 
discussed below.  
6.2.2 Participation and deprivation 
Participation and deprivation are inversely related. Deprivation inhibits participation. The lack of 
participation contributes to deprivation. Studies show that the level of participation of individuals is 
low when they are deprived.46 Deprivation may manifest itself in the form of low income or low 
levels of education, which indicates that there are barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The inverse relationship between participation and deprivation emerges whether the 
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deprived are exercising their right to vote or their right to freedom of association.47 This relationship 
is also evident in relation to institutions related to the exercise of participation, whether such 
institutions are run by elected or unelected officials. I will discuss below how institutions run by 
elected officials such as the legislature as well as those run by unelected officials such as the judiciary 
exclude the deprived.  
The effectiveness of participation depends on how the right to participate in government is 
exercised.48 It is easier to draw the attention of the government to some deprivations than others.49 
The plight of famine victims may easily attract attention while other deprivations such as 
undernourishment and illiteracy may call for ‘deeper analysis and more effective use of 
communication and political participation’.50 Although one may assume that there is better 
participation in places where democracy works well, this does not necessarily prevent deprivation. 
To use Sen’s example, the working of American democracy has not prevented ‘the extraordinary 
deprivations in health care, education, and social environment of African Americans in the United 
States’.51 Sen also notes ‘the low percentage of voting in American elections, especially by African 
Americans’.52 As Key observes, ‘if certain groups or classes of citizens habitually do not vote their 
interest will be neglected in the actions and policies of governments’.53 This argument that elected 
officials neglect social rights of groups excluded from voting was presented to the European 
Committee of Social Rights, as discussed below. 
The inverse relationship between participation and deprivation appears to lock the deprived 
individuals in a vicious circle. On the one hand, the participation of the deprived is low, at least in the 
case of voting. On the other hand, elected officials neglect the interests of those who do not vote.54 
In other words, institutions such as the legislature do not address the needs of the deprived because 
the votes of the deprived are not a threat to the power of the legislators. In short, the elected 
officials are not accountable to the deprived since votes of the deprived play no role in electing an 
official to a public office or in removing an official from that office.  
One may wonder whether institutions that do not depend on popular vote, such as courts, are more 
responsive to the interests of the deprived. As Ely observes, courts are appropriate organs to protect 
‘those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in 
attending’.55 As already noted, the elected officials might neglect the interests of the deprived. Thus, 
the deprived should be protected by courts. However, courts have their own downside. Court 
processes also show vulnerabilities in terms of the participation of the deprived. These processes 
involve limited parties.56 Courts address primarily litigants. The deprived are not necessarily among 
the litigants. It is possible that court decisions may benefit the litigants only. Moreover, court 
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processes involve specialised rules.57 The deprived may have little knowledge about these rules. Both 
factors (ie, limited parties and specialised rules) undermine the participation of the deprived. These 
factors are obstacles to ‘meaningful participation by those whose rights are affected’.58  
Therefore, courts run the risk of incurring two kinds of deficit when they adjudicate economic, social 
and cultural rights.59 One is a democratic deficit resulting from the fact that court processes are 
limited to litigants. The democratic deficit occurs when courts ‘hand down judgments which have 
major policy implications without the opportunity for large sections of the population who may be 
affected by the decision to be heard’.60 The other is a distributional deficit, which occurs when ‘those 
with the resources to access the courts gain preferential access to social benefits ahead of groups in 
a worse-off position’.61  
Silva and Terrazas explain a type of distributional deficit.62 Based on empirical data related to the 
enjoyment of the right to health, they demonstrate that court processes in Brazil operate to exclude 
the worse off and benefit the better off.63 They argue that ‘since access to courts presupposes 
financial resources as well as access to information and since the poor in Brazil have both limited 
financial resources and highly limited access to information, the judiciary remains far from being an 
institutional voice for the poor’.64 Instead, Ferraz argues, courts harm the poor in the area of the right 
to health.65 This is because ‘litigation is likely to produce reallocation from comprehensive programs 
aimed at the general population to […] privileged litigating minorities’.66 That is, the deprived do not 
participate in and benefit from the judicial process. The Brazilian health right litigations do highlight 
instances showing that the exclusion of the deprived from the judicial process does occur in reality. 
That, however, does not mean that court processes always exclude the deprived. Even in Brazil itself, 
Brinks and Gauri provide empirical data that ‘the poor were overrepresented in Brazil’s more 
collective right-to-education litigation’ since at least 78 per cent of the beneficiaries of the right to 
education litigation were underprivileged.67    
The distributional deficit, which arises from the exclusion of deprived individuals from court 
processes, may be attributed to the types of remedies courts adopt rather than to their institutional 
nature. Landau argues that ‘social rights enforcement is essentially majoritarian in many cases, and 
the beneficiaries are middle and upper class groups rather than the marginalized’.68 He also argues 
that courts can avoid capacity and legitimacy costs of their judgments by adopting individualised 
enforcement models or ‘by issuing negative injunctions striking down a law and maintaining the 
status quo’.69 Both remedies (ie, individualised enforcement and negative injunction) ‘are heavily 
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tilted toward middle class and upper income groups rather than poor plaintiffs’.70 The individualised 
enforcement benefits the privileged because ‘individual middle class rather than poor plaintiffs are 
more likely to know their rights and to be able to navigate the expense and intricacies of the legal 
system’.71 The negative injunctions favour the better off because ‘the state usually tries to cut middle 
class pension and health care benefits for civil servants and other middle class groups rather than 
those few services going to the very poor’.72 Nevertheless, he does not attribute this effect to the 
institutional structure of courts. Thus, courts may remedy the exclusion of the deprived by adopting 
remedies that cater for the interests of the worst off. Structural remedies may be appropriate 
although they require a lot of resources and do not work in certain political contexts.73 
A participatory model of adjudicating economic, social and cultural rights may remedy both 
democratic and distributional deficits when different strategies are adopted.74 One such strategy is to 
broaden the range of parties that have access to courts.75  The other strategy is to adopt a flexible 
model of adjudication. Flexibility can be achieved by taking into account several factors such as 
‘consideration of the particular circumstances of the complaint, the broader social context, including 
those similarly placed or worse off than the complainant, and the available resources and capacity 
which the state can marshal at the particular juncture’.76 Another strategy is to adopt dialogic and 
participatory modalities of rights adjudication.77  
The deprived individuals benefit from participatory models of adjudication when such models work. 
One example is the dialogic model. According to this model, courts provide remedies to protect not 
only the claimants who file the cases but also others who are similarly situated, particularly the 
multitude of individuals affected by repeated and constant violations due to structural problems 
‘requiring intervention of several state authorities’.78 The Constitutional Court of Colombia has 
applied the model, among other cases, to complaints of Colombians who were internally displaced 
due to conflicts in the country.79 The Court employed the model to address the situation of around 
four million internally displaced Colombians.80 The participatory nature of this model lies primarily in 
how the Colombian Constitutional Court monitored the implementation of the remedy. The Court 
retained jurisdiction to monitor its judgment through a permanent chamber, which provided ‘space 
for dialogue and debate among state institutions and between government and civil society’.81 It also 
‘organized public hearings and informal meetings’.82 The Court developed a mechanism that allowed 
different actors such as the Ombudsman, international refugee organizations, and civil society groups 
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to respond to reports of the government on the implementation measures of the judgment.83 When 
this process reveals a particular problem, the Court analysed different views and made orders to 
correct the problem. Besides, civil society organizations and social movements interested in the issue 
organised public hearings.84 
The participation of the deprived (as well as other stakeholders) improves the dialogic model of 
adjudication, as the above example from Colombia demonstrates. This example also shows that 
courts themselves can address barriers to participation by adopting a certain model of adjudication. 
It is still worth noting that the deprived may be unable to participate in decisions affecting their lives, 
whether those decisions are made by representative institutions such as parliaments or by other 
institutions whose officials are not elected such as courts. Thus, if participation is limited from the 
beginning, the benefit of its instrumental role in improving the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights would also be limited.  
6.2.3 Participation as a right 
Participation involves a number of activities. These include taking part in politics (forming and joining 
political parties, voting, standing for elections), influencing policies (conducting media campaigns, 
lobbying), influencing decision-making (bringing relevant facts to or arguing before decision-makers, 
proposing reforms, opposing legislative or administrative proposals), consultations and 
negotiations.85 Participation necessarily implies the exercise of a number of rights recognised in 
international human rights law. The subjects of these rights are either individuals or groups. Chief 
among individual rights is the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs guaranteed in 
international human rights treaties and other human rights instruments. These treaties guarantee 
the right of every citizen to ‘take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives’.86 The right to take part in the conduct of public affairs includes the rights to 
vote and to be elected at periodic elections.87  In some human rights treaties, the right to vote and to 
be elected are not expressly guaranteed.88 The text of other treaties appears to be narrower in 
scope. An example is the European Convention of Human Rights, which does not provide for the right 
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, being rather limited to elections and voting.89  
Citizens have the right to participate in ‘the conduct of public affairs’. They have the ‘right to 
participate in government’.90 This can be shortened to the ‘right to participate’ or simply 
‘participation’. The locus of participation is the government or ‘the conduct of public affairs’, which is 
a broad concept. The Human Rights Committee explains that  
The conduct of public affairs […] is a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. It covers all aspects of 
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public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, 
regional and local levels.91 
Thus, participation in the conduct of public affairs includes involvement in the formulation and 
implementation of a policy. A policy may relate to issues such as food security or access to water in a 
particular community. The right to participate, therefore, entails much more than involvement in 
national elections whether an individual votes or competes for an office. The right to vote and the 
right to be elected remain indispensable for the participation in the conduct of public affairs.92 
However, elections and the accompanying processes, including the discussion of public issues and 
the expression of ideas, are themselves insufficient ‘to realize the democratic ideal of the citizenry's 
continuing involvement in public life’.93 Strictly speaking, voters do not determine policies when they 
participate in elections. When they vote for a candidate or a party, they choose a policy formulated 
by one elite group from among policies prepared by other elite groups. Thus, limiting the 
participation of citizens to periodic elections denies them ‘the benefits of a continuing experience of 
involvement in public life, of "taking part" in the conduct of public affairs’.94 As discussed below, the 
CESCR warns against the danger of equating participation with voting and elections.95  
The ideal participation goes far beyond holding periodic elections and ensuring the enjoyment of 
rights necessary for the conduct of fair and free elections. However, it is not practical to involve 
everyone in a national government.96 The alternative is to devise other contexts in which widespread 
civic participation can be practical. Such contexts may include the decentralization of authority that 
may lead to the creation of local governments conducive to public participation.97 Such participation 
may take various forms: ‘citizen representation on governmental boards, public meetings and 
discussions, formally structured relationships between the managers of public enterprises and their 
consumers or the general citizenry, more extensive functions of city government responsive to 
citizens' needs’.98 The Human Rights Committee emphasises such decentralised contexts as sites of 
exercising the right to participate directly. It explains that ‘citizens may participate directly by taking 
part in popular assemblies which have the power to make decisions about local issues or about the 
affairs of a particular community and in bodies established to represent citizens in consultation with 
government’.99  
The right to participate shares the general characteristics of other human rights. Human rights are 
interdependent by nature.100 In other words, the exercise of a particular right may constitute the 
enjoyment of another right; similarly, the violation of one right may lead to the violation of another 
right. The right to participate depends on other rights. For example, when individuals exercise their 
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rights directly by attending popular assemblies, they are exercising their right to freedom of assembly 
at the same time. Whether the purpose of such assembly is to debate a particular issue or to simply 
share information, the participants are simultaneously exercising their right to freedom of 
expression. In other words, the ‘freedoms of expression, procession, association and conscience 
imply, and facilitate, participation in politics and public policies’.101 The Human Rights Committee 
emphasises that citizens can ‘take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through 
public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize 
themselves. This participation is supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and 
association’.102 Without simultaneously exercising these rights, the right to participate cannot be 
meaningful. In this regard, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
observes that 
[I]f people […] are to participate meaningfully in the conduct of public affairs, they must be free to 
organize without restriction (right of association), to meet without impediment (right of assembly), to 
say what they want to without intimidation (freedom of expression) and to know the relevant facts 
(right to information).103 
Participation, one may argue, is nominal unless it is accompanied by the exercise of the freedoms of 
assembly, association, expression and information. These rights are worth implementing given their 
intrinsic value. Moreover, they are instrumental in giving effect to the right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs. They can be regarded as participation rights.104 
Participation has a collective dimension: it is related to the right to self-determination, the subjects 
of which are groups or peoples. By definition, a people is a collection of individuals. The enjoyment of 
participation rights by individuals enhances the realisation of the peoples’ right to self-
determination. In other words, when a state violates participation rights of individuals, it denies its 
people the right to self-determination.105  
The right to self-determination emerged as ‘the right of peoples under colonial, foreign, or alien 
domination to self-government, whether through formation of a new state, association in a federal 
state, or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary (non-federal) state’.106 This represents an external 
aspect of self-determination. It implies the formation of a separate independent state or secession. 
This aspect has ‘widely been recognised as part of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international 
law’.107 In the post-colonial era, however, the external self-determination of ethnic groups within a 
sovereign state is rarely recognised unless it is won through a bloody conflict.108  
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The recognition of the right to self-determination in the common article 1 of the ICESCR and the 
ICCPR is an important milestone. This provision codifies the internal dimension of self-
determination.109 Recounting the history of the ICCPR, Franck notes that states rejected the notion 
that the right to self-determination applies ‘only to colonial "peoples"‘.110 Rather, the right applies ‘to 
peoples anywhere, whether in a politically independent state or a dependent territory’.111  With the 
entry into force of the ICCPR, Franck argues, the right reached an important phase of enunciation. It 
‘stopped being a principle of exclusion (secession) and became one of inclusion: the right to 
participate. The right now entitles peoples in all states to free, fair and open participation in the 
democratic process of governance freely chosen by each state’.112 Thus, participation represents an 
internal aspect of self-determination. Yusuf succinctly describes this strand of self-determination: 
The right of self-determination, in its post-colonial conception, chiefly operates today inside the 
boundaries of existing states in various forms and guises, particularly as a right of the entire 
population of the state to determine its own political, economic, and social destiny and to choose a 
representative government; and, equally, as a right of a defined part of the population, which has 
distinctive characteristics on the basis of race or ethnicity, to participate in the political life of the 
state, to be represented in its government, and not to be discriminated against.113 
According to Yusuf, the subjects of internal self-determination include a defined part of the 
population of the state whose race or ethnicity is different from that of the rest of the population. 
Thus, internal self-determination entails the participation of a particular group such as indigenous 
peoples. As discussed below, the CESCR indeed finds non-compliance with the right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples contrary to Article 1 of the ICESCR when states fail to put in 
place or adequately enforce laws for ‘consultation with, and the participation of, indigenous peoples 
in decisions affecting them’.114      
6.3 Participation in the practice of treaty bodies  
Human rights treaty bodies, namely, the CESCR, the European Committee, the Inter-American 
Commission and the Inter-American Court, emphasise the state obligation to ensure the participation 
of rights holders in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Nevertheless, the 
legal basis of participation and that of the state obligation to ensure participation varies across 
different human rights systems. The CESCR usually requires that states ensure participation in 
relation to most substantive rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. The European Committee establishes a 
link between participation and the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights derives the requirement of participation from the right to property 
of indigenous peoples. The practice of these treaty bodies is discussed briefly in the next sub-
sections.   
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6.3.1 The CESCR 
Participation requires the exercise of political rights. The ICESCR does not guarantee political rights. 
The CESCR derives the state obligation to ensure participation from rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. 
This sub-section first examines the legal basis of participation (3.1.1). When the CESCR requires 
states to ensure participation, it usually states the roles that participation can play. This sub-section 
also identifies those roles (3.1.2). From the practice of the CESCR emerge some requirements of 
participation, particularly when states conduct consultations with indigenous peoples (3.1.3).    
6.3.1.1 The legal basis of participation 
The ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR, does not expressly refer to the right to take part in government. In its 
supervision, the CESCR addresses participation with regard to the implementation of almost all rights 
guaranteed in the ICESCR. However, it does not always specify the legal basis for requiring states to 
ensure participation of rights holders. When the CESCR states its legal basis, it does not clarify how 
the provisions of the ICESCR relate to participation. It frequently requires participation when it deals 
with violations arising from evictions or displacements. When the evictions affect city dwellers, the 
CESCR relates the requirement of participation or consultation to the realisation of the right to 
housing (article 11).115 When the evictions affect indigenous people especially in the contexts of the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources, the CESCR relates participation to the realisation 
of, among other rights, the right to self-determination (Article 1),116 the prohibition of discrimination 
(Article 2(2))117 and the right to take part in cultural life (Article 15).118 
The right to self-determination includes the right of peoples to ‘freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.119 For indigenous peoples, the 
right to self-determination includes the right to self-government in certain matters.120 The free 
determination of political status, one may argue, involves participation in government. At times, the 
CESCR requires states to ensure the participation of peoples in the governance of their country.121  
The free pursuit of economic, social and cultural development also involves participation. That is, 
states should engage peoples in economic, social and cultural policies,122 which may include 
participation in programmes designed for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.  
According to the CESCR, the right to self-determination under Article 1 of the ICESCR entails the 
obligation to seek free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. In its concluding 
observations, the CESCR requires that ‘indigenous peoples are regularly consulted with a view to 
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obtaining their free, prior and informed consent in respect of decision-making processes that may 
affect their ability to exercise their economic, social and cultural rights’.123 Therefore, the right to 
self-determination entails the obligation to ensure participation, including the obligation to seek 
consent in cases of indigenous peoples. However, the argument that the right to self-determination 
provides a legal basis for the CESCR to require participation may be difficult to make when it comes 
to individuals. The right to self-determination is a collective right. The subjects of this right are 
peoples, whereas the subjects of other rights under the ICESCR are individuals.  
The CESCR sometimes derives the obligation to ensure participation from Article 15 of the ICESCR 
(cultural rights). In particular, it emphasises a core obligation of states to ‘allow and encourage the 
participation of persons belonging to minority groups, indigenous peoples or to other communities in 
the design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them’.124 The CESCR does not explain 
why it requires the participation of members of certain groups only, yet it has adopted a view similar 
to the interpretation of the Human Rights Committee. According to the Human Rights Committee, 
the exercise of cultural rights includes ‘a particular way of life associated with the use of land 
resources’.125 Traditional activities such as fishing and hunting are examples of a way of life, 
especially in the case of indigenous peoples.126 The realisation of these rights requires states to adopt 
measures to ensure the effective participation of members of indigenous peoples or other minority 
communities in decisions affecting them.127 The Human Rights Committee’s interpretation is based 
on the text of Article 27 of the ICCPR, which provides for the protection of minorities. However, the 
CESCR does not have such a textual basis. If one accepts the CESCR’s interpretation that the 
implementation of Article 15 of the ICESCR requires participation, this interpretation would apply to 
cultural rights only. Article 15 is not a general provision applicable to all rights in the ICESCR. Thus, it 
would be difficult to claim that Article 15 is a legal basis for participation in the implementation of all 
rights guaranteed in the ICESCR.     
International human rights law certainly guarantees the right to participate. The CESCR explains that 
the right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is recognised in the normative framework of 
international human rights. It has stated that    
[T]he international human rights normative framework includes the right of those affected by key 
decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making processes. The right to participate is reflected 
in numerous international instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development.128 
In this passage, the CESCR refers to Article 13(1) of the ICESCR, which provides that ‘education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society’. Article 13(1) states the purpose of 
education, thereby implying the importance of participation in a society in general. Thus, it may be 
submitted that participation in decision-making processes that affect one’s life is just a form of 
participation in a society. Nevertheless, the CESCR hardly relies on Article 13(1) when it requires 
states to ensure participation in decision-making processes.  
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Locating the right to participate in the international human rights normative framework as a whole is 
a plausible alternative, as the right is guaranteed in regional and global human rights instruments,129 
which clearly recognise the right to participate and thereby establish the corresponding state 
obligation to ensure participation. The CESCR emphasises the relevance of the right to take part in 
government, including participation in elections. It recognises that ‘free and fair elections are a 
crucial component of the right to participate’.130 It warns against reducing participation to elections 
only, stressing that elections ‘are not enough to ensure that those living in poverty131 enjoy the right 
to participate in key decisions affecting their lives’.132 With regard to the right to health, it clearly 
underlines the importance of ‘participation in political decisions relating to the right to health taken 
at both the community and national levels’.133 It is needless to state that the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights requires political decisions; however, the CESCR does not have 
the mandate to supervise the implementation of the right to participate per se. Thus, it emphasises 
the instrumental role of participation in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
6.3.1.2 The instrumental role of participation  
The CESCR sometimes states why it requires participation. In its general comment on the right to 
housing, it explains that 
Both for reasons of relevance and effectiveness, as well as in order to ensure respect for other human 
rights, […] a strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of 
those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their representatives.134 
The CESCR recognises that participation in a strategy for the implementation of economic, social and 
cultural rights has two benefits. As the proverb goes, states kill two birds with one stone when they 
ensure participation in their strategies. They respect the right to participate while enhancing the 
effectiveness of their strategies. The CESCR requires participation of all members of the community, 
including vulnerable groups. It expresses its concern ‘at the lack of meaningful consultation with civil 
society and relevant stakeholders in formulating and implementing policies and legislation, 
particularly relating to persons with disabilities, people living in poverty’ and other vulnerable 
groups.135 The CESCR states that policies and legislation are less effective when states fail to ensure 
participation, particularly when they fail to consult members of vulnerable groups.136  
A proper utilisation of resources enhances the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of a strategy, as 
discussed above. Participation plays an important role in avoiding the misuse of resources and other 
vices such as corruption. The CESCR recognises the role of participation in this regard. It requires 
states to ensure participation along with transparency and accountability to counter corruption. With 
regard to Guyana, for example, the CESCR has found that ‘corruption, which has a devastating impact 
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on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, is pervasive in the country’.137 It has 
required Guyana to address ‘the root causes of corruption, including by enhancing transparency, 
participation and accountability in the conduct of public affairs’.138     
The implementation of economic, social and cultural rights requires political decisions. However, 
politicians may have the propensity to neglect the demands of citizens when the latter have no 
influence on how politicians obtain and retain their power as discussed above. The CESCR seems to 
recognise this problem when it has examined the implementation of the ICESCR in the Congo. It has 
underlined that ‘one of the root causes of violations of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
State party is the lack of public participation in the governance of the country and the limited 
involvement of non-governmental organizations in public policymaking’.139 If lack of participation is a 
root cause of these violations, there is no other solution than ensuring participation. Thus, the CESCR 
has required the State party to identify ‘the factors hindering genuine forms of participation on the 
part of the general public in the governance of the State party’.140  
The CESCR requires states to ensure participation, even when they are relatively more democratic 
than other states. It makes this recommendation when the policy being examined adversely affects 
the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. For example, the United Kingdom is 
considered more democratic than Congo is, insofar as it is more democratic than any other country 
in Africa.141 Yet the CESCR has required the United Kingdom to ensure participation in its fiscal policy. 
The fiscal policy resulted in, among other things, ‘the increase in the threshold for the payment of 
inheritance tax and the increase of the value added tax, as well as the gradual reduction of the tax on 
corporate incomes’.142 Such a policy has a negative impact on the capacity of the state to ensure the 
enjoyment of the rights by disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.143 The CESCR has 
required the United Kingdom to conduct a human rights impact assessment of the fiscal policy ‘with 
broad public participation’.144 The impact assessment should include ‘an analysis of the distributional 
consequences and the tax burden of different income sectors and marginalized and disadvantaged 
groups’.145 An assumption underpinning this recommendation stands out, namely that there was no 
broad participation in the fiscal policy, particularly by marginalised and disadvantaged groups.  
Participation is an important tool for avoiding the exclusion of vulnerable groups from the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights. The CESCR emphasises this function with regard to the 
achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. It states that the implementation of ‘the Goals on 
the basis of the principle of participation, accountability and non-discrimination would ensure that 
no one is left behind’.146    
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6.3.1.3 Requirements of consultation  
Participation in the implementation of rights involves consultation with the subjects of those rights. 
The CESCR has developed some requirements of consultation. Although the ICESCR does not 
distinguish one category of rights holders from another, the CESCR has developed most of these 
requirements in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples. In certain respects, it applies these 
requirements to urban dwellers affected by evictions.  
According to the CESCR, states should put in place a specific regulatory or legislative framework for 
the implementation of ‘the right to prior informed consultation of indigenous peoples’.147 While 
emphasising that indigenous peoples have the right to consultation, it indicates two requirements of 
such consultation. One is the requirement of prior consultation. In other words, consultations should 
be conducted in advance, preceding a permission to implement a development project. States 
parties should ‘always enter into effective consultations with indigenous communities before 
granting concessions for the economic exploitation of the lands and territories traditionally occupied 
or used by them’.148 
States should also conduct consultations before carrying out evictions in urban centres. According to 
the CESCR, ‘any relocation of homes necessary for city renewal is carried out with prior consultations 
among affected households’.149 Irrespective of the purpose of evictions, consultations are necessary 
to provide procedural protection. In Ben Djazia et al v Spain, the CESCR has examined the eviction of 
complainants from rental accommodation due to their inability to pay rent.150 In principle, such an 
eviction is compatible with the ICESCR but states should comply with a number of criteria, as 
developed by the CESCR.151 Among these criteria is the requirement of prior consultation.152 The 
CESCR has emphasised that ‘there must be a real opportunity for genuine prior consultation between 
the authorities and the persons concerned’ even when the eviction from a private rental 
accommodation is justified.153  
The CESCR indicates the second requirement while emphasising the right to ‘prior informed 
consultation’. This requirement relates to information and involves exercising the right to freedom of 
expression including the right to receive information. It is the right of individuals to request and 
obtain information held by state authorities even though this right is not guaranteed in the ICESCR. 
According to the CESCR, state authorities should provide information necessary for conducting a 
consultation.154 It has commented negatively on a state party because state ‘authorities did not 
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provide accurate information on the scope and the impact’ of a development project.155 Individuals 
participating in a consultation have the right to freedom of expression. The exercise of this right is 
indispensable for conducting ‘open, participatory and meaningful consultations’.156 Otherwise, a 
consultation would be a mere procedural formality. Thus, the CESCR stresses that states should allow 
free expression while conducting consultations.157 
The requirement to conduct an informed consultation also implies another duty. States should 
provide information concerning the scope and impact of a development project. They are unable to 
discharge this duty unless they carry out comprehensive studies in advance. The CESCR requires 
impact assessments on a number of issues. It requires states to implement development projects 
‘only after comprehensive studies are carried out, with the participation of the peoples concerned, to 
assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them’.158 Conducting impact 
assessments is also necessary to comply with rights under the ICESCR whether a consultation is 
anticipated or not.159 For example, the CESCR requires that environmental impact assessments be 
carried out on a regular basis in order to comply with the right to health under Article 12 of the 
ICESCR.160   
Establishing a mechanism of consultation is another requirement. States should put in place ‘a legal 
framework for consultation with the affected communities’.161 They should develop institutional and 
procedural guarantees ‘to ensure the effective participation of indigenous communities in decision-
making on issues that affect them’.162 The legal framework to be adopted should not replace 
traditional institutions of indigenous peoples because ‘consultations should be conducted in 
accordance with the community consultation procedures’.163 
The CESCR does not require that consultation result in free, prior and informed consent, but 
nonetheless indicates that that is the precise objective of consultation. Accordingly, states should 
ensure that ‘indigenous peoples are regularly consulted with a view to obtaining their free, prior and 
informed consent in respect of decision-making processes that may affect their ability to exercise 
their economic, social and cultural rights’.164 The ICESCR does not expressly provide for the right of 
indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent, in contrast to other international human 
rights instruments that clearly guarantee this right.165 Thus, the CESCR interprets the ICESCR in light 
of other instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples. Moreover, the CESCR requires free, prior 
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and informed consent in the context of evictions from urban centres even where a violation of the 
rights of indigenous peoples is not necessarily at issue. The CESCR urges states to ensure that ‘any 
relocation necessary for city renewal is carried out after prior consultation with the affected 
individuals and households, with their free, prior and informed consent and with full respect for their 
safety and dignity’.166 
6.3.2 European Committee of Social Rights 
Like the ICESCR, the European Social Charter does not guarantee the right to take part in the conduct 
of public affairs or other related rights. Still, the European Committee of Social Rights addresses 
participation in relation to the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion.167 To ensure 
the effective exercise of this right, states should adopt necessary measures. The Charter provides 
that 
[T]he Parties undertake […] to take measures within the framework of an overall and co-ordinated 
approach to promote the effective access of persons who live or risk living in a situation of social 
exclusion or poverty, as well as their families, to, in particular, employment, housing, training, 
education, culture and social and medical assistance.168  
The European Committee has stressed the importance of participation or consultation to ensure the 
right to protection against poverty and social exclusion. In European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v 
France, the Committee stressed the contribution of the right to vote.169 The case concerns Travellers, 
persons who move around in France without a fixed domicile or residence. To exercise their right to 
vote, Travellers who hold circulation documents should be attached to a particular municipality for a 
period of three years. Even if the Travellers fulfil this condition, they can be excluded from exercising 
their right to vote if their number exceeds three per cent of the total population of the municipality 
to which they are attached. What is more, both requirements did not apply to other French citizens 
without a fixed abode: they can exercise their right to vote if they reside in a given municipality for 
six months. 
The issue central to the complaint was not whether the respondent State violated the right to vote or 
not. For that matter, the European Committee does not have jurisdiction to examine whether there 
is a violation of the right to vote. The crux of the matter relates to the instrumental role of exercising 
(or not) the right to vote. The complainant argued: ‘Travellers have virtually no political influence. As 
a result, they suffer discrimination and are not in fact in a position to vote in elections, thereby 
allowing local authorities to ignore them and perpetuate their social exclusion’.170 Deprivation and 
the lack of participation including the right to vote reinforce each other, as discussed above. Thus, 
this relationship was submitted for examination to the European Committee.  
The respondent State made a clear distinction between Travellers and other French citizens: to 
achieve the right to vote, the Travellers should be attached to a particular municipality for three 
years while only six months are required of other citizens. The number of Traveller voters should not 
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exceed three per cent of the total vote of a given municipality, while there is no such limitation on 
other citizens. At first glance the distinction appears neutral; however, it disproportionately affects 
Travellers. The European Committee recognised the effect of the distinction:      
[L]imiting the number of persons with the right to vote to 3% has the effect of excluding some 
potential voters. In practice this restriction affects Travellers. The Committee considers that setting 
this limit at such a low level leads to discriminatory treatment with regards to access to the right to 
vote for Travellers and, thus, is a possible cause of marginalisation and social exclusion.171 
The non-discrimination provision of the European Charter is not a self-standing provision.172 The 
European Committee finds a violation of this provision only in relation to other rights guaranteed in 
the Charter. That is not the case with the right to vote. Thus, the European Committee established a 
causal relationship between voting and exclusion, stating that the respondent’s conduct is 
discriminatory treatment with respect to voting although this would not amount to a violation of the 
European Social Charter. Thus, the Committee has recognised the importance of the right to vote in 
the realisation of the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion: 
[T]he reference to the social rights enshrined in Article 30 should not be understood too narrowly. In 
fact, the fight against social exclusion is one area where the notion of the indivisibility of fundamental 
rights takes a special importance. In this regard, the right to vote, as with other rights relating to civic 
and citizen participation, constitutes a necessary dimension in social integration and inclusion and is 
thus covered by article 30.173 
Noting the indivisibility of fundamental rights, the European Committee has gone beyond the 
instrumental role of the right to vote in particular and the rights relating to civic and citizen 
participation in general. The Committee has explained that these rights are a dimension of the right 
to protection against poverty and social exclusion guaranteed under Article 30 of the European Social 
Charter. Therefore, the Committee has concluded that the respondent State’s conduct is 
discriminatory and a violation of Article 30 of the European Social Charter. 
In ERRC v France, the European Committee also addressed positive measures that states should 
adopt. It examined an allegation that the respondent State did not put in place an overall national 
policy for addressing the problem of poverty and social exclusion.174 The European Committee has 
emphasised that states should adopt a comprehensive and coordinated policy to protect Travellers 
against poverty and social exclusion. Such policy should consist of ‘an analytical framework, a set of 
priorities and measures to prevent and remove obstacles’ to accessing fundamental rights and 
should be supported with adequate resources.175 It should also consist of ‘monitoring mechanisms 
involving all relevant actors, including civil society and persons affected by exclusion’.176 The 
respondent State acknowledged ‘the need to provide Travellers with the means to participate in the 
process of conceiving, designing, implementing and monitoring policies and programmes’ aimed at 
improving their situation.177 However, since the respondent State did not have a coordinated 
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national policy in place, particularly on housing, the European Committee found a violation of the 
right to protection against poverty and exclusion under Article 30 of the European Social Charter.  
The European Committee dealt with a similar issue in International Federation of Human Rights 
(FIDH) v Belgium.178 In this case, the respondent State had policies in place which covered all 
inhabitants in a situation of poverty or exclusion. However, the policies did not specifically target 
Travellers.179 Besides, there was ‘no system for Travellers to be consulted on and take part in the 
framing and supervision of policies relating to them’ in parts of the respondent State.180 One of the 
reasons for finding the respondent State in violation of Article 30 was ‘the fact that the 
representatives of Travellers are not involved in the various stages of policy making’.181   
The European Committee also addresses issues of participation in relation to the right to housing 
guaranteed under Articles 16 and 31 of the European Social Charter.182 It requires consultation with 
the affected persons. In International Movement ATD Fourth World v France, the Committee has laid 
down some requirements to be complied with when states carry out evictions.183 The Committee 
does not say that the European Social Charter prohibits evictions. It defines the term ‘eviction’ as ‘the 
deprivation of housing which a person occupied, on account of insolvency or wrongful occupation’.184 
In principle, evictions in themselves do not violate the right to housing under the European Social 
Charter. However, it is possible that states may contravene the Charter if they do not follow 
appropriate eviction procedures. Thus, the Committee has stressed that ‘[l]egal protection for 
persons threatened by eviction must include, in particular, an obligation to consult the affected 
parties in order to find alternative solutions to eviction and the obligation to fix a reasonable notice 
period before eviction’.185 In its decisions, the Committee usually emphasises this requirement as 
well as other additional safeguards.186 
The European Committee finds violations of the Charter when laws regulating evictions do not 
provide for procedural safeguards including consultation. In European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v 
Ireland, it has found that ‘some of the legislation permitting evictions fails to provide for consultation 
with those to be affected’.187 In European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v the Czech Republic, it 
has expressed its dissatisfaction with the way ‘all legislation permitting evictions ensures the 
necessary safeguards required by Article 16 of the 1961 Charter, such as the prior consultation of 
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affected parties’.188 Here, the Committee has indicated that consultations should be conducted 
before evictions take place.  
6.3.3 The Inter-American system 
In the Inter-American system, a right to participation is derived from the right to property of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. In general, human rights are interdependent and interrelated. This 
relationship evidently exists between the right to property and other rights including economic, 
social and cultural rights. The right to property ‘serves as a basis for entitlements which can ensure 
an adequate standard of living’.189 The enjoyment of the right to property provides the means for 
meeting one’s basic needs. Thus, individuals who have adequate properties enjoy their rights to 
food, water and housing. In addition, they also have the means to access education and health 
services and thereby exercise their rights to education and health. One may argue that this 
relationship is even stronger with regard to the right to property of indigenous peoples. The Inter-
American Court stresses this relationship. In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, the Inter-
American Court has held that the failure of the respondent States to guarantee the right to property 
of an indigenous people has ‘a negative effect on the right of the members of the Community to a 
decent life’.190 The denial of the right to property prevents the members of indigenous peoples from 
‘the possibility of access to their traditional means of subsistence, as well as to use and enjoyment of 
the natural resources necessary to obtain clean water and to practice traditional medicine to prevent 
and cure illnesses’.191 Therefore, the denial of the right to property implies a violation of a number of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the context of indigenous and tribal peoples.  
The Inter-American Court requires effective participation of indigenous and tribal peoples in the 
context of development or investment projects. The Court laid down this requirement in Saramaka 
People v Suriname (Saramaka case).192 In this case, the Court examined the failure of the respondent 
State to recognise and protect the system of communal land ownership of a tribal people, the 
Saramaka. It held that indigenous and tribal peoples are entitled to the recognition and protection of 
their territories.193 The Court also recognised that their right to property is subject to restrictions. In 
line with its rulings in other cases, the Court has explained that restrictions on the right to property 
are permissible provided that they are established by law; that they are necessary; that they are 
proportional; and that they are adopted to attain a legitimate goal as discussed in the previous 
chapter.194 An additional requirement applies when the restrictions concern the right to property of 
indigenous and tribal peoples over their traditionally owned land and natural resources. The Court 
held that ‘another crucial factor to be considered is whether the restriction amounts to a denial of 
their traditions and customs in a way that endangers the very survival of the group and of its 
members’.195 In other words, the Court is of the view that Article 21 of the American Convention 
permits states to grant concessions for the exploration and extraction of natural resources. By 
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granting concessions, states can restrict the right to the property of indigenous and tribal peoples, 
particularly their right ‘to use and enjoy their traditionally owned lands and natural resources’.196 
Such restriction is permissible only when ‘it does not deny their survival as a tribal people’.197 
In the Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court has established three safeguards. The safeguards 
ensure the survival of the members of the indigenous and tribal communities as a people. The Court 
has observed that  
First, the State must ensure the effective participation of the members of the Saramaka people, in 
conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment, exploration or 
extraction plan […]. Second, the State must guarantee that the Saramakas will receive a reasonable 
benefit from any such plan within their territory. Thirdly, the State must ensure that no concession will 
be issued within Saramaka territory unless and until independent and technically capable entities, with 
the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and social impact assessment.198     
In the Saramaka case, therefore, the Inter-American Court has established the requirement of 
effective participation as one of the sub-criteria for assessing the permissibility of restrictions on the 
right to property.199 In order to ensure an effective participation in development or investment plans, 
states have a duty to actively consult with the members of indigenous and tribal peoples.200 Effective 
participation mainly consists of consultation, or to use the Court’s language, the ‘right to 
consultation’. States should conduct the consultation ‘in good faith, through culturally appropriate 
procedures and with the objective of reaching an agreement’ in accordance with the customs and 
traditions of indigenous peoples.201  
Another element of effective participation is consent. The requirement of consent comes into the 
picture when states implement ‘large-scale development or investment projects that would have a 
major impact’ within the territories of indigenous peoples. The Court has emphasised that states 
have not only a duty to consult but also a duty to obtain ‘free, prior, and informed consent’ of 
indigenous and tribal peoples according to their customs and traditions.202 The consultation is 
required in any development or investment plan while the consent is required when two conditions 
are met. These conditions relate to the magnitude and impact of development or investment plans. 
In terms of magnitude, the development plans should involve large-scale projects. A large-scale 
project may not necessarily have a significant effect on indigenous peoples. When it does have a 
major impact, it is necessary to obtain prior informed consent of the affected peoples. Antkowiak 
and Gonza point out that due to these conditions, the protection for the indigenous peoples is 
insufficient.203 For example, a ‘small-scale operation that destroys a sacred site could devastate a 
community, yet it would not likely require consent by the Court’.204   
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The Inter-American Court has further elaborated the right to consultation in Kichwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (Sarayaku case).205 The case concerns a permit given by the respondent 
State to a private oil company for oil exploration and exploitation activities in Sarayaku.206 The permit 
was granted without consulting the Sarayaku people and without obtaining their consent. The 
exploration by the company prevented the Sarayaku people from seeking means of subsistence and 
exercising their freedoms of movement and cultural expression, since the company used high-
powered explosives. 
In its submission, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights related the right to consultation 
with two other rights. It argued that the respondent State violated Article 13 (right to freedom of 
thought and expression) and Article 23 (right to participate in government) of the American 
Convention.207 The violation of these rights was in relation to Article 21 (right to property) of the 
American Convention.208 The right to freedom of thought and expression includes the ‘freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds’. The Inter-American Commission 
emphasised the access to information element. It stressed that ‘the right of access to information has 
special meaning and consequences where Indigenous Peoples are concerned’.209 It also underlined 
that ‘while the right to prior consultation is not simply a matter of supplying information, that 
information is nonetheless a condition sine qua non for the consultation to be an effective 
consultation’.210 The Inter-American Commission argued that a similar relationship exists between 
the right to consultation and the right to participate in government. It stated in its application that: 
States not only have an obligation to consult indigenous peoples or communities before approving any 
project that might affect them, but also to respect the particular system of consultation that each 
indigenous people or community practices, as that is their method of exercising their political rights. 
The law requiring prior consultation is one dimension of the exercise of indigenous peoples’ political 
rights.211 
The Inter-American Commission argued unequivocally that the right to consultation in the context of 
implementing development projects is a dimension of exercising political rights. However, the Inter-
American Court has declined to rule on whether the respondent State had violated Articles 13 and 23 
of the American Convention.212 Similarly, the Court has declined to rule on the relationship between 
the right of access to information in the context of development projects and the right to participate 
in government in Claude-Reyes et al v Chile.213  
The right to consultation ensures the participation of indigenous peoples. The Inter-American Court 
affirmed this instrumental purpose of the right to consultation in the Sarayaku case. It held that ‘one 
of the fundamental guarantees to ensuring the participation of indigenous peoples and communities 
in decisions regarding measures that affect their rights and, in particular, their right to communal 
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property, is precisely the recognition of their right to consultation’.214 In addition, the Court has 
explained the dual sources of the state obligation to consult. One of the sources is a treaty provision, 
Article 21 of the American Convention (right to property) interpreted in the light of other treaties, 
particularly the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 
Convention No 169).215 The Inter-American Court has also found another source. It has held that ‘the 
obligation to consult, in addition to being a treaty-based provision, is also a general principle of 
international law’.216 To reach this conclusion, the Court refers extensively to domestic legislation 
and case law of Member States of the Organisation of American States.217 According to Brilman, 
although the Court does not refer to ‘the right to consultation as customary international law’, its 
extensive references to domestic norms and case law could be interpreted ‘as an effort to establish 
an opinio iuris or state practice’.218  
The Inter-American Court has identified the corresponding state obligations of the right to 
consultation. The Court has established ‘the minimum standards and essential requirements of a 
valid consultation process’.219 First, the consultation must be carried out in advance, that is, before 
the implementation of any development project or any legislative or administrative decision affecting 
indigenous peoples.220 Recalling its holdings in the Saramaka case, the Court affirmed that the 
purpose of conducting consultations in advance is to give notice to indigenous peoples and to allow 
them ‘sufficient time for an internal discussion within the community’.221   
Second, the consultation must be conducted in good faith with the aim of reaching an agreement. 
States should ensure that consultations are a true instrument for participation, not a matter of mere 
formality.222 Good faith involves establishing a climate of mutual trust and respect among the parties. 
The presence of members of armed forces in the areas where development projects are expected to 
take place may undermine mutual trust and respect.223 Good faith does not exist when coercion is 
used, nor when there are ‘attempts to undermine the social cohesion of the affected communities, 
either by bribing community leaders or by establishing parallel leaders, or by negotiating with 
individual members of the community’.224 Since ‘the obligation to consult is the responsibility of the 
State,’ it cannot be avoided by delegating it to third parties, particularly to a private company that 
has an interest in implementing a development project.225 A delegation in this respect shows that the 
conduct of consultations is not in good faith.226 The aim of consultations is to reach an agreement,227 
and this depends on the consent of both sides. The consent of indigenous peoples is particularly 
important, since states are usually interested in the implementation of development projects. There 
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is an agreement when the concerned indigenous peoples accept the proposed development project. 
An agreement cannot exist without consent. 
Third, the consultation must be adequate and accessible. A consultation complies with these criteria 
when it is conducted in accordance with the traditions of indigenous peoples.228 Consultations should 
take into account different forms of political organisation of indigenous peoples as well as respect 
their decision-making processes.229 When language barriers exist, translation should be provided, 
‘particularly in those areas where the official language is not spoken by a majority of the indigenous 
population’.230 
Finally, the consultation must be informed. An informed consultation involves constant 
communications between the parties because states should receive and provide information.231 The 
purpose of providing information is to ensure that indigenous peoples become aware of ‘the 
potential risks of the proposed development or investment plan, including the environmental and 
health risks’.232 Thus, the obligation to provide information presupposes environmental and social 
impact studies,233 because without such studies, it would not be possible to identify environmental 
and health risks. States should respect the culture and traditions of indigenous peoples when they 
conduct environmental impact assessments.234  
In the Saramaka case, it seems that the Inter-American Court addressed the issue of consent in the 
requirements of consultation, clearly explaining that free, prior, and informed consent is an element 
of participation.235 However, the Court did not address this issue separately in the Sarayaku case. 
According to Brilman, the Court’s decision in the Sarayaku case ‘solidifies the distinction made 
between consultation and consent in Saramaka; consent is to be understood as something additional 
to consultation that is only required in certain circumstances’.236 One may submit that the Court’s 
detailed requirements on consultation reduce the relevance of free, prior, and informed consent. 
The requirement that consultations should be conducted in good faith with the aim of reaching an 
agreement implies consent, since an agreement cannot exist without the consent of indigenous 
peoples. Good faith and prohibition of coercion ensure that the consent of indigenous peoples be 
free. The requirement that the consultation should be conducted in advance ascertains that the 
consent is prior to the implementation of any development project. The requirement that states 
receive and provide information, particularly after conducting environmental and social impact 
assessments, ensures that the consent of indigenous peoples is informed. 
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The Inter-American Court ascertains whether states comply with the essential requirements of a 
valid consultation process outlined above. By specifying these requirements, the Court established 
when (i.e., in advance) and how (ie, in good faith) states should conduct the consultation. It has also 
identified positive state obligations to arrange for translation services, provide information and 
conduct environmental impact assessments. Moreover, the obligations to structure law and 
institutions and to take special measures, which are positive obligations of a general nature, arise 
from the obligation to consult indigenous peoples. These obligations flow from the relationship 
between Articles 21 and 1(1) of the American Convention. As discussed above, the obligation to 
consult arises from Article 21 (right to property). As a general obligation provision, Article 1(1) 
requires states to ensure the free and full exercises of the rights guaranteed in the Convention.237 
States have the obligation to structure their laws and institutions so that indigenous peoples can be 
consulted effectively.238 In relation to Article 1(1), the effective protection of the right to property 
under Article 21 ‘imposes on States the positive obligation to adopt special measures’ to ensure that 
indigenous peoples enjoy the full and equal exercise of their right to their lands.239  
6.4 Participation under the African Charter  
The African Charter guarantees a self-standing right to participate in the government of one’s 
country (discussed in Subsection 6.4.1) and a collective right to self-determination (discussed in 
Subsection 6.4.2). In these subsections, I would argue that these rights entail the obligation to ensure 
the participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of their economic, social and 
cultural rights. The obligation to ensure participation is clearly established in the practice of the 
African Commission and the African Court.  
However, neither the Commission nor the Court explains that the legal basis of the obligation to 
ensure participation is the right to participate in the government of one’s country and the right to 
self-determination. The Commission sometimes requires states to ensure participation in plans and 
policies relating to the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights but it does not state its 
legal basis (discussed in Subsection 6.4.3). The Commission and the Court sometimes explain the 
legal basis of the state obligation to ensure participation, particularly in their case law, and in those 
cases, they derive the obligation from other rights guaranteed in the African Charter. The African 
Commission cites a category of these rights in relation to environmental protection (discussed in 
Subsection 6.4.4). It derives the obligation to ensure participation from the right to health (Article 16 
of the African Charter) and the right to a general satisfactory environment (Article 24 of the African 
Charter). In relation to evictions, the African Commission and the African Court derive the obligation 
to ensure participation from another category of rights (discussed in Subsection 6.4.5). These rights 
include the right to property (Article 14 of the African Charter) and the right to development (Article 
22 of the African Charter). From the eviction cases, one may glean the requirements of effective 
participation (discussed in Subsection 6.4.6). 
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6.4.1 Individual participation  
Article 13 of the African Charter guarantees the right of every citizen to participate freely in the 
government of one’s country.240 The Charter does not expressly refer to the right to vote and the 
right to be elected, nor does it lay down election requirements.241 For this reason, according to 
Mbondenyi, the Charter’s provision is very superficial, since ‘it does not expressly guarantee the 
holding of periodic and genuine elections’.242 In contrast, other human rights instruments contain 
provisions on elections.243 In these instruments, the ‘right to political participation has two parts: an 
"election clause" and a "take part" clause’.244 The take part clause has a general scope of 
application245 and is an all-embracing provision which by itself requires elections open to contest.246 
The election clause is ‘one realization or institutionalization of citizens' right to take part in public 
affairs and government’.247  
An election clause is missing from the African Charter. Nevertheless, in substantive terms, Article 
13(1) of the Charter includes the right to vote and the right to be elected. This view is confirmed in 
the practice of the African Commission and the African Court. In Legal Resources Foundation v 
Zambia, the African Commission examined a communication alleging a violation of the right to be 
elected.248 The communication concerns a constitutional amendment that changes eligibility 
requirements for presidential candidates. According to the amendment, around 35% of the Zambian 
population would not be eligible to be elected as the president of the Country.249 The Commission 
has found that the amendment is a violation of Article 13 of the Charter.250 In addition, the 
Commission has also found a violation of the right to vote because the amendment limits the choice 
of Zambian citizens by disqualifying preferred presidential candidates.251 In Jawara v The Gambia, the 
Commission has examined alleged violations of the African Charter due to suppressions that followed 
a coup d’état in the respondent State.252 The government that came to power through a coup 
banned former ministers and members of parliament from taking part in any political activities.253 
The Commission has found that such ban is a violation of Article 13(1) of the Charter.254   
Like the African Commission, the African Court has confirmed that Article 13(1) of the African Charter 
includes the right to vote and the right to be elected. In Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and 
Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania (Mtikila v 
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Tanzania), the Court has examined an alleged violation of the African Charter due to amendments to 
the respondent State’s Constitution.255 The amendments require that ‘any candidate for Presidential, 
Parliamentary and Local Government elections had to be a member of, and be sponsored by, a 
political party’.256 Because of these amendments, the complainant was unable to run in an election as 
a presidential candidate. The Court has found a violation of Article 13(1) of the Charter due to the 
amendments.257  
In Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l'Homme (APDH) v Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (APDH v Côte 
d'Ivoire), the Court established the obligation of states to organise an independent and impartial 
electoral body.258 In this case, the respondent State constituted an electoral body by law. According 
to the law, the ruling party was represented by eight members, while the opposition parties were 
represented by four members.259 The Court found that the electoral body was not independent and 
impartial.260 The Court has interpreted Article 13(1) of the African Charter in light of Article 17(1) of 
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,261 which requires states to establish 
and ‘strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the 
management of elections’. It found that a failure to establish an independent and impartial electoral 
body is a violation of Article 13(1) of the African Charter.262 In the above cases, the African 
Commission and the African Court have examined violations concerning the right to be elected. In 
these cases, the bone of contention is power. The disputes arose from competitions for political 
power. While these cases are not directly related to the participation in the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights, the instrumental role of competition for political power should 
be acknowledged, as discussed above.   
In their practice, the African Commission and the African Court are developing the election clause 
under the African Charter, although that clause is still missing from the Charter’s text. The African 
Charter provides for the take part clause in Article 13(1). However, this clause is yet to develop in the 
practice of the African Commission and the African Court. Still, it is submitted, Article 13(1) includes 
participation in the formulation and implementation of policies relating to economic, social and 
cultural rights. In particular, this view is in line with the interpretation of the take part clause under 
Article 25 of the ICCPR. As discussed above, the take part clause under the ICCPR encompasses 
participation in ‘the formulation and implementation of policy at international, national, regional and 
local levels’.263 The Human Rights Committee does not distinguish areas of policy formulation and 
implementation. Thus, one may argue that the Human Rights Committee refers to all state policies, 
including those relating to the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.      
The African Commission and the African Court recognise the right to participate in development 
programmes, which includes the formulation and implementation of policies relating to the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights as discussed below. However, they do not seem to 
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consider that the take part clause under Article 13(1) of the African Charter entails participation in 
development programmes.   
6.4.2 Collective participation 
The African Commission derives the right to participate in elections from the right to self-
determination under Article 20(1) of the Charter.264 It emphasises the internal dimension of self-
determination. In Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, the Commission examined a claim for 
external self-determination.265 In this case, the complainant was a liberation front seeking the 
secession of Katanga from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), alleging a violation of the right 
to self-determination.266 The Commission refused to find a violation of the right to self-determination 
and emphasised that 
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial 
integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the absence of evidence that the people of 
Katanga are denied the right to participate in government as guaranteed by Article 13.1 of the African 
Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-
determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.267 
The Commission found no violation because the complainant was unable to prove that individuals in 
Katanga were denied the right to vote. Therefore, it is submitted, the Commission establishes a clear 
link between the individual right to participate in government (Article 13(1) of the Charter) and the 
collective right to self-determination (Article 20(1) of the Charter). The Commission suggests that a 
violation of the right to vote leads to a violation of the right to self-determination.  
In Gunme and Others v Cameroon, the Commission has examined another claim for external self-
determination.268 In this case, the complainants sought the independence of English speaking 
Southern Cameroon from the French-speaking part of the Republic of Cameroon. Although the 
Commission found a number of violations of the rights of Southern Cameroonians,269 it declined to 
find a violation of Article 13(1) of the Charter,270 by reasoning that Southern Cameroonian 
representatives were elected to the National Assembly and that they constituted 20% of the 
members of the National Assembly.271 For this reason, the Commission did not find a violation of the 
right to self-determination.272 In fact, the Commission underlined that ‘secession is not recognised as 
a variant of the right to self-determination within the context of the African Charter’.273   
Even when the right to external self-determination is not an issue before the Commission, as is the 
case in Jawara v The Gambia, the Commission seems to confirm the relationship it has established 
between the right to vote and the right to self-determination. As discussed above, the Commission 
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found a violation of an individual right to participate in government in Jawara v The Gambia.274 
Moreover, the Commission has also examined an alleged violation of the collective right to self-
determination, finding that overthrowing an elected government by force denies the people their 
right to freely choose their government as expressed in Article 20(1) of the Charter.275 Obviously, the 
coup d’état in the Gambia denied everyone his or her right to vote. Yet the African Commission did 
not find a violation of the right of every Gambian citizen to participate in the government (Article 
13(1) of the African Charter). Therefore, the Commission appears to say that there is a violation of 
the right to self-determination of a people when individual members of that people are denied their 
right to vote.      
In the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission confirms that the right to self-determination under 
the African Charter does not include external self-determination or secession.276 The Commission 
emphasises that the right to self-determination at the national level ‘implies the right to take part in 
the democratic governance of the state, especially through free and fair national elections’.277 
Moreover, it explains that 
States parties must take special steps to encourage participation by all peoples, including indigenous 
populations/communities, in the democratic process of national governance. This may include 
governance schemes that provide more power and authority to regional and local authorities and/or 
proportional representation systems.278 
The African Commission clarifies a number of issues. It explains that states should encourage 
participation in a democratic process, a process that presupposes the enjoyment of a number of 
rights including the right to vote and be elected, freedom of expression and information, freedom of 
association and freedom of assembly. Obviously, states should refrain from unjustified interferences 
with the enjoyment of these rights, but simply refraining would not be sufficient, the Commission 
requires states to take special steps to ensure the participation of all peoples in the democratic 
process. What are ‘special steps’?  
The Commission does not explain the special steps to be taken by the states. It is submitted that such 
steps may include measures such as enacting laws, providing funding and establishing institutions 
that promote participation. The establishment of institutions such as electoral commissions is 
necessary. As noted above, the African Court has established that states parties to the African 
Charter have the obligation to establish an independent and impartial electoral body.279 It is 
submitted that states should take additional measures to ensure the participation of the deprived, 
particularly members of vulnerable groups, in the implementation of their economic, social and 
cultural rights. This is because the participation of the deprived is low even in countries where 
democracy works well, as discussed above.280  
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According to the Commission, participation should take place at all levels: national, regional and local 
levels.281 A direct participation at the national level may not be practical as discussed above. Thus, 
participation in the national governance can be indirect. Self-determination includes decentralisation 
because the Commission requires states to provide more power to local and regional authorities, as 
it stresses in paragraph 46 of the the Nairobi Principles. With decentralisation, direct participation 
becomes more practical, as discussed above.         
Participation in a democratic process of governance, one may argue, includes involvement in the 
decisions and policies relating to the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. In fact, 
the African Commission explains that the ‘right to self-determination in its application to peoples, 
including indigenous populations/communities, encompasses economic, social and cultural rights’.282 
One may immediately rule out the reading that self-determination is a composite right that contains 
economic, social and cultural rights. Since the Charter already provides for these rights, such an 
interpretation would have no point.283 A plausible reading might be that self-determination entitles 
peoples to decide, at least to be involved in, policies and plans involving the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. These policies and plans may be adopted at different levels of 
administrative hierarchies. As discussed below, however, the African Commission does not clearly 
explain that the right to self-determination entails the obligation to ensure participation in the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
From the Nairobi Principles, it appears that the right to self-determination includes a state obligation 
to obtain free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. Under the right to self-
determination, the Commission requires that ‘States parties should ensure the prior informed 
consent by indigenous populations/communities to any exploitation of the resources of their 
traditional lands and that they benefit accordingly’.284 The prior and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples cannot happen without consultations. As discussed above particularly in relation to the 
practice of the Inter-American Court, consultations with indigenous peoples are conducted to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent. It is submitted that the requirement of the African 
Commission that states should obtain prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples presupposes 
participation. Therefore, the right to self-determination under the African Charter entails 
participation in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, at least in relation to the 
rights of indigenous peoples. In its practice discussed above, the CESCR adopts the same view.285  
The subjects of the right to self-determination are peoples according to Article 20 of the African 
Charter. It does not matter whether they are indigenous or not. If this right entails not only the 
obligation to ensure participation but also the obligation to obtain prior informed consent of 
indigenous peoples, this should apply to other subjects of the right. However, the Commission seems 
to limit the obligation to obtain consent to the enjoyment of the right solely to indigenous peoples. 
As discussed in the third subsection below, the Commission contradicts its earlier decision where it 
derives the requirement of free, prior and informed consent from the right to property. 
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To conclude, participation in elections plays an instrumental role in the implementation of economic, 
social and cultural rights, as discussed above in relation to the practice of the CESCR and that of the 
European Committee. Although the African Commission and the African Court do not identify the 
instrumental role of elections, they interpret the right to participate in the government of one’s 
country (Article 13(1) of the African Charter) as guaranteeing the right to vote and the right to be 
elected. Moreover, the African Commission derives these rights from the right to self-determination 
(Article 20(1) of the African Charter).  
In their practice, the African Commission and the African Court have not addressed whether the 
individual right to participate in the government of one’s country and the collective right of self-
determination entail the obligation to ensure participation in the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights. The exception in this regard is the obligation to obtain consent of indigenous 
peoples. Still, it is submitted, the right to participate in the government of one’s country (Article 
13(1) of the African Charter) entails the obligation to ensure the participation of individuals in the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. This view is similar to the view adopted in the 
practice of the Human Rights Committee. It is also submitted that the right to self-determination 
(Article 20(1) of the African Charter) entails the obligation to ensure the participation of peoples in 
the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. This view is in line with the practice of the 
CESCR.      
6.4.3 Participation in plans and policies  
According to Article 1 of the African Charter, states parties have undertaken the obligation ‘to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect’ to rights recognised in the Charter. It is submitted that 
this obligation includes, among other things, the duty to design, implement, monitor and review 
plans and policies on the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. The African 
Commission underlines the state obligation to adopt such plans and policies.286 Nevertheless, the 
Commission does not explain that this obligation springs from Article 1 of the African Charter.      
In addition to establishing the obligation to adopt plans and policies, the African Commission 
establishes two requirements that should be observed during the adoption process of those plans 
and policies. According to the Commission, for each economic, social and cultural right, ‘national 
plans and policies should be devised and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and 
transparent process’.287 One of the requirements is a transparent process, which is by definition open 
to the public and lacks secrecy among its actors.288 A transparent process of adopting plans and 
policies should thus be open to the public.  
The other requirement relates to participation. The Commission requires a participatory process of 
devising and reviewing plans and policies to implement all economic, social and cultural rights.289 This 
requirement relates to the process. The requirement does not address what the plans and policies 
should do. With regard to the right to water and sanitation, the Commission adds an additional 
requirement relating to the content of these plans and policies. According to the Commission, the 
adopted plans and policies should ‘ensure the right of everyone to participate in decision-making 
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affecting their right to water and sanitation’.290 Although the Commission does not establish such a 
requirement in relation to each right, it is submitted that this requirement should also apply to all 
other rights guaranteed in the African Charter.  
In a participatory process of adopting plans and policies, states should conduct consultations with 
relevant stakeholders. They should invite such stakeholders to contribute to the plans and policies 
through activities such as raising relevant facts, proposing alternatives, and conducting media 
campaigns. This is because participation by definition involves activities such as taking part in politics, 
influencing policies or decision-making and conducting consultations and negotiations.291 The 
practice of the Commission sometimes indicates who should participate. It indicates that those 
individuals and groups who are affected by the plans and policies should participate.292  
Individuals and groups may be affected in a positive or negative way. When a policy benefits some 
individuals, it has a positive effect on them. For example, a policy may aim at increasing access to 
social benefits for some groups such as individuals living in poverty. Such individuals should be 
involved in the policy. The fact that a policy benefits some individuals cannot be a reason for 
excluding them. A policy may affect other individuals negatively. For example, a policy may 
redistribute social funds, which may result in the reduction of payments for some beneficiaries.293 
For this reason, a policy can be a retrogressive measure, and in principle, such measures are not 
permitted except in exceptional circumstances, particularly when they increase the total enjoyment 
of the rights.294 To assess whether such a policy violates the African Charter, the Commission 
considers whether ‘there was genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed 
measures and alternatives’.295 Thus, those affected, whether positively or negatively, should be able 
to participate in a policy. 
For the purpose of participation, it is submitted, affected individuals and groups may include a 
category of persons broader than claimants of a particular right. With regard to the right to health for 
example, the Commission has urged states to work on access to medicines by ‘promoting meaningful 
participation by affected individuals and groups in decisions that affect access to medicines’.296 Here, 
affected individuals and groups in a narrow sense may include those persons who need medicine 
because of their current illness. In a broader sense, one may argue, affected individuals and groups 
may include health professionals, persons involved in the provision of health services and medicines 
and bureaucrats authorised to regulate the provision of those services and medicines.   
The African Commission requires that participation be necessary in all phases of a policy.297 The 
Commission seems to adopt the ‘stages model’ of the public policy-making process. This model 
assumes that ‘policy making proceeds step by step, starting at the beginning and ending at the 
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end’.298 According to the Commission, states should ensure ‘effective participation of the population 
in all phases of policy and programme design, implementation, monitoring and review’.299 Thus, the 
Commission identifies four stages or phases of a policy-making process. Designing a policy is the first 
phase and is thus the starting point, which means affected individuals and groups should be engaged 
right from the beginning. Once the designed policy is adopted, the next phase is implementation. The 
third phase involves monitoring the implementation, and the final phase of a policy is revision, which 
should be based on the experience on the ground. Involvement in just one of the phases can still be 
called participation, albeit insufficient participation: affected individuals and groups should be 
involved in all phases. . In reality, however, policy making is not ‘a linear process, with a clear 
beginning, middle and end’.300 
Participation obviously requires resources. For example, an individual interested in participation 
regarding a certain policy needs to spend time and money to take part in a debate or to obtain the 
necessary information. Individuals deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly those 
living in poverty, lack the required resources. Thus, the African Commission requires states to provide 
‘political and financial support’ to ensure effective participation in plans and policy relating to the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.301 With regard to cultural rights for example, 
states should provide financial support by making ‘funds available for the promotion of cultural 
development and popular participation in cultural life’.302 States provide political support when they 
establish institutional infrastructure for ‘the implementation of policies to promote popular 
participation in culture’.303 
In sum, the African Commission emphasises the obligation to ensure participation in plans and 
policies relating to the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. In this regard, the 
Commission’s view is the same as the position of the CESCR. Unlike the CESCR, however, the 
Commission does not explain why it requires states to ensure participation. It is submitted that 
ensuring participation advances the realisation of the individual right to participate in one’s 
government and the collective right to self-determination. The enjoyment of these rights is 
instrumental in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.   
6.4.4 Participation in environmental protection 
The African Charter guarantees both individual and collective aspects of participation as discussed 
above. Despite these guarantees, the African Commission derives the obligation to ensure 
participation from other Charter rights in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Another v Nigeria (Ogoniland case).304 In this case, the Commission has examined a complaint arising 
from oil development activities that affected the health of the Ogoni communities due to 
environmental pollution. While examining the alleged violations of the right to health (Article 16) and 
the right to a general satisfactory environment (Article 24), the Commission laid down the following 
requirements to be met when oil reserves are exploited: 
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Government compliance with the spirit of Article 16 and Article 24 of the African Charter must also 
include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, 
requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial 
development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to those communities 
exposed to hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals 
to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.305 
The Commission lists the requirements to be met to comply with Articles 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter. Among these requirements is the obligation to provide meaningful opportunities for 
individuals to participate in the development decisions. It is submitted that the right to take part in 
the government of one’s country (Article 13(1) of the African Charter) entails the same obligation. 
Thus, the failure of the respondent State to ensure participation in development decisions would 
have been a violation of Article 13. However, the Commission has not found a violation of this 
provision.    
Two other requirements to comply with Articles 16 and 24 relate to the right to receive information. 
First, states should publicise environmental and social impact studies. This may take place through 
different media including publication in print or broadcasting media. Publicising the studies (ie, 
through their publication in a particular newspaper) provides information to the general public. 
Second, states should provide information to communities affected by environmental pollution. If 
the concerned state properly publicises the environmental and social impact studies, the 
communities affected by the development activities would receive the information. The importance 
of the second requirement lies in the emphasis of the Commission on the recipients of the 
information. That is, states should ensure that the relevant information gets to the communities 
exposed to hazardous materials and activities.  
Article 9(1) of the African Charter guarantees the right to receive information. Explaining the content 
of this provision, the African Commission emphasises that organs of states should actively publish 
‘important information of significant public interest’. 306 It also explains that individuals have the right 
to request and obtain information held by public and private bodies.307 In particular, the Commission 
establishes not only the state obligation to publish environmental impact assessment reports but 
also the timeframe within which such reports should be published.308 The Commission requires the 
publication of environmental impact assessment reports within 30 days to be counted from the date 
of receipt or generation of the reports.309 Therefore, the communities affected by the pollution in the 
Ogoniland case have the right to request the information under Article 9(1) of the Charter. However, 
the African Commission has not examined the publication of environmental and social impact studies 
in relation to freedom of information. Consequently, the Commission has not found a violation of 
Article 9(1) of the African Charter. 
Access to information is indispensable in itself. Access to information also facilitates the realisation of 
the right to participate. As discussed above, participation involves the exercise of several rights 
including the exercise of freedom of information.310 It is submitted that access to information is a 
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prerequisite to participation in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. In the 
Ogoniland case, the Commission has not examined a violation of the right to participate in the 
government of one’s country (Article 13(1)) and the right to receive information (Article 9(1)). 
Nevertheless, it has explained that a state failure to provide information and ensure participation 
may lead to a violation of the right to health (Article 16). In other words, the Commission has derived 
the requirement of participation from the right to health and the right to a general satisfactory 
environment (Article 24).  
The African Commission recognises that the Ogoni people are indigenous communities or 
populations.311 As discussed above, the Commission explains that the right to self-determination 
(Article 20(1) of the African Charter) entails the state obligation to obtain prior and informed consent 
of indigenous peoples. In the Ogoniland case, however, the African Commission has not examined 
the right to self-determination of the Ogoni people. Thus, it has not required the Nigerian 
government to obtain free, prior, and informed consent of the Ogoni people. In later eviction cases 
discussed below, the Commission emphasises that states should obtain free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples when they explore and exploit resources in their ancestral territories.   
6.4.5 Participation in eviction processes  
The African Commission and the African Court have dealt with two cases concerning evictions of 
indigenous peoples from their ancestral land. The cases were submitted against the Republic of 
Kenya. The African Commission has decided one of the cases itself and submitted the other one to 
the African Court. In these cases, the Commission and the Court have derived participation from the 
right to property (Article 14) and the right to development (Article 22). In Centre for Minority Rights 
Development and Others v Kenya (Endorois case), the African Commission has examined the alleged 
violations of the rights of the Endorois Indigenous People,312 which were due to their eviction from 
their ancestral land. The respondent State wanted the land for the creation of a game reserve. The 
Commission has considered participation in relation to the rights to property, to development and to 
freely dispose of natural resources. In deciding this case, the Commission heavily relied on the case 
law of the Inter-American Court.  
The African Commission submitted to the African Court a case involving facts similar to those of the 
Endorois case. The Commission relied on its jurisprudence in the Endorois case in its submission to 
the Court in the case of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of Kenya, a 
case concerning the eviction of the Ogiek indigenous people from the Mau Forest (Ogiek case).313 In 
this case, the African Court has dealt with participation in relation to the right to property and the 
right to development. Based on these cases, participation in relation to the right to property (6.4.5.1) 
and the right to development (6.4.5.2) will be discussed below.  
6.4.5.1 Participation and the right to property  
In the Endorois case, the African Commission has found a violation of the right to property 
guaranteed under Article 14 of the African Charter. Article 14 permits encroachment upon the right 
to property ‘in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’. In the Endorois case, the African Commission 
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established that ‘the land of the Endorois has been encroached upon’.314 The encroachment occurred 
because the Endorois were evicted and prevented from accessing their ancestral land ‘to have free 
access to religious sites and their traditional land to graze their cattle’.315 The denial of access was 
due to activities such as the building of roads, gates, game lodges and a hotel on their ancestral land, 
the implementation of mining operations and the demarcation of Endorois historic lands for sale.316 
The Commission emphasised that the ‘encroachment in itself is not a violation of Article 14 of the 
Charter, as long as it is done in accordance with the law’.317 The Commission conducts an analysis of 
limitations on the right to property to determine whether the encroachment took place in 
accordance with the law as discussed in Chapter 3.  
Moreover, the Commission addressed the issue of participation to determine whether the 
encroachment upon the right to property was ‘in accordance with the provisions of appropriate 
laws’. It explained that ‘further elements of the “in accordance with the law” test relate to the 
requirements of consultation and compensation’.318 It thereby emphasised that 
In terms of consultation, the threshold is especially stringent in favour of indigenous peoples, as it also 
requires that consent be accorded. Failure to observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent - 
or to compensate - ultimately results in a violation of the right to property.319 
Echoing the three safeguards (participation, benefit sharing and environmental impact assessment) 
established by the Inter-American Court in the Saramaka case, the African Commission held that 
[N]o effective participation was allowed for the Endorois, nor has there been any reasonable benefit 
enjoyed by the community. Moreover, a prior environment and social impact assessment was not 
carried out. The absence of these three elements of the 'test' is tantamount to a violation of Article 14, 
the right to property, under the Charter.320   
From the above passages, it is clear that the African Commission derives the obligation to ensure 
participation from the right to property (article 14). It explains that States have the obligations to 
consult and seek consent under Article 14 of the African Charter. These obligations should be 
discharged during evictions, particularly that of indigenous peoples. The failure to ensure effective 
participation is a violation of the African Charter.   
Based on its decision in the Endorois case, the African Commission argued the Ogiek case before the 
African Court. The Commission argued that the eviction of Ogiek indigenous people from the Mau 
forest was a violation of their right to property. The Commission submitted that ‘the Ogieks' eviction 
and dispossession of their land without their consent and without adequate compensation, and the 
granting of concessions of their land to third parties, mean that their land has been encroached 
upon’.321 The respondent State argued that ‘its land laws recognise community ownership of land 
and provide for mechanisms by which communities can participate in forest conservation and 
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management’.322 However, it did not show that it ensured the participation of the Ogieks in the 
process that led to their eviction from the Mau Forest.  
The African Court has held that ‘by expelling the Ogieks from their ancestral lands against their will, 
without prior consultation and without respecting the conditions of expulsion in the interest of public 
need, the Respondent violated their rights to land [...] as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Charter’.323 
The Court has confirmed that states have the obligations to consult and obtain consent under Article 
14 of the African Charter. In other words, states should ensure participation during evictions. Unlike 
the Commission, the Court does not clearly derive participation from the requirement of ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws’ provided under Article 14 of the Charter.  
In both the Endorois and Ogiek cases, the African Commission and the African Court applied Article 
14 (individual right to property) to peoples. In the Endorois case, the Commission also applies Article 
21 (collective right to natural resources) to peoples.324 It has referred to the analysis of the Inter-
American Court in the Saramaka case and concluded that the ‘same analysis would apply regarding 
concessions in the instant case of the Endorois’.325 The Commission does not distinguish the 
individual right to property from the collective right to natural resources in the Endorois case. In the 
Ogiek case, the Court has not examined whether there was a violation of the right to natural 
resources since the Commission has not alleged a violation of Article 21 of the African Charter. As a 
result, the practice of the Commission is not clear on the conditions necessary for the application of 
Article 21.  
While drawing on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, it appears that the African 
Commission has missed the textual context of the African Charter. The American Convention does 
not guarantee the collective right to natural resources. Thus, the Inter-American Court has developed 
the individual right to property (Article 21 of the American Convention) to protect collective rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. In contrast, the African Charter distinguishes the individual right to 
property (Article 14) from the collective right to natural resources (Article 21 of the African Charter). 
Since the African Commission misses this textual difference, the Commission has decided the 
Endorois case under Article 14. Instead, both the Endorois and Ogiek cases could have been 
determined under Article 21 of the Charter because the claimants were peoples in both cases.  
Moreover, the African Commission does not seem to properly grasp the Inter-American Court’s 
jurisprudence relating to the individual right to property (Article 21 of the American Convention). 
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Under this provision, the Inter-American Court has developed the collective right to property as an 
exception only applicable to indigenous and tribal peoples, not to other groups. It appears that the 
African Commission misses this point since it contradicts itself in a later case. The Commission 
appears to ignore the Endorois requirements in Nubian Community in Kenya v Kenya.326 The 
members of the Nubian Community are descendants of Sudanese soldiers forcefully conscripted by 
the British colonial authorities and settled in a military reserve in Kibera in 1904.327 Since the British 
colonial period, members of the Nubian Community have been enjoying occupation and the right of 
use over land in Kibera for over a century.328 The African Commission has found that such use entitles 
them to request and obtain an official recognition and registration of their land as a communal 
property.329 It has held that ‘the property rights of the Nubians in Kibera have been encroached on, in 
violation of Article 14 of the Charter’ because ‘Nubians have severally been evicted from Kibera with 
no provision made for alternative housing; no compensation provided to the displaced and no notice 
of such evictions given to the occupants’.330 However, the African Commission has not examined 
whether the respondent State had consulted the members of the Nubian Community and obtained 
their free, prior, and informed consent.  
In fact, there are a couple of differences between the Endorois and the Nubian Community cases, 
which should not affect the obligation to ensure participation. One relates to indigeneity: the 
Commission considers that the Endorois people are indigenous, but does not give that status to the 
Nubians. The other difference relates to the land over which the right to property under Article 14 is 
claimed. In the Nubian Community case, the land that is the subject of the claim lies in the capital, 
Nairobi, and is thus urban land, whereas in the Endorois case, the subject of the claim is not urban 
land. With regard to participation, none of these differences are material. Article 14 of the African 
Charter does not make any distinction among the subjects of the right – it does not matter whether 
the claimants are indigenous or not. Neither does Article 14 distinguish among the objects of the 
right to property – the provision is applicable to any plot of land whether it is urban or not. These 
cases thereby evidence inconsistency in the Commission’s jurisprudence. 
6.4.5.2 Participation and the right to development 
The African Charter is among few international human rights treaties that guarantee the right to 
development.331 The right to development is among collective rights guaranteed in the Charter. The 
subjects of this right are groups while economic, social and cultural rights in the Charter are 
individual rights. The African Commission does not identify the right to development among 
economic, social and cultural rights in the Nairobi Principles. One may still argue that the text of the 
Charter implies that the right to development is related to economic, social and cultural rights. 
Article 22(1) of the African Charter guarantees the right of all peoples to ‘economic, social and 
cultural development’. It is submitted that economic, social and cultural development implies the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.   
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This relationship seems to emerge from the practice of the African Commission and the African 
Court. The Commission addresses the lack of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as a 
violation of the right to development in the Endorois case. The Commission has noted lack of clean 
drinking water and the disruption of traditional means of subsistence as issues affecting the right to 
development.332 Similarly, the African Court addresses programmes related to economic, social and 
cultural rights under the right to development in the Ogiek case.333  
Article 22 of the African Charter does not expressly state the role of participation in the right to 
development. In contrast, other human rights instruments expressly provide for participation. For 
example, the right to development essentially means participation according to the Declaration on 
the Right to Development.334 The Arab Charter provides that ‘every citizen shall have the right to 
participate in the development’.335 In line with the provisions of these instruments, the African 
Commission and the African Court interpret the right to development under the Charter as inclusive 
of participation.  
In the Endorois case, the complainants submitted to the Commission that the violation of the right to 
development was due to ‘the Respondent State's creation of a game reserve and the Respondent 
State's failure to adequately involve the Endorois in the development process’.336 Interestingly, the 
respondent State denied the violation, arguing that it complied with its obligation in relation to the 
right to vote and the right to be elected. It submitted that its ‘political system embraces the principle 
of a participatory model of community through regular competitive election’ and the Endorois were 
represented in county councils.337 The African Commission, however, did not address the issue in 
relation to the right to participate in government (Article 13(1) of the African Charter) or the right to 
self-determination (Article 20(1) of the African Charter). It did not rule on whether holding regular 
elections is enough to ensure participation in development activities. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
Commission accepted as a form of participation, albeit insufficient, the representation of the 
Endorois in the decision making structures.338 It held that ‘the consultations that the Respondent 
State did undertake with the community were inadequate and cannot be considered effective 
participation’ because the consultations did not fulfil the required standard ‘in a form appropriate to 
the circumstances’.339 Similar to the Inter-American Court’s ruling in the Saramaka case, the African 
Commission considers that there is an effective participation when consultations comply with certain 
requirements.  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court examined participation in relation to health, housing and other 
similar programmes as aspects of the right to development guaranteed under Article 22 of the 
African Charter. In line with its decision in the Endorois case, the African Commission argued before 
the Court that the respondent State failed ‘to consult with and/or seek the consent of the Ogiek 
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Community in relation to the development of their shared cultural, economic and social life within 
the Mau Forest’.340 It added that the respondent State failed to recognise their ‘right to determining 
development priorities and strategies and exercising their right to be actively involved in developing 
economic and social programmes affecting them’.341 Rather than stating that it consulted members 
of the Ogiek community, the respondent State argued that ‘consultations were held with the Ogieks' 
democratically elected area representatives’.342 The respondent State seems to have too narrowly 
interpreted the right to participate in the government of one’s country (Article 13(1)) and the right to 
self-determination (Article 20(1)). Since the Court was examining the right of Ogieks as a people, the 
collective right to self-determination is more relevant than the individual right to participate. In other 
words, the respondent State seems to argue that elections are a sufficient form of participation. The 
Court held that      
[T]he Ogieks have been continuously evicted from the Mau Forest by the Respondent, without being 
effectively consulted. The evictions have adversely impacted on their economic, social and cultural 
development. They have also not been actively involved in developing and determining health, 
housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them.343 
The African Court established that the respondent State had not consulted the Ogieks before the 
eviction took place. It also established the Commission’s allegation that the respondent State failed 
to ensure participation of the Ogieks in ‘health, housing and other economic and social 
programmes’.344 For these reasons, the Court found a violation of the right to development (Article 
22).345 Like the Commission, the Court did not address the respondent State’s argument that the 
Ogieks were consulted through their democratically elected representatives, nor did it explain and 
distinguish community level participation from participation in elections. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem to have accepted the consultations allegedly held with elected representatives as sufficient.  
In the Ogiek case, the Court did not examine the eviction in relation to the right to health (Article 16) 
or the right to housing (Articles 14, 16 and 18(1)). It did not find a violation of these provisions. 
However, the Court examined whether the respondent State had ensured the participation of the 
Ogieks in the programmes intended to implement the right to health, the right to housing and other 
similar rights.346 The Court found that the failure to ensure participation in such programmes is a 
violation of the right to development. Therefore, the Court indicated that the implementation of the 
right to development improves the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Moreover, the Court indicated the type of consultations required under Article 22 of the Charter. It 
requires effective consultations. In other words, the Court would not accept every kind of 
consultation. Unlike the Inter-American Court, however, the African Court does not lay down 
detailed criteria for effective participation. Some criteria can nonetheless be gathered from the 
decisions of the Commission and the Court. 
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6.4.6 Requirements for effective participation  
The African Commission relied on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court to decide the 
Endorois case as already noted. In the Endorois case, the Commission by and large transplanted the 
requirements of effective participation developed by the Inter-American Court. Based on its 
jurisprudence in the Endorois case, the Commission argued the Ogiek case before the African Court. 
In the Ogiek case, the Court confirmed some requirements of effective participation transplanted by 
the Commission. The Commission lacks the clarity with which the Inter-American Court explains 
these requirements. Some requirements of participation can still be gleaned from the decisions of 
the African Commission and the African Court.  
One of the requirements relates to when the consultations should be conducted. The Commission 
indicates that states should conduct consultations before implementing a particular development 
project such as the establishment of a game reserve. In the Endorois case, the Commission found 
that the consultations conducted by the respondent State were inadequate because ‘community 
members were informed of the impending project as a fait accompli, and not given an opportunity to 
shape the policies or their role in the game reserve’.347 In other words, consultations conducted after 
a final decision to implement a project do not amount to effective participation. In the Ogiek case, 
the African Court confirmed this requirement. While finding a violation of the right to property 
(Article 14 of the Charter), the Court qualified the kind of consultations that the respondent State 
should have conducted. The Court has stressed a prior consultation,348 which means that the 
respondent State should have consulted the Ogieks before granting concessions of their land to third 
parties. This is comparable to the Inter-American Court’s requirement that consultations take place 
in advance. 
The Commission implies the requirement of accessibility in conducting consultations. Noting that the 
representatives of the Endorois were illiterate and had a conception of property different from that 
of the authorities of the respondent State, the Commission stressed that ‘it was incumbent upon the 
Respondent State to conduct the consultation process in such a manner that allowed the 
representatives to be fully informed of the agreement, and participate in developing parts crucial to 
the life of the community’.349 The Commission found that the respondent State did not ensure that 
the Endorois understood the consequences of establishing a game reserve since they ‘continued to 
believe that ‘the game reserve and their pastoralist way of life would not be mutually exclusive and 
that they would have a right of re-entry on to their land’.350 This shows that the consultation was 
inadequate according to the Commission. From this, one may submit that the Commission adopts 
the requirement that consultations should be accessible to the indigenous people.351   
The Commission’s decision in the Endorois case implies that states should conduct an informed 
consultation. The same facts that the representatives of Endorois people were illiterate and did not 
understand the documents produced by the respondent State also show another problem with the 
consultation, namely that the Endorois and their representatives did not have the necessary 
information. For this reason, the Commission found that ‘the Respondent State did not ensure that 
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the Endorois were accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the process’.352 As a 
result, the Commission implied the requirement that consultations must be informed, however, it did 
not specify whether the obligation of the respondent State to provide information arises from the 
right to receive information (Article 9(1) of the African Charter).  
The Commission indicates that the consent of indigenous peoples affects the adequacy of 
consultation. It has addressed the relevance of free, prior and informed consent and its relationship 
with consultation. With respect to ‘any development or investment projects that would have a major 
impact within the Endorois territory, the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, 
but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions’.353 It found that ‘the Respondent State did not obtain the prior, informed consent of all 
the Endorois before designating their land as a Game Reserve and commencing their eviction’.354 As a 
result, the Commission concludes, ‘this consultation was not sufficient’.355 In this holding, the 
Commission has not referred to any specific case; however, it is obvious from the phrasing that the 
African Commission borrowed this requirement from the Inter-American Court’s decision in the 
Saramaka case.356 Nonetheless, there are a couple of distinctions: the Inter-American Court requires 
free, prior and informed consent as an element additional to the consultation whereas the African 
Commission considers a consultation inadequate if there is no free, prior, and informed consent. The 
Inter-American Court requires free, prior, and informed consent in cases of large-scale development 
or investment projects, whereas the African Commission does not make a distinction among 
development projects based on whether they are large-scale or not.  
In the Ogiek case, the African Court implies the requirement of consent, holding that the eviction of 
‘the Ogieks from their ancestral lands against their will’ was a violation of the right to property 
(article 14 of the Charter).357 According to the Court, the willingness of individuals to be evicted is an 
important element for an eviction to comply with the requirements of Article 14. In other words, an 
eviction conducted without the consent of the evicted violates the right to property. Unlike the 
Commission, which requires the ‘free, prior and informed consent’, the Court does not describe the 
kind of consent it requires.  
In sum, the Commission has indicated that consultations should be conducted in advance; that they 
should be accessible; that they should be informed; and that they should result in free, prior, and 
informed consent. The Commission has laid down these criteria in relation to development projects 
affecting indigenous peoples. Unlike the Inter-American Court, however, the African Commission has 
not clearly stated that a prior environmental and social impact assessment is necessary for the 
purpose of conducting an informed consultation. Yet it has found a violation of the right to property 
due to the respondent State’s failure to carry out such assessment.358 In the Ogoniland case 
discussed above, the Commission has held that the failure to conduct an environmental and social 
impact assessment is a violation of the rights to health and to a general satisfactory environment. 
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The Commission also does not expressly address the requirement of conducting consultations in 
good faith and with the aim of reaching an agreement. One may argue that the requirement of free, 
prior and informed consent obviates the need to refer to good faith. Nevertheless, the Commission 
referred to a provision of the ILO Convention No 169, which contains this requirement.359 As 
discussed above, the Inter-American Court has clearly established the requirement of good faith in 
conducting consultations. 
6.5 Conclusion 
States have the obligation to ensure participation of individuals in the implementation of their 
economic, social and cultural rights. This is clearly established in the practice of the CESCR, the 
European Committee, and the Inter-American Court. Their practice converges on the issue of 
whether this obligation exists: states do have the obligation regardless of whether a treaty text 
recognises the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs or other related rights. The ICESCR 
and the European Charter do not guarantee such rights. Still, the CESCR and the European 
Committee require states to ensure participation.  
However, the practice diverges on the legal basis of the obligation. The CESCR does not always 
explain its legal basis. It emphasises the obligation to ensure participation with regard to most rights 
guaranteed in the ICESCR. It relies more frequently on the right of self-determination, the prohibition 
of non-discrimination, the right to adequate housing and participation in cultural rights than it does 
on other rights. The European Committee derives the obligation from the right to protection against 
poverty and social exclusion. The Inter-American Court derives the obligation from the right to 
property. This divergence implies that the content of the obligation is different in different systems. 
It seems that the CESCR requires participation of everyone, although most of its concerns and 
recommendations in this respect relate to indigenous peoples and individuals subjected to evictions 
in urban centres. The Inter-American Court has adopted the narrowest state obligation by limiting 
this obligation to indigenous peoples. As a result, there is a clear convergence on the state obligation 
to ensure participation of indigenous peoples, which includes consultations as well as free, prior and 
informed consent. The CESCR and the Inter-American Court establish the requirement of such 
consultations; however, it is not clear whether the requirement of consultation established by the 
CESCR with respect to indigenous peoples also applies to consultation with other individuals or 
groups claiming rights under the ICESCR.   
The African Charter provides textual bases for requiring states to ensure participation of individuals 
in the implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights. It guarantees the right to 
participate in government, the right to self-determination and other rights relevant to participation 
such as the rights to freedoms of association, assembly, expression and information. Like other treaty 
bodies, the African Commission requires states to ensure the participation of rights-holders in the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. In particular, the Commission requires states 
to ensure the participation of individuals and groups in the design, implementation, monitoring and 
review of plans and policies, which are necessary for the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights. In its case law, particularly in cases involving indigenous peoples, the Commission has 
identified the requirements of effective participation: conducted in advance, accessible, informed 
and results in free, prior, and informed consent. When one of these requirements is missing, the 
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Commission finds a violation of rights. Thus, it found violations of the rights to health, housing, 
property and culture.  
The Commission, however, lacks clarity in terms of identifying the legal basis of the obligation. It does 
not clearly link the obligation to ensure participation of individuals and groups in the implementation 
of their economic, social and cultural rights to the recognition of the the individual right to 
participate in the government of one’s country and the peoples’ right to self-determination in the 
African Charter. Sometimes, the Commission copies the Inter-American Court and derives the 
obligation from the right to property of indigenous peoples as it did in the Endorois case and argued 
before the African Court in the Ogiek case. In the Nairobi Principles, the Commission follows the 
practice of the CESCR and requires participation in all phases of a policy; but it fails to explain the 
purpose and legal basis of such a requirement. The Commission does not address the importance of 
participation or consultation during eviction processes as its decision in the Nubian Community case 
demonstrates. This happens perhaps when the Commission does not find similar jurisprudence from 
other treaty bodies.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The recognition of economic, social and cultural rights entails state obligations. The clarity of state 
obligations is important in the implementation of the rights. States should be able to identify the 
actions to be performed or avoided. To facilitate the identification of required actions or omissions, it 
is necessary to define state obligations in the treaties that guarantee the rights. Human rights treaty 
bodies established to monitor the implementation of these rights may also define and classify state 
obligations. Thus, the process of defining and classifying is an on-going process, not a one-time 
project. Focusing on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), I have 
examined the definition and classification of state obligations corresponding to economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
The research questions I have sought to answer relate to general state obligations, those applicable 
to all economic, social and cultural rights. In international human rights law, the concept of 
progressive realisation is identified as the principal general obligation relating to all economic, social 
and cultural rights. In Chapter 2, I have addressed the questions relating to the concept of 
progressive realisation under the African Charter. Once the principal obligation is identified, other 
general obligations can be defined from the perspective of the principal obligation. At times, the 
concept of progressive realisation is defined as a form of rights limitation. In Chapter 3, I have 
examined permissible limitations of rights under the African Charter. The concept of progressive 
realisation can also be distinguished from its exceptions, the immediate obligations. In Chapters 4 
and 5, I have examined immediate obligations: minimum core obligations and obligations relating to 
non-discrimination and equality. Finally, in Chapter 6, I have examined the obligation to ensure 
participation as an important obligation. When the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) assesses progressive realisation, it places great importance on participatory decision-
making processes at the national level.1 Put differently, the CESCR requires the participation of 
individuals and groups in the implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights. 
Participation in decision-making involves the exercise of political rights. Although the CESCR lacks the 
jurisdiction to monitor the implementation of political rights, it recognises the instrumental role of 
participation in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Against this background, I 
examined the state obligation to ensure participation of individuals and groups in the 
implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter.  
To answer the research questions, I have analysed the text of the African Charter along with the 
findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court). I have drawn on the texts of the 
European Social Charter (European Charter), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) 
along with its Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador). I have also drawn on the practice of 
the judicial and quasi-judicial organs monitoring these treaties, namely, the European Committee of 
Social Rights (European Committee), the CESCR, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(Inter-American Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).  
In this chapter, I summarise the findings of the research with some reflections. As discussed 
throughout all chapters, the African Commission, and to some extent the African Court, have 
interpreted economic, social and cultural rights by defining and categorising state obligations. 
Through their interpretation, they have articulated a particular conception of these rights. In the next 
section, I identify the conception of economic, social and cultural rights articulated by the 
Commission and the Court. In the third section, I show how the Commission’s interpretation (the way 
it defines and categorises state obligations) affects the indivisibility and interdependence of human 
rights under the Charter. In the fourth section, I note the link between deprivation and discrimination 
transplanted by the Commission from the practice of the CESCR and suggest that it is necessary to 
identify such a link in concrete cases. In the fifth section, I summarise the legal basis and use of 
proportionality analysis and other similar tests in the practice of the African Commission and the 
African Court. I suggest ways of consolidating and extending the application of the analysis to 
determine the scope of state obligations. In the sixth section, I engage with the Nairobi Principles, 
and suggest a reformulation of some specific paragraphs in light of the findings of this study. Finally, I 
make suggestions for future lines of research. 
7.2 Conception of economic, social and cultural rights 
The African Commission and, in some instances, the African Court have articulated a particular 
conception of economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter by defining and 
classifying corresponding state obligations. From the analysis of their findings emerges a trend that 
erodes some of the uniqueness of the African Charter, affecting the substantive scope of economic, 
social and cultural rights guaranteed in the African Charter in certain respects. First, the African 
Commission has introduced a distinction between obligations of progressive realisation and 
immediate obligations. It has introduced the concept of progressive realisation although there is 
ample historical evidence as well as economic and political reasons for omitting the concept from the 
African Charter, as discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3).  
The concept of progressive realisation does not mean the same thing to everyone. A version of 
progressive realisation, advocated by the CESCR in particular, refers to improvement in the level of 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The CESCR indicates that states should make 
progress in the realisation of rights guaranteed in the ICESCR. The ICESCR contains a state reporting 
procedure that can be used as a tool to ascertain whether states have made progress or not. In 
respect of some states, which are also parties to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR), the complaint procedure can be an additional 
tool. Defined as an obligation to improve levels of enjoyment, progressive realisation is applicable to 
all human rights. This version of the concept is implicit in international human rights treaties 
requiring states to report on their progress. For example, Article 40 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressly requires states to report on their progress in the realisation 
of civil and political rights. Similarly, the African Charter requires states to report on their progress. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.6), Article 62 of the African Charter stipulates the obligations of 
states to report on their progress not only in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
but also in other rights guaranteed in the Charter. In short, the African Charter recognises the 
concept of progressive realisation when the concept is understood as an obligation to improve the 
levels of enjoyment of rights. Therefore, the introduction of the concept into the Charter is not 
necessary unless a different meaning is intended.  
Another version of the concept of progressive realisation connotes some form of defect in the legal 
or judicial nature of economic, social and cultural rights or some kind of limitation on these rights, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The concept implies that economic, social and cultural rights need not be 
enforced to the letter any time soon. From the views of state representatives expressed during the 
adoption of the OP-ICESCR in 2008, it is clear that some states understand the concept of progressive 
realisation to mean non-justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. In the literature, some 
authors conflate non-justiciability with the concept of progressive realisation while others regard the 
concept as a limitation on economic, social and cultural rights. The African Commission applies the 
concept to economic, social and cultural rights only, indicating that it uses the concept as a form of 
limitation. Consequently, the Commission undermines the substantive scope of economic, social and 
cultural rights guaranteed in the African Charter. Still, the Commission cannot take the concept of 
progressive realisation to mean non-justiciability because of the direct and complete jurisdiction of 
the African Court over economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in any human rights treaty so 
far as a respondent state is a party to that treaty.   
Second, the African Commission has introduced a limitation clause applicable to economic, social and 
cultural rights although the African Charter does not contain such a clause, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
In this regard, the Charter is different from other treaties, particularly from the European Charter, 
the ICESCR and the Protocol of San Salvador, all of which contain a general limitation clause. As the 
drafting history of the Charter indicates, the drafters considered including a general limitation clause 
in the early draft of the Charter, but dropped the clause from its final text. Instead, the Charter 
contains claw-back or specific limitation clauses that are limited to civil and political rights, but are 
missing from most provisions on economic, social and cultural rights. Since the Charter does not 
circumscribe most economic, social and cultural rights with claw-back clauses or limitation clauses, it 
guarantees broader rights compared to other treaties.  
The absence of a limitation clause does not transform economic, social and cultural rights in the 
African Charter into absolute rights. With a few exceptions, human rights are not absolute in 
international human rights law. Economic, social and cultural rights are not among the exceptions 
and, therefore, are not absolute rights in international human rights law. In principle, this status in 
international human rights law does not prohibit African States from defining economic, social and 
cultural rights as absolute rights in the African Charter. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Charter itself contains internal and external limitations on the economic, social and cultural rights it 
guarantees. The introduction of a general limitation clause is an additional limitation. By introducing 
a general limitation clause into the Charter, the African Commission and the African Court narrowed 
the substantive scope of economic, social and cultural rights and harmonised the Charter with other 
treaties, particularly with the ICESCR. Moreover, the Commission and the Court identify more 
legitimate goals for limiting rights than those provided in the ICESCR, making state obligations in the 
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African Charter narrower than state obligations in the ICESCR. Therefore, a narrow state obligation 
means a narrow scope of economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter.  
Third, the African Commission introduced the concept of minimum core obligations as an exception 
to progressive realisation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the concept emerged in the literature to identify 
elements of economic, social and cultural rights for immediate implementation. Like the CESCR, the 
African Commission has clarified state obligations corresponding to economic, social and cultural 
rights by defining and listing minimum core obligations. The Commission has underlined that 
minimum core obligations are immediate obligations, are non-derogable, are not dependent on 
available resources, and have priority over other obligations. Unfortunately, the Commission’s 
interpretation contains problematic aspects that reduce the substantive scope of economic, social 
and cultural rights. To begin with, the Commission defines minimum core obligations in terms of the 
number of the deprived. It stresses that no significant number of individuals should be deprived of 
essential elements of each right. In other words, the Commission says that the failure of states to 
discharge their minimum core obligations does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Charter 
unless the number of the deprived is significant. This definition excludes some individuals whose 
number is not significant and, therefore, is contrary to the idea that human rights are inherent in 
each individual.      
The analysis of the list of minimum core obligations in Chapter 4 shows that the Commission has 
watered down state obligations. It has identified fewer minimum core obligations compared to the 
core obligations identified by the CESCR. Fewer minimum core obligations mean fewer state 
obligations and narrower scope of economic, social and cultural rights. The classification of the 
obligations to respect and protect among minimum core obligations is another way of watering 
down state obligations. This has a serious repercussion on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. From the perspective of rights-holders, particularly in the case of the most serious 
deprivation occurring due to the failures in the implementation of the rights, there is no enjoyment 
to be respected or protected by states in the first place. Discharging the obligations to respect and 
protect is relevant only to those who are already enjoying the rights, not to those who are totally 
deprived and need protection.  
Finally, the African Commission adopts a narrow interpretation of the obligation to ensure 
participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of their economic, social and cultural 
rights, as the analysis in Chapter 6 shows. Since the African Charter recognises all categories of rights 
in the same treaty, it guarantees the enjoyment of the individual right to take part in the government 
of one’s country and the collective right to self-determination because not only are these rights 
invaluable in themselves, but are also means of ensuring the enjoyment of all economic, social and 
cultural rights. The recognition of these rights gives rise to the corresponding state obligation to 
ensure participation. Nevertheless, the analysis in Chapter 6 shows that the African Commission does 
not derive the obligation to ensure participation from the right to participate in government and the 
right to self-determination. As a result, the Commission has limited the obligation to ensure 
participation to a couple of economic, social and cultural rights (the right to property and the right to 
health) and to a particular group (the indigenous peoples).   
In sum, in the text of the African Charter, economic, social and cultural rights entail broader state 
obligations than the rights contained in other treaties, particularly those guaranteed in the ICESCR. 
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However, the African Commission has watered down state obligations and harmonised them with 
those obligations undertaken by states parties to the ICESCR. Sometimes, the Commission adopts a 
narrower interpretation than the CESCR does. By defining and classifying the state obligations 
undertaken in the African Charter, the African Commission has articulated a narrow conception of 
economic, social and cultural rights, which removes some burdens from states but undermines a 
meaningful protection of individuals.  
7.3 Indivisibility and interdependence of human rights  
Indivisibility and interdependence are common characteristics of human rights. By ‘indivisibility’, I 
mean the recognition and protection of economic, social and cultural rights on equal footing as civil 
and political rights or other categories of rights. An interpretation of human rights treaties erodes 
indivisibility when that interpretation weakens the recognition and protection of economic, social 
and cultural rights, particularly in relation to the recognition and protection accorded to other 
categories of rights. The classification of human rights into different categories and their recognition 
in separate treaties per se do not affect the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are 
interdependent because the realisation of a right (a category of rights) often leads to the realisation 
of another right (another category of rights); or the violation of a right (a category of rights) often 
leads to the violation of another right (another category of rights).  
The African Charter recognises the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights because the 
Charter recognises economic, social and cultural rights along with other categories of rights in the 
same treaty and establishes the same mechanisms of monitoring their implementation, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. Indivisibility of human rights is the hallmark of the Charter, making the 
African human rights system distinct from international (United Nations) and regional (European and 
Inter-American) human rights systems. However, the treatment of economic, social and cultural 
rights separately from civil and political rights in international and regional human rights systems has 
influenced the interpretation of the African Charter, particularly the interpretation by the African 
Commission. 
The analysis throughout the previous chapters reveals that the African Commission usually takes the 
ICESCR and the interpretation by the CESCR as a point of reference when explaining the scope of 
economic, social and cultural rights and their corresponding state obligations in the African Charter. 
The Commission treats economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in the African Charter in 
isolation because that is how the ICESCR and the CESCR treat these rights. Indeed, like other 
international courts and quasi-judicial organs, it is necessary for the African Commission and the 
African Court to consider the text of international human rights treaties along with its interpretation 
in practice while interpreting and applying the African Charter.  The problem lies in disregarding, and 
in some cases displacing, the context and text of the African Charter, particularly when the Charter 
recognises a wider scope of rights and stronger mechanisms of protection.  
From the analysis in Chapter 2, it is clear that the Commission considers the concept of progressive 
realisation applicable to economic, social and cultural rights, but not to other rights in the Charter. 
The Commission has re-introduced a concept, which the Charter drafters had discussed and rejected 
for economic and political reasons. As long as the concept of progressive realisation means an 
additional limitation on economic, social and cultural rights, the re-introduction of the concept 
undermines the indivisibility of the rights in the Charter. If the Commission wanted to maintain the 
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indivisibility under the Charter, it would have rejected the concept of progressive realisation just the 
way the drafters of the Charter did. Alternatively, the Commission could have adapted the concept 
for all rights in the Charter, a position that would have been logical, particularly if the Commission’s 
intention were to recognise that the realisation of all rights requires resources and improves over 
time.  
Chapter 4 shows that the concept of minimum core is understood as the irreducible part of a right or 
as an obligation that can be applicable to all rights. The idea of core and periphery is implicit in the 
concept of limitation, as discussed in Chapter 3. The Commission itself declared that limitations are 
not permissible if they render a right illusory, implying that there are parts of the right that cannot be 
taken away through limitations. Yet the Commission restricts the concept of minimum core to 
economic, social and cultural rights only. More surprisingly, the Commission regards as minimum 
core obligations the obligations to respect and protect in relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights, but not in relation to civil and political rights. The Commission makes this decision although it 
recognises that each right in the Charter engenders the obligations to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil.  
The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that the Commission also misses the opportunity to capitalise on the 
interdependence of human rights entrenched in the African Charter. The implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights involves political decisions such as the allocation of state budget. 
Participation and deprivation have a negative correlation. Individuals and groups who are deprived of 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights are unable to participate in decisions relating to 
the implementation of their rights. At the same time, public officials do not have incentives to 
address the need of the deprived, locking them up in a vicious circle. The deprived, who are usually 
members of vulnerable groups, do not participate in decision-making; and because they do not 
participate, public officials ignore the implementation of their rights. Given this correlation, the 
individual right to take part in the government of one’s country and the collective right to self-
determination have not only an intrinsic value but also an instrumental role in the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The recognition of these rights entails the corresponding state 
obligation to ensure the participation of individuals and groups in the implementation of their rights. 
Exercised individually or collectively, participation requires the enjoyment of a host of political rights 
including the rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression and 
freedom of information, which are also guaranteed in the African Charter. Therefore, the obligation 
to ensure participation arises from the recognition of political rights in the African Charter. However, 
the African Commission misses the interdependence of rights adopted in the Charter because of its 
uncritical incorporation of the practice of the CESCR, which lacks the mandate to monitor the 
implementation of civil and political rights.   
In sum, the African Commission and the African Court should maintain the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights in the interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights under 
the African Charter. They should apply these rights in a way that takes into account civil and political 
rights and the peoples’ rights guaranteed in the Charter. That approach may be challenging at times, 
particularly if the Commission and the Court rely, as they often do, on the jurisprudence of other 
human rights systems that separate economic, social and cultural rights from civil and political rights. 
It is certainly useful to draw on the experience of the Human Rights Committee to interpret civil and 
political rights under the African Charter. Similarly, it is useful to tap into the practice of the CESCR 
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while interpreting economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter. However, the 
Commission and the Court should not heavily rely on materials from other human rights systems to 
the extent that undermines the indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social and cultural 
rights and civil and political rights.    
7.4 Discriminatory social structures 
The African Commission has undermined the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights 
under the African Charter, as discussed above. An exception is in the area of equality and non-
discrimination, discussed in Chapter 5, but not because the Commission has finally discovered that 
the African Charter is different from the ICESCR or that its own mandate is different from that of the 
CESCR; rather, it is because the CESCR integrates equality and non-discrimination into economic, 
social and cultural rights based on provisions of the ICESCR prohibiting discrimination. While 
transplanting the practice of the CESCR, the Commission misses the textual nuances of the African 
Charter. Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not guarantee a separate right to equality. Thus, the 
CESCR derives the state obligation to achieve equality in the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights from the non-discrimination provisions of the ICESCR. Like the ICCPR, the African 
Charter guarantees a separate right to equality (Article 3 of the Charter). The Commission’s 
interpretation of the non-discrimination clause (Article 2 of the Charter) is in line with the practice of 
the CESCR and thus makes the right to equality under the African Charter superfluous.  
A rather important transplantation is the link between discriminatory social structures and 
deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights. According to the CESCR, the non-discrimination 
provisions (Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR) require states to eliminate social structures, which are 
barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly barriers to the 
enjoyment by members of vulnerable groups who are victims of discrimination. The CESCR stresses 
that states should eliminate the deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights caused by past 
and current discriminatory laws, traditions and practices. In particular, the CESCR finds that national 
laws such as tax laws lead to inequality in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, 
attributing discrimination to states at least partly. Like the CESCR, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
African Commission identifies discrimination as a cause of deprivation.  
The Commission identifies members of vulnerable groups as individuals who faced or continue to 
face significant impediments to their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. As direct 
victims of discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices, members of vulnerable groups are 
the deprived. The Commission considers their deprivation to be the result of discrimination 
embedded in social structures such as laws, policies and practices. The Commission implies that 
perpetrators of discrimination are states because the discriminatory laws and policies emanate from 
states. States do not create discriminatory customary practices but they are still responsible for 
perpetuating or tolerating the perpetuation of those practices. Therefore, states are responsible for 
the significant impediments to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by vulnerable 
groups. In short, the Commission also establishes that states cause deprivation to the extent that 
such deprivation is the result of discriminatory laws, policies and practices. Like the CESCR, the 
Commission emphasises that states should effect structural, cultural and social changes by changing 
discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices. It also requires states to correct effects of 
discrimination by according priority to the deprived and by adopting temporary special measures in 
their favour.  
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The African Commission has no difficulty following the practice of the CESCR and establishing 
discrimination as a cause of deprivation. However, in concrete cases where the CESCR has no 
experience to offer, the Commission misses the social structures that are discriminatory and a cause 
of deprivation. This is true even when the victims were indigenous peoples, women and persons with 
disabilities, whom the Commission identifies as members of vulnerable groups. In its decision in the 
Endorois case and its submission in the Ogiek case, where indigenous peoples were denied access to 
their ancestral land in Kenya, the African Commission failed to identify the system of private property 
laws and institutions as a structure that constitutes discrimination against indigenous peoples. 
Likewise, in the Ogoniland case, where pollution from oil extraction destroyed food and water 
sources, and affected the health of the Ogoni People in Nigeria, the Commission did not identify laws 
relating to investment or those relating to the exploitation of natural resources as the social 
structure that led to violations of economic, social and cultural rights.  
In Negash v Ethiopia, where a marriage by abduction, a prevalent customary practice that does not 
affect boys, prevented a thirteen-year-old girl from going to school, the Commission did not find 
discrimination. Nor did it find a violation of the victim’s right to education. In Purohit and Moore v the 
Gambia, the Commission did not find an archaic law called Lunatic Detention Act discriminatory, 
although persons with mental disabilities were victims of a violation of their right to health due to 
that law. In concrete cases, therefore, the Commission has been unable to spot deprivation of 
economic, social and cultural rights resulting from discriminatory social structures including 
discriminatory laws, policies and customary practices. While the African Court has yet to develop its 
jurisprudence on economic, social and cultural rights, it could have still found the respondent State’s 
law discriminatory in the Ogiek case. 
In short, it is advisable to identify the link between discriminatory social structures and deprivation 
for a couple of reasons. As the saying goes, a stitch in time saves nine. It would be late to address the 
deprivation of members of a community who were denied their livelihood due to the application of 
private property systems as happened in the Endorois and Ogiek cases. An early intervention strategy 
would have been the recognition of traditional property systems that would ensure the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ traditional territories. Similarly, as the facts in Negash v Ethiopia suggest, 
eliminating a practice that bars girls from school is a better strategy than attempting to address the 
deprivation of women due to the lack of education. Moreover, the identification of the link clarifies 
that the deprivation suffered by individuals such as members of the Endorois or Ogiek Community or 
by women such as Ms Negash is caused by state actions or omissions in the first place. Therefore, It is 
necessary to eradicate social structures that are barriers to the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights.     
7.5 Proportionality analysis  
The African Commission and the African Court use some form of proportionality analysis as a tool for 
defining state obligations and determining the substantive scope of rights guaranteed in the African 
Charter. As discussed in Chapter 3, the proportionality analysis consists of several steps or 
components, namely, legitimate goal, suitability, necessity and balancing. In a narrow sense, 
proportionality analysis may be limited to checking compliance with the component of balancing. 
Moreover, for the purpose of examining allegations of discrimination and assessing the 
appropriateness of retrogressive measures, the Commission has laid down criteria, which are similar 
to the components of proportionality. The proportionality analysis usually takes place in the 
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application of a limitation clause. In this section, I summarise the introduction of a general limitation 
clause into the African Charter and the application of proportionality analysis and propose the 
consolidation of components of proportionality and other similar criteria to enhance the clarity and 
consistency of the proportionality analysis as a tool.  
The African Commission and the African Court employ different versions of the proportionality 
analysis; some relating to the application of limitation clauses while others not. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the African Commission has assigned the role of a general limitation clause to Article 27(2) 
of the African Charter. This provision imposes a duty on individuals to exercise their rights ‘with due 
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’ The African Court 
also recognises this provision as a general limitation clause in line with the practice of the 
Commission. As Article 27(2) was not intended to serve as a general limitation clause, it omits some 
elements usually contained in conventional limitation clauses.  It does not state that limitations must 
be determined by law. The provision contains a restrictive list of items that can be taken as legitimate 
goals of limitations. It does not contain other legitimate goals of limitations such as national security, 
public health, public safety and public order, which are common in limitation clauses of human rights 
treaties. Article 27(2) does not state that limitations should be necessary.  
Despite these textual limitations, the African Commission and the African Court have developed 
Article 27(2) into a full-fledged conventional limitation clause that applies to economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Charter. In other words, Article 27(2) of the Charter now requires that 
limitations be determined by law; that they serve legitimate goals; that they be necessary and that 
states consider and balance competing interests (proportionality in the narrow sense). The 
Commission does not follow any particular order while assessing state compliance with these 
components. On the other hand, the Court assesses compliance with each component in a sequential 
order, starting with the assessment of whether a limitation is determined by law. The Court then 
proceeds to the assessment of whether the limitation serves a legitimate goal and finally evaluates 
whether the limitation is necessary and proportional. If the Court finds non-compliance with one 
component it does not proceed to the next one. Neither the Commission nor the Court assesses 
compliance with the component of suitability. They can still be regarded as employing 
proportionality analysis for assessing state compliance with the components of legitimate goals, 
necessity and balancing. The development of a general limitation clause and proportionality analysis 
has taken place in relation to negative obligations usually corresponding to civil and political rights. 
The Commission and the Court have also applied proportionality analysis to the rights to take part in 
cultural life and the right to property. Both rights fall under the category of economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
The African Commission and the African Court employ a similar proportionality analysis for 
examining allegations of discrimination, as the analysis in Chapter 5 shows. The Commission 
considers that discrimination is a distinction made on prohibited grounds unless the distinction has 
objective and reasonable justification; and unless there is proportionality between the aim sought 
and the means employed. Similarly, the Court stresses objective and reasonable justification and 
proportionality; it also adds an element of necessity. That is, the criteria used to identify 
discrimination overlap with the components of proportionality. The Commission and the Court have 
derived the components of proportionality from the newly discovered general limitation clause 
under Article 27(2) of the African Charter, but they do not explain the sources of the criteria used to 
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identify discrimination. Thus, the examination of the allegation of discrimination is different from the 
limitation analysis in some respects. First, a limitation must be determined by law to be permissible, 
whereas a distinction on prohibited grounds need not be determined by law. Second, a permissible 
limitation must serve one of the legitimate goals restrictively listed in limitation clauses, whereas a 
distinction on prohibited grounds need not serve any predetermined goal as long as there is an 
objective and reasonable justification.  
Although the rationale for these differences is not clear, the implication is obvious. States have more 
discretion when they make distinctions on prohibited grounds than when they impose limitations on 
the exercise of rights, because they do not have to enact laws or serve a particular predetermined 
goal. The differences also raise another question: Is the newly discovered general limitation clause 
under Article 27(2) applicable to the right to non-discrimination (Article 2 of the African Charter)? 
This question is apposite given that the Commission and the Court regard Article 2 of the Charter as 
an independent right. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 5, some other treaty bodies find a violation 
of non-discrimination provisions only when such provisions are read together with substantive rights, 
not when they are read alone. Therefore, the Commission and the Court may avoid these concerns 
by examining allegations of discrimination based on the criteria established in the newly discovered 
general limitation clause.    
The criteria adopted for assessing the appropriateness of retrogressive measures under the African 
Charter can also be assimilated with the components of proportionality. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the African Commission explains that retrogressive measures are prohibited under the African 
Charter save exceptional situations. Even in those exceptional cases, retrogressive measures should 
comply with certain criteria transplanted by the Commission from the practice of the CESCR, which 
requires that retrogressive measures should be necessary and proportionate. The analysis in Chapter 
2 shows that the Commission requires a reasonable justification for adopting retrogressive measures. 
It also requires states to adopt the least restrictive alternative. The first requirement is similar to the 
legitimate goal component, while the second one is similar to the component of necessity. Apart 
from terminological differences, the criteria for evaluating retrogressive measures overlap with the 
components of proportionality analysis and, therefore, become an unnecessary duplication and a 
source of confusion. The Commission and the Court may avoid the duplication and the confusion if 
they regard retrogressive measures as limitations. A helpful insight in this regard is the practice of 
the European Committee, which considers that retrogressive measures are the same as restrictive 
measures and are subject to a general limitation clause and proportionality analysis, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
The African Commission utilises proportionality analysis in relation to positive steps taken by states 
to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights, as the analysis in Chapter 3 shows. For this purpose, the 
Commission defines the principle of proportionality as balancing, implying that the other 
components of proportionality, namely, legitimate goals, suitability and necessity, are not applicable. 
The Commission requires the balancing of competing individual and public interests, indicating that 
the positive steps interfere with the enjoyment of rights by individuals. In that case, the same 
measures become positive steps and retrogressive measures at the same time. A typical example 
from other systems is the measures examined by the Inter-American Commission in National 
Association of Ex-Employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al v Peru, where the 
Respondent State adopted some measures to reduce the pension of highly paid individuals (victims 
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of the measure) to increase the pension of individuals who received little or no payment 
(beneficiaries of the measures). The measures were positive steps for the beneficiaries but 
retrogressive measures for the victims. Since all components of proportionality are applicable to 
retrogressive measures, the African Commission’s definition of proportionality as balancing is 
confusing.       
The proportionality analysis is not used to evaluate the adequacy of positive steps taken to achieve 
the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, the African Commission and the African 
Court do not apply proportionality for this purpose. To extend the application of proportionality to 
positive steps, particularly when such steps lead to the realisation of rights without interfering with 
the existing level of enjoyment, the African Commission needs to make some modifications to the 
conventional components of proportionality, particularly to the component of necessity. If defined as 
the least restrictive alternative as discussed in Chapter 3, necessity may not be applicable. When the 
Commission assesses the adequacy of steps taken, the preferable alternative is the most effective 
means of achieving the realisation. Therefore, the conventional proportionality analysis requires 
some slight adjustment when utilised to assess positive steps taken to fulfil economic, social and 
cultural rights. With this kind of adjustment, the Commission and the Court can apply proportionality 
analysis to positive steps as well.  
In sum, the Commission and the Court should fine-tune the application of the limitation clause and 
the principle of proportionality. First, they may consider evaluating the suitability of a limitation for 
achieving one of the legitimate goals. The fewer the components, the weaker the justification for 
limitation becomes. The application of the component of suitability requires stronger justification for 
imposing a limitation. Second, they may consider applying all components of proportionality to 
limitations imposed on the right to non-discrimination (Article 2 of the Charter) or on the right to 
equality (Article 3 of the Charter). Third, they may draw on the practice of the European Committee 
of Social Rights, and consider defining retrogressive measures as limitations and assessing the 
compliance of such measures with each component of proportionality. This definition enables the 
Commission and the Court to apply the newly discovered general limitation clause to all rights in the 
African Charter. Finally, they need to make modifications to extend the application of proportionality 
to evaluate the adequacy of positive steps taken to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights.      
7.6 The Nairobi Principles 
The African Charter mandates the African Commission to formulate and lay down principles and rules 
for the purpose of solving legal problems related to human and peoples’ rights in African States. 
Exercising this mandate, the Commission adopted the Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles). The Commission developed the Nairobi Principles based on 
regional and global human rights treaties and the practice of judicial and quasi-judicial organs 
monitoring the implementation of those treaties. The objective of the Nairobi Principles is to assist 
states to comply with their obligations under the African Charter, as clearly stated in the Preamble. 
To achieve this objective, the Commission identifies, defines, classifies and explains state obligations 
corresponding to economic, social and cultural rights, thereby clarifying the content of economic, 
social and cultural rights expressly or impliedly guaranteed in the African Charter. Therefore, the 
Nairobi Principles represent an important contribution of the Commission to the normative 
development of economic, social and cultural rights.  
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The Nairobi Principles address all economic, social and cultural rights expressly and impliedly 
guaranteed in the African Charter. Therefore, the Nairobi Principles are comprehensive, particularly 
when compared with the piecemeal development of the general comments of the CESCR, which 
usually address one right or a single issue at a time. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of cases 
regarding economic, social and cultural rights decided by the Commission is very low. As a result, the 
Commission’s comprehensive interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights has emerged 
from the Nairobi Principles, not from concrete cases. However, one’s point of reference is important 
as noted in Chapter 2. The Nairobi Principles are comprehensive so long as one’s point of reference 
remains the ICESCR and the practice of the CESCR, which are limited to economic, social and cultural 
rights. The African Charter adopts a different model of treaty-making, integrating all rights in one 
treaty, as discussed in the previous chapters. The Nairobi Principles single out economic, social and 
cultural rights under the Charter for separate treatment. Considered from the perspective of the 
integrated framework of rights provided by the Charter, the Nairobi Principles are not only lacking in 
terms of comprehensiveness, but also undermine the interdependence and indivisibility of rights 
embedded in the African Charter.  
By revising the Nairobi Principles, the African Commission may address some of the problems with its 
interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights identified above, namely the 
compartmentalisation of human rights and the narrow conception of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Revision of previous interpretation is not new in the field of human rights. Some United 
Nations human rights treaty bodies regularly update their interpretation by replacing previous 
general comments with new ones. It is also the practice of the African Commission to revise earlier 
interpretations of the Charter. In 2016, the Commission had already decided to revise the 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa. Noting the experiences of other treaty 
bodies and that of its own, the African Commission can revise the Nairobi Principles. To this end, I 
identify specific paragraphs of the Nairobi Principles that should be revised. In the following 
subsections, I divide the paragraphs into five groups based on the topics discussed in the previous 
chapters.  
7.6.1 Progressive realisation 
The Nairobi Principles contain the concept of progressive realisation. Because of the negative 
connotation of the concept discussed above, it is advisable to remove the reference to ‘progressive 
realisation’ from the Nairobi Principles. In particular the Commission should revise paragraphs 13 to 
16. Paragraph 13 states: ‘While the African Charter does not expressly refer to the principle of 
progressive realisation this concept is widely accepted in the interpretation of economic, social and 
cultural rights and has been implied into the Charter in accordance with articles 61 and 62[sic] of the 
African Charter.’ This formulation is problematic for several reasons. First, the Commission overlooks 
the fact that the omission of the concept from the African Charter was intentional, although it is true 
that the Charter does not refer to the concept of progressive realisation. The intention of the drafters 
is clear from the drafting history of the Charter as well as from economic and political interests of the 
African States, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
Second, the Commission’s view that the concept of progressive realisation is ‘widely accepted in the 
interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights’ is misleading in the African context. Economic, 
social and cultural rights treaties that follow the European model of treaty-making, as indicated in 
Chapter 1, expressly recognise the concept of progressive realisation. However, the African Charter is 
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not one of those treaties. Within the framework of the African Union (AU), previously the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African states adopted their own model of treaty-making, which 
departs from pre-existing European model followed by the Council of Europe, the United Nations and 
the Organisation of American States. The acceptance of the concept of progressive realisation does 
not apply to the African Charter unless one denies that African States are sovereign, that they can 
depart from existing models of treaty-making and can adopt their own treaties.  
Third, the Commission mistakenly considers that the concept of progressive realisation ‘has been 
implied into the African Charter.’ Indeed, the Commission has the mandate to adopt concepts 
implied in the text of the African Charter, but not every concept, especially when a particular concept 
was intentionally omitted. Finally, the Commission often cites Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter to 
justify the recognition of legal concepts and doctrines in the African Charter. These provisions 
certainly mandate the Commission to borrow and develop legal concepts and doctrines. However, 
the provisions do not give the African Commission a blank check. The provisions do not empower the 
Commission to change the fundamental nature of state obligations in the Charter. Since Articles 60 
and 61 do not give the Commission a treaty-making power, the Commission lacks the power to 
introduce the concept of progressive realisation into the African Charter.  
Paragraph 14 of the Nairobi Principles provides: ‘The concept of progressive realisation means that 
States must implement a reasonable and measurable plan, including set achievable benchmarks and 
time frames, for the enjoyment over time of economic, social and cultural rights within the resources 
available to the state party. Some obligations in relation to progressive realisation are immediate.’ 
This paragraph is equally problematic. First, Article 1 of the African Charter specifies state obligation 
to give effect to Charter rights including economic, social and cultural rights. Giving effect to the 
rights requires states to take different measures such as the implementation of ‘a reasonable and 
measurable plan, including set achievable benchmarks and time frames.’  However, Paragraph 14 
conveys a different message. The Paragraph gives the impression that the African Charter does not 
require states to take measures unless the concept of progressive realisation is introduced into the 
Charter. Second, the requirement of ensuring the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
‘within the resources available to the state party’ is unnecessary. Obviously, states implement rights 
within their available resources, which are scarce by nature and are distributed unevenly among 
states. Instead, the African Commission could have specified a more helpful requirement. It could 
have underlined the obligation to allocate resources for the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights and the obligation to make the maximum use of the allocated resources.  
Finally, Paragraphs 14 and 16 explain that states have some immediate obligations. Paragraph 16 
states: ‘Despite the obligation to progressively realise economic, social and cultural rights, some of 
the obligations imposed on States parties to the African Charter are immediate upon ratification of 
the Charter.’ Paragraphs 14 and 16 classify as immediate only ‘some of the obligations’, not all 
obligations in the Charter. This dichotomy between obligations of progressive realisation and 
immediate obligations alters the nature of state obligations in the Charter, which does not contain 
such classification or a provision permitting states to postpone their obligations. That is, all state 
obligations in the Charter are immediate upon ratification and continue for an indefinite period. 
Moreover, the performance of immediate obligations over time leads to progress in the realisation of 
the rights in the Charter as it is evident from the mechanism of regular reporting and monitoring 
established by the Charter. The pace of progress may vary from one state to another depending on 
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the context in each state, particularly due to uneven distribution of resources. Therefore, Paragraphs 
14 and 16 should be reformulated.       
7.6.2 Limitation and proportionality 
The African Commission and the African Court have developed a general limitation clause containing 
specific criteria for assessing the proportionality of a limitation, as noted above. The Commission and 
the Court applied these criteria to different rights guaranteed in the Charter. However, the definition 
under the Nairobi Principles does not conform to these criteria. Paragraph 1(g) states that: ‘A 
limitation upon a right, or steps taken positively to protect or fulfil it, will not be proportionate, 
where there is no evidence that the state institutions have balanced the competing individual and 
public interests.’  
Paragraph 1(g) does not contain all the criteria to be complied with when states limit the exercise of 
rights in general. In particular, the requirements of legitimate goals and necessity are obviously 
missing. Moreover, it appears that the Commission seeks evidence relating to whether the 
institutions of a state have examined competing interests. If the Commission finds such evidence, it 
appears, the limitation would be proportional. In other words, the Commission does not need to 
conduct the limitation analysis by itself. In practice, however, the Commission and the Court actually 
evaluate a limitation against specific criteria provided in the newly discovered limitation clause of 
Article 27(2).  
Paragraph 1(g) of the Nairobi Principles uses the term ‘public interests’ to explain limitation and the 
principle of proportionality. Paragraph 1(h) defines public interest as ‘the common well-being or 
general welfare of the population.’  Thus, it is not clear whether all the legitimate goals developed 
under Article 27(2) of the Charter are considered public interests. To avoid such confusion, it is 
advisable to reformulate the definition of the principle of proportionality under Paragraph 1 in line 
with the general limitation clause developed under Article 27(2) of the African Charter.      
7.6.3 Minimum core obligations 
The Nairobi Principles define minimum core obligations and identify their central characteristics. 
Paragraph 17 states that: ‘The minimum core obligation is the obligation of the State to ensure that 
no significant number of individuals is deprived of the essential elements of a particular right.’ This 
paragraph defines minimum core obligation in terms of the number of individuals deprived of the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. This definition is problematic because human 
rights are inherent in each individual. It should not matter whether the number of the deprived is 
significant or not. There should be a violation even when one individual is deprived. Therefore, the 
definition in Paragraph 17 should be modified to reflect the deprivation of each individual.  
Paragraph 17 states that a minimum core obligation ‘exists regardless of the availability of resources 
and is non-derogable.’ The description that minimum core obligations are non-derogable is 
misleading in light of the text of the African Charter and the practice of the African Commission. 
Unlike some human rights treaties, the African Charter does not contain a derogation clause, a 
provision permitting suspension of rights during a state of emergency. Because of the absence of a 
derogation clause, the Commission considers that all rights guaranteed in the African Charter 
including economic, social and cultural rights are non-derogable.  The description of minimum core 
obligations as non-derogable may give the impression that other obligations corresponding to 
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economic, social and cultural rights are derogable. Therefore, it is advisable to avoid describing 
minimum core obligations as non-derogable.  
In addition to the definition and the description, the Nairobi Principles identify elements of minimum 
core obligations relating to each right guaranteed in the African Charter expressly or by implication.  
Paragraphs 59(c) (right to work), 79(a) (right to housing), 86(b-c) (right to food) and 92(c) (right to 
water and sanitation) identify obligations to respect and protect as minimum core obligations. These 
levels of obligations are relevant to individuals who are already enjoying economic, social and 
cultural rights, as discussed above. It would be advisable to put greater emphasis on the obligations 
to fulfil, particularly on the sub-obligation to provide, because the main purpose of identifying 
minimum core obligations is to address a serious deprivation, particularly a total deprivation.  
Minimum core obligations corresponding to the right to work should also be revised. Paragraph 59(a) 
specifies the prohibition of slavery and forced labour as a minimum core obligation. Paragraph 59(b) 
requires states to ensure the right to freedom of association as a minimum core obligation 
corresponding to the right to work. These paragraphs merely reproduce the right to protection from 
slavery (Article 5 of the Charter) and the right to freedom of association (Article 10 of the Charter). 
The right to work under Article 15 of the Charter is a separate right with content different from those 
specified in Articles 5 and 10 of the Charter. Nevertheless, Paragraph 59 redefines the right to work 
as a composite right. Instead, it would be advisable to specify a certain level of employment as a 
minimum core obligation relating to the right to work. This requirement would not be new as the 
African Commission considers certain rates of unemployment a violation of the right to work in its 
concluding observations. 
7.6.4 Equality and non-discrimination 
The equality and non-discrimination provisions of the African Charter are similar to corresponding 
provisions of other human rights treaties. The explanations in the Nairobi Principles are more or less 
consistent with the text of the African Charter. Yet there is still room for improvement. Paragraph 19 
defines discrimination and reiterates the prohibition of discrimination stated under Article 2 of the 
Charter, which contains a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. Paragraph 1(d) 
has expanded the list in Article 2. However, Paragraphs 1(d) and 19 omit one of the grounds listed 
under Article 2. Therefore, it is advisable to maintain the list provided by the Charter.  
The Nairobi Principles explain equality and non-discrimination in separate parts. Under Part II that 
deals with the nature of state obligations under the Charter, Paragraph 19 explains that Article 2 of 
the Charter entails an obligation to protect individuals from discrimination. Under Part III, Paragraphs 
31 to 38 explain that equality is one of the key obligations under the Charter; but it is not clear 
whether this obligation arises from the right to non-discrimination (Article 2 of the Charter), the right 
to equality (Article 3 of the Charter) or the right to equality of peoples (Article 19 of the Charter). It is 
advisable to explain the relationship among these provisions to improve the clarity of the Nairobi 
Principles.  
Paragraph 19 states that the obligation to protect individuals from discrimination is an immediate 
obligation, whereas Paragraphs 31 to 38 do not describe the obligation to achieve equality as 
immediate obligation. These formulations suggest that the obligation to protect individuals from 
discrimination is an immediate obligation while the obligation to achieve equality is not. The binary 
division of obligations under the Charter into immediate and progressive obligations is not helpful, as 
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already suggested above. What is more, the difference between the obligation to protect individuals 
from discrimination and the obligation to achieve equality is not significant, because Paragraph 35 
explains that correcting ‘past and current forms and effects of discrimination’ results in the 
achievement of ‘de facto or substantive equality’ in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights, particularly by members of vulnerable groups. Therefore, it is advisable to clarify the 
relationship between the obligation to achieve equality and the obligation to protect individuals from 
discrimination.              
7.6.5 Participation 
With regard to participation, the problem with the Nairobi Principles arises from treating economic, 
social and cultural rights in isolation, with little attention to the feature of the African Charter relating 
to the indivisibility of human rights. From Paragraph 29 of the Nairobi Principles, it is clear that states 
have the obligation to ensure the effective participation of individuals and groups in the design, 
implementation, monitoring and review of policies and programmes relating to their economic, 
social and cultural rights. It seems from the formulation of Paragraph 29 that the Nairobi Principles 
contain new obligations not envisaged in the Charter. Instead, it is advisable to reformulate 
Paragraph 29 with the emphasis on the instrumental role of realising political rights. Such a 
reformulation is necessary because participation involves the exercise of not only the right to 
participate in the government of one’s country (Article 13 of the Charter) but also the exercise of 
other political rights including freedom of expression and information (Article 9 of the Charter), 
freedom of association (Article 10 of the Charter) and freedom of assembly (Article 11 of the 
Charter).  
Moreover, the Nairobi Principles emphasise the importance of exercising the right to self-
determination as a collective form of participation in the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights. The Principles underline the state obligation to ensure the participation of all peoples; but 
Paragraph 44 of the Principles restricts the obligation to obtain prior informed consent to cases 
where indigenous peoples are the subjects of the right. If the obligation to obtain prior informed 
consent flows from the right to self-determination (Article 20 of the Charter), it should apply to all 
peoples as defined under Paragraph 1(c) of the Nairobi Principles. Therefore, it is advisable to 
reformulate Paragraph 44 accordingly.          
7.7 Topics for further research 
Some topics for further research emerge from the discussions in the previous chapters. In this 
section, I suggest three topics that relate to issues covered in the previous chapters but that require 
further investigation. These topics relate to the submission and examination of state reports, 
remedies and reparations, and accessibility to the African Commission and the African Court. 
7.7.1 Submission and examination of state reports 
In Chapter 2, I identified different meanings of the concept of progressive realisation. Because of one 
of the meanings (that is, the understanding that progressive realisation is a defect in the legal 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights), I argued against introducing the concept into the 
African Charter in the guise of interpretation. The objection is to conceptions that weaken the state 
obligation to improve the level of realisation of all rights guaranteed in the Charter, not to the 
obligation itself. To improve the level of realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, it is 
necessary to enhance the state performance of this obligation. 
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A future line of research may contribute in this regard by identifying ways of strengthening the 
supervisions of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in the African 
Charter. The Charter contains a clear state obligation to report on improvements made in the 
realisation of the rights every two years. States submit their reports to the Commission for 
examination. There are some challenges relating to the submission as well as the examination of 
reports. According to the 2019 Activity Report of the Commission, of the 54 state parties to the 
African Charter only 10 states (less than 20% of the total number of states) have discharged their 
reporting obligations. The majority of states (around 72%) fail to maintain the regularity required by 
the Charter but they have submitted at least one report. Five states have never submitted any 
report. Although there is variation in the degree of performance, it is clear that more than 80% of the 
state parties fail in their reporting obligations. Therefore, a future line of research may study ways of 
improving the submission of regular reports to the Commission.  
The examination of state reports also faces challenges. The reports usually specify and list measures 
taken by states. The Commission identifies areas of concern and makes recommendations. 
Nevertheless, the Commission is unable to evaluate the adequacy of measures particularly in light of 
the level of development of each state. Like any other treaty body, the African Commission needs a 
tool, which is helpful to identify failures of States to discharge their obligations, particularly by 
assessing the allocation and utilisation of resources for the purpose of ensuring the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Scholars and international organisations have made efforts to 
come up with such tools. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
developed human rights indicators.2 Economists have developed the Index of Social and Economic 
Rights Fulfilment (SERF Index) that shows the gap between actual performance of States and their 
potential.3 Achievements of States depend on their resources.  
The African Commission does not use any particular tool for the purpose of examining state reports. 
It is helpful to use tools such as human rights indicators to monitor the realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights under the African Charter. In this regard, future research may investigate how the 
African Commission can adapt tools developed by scholars and international organisations or 
develop its own tool for assessing the adequacy of improvements in the realisation of rights 
guaranteed in the Charter. This line of research may also identify advantages and disadvantages of 
using indicators and indices.      
7.7.2 Remedy and reparation 
In Chapter 4, I examined the obligation to provide a remedy as one of the core obligations identified 
by the CESCR (section 4.3.2.4); but I have not examined the forms of remedies and reparation 
measures at national levels or before regional forums, particularly the remedies and reparations 
ordered by the African Commission. In the Nairobi principles, the African Commission stresses the 
obligation to provide effective domestic remedies in cases of violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights although it does not classify this obligation among the minimum core obligations. 
When states fail to provide domestic remedies, the African Commission and the African Court 
provide remedies as subsidiary mechanisms. Future lines of research may study domestic remedies 
as well as remedies and reparations made by the African Commission and the African Court.   
                                                          
2 Office of High Commissioner for Human Rrights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation 
(2012). 
3 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer & Susan Randolph, Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights (OUP 2015). 
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With regard to effective domestic remedies, Paragraph 21 of the Nairobi Principles underlines that: 
‘A rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond 
the reach of the courts would be incompatible with the principle that human rights are indivisible 
and interdependent.’ The Nairobi Principles stress the obligation to ‘recognise the justiciability of 
economic, social and cultural rights.’ Thus, one line of research may study the extent to which states 
recognise the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights before domestic courts and 
administrative tribunals.    
Another line of research may study international remedies and reparation measures. The African 
Charter does not expressly authorise the African Commission to make reparation orders in cases of 
violations of the economic, social and cultural rights it guarantees. In the absence of a clear mandate 
to order a specific remedy, the African Commission usually limits itself to declaring violations of 
rights and recommends very general remedies. In cases of compensation, the Commission leaves the 
determination of the exact amount to domestic systems. In its recent cases, the Commission has 
begun issuing specific remedies such as predetermined lump sum compensation.4 On the other hand, 
the African Court has a clear mandate to order remedies and to determine the amount.5 While the 
Commission and the Court are refining their jurisprudence on remedies for violations of individual 
rights, neither the African Charter text nor the practice of these bodies address remedies for 
systemic violations involving groups. Thus, future research may examine the remedies available 
under international human rights law in general and how the African Commission and the African 
Court choose to apply those remedies. Such research may also identify remedies appropriate for 
systemic violations of economic, social and cultural rights.  
7.7.3 Accessibility to the African Commission and the African Court 
In Chapter 1, I noted that the African Commission and the African Court have decided a very low 
number of cases relating to economic, social and cultural rights although they have been operating 
for a long period of time. When the Commission was established, there was an expectation that the 
Commission would be flooded with cases alleging violations of economic, social and cultural rights. 
The concern is understandable given the relatively liberal standing before the African Commission: 
any individual or NGO has standing before the Commission, according to its Rules. In addition, the 
low level of enjoyment of these rights in Africa would still give rise to similar concerns. Nevertheless, 
that concern never materialised: the Commission and the Court have never been flooded with cases 
regarding economic, social and cultural rights, even after operating for decades. The low number of 
cases shows that the Commission and the Court have been underutilised. The normative and 
structural problems underlying the underutilisation should be investigated. This future line of 
research may identify the problems and suggest solutions. 
A future line of research may also examine the beneficiaries of litigation in the areas of economic, 
social and cultural rights at the African regional level. Empirical evidence shows that litigation of 
economic, social and cultural rights may not serve its purpose. Litigation usually benefits only the 
middle class, the litigating minority who have access to courts and who are already better off, not the 
                                                          
4 Equality Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) v Federal Republic of Ethiopia Communication 341/2007, 
57th Ordinary Session (4 to 18 November 2015); Mbiankeu Geneviève v Cameroon Communication 389/10, 56th Ordinary 
Session (21 April to 7 May 2015). 
5 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights Adopted on 10 June 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and entered into force 25 January 2004. 
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vulnerable groups who constitute the non-litigating majority. So other actors, particularly NGOs, 
should have access to the African Court, which is relatively inaccessible to individuals and NGOs. 
Thus, future research may investigate ways of improving accessibility to the African Court. An 
important factor for improving accessibility is the availability of funds for that purpose. While the 
Commission requires the provision of legal assistance in domestic courts, it has not dealt with 
financial assistance and its own accessibility. In this regard, it is worth evaluating the decision of the 
African Union to establish funds for the African Court.  
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Summary 
Food, health care, housing and water are basic goods and services necessary to lead a dignified life. 
The main means of accessing basic goods and services are usually property ownership and work, save 
exceptional circumstances where individuals rely on the support of their fellow human being or 
institutions. Since the advent of the United Nations, access to basic goods and services has been 
recognised as economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in international human rights treaties. 
State parties have undertaken the international obligations to give effect to these rights. The treaties 
were adopted within the framework of international organisations. The pioneer is the Council of 
Europe whose model of treaty-making has been replicated first by the United Nations and then by 
the Organisation of American States. The Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) was 
the late comer to the human rights project when it adopted the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), the main human rights treaty of the African Union. The African 
Charter applies to the Continent of Africa, where the implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights is relatively low. 
This research examines the scope of general legal obligations undertaken by states in the African 
Charter, considering the progressive realisation obligation as the principal obligation corresponding 
to the recognistion of economic, social and cultural rights. The research distinguishes the progressive 
realisation obligation from its exceptions, the immediate obligations, which include minimum core 
obligations and non-discrimination/equality. It links the progressive realisation obligation to the 
limitations on economic, social and cultural rights and recognises the the importance of participation 
of individuals and groups in the implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights.  
To examine the general legal obligation of states in the African Charter, the research analyses text of 
the African Charter and findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court), which include 
cases, comments, declarations, guidelines, observations, opinions, principles, reports and 
resolutions. The research draws insights from the text of the Europian Social Charter (European 
Charter),  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),  the American 
Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), and the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San 
Salvador),  and from the practice the Eurpean Committee of Social Rights (European Committee), the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Inter-American Commission), and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American 
Court). 
The research finds that the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter 
envisages broader state obligations than in the European Charter, the ICESCR, and the Protocol of 
San Salvador. It also finds that the African Commission reduces the state obligations by interpreting 
economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter in line with the ICESCR and the practice of 
the CESCR. The Commission imported the concept of progressive realisation without adapting the 
concept to the textual contexts of the Charter and introduced a general limitation clause into the 
Charter. It has interpreted economic, social and cultural rights in isolation, undermining the 
indivisibility of all rights in the African Charter. The Commission and the Court have overlooked the 
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individual right to participate in government of one’s country and the collective right to self-
determination, reducing the state obligation to ensure participation of individuals and groups in the 
implementation of their economic, social and cultural rights only to the rights to property, health, 
and a general satisfactory environment. The research finds that the Commission’s interpretation of 
state obligations in the African Charter is sometimes narrower than the CESCR’s interpretation of 
state obligations in the ICESCR. In particular, the Commission identified fewer minimum core 
obligations compared to those identified by the CESCR as core obligations. While developing a 
general limitation clause under the Charter, the Commission and the Court expanded grounds for 
limiting the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights that are not incorporated in the 
ICESCR.  
The research concludes that the African Commission and the African Court have articulated a narrow 
conception of economic, social and cultural rights. It recommends that the Commission and the 
Court should avoid the interpretation that erodes substantive content of economic, social and 
cultural rights guaranteed in the African Charter. In particular, the research recommends the revision 
of the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi Principles), which contains the major 
interpretation of the Commission. 
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Samenvatting 
Voedsel, gezondheidszorg, huisvesting en water zijn basisgoederen en –diensten die noodzakelijk zijn 
om een menswaardig leven te kunnen leiden. Behoudens uitzonderlijke omstandigheden, waarin 
individuen op de steun van anderen of van de overheid moeten rekenen, kan men deze basisnoden 
vervullen door te werken, of door op een andere manier eigendommen te vergaren. Het 
fundamentele belang van toegang tot deze goederen en diensten, is wereldwijd erkend door de 
formulering van mensenrechten: economische, sociale (en culturele) rechten (ESC rechten) maken 
sinds de Universele Verklaring van de Mensenrechten (1948) deel uit van het arsenaal van universele 
mensenrechten. Staten die partij zijn bij internationale mensenrechtenverdragen in dit domein, 
hebben internationaalrechtelijke verplichtingen om deze rechten ten uitvoer te brengen. Behalve op 
het niveau van de Verenigde Naties, krijgen deze rechten en de bijhorende verplichtingen vorm in 
verdragen die worden afgesloten binnen regionale organisaties. In Europa is dat in de eerste plaats 
de Raad van Europa. Daarnaast is er op het Amerikaanse continent de Organisatie van Amerikaanse 
Staten. Dit proefschrift handelt over mensenrechtenbescherming op het Afrikaanse continent, 
binnen het kader van de Afrikaanse Unie. Het voornaamste mensenrechtenverdrag van de Afrikaanse 
Unie is het Afrikaans Handvest van de Rechten van Mensen en Volkeren.  
Dit onderzoek handelt over de interpretatie van de ESC rechten in het Handvest. Het zoomt met 
name in op de reikwijdte van de algemene statenverplichtingen onder dit verdrag. Het gaat daarbij in 
de eerste plaats om de verplichting  van ‘progressieve verwezenlijking’ van ESC rechten.  Vervolgens 
worden twee algemene verplichtingen onderzocht die gelden als uitzonderingen op het principe van 
progressieve verwezenlijking, omdat ze een onmiddellijk karakter hebben. Dit zijn de ‘minimale 
kernverplichtingen’ en het principe van gelijkheid/non-discriminatie. Daarna komen de 
beperkingsmodaliteiten van ESC rechten aan bod, en tenslotte het belang van de participatie van 
individuen en groepen bij de tenuitvoerlegging van ESC rechten. 
In dit onderzoek wordt de tekst van het Afrikaans Handvest geanalyseerd, samen met de 
bevindingen van de Afrikaanse Commissie voor de Rechten van Mensen en Volkeren, en het 
Afrikaans Hof voor de Rechten van Mensen en Volkeren. Deze bevindingen zijn vervat in diverse 
bronnen: (quasi-) gerechtelijke uitspraken, commentaren, verklaringen, richtlijnen, opinies, principes, 
rapporten en resoluties.  Het onderzoek betrekt ook andere regionale systemen in de analyse, met 
name de interpretatie van het Europees Sociaal Handvest, het Internationaal Verdrag inzake 
Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten (IVESCR), het Amerikaans Verdrag van de Rechten van de 
Mens, en het toegevoegd Protocol bij het Amerikaans Verdrag van de Rechten van de Mens in het 
domein van Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten (Protocol van San Salvador). Daarbij komt 
ook de interpretatieve praktijk aan bod van het Europees Comité voor Sociale Rechten, het VN 
Comité inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten (CESCR), de Inter-Amerikaanse Commissie 
voor de Rechten van de Mens, en het Inter-Amerikaanse Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens. 
Het onderzoek stelt vast de erkenning van ESC rechten in de tekst van het Afrikaans Handvest 
verdergaande overheidsverplichtingen omvat dan deze in het Europees Sociaal Handvest, het IVESCR 
en het Protocol van San Salvador. Het stelt ook vast dat de Afrikaanse Commissie deze 
overheidsverplichtingen reduceert door de ESC rechten in het Afrikaans Handvest te interpreteren in 
lijn met het IVESCR en de interpretatieve praktijk van de CESCR. De Afrikaanse Commissie voerde 
met name het concept van progressieve verwezenlijking in zonder dit aan te passen aan de tekstuele 
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context van het Handvest. Ze introduceerde bovendien een algemene beperkingsclausule in het 
Handvest. De Afrikaanse Commissie interpreteert ESC rechten in isolatie, waardoor ze tekort doet 
aan de ondeelbaarheid van alle mensenrechten in het Afrikaans Handvest. De Commissie en het Hof 
doen bovendien te weinig recht aan het individuele recht om deel te nemen aan het bestuur en aan 
het collectieve zelfbeschikkingsrecht. Hierdoor reduceren ze de overheidsverplichting om participatie 
van individuen en groepen te verzekeren in de tenuitvoerlegging van hun ESC rechten, tot amper drie 
rechten: het eigendomsrecht, het recht op gezondheid en het recht op een aanvaardbaar leefmilieu. 
Het onderzoek stelt vast de interpretatie door de Commissie van de overheidsverplichtingen in het 
Afrikaans Handvest soms enger is dan de interpretatie van de overheidsverplichtingen in het IVESCR 
door de CESCR. In het bijzonder heeft de Afrikaanse Commissie een kleiner aantal minimale 
kernverplichtingen geïdentificeerd in vergelijking met de CESCR. Bovendien hebben de Afrikaanse 
Commissie en het Afrikaanse Hof bij het ontwikkelen van een algemene beperkingsclausule onder 
het Handvest, de gronden voor de beperking van het genot van ESC rechten uitgebreid op een wijze 
die verder gaat dan de beperkingen in het IVESCR. 
Het onderzoek besluit dat de Afrikaanse Commissie en het Afrikaanse Hof een enge interpretatie van 
ESC rechten hebben uitgewerkt. Het formuleert de aanbeveling dat de Commissie en het Hof 
interpretaties zouden vermijden die de inhoudelijke bescherming van de ESC rechten in het Handvest 
eroderen. Meer specifiek beveelt het onderzoek een herziening aan van de ‘Nairobi Principles’ 
(Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights), die de krijtlijnen van de interpretatie van de 
Commissie in deze materie vastleggen.              
 
